Case law

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gladstone

895 F. Supp. 356 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 18, 1995

Clearly, these documents come within the purview of Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), 21 since the supporting affidavits point out that they were kept in the course of Home Federal’s regular business activity. … knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, ... all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified

Ellis v. Varney

19 Mass. L. Rptr. 260 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 22, 2005

Among other equitable orders which the plaintiff also requested were to require the corporation to establish a dividend payment policy and to have the directors replaced by persons independent of the Varney family. … However, the plaintiffs own conduct is not immune from scrutiny, as it was noted in Smith v.

Arivella v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

623 F. Supp. 2d 164 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 8, 2009

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is an appropriate mechanism for raising a statute of limitations defense, “provided that the facts establishing the defense [are] clear on the face of the plaintiffs pleadings.” … Because the plaintiffs in this case qualify for American Pipe tolling, this Court does not have the discretion to otherwise limit the period of time in which they are permitted to file suit.

City of Chicopee v. Sullivan

379 F. Supp. 569 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 1974

The Court, however, repeatedly informed the parties that actual figures were needed to insure the Court’s decision would be clearly reasoned, fully informed, and based upon fact rather than upon an abstract, and perhaps hypothetical … receipts were not required to be deducted from the ‘total amount expended’ by each of the plaintiffs in a given fiscal year, each plaintiff would have substantially greater ‘reimbursable expenditures’ and consequently would qualify

Noone v. Carpenter

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 9, 2022

acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia” who subjects or causes to subject someone “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … Even if this vague reference were sufficient to establish that Noone is a qualified individual with a disability, Noone has failed to provide facts demonstrating that he did not receive adequate medical care based on

Barry v. The Trustees of Emmanuel College

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 8, 2019

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with tenure, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for tenure; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action … Barry was qualified for tenure. Supra Section III(C)(3). Therefore, Prof. Barry has established a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination.

Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Board

34 Mass. L. Rptr. 127 · Massachusetts Superior Court, Suffolk County · Mar 28, 2017

In this context, the opportunity for reclassification, balances the clearly articulated purpose of the legislation to protect vulnerable victims with the also clearly articulated constitutional rights of a sex offender. … And similar to the mother in Erin, Petitioner’s request for reclassification effectively constitutes a “readjudication” of the Board’s initial determination that Petitioner qualifies as a Level 3 sex offender and “implicates

Stegall v. Ladner

394 F. Supp. 2d 358 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 14, 2005

That is clearly not sufficient. … Although Judge Friendly is quite clear that the addition of § 36(b) did not abolish previously recognized implied rights under the ICA, he qualified that finding with the language "other than § 36.”

Mount Auburn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Watertown

55 Mass. App. Ct. 611 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 19, 2002

L. c. 59, § 5, Third, and “coupled with the proportionate exemption rule, was enough to qualify the property for a partial exemption.” The abatement for fiscal year 1994 was $104,311.44. 2. Discussion. A. … A taxpayer has the burden of establishing its right to an exemption, Assessors of Boston v.

Akar ex rel. Akar v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

845 F. Supp. 2d 381 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 8, 2012

Allegedly, Wells Fargo also informed her that she did not qualify for any government assistance programs for the same reason. (Id.). … Therefore, this court recommends that Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings be allowed with respect to Count I. 8 “ ‘TILA requires creditors to disclose, clearly and accurately, all the material terms of consumer

Town of Hingham v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy

433 Mass. 198 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 16, 2001

Utils., 416 Mass. 668, 673 (1993) (“the requirement of ‘reasoned consistency’ . . . means that any change from an established pattern of conduct must be explained . . . … The department stated that “[t]he record clearly demonstrates that if the [plant] were treated as a capital lease on the [c]ompany’s books, [the company’s] debt would no longer meet the indenture requirements, thereby resulting

New York State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Commission

26 F. Supp. 2d 249 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 2, 1998

marketing order that imposes financial obligations upon partially regulated plants for the sale within the regulated area of out-of-region milk constitutes a compensatory payment and that the Compact pooling scheme thus qualifies … HEP-97-001, - 002, -004 & -005, at 15 (“The third and fourth sentences of the condition clearly must be read together.

Hall v. FMR Corp.

667 F. Supp. 2d 185 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 30, 2009

She has clearly demonstrated two of OSGs “ASAP” cornerstones: Accuracy and Passion for Service. Her accuracy has been outstanding and she clearly cares about our Clients. Goulding Aff. at ¶ 119. … Discrimination under Section 1981 To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on race, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) her

Ellis v. Varney

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 394 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 9, 2004

While Linda was clearly not disinterested in this decision, at least two of the remaining three directors were disinterested: Shelley Vincent, III and Jerrier. … Rather, the failure appears to be in the nature of an accounting oversight constituting a mere error of judgment or want of prudence, for which corporate officers and directors are immune from individual liability.

Lamorak Insurance Company v. Certain London Market Company Reinsurers

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 13, 2020

Lamorak, seeking to protect the documents, bears the burden of establishing that they are privileged. Maine v. U.S. DOI, 298 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2002). … The court continued: “[M]aterials assembled in the ordinary course of business . . . or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.” Id. at 30 (quoting Fed. R.

United States v. Rose

914 F. Supp. 2d 15 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 14, 2012

In August 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“the DC Circuit”) challenged the consensus by ruling that the use of GPS tracking for 28 days qualified as a Fourth Amendment search … Such a bright-line rule would also be unworkable in practice: Suppose an officer’s conduct is consistent with the language of a Fourth Amendment rule that a court of appeals announced in a case with clearly distinguishable

Abdelrasoul v. Trustees of Boston University

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 10, 2024

Even if plaintiff could establish that he has a qualifying handicap because his mental impairment “substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) ( … MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which emphasized that courts should not presume irreparable harm unless Congress clearly indicates that a departure from the “long tradition

Mitzan v. Medview Services, Inc.

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 242 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 16, 1999

Concentra established a Voluntary Network Access Program (VNA Program) whereby automobile insurers could access PPO discount information. … However, G.L.c. 176D, §3(2) prohibits false advertising of insurance matters to the public, and is clearly aimed at protecting the public, not insurance companies.

Berg v. Town of Lexington

68 Mass. App. Ct. 569 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 6, 2007

Relying on the definition of “lot” in § 2 of the by-law, the plaintiffs claim that parcels 1 and 2 do not qualify as lots. … The right exists even more clearly [as here] where without improvement the way is impassable and useless.” Guillet v.

Foster v. Hurley

444 Mass. 157 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 28, 2005

We conclude that the personnel director’s affidavit adequately establishes that Foster was the policy’s beneficiary from 1991 to 1999, when the deceased named Hurley as beneficiary. … The Prudential policy does not qualify as such a mutually understood substitute for a policy in effect at the time of the relevant agreement.