The opinion
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
Islam Faisal Muhammad Ibrahim )
Abdelrasoul, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No.
v. ) 24-10988-NMG
)
Trustees of Boston University )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Pro se plaintiff Islam Faisal M.I. Abdelrasoul
(“plaintiff”) seeks a preliminary injunction to restrain
defendant Trustees of Boston University (“BU” or “defendant”)
from refusing to offer him a housing accommodation for his
disability or from failing to renew his graduate residence lease
agreement (Docket No. 3).1 That motion will be denied.
I. Background
A. Facts
Plaintiff has filed a 13-count complaint alleging, among
other things, that defendant discriminated against him under the
1 Plaintiff’s preceding motion for a temporary restraining order was denied,
at least in part, because he did not certify that he gave notice to defendant
or that such notice would have been irreparably harmful (Docket No. 7).
Fair Housing Act, retaliated against him after he threatened to
report the University to the City of Boston and intentionally
inflicted upon him emotional distress. Plaintiff has since
moved to dismiss two counts voluntarily: his claim for
retaliation and his claim for breach of contract, both of which
were filed on behalf of his brother.
According to the complaint, plaintiff is a Ph.D. student at
BU who resides in graduate student housing. In April, 2023,
plaintiff submitted to BU a housing disability accommodation
letter in which he requested to move from a studio apartment to
a one-bedroom apartment for the following academic year.2 He
attached a letter from a clinical psychologist that stated that
his mental health would benefit from the move. BU denied the
request and plaintiff remained in the same studio unit for the
2023-24 academic year.
Nearly a full year later in February, 2024, BU Housing
Services notified plaintiff that it had received a notice of
inspection from the City of Boston and requested that he sign
and return a consent form for the inspection. The form includes
a confirmation that BU can enter the residence even if the
tenant is not present when the city inspector arrives.
2 According to BU, plaintiff repeatedly requested to move from a studio to a
one-bedroom apartment between June, 2022 and February, 2023. It was not
until April, 2023 that he changed his approach and attached a letter from a
clinician.
Recipients were informed of their right to be present during the
inspection. In its email to plaintiff, BU explained that a
resident’s failure to fill out the form could result in a
violation of his or her residence license agreement.
On March 5, 2024, plaintiff responded to the BU Housing
Services email by questioning the wording of the consent form.
He described the form’s warning as a “threat[]” and asserted
that BU had been engaging in “a lot of unfair practices towards
the students since they took over graduate housing”. He
suggested that the form violated policies of the City of Boston,
stated that he would not be “coerce[d]” into signing the form
and threatened to report BU to the City.
On March 11, 2024, plaintiff reported to BU Graduate
Housing that he could not access his lease renewal agreement
online when he tried to renew his lease for the 2024-25 academic
year. BU Graduate Housing responded that he could not renew his
lease because of his non-compliance with section 32 of his
graduate residence license agreement, i.e. failure to provide a
completed inspection consent form. The relevant portion of
section 32 reads:
The City of Boston Inspectional Services and
University have the right to enter for routine
inspections of the Premises. Licensee cannot refuse
entry for Inspectional Services to conduct these
routine inspections during stipulated dates and times
which will be provided with reasonable notice.
In that same email thread, BU confirmed that it would not
accommodate plaintiff’s April, 2023 disability accommodation
request. Although plaintiff attempted to submit a signed
inspection consent form the following day, BU persisted in
declining to renew his residence agreement.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the pending action on April 17, 2024,
roughly three weeks after the Director of BU Housing confirmed
the decision not to renew his lease. BU has informed the Court
that plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint and motion for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the
Massachusetts Housing Court on April 9, 2024.
After denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order, this Court scheduled a hearing on his motion
for preliminary injunction for April 25, 2024, which was
continued by leave of Court, until to May 3, 2024. At that
hearing, defendant alerted this Court that, although the
Massachusetts Housing Court had held a hearing that same day on
plaintiff’s parallel motion for preliminary injunction, the
state judge had scheduled a subsequent hearing for late June,
2024, and informed the parties that he would defer to this
Court’s ruling.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Standard
When seeking a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
establish 1) likelihood of success on the merits, 2) likelihood
of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 3)
that the balance of equities weighs in his favor and 4) that
injunction is in the interest of the public. Winter v. NRDC, 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The first two factors are the most
important. Together Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 32 F.4th
82, 85 (1st Cir. 2022).
B. Application
Plaintiff has failed to establish that a preliminary
injunction is warranted in this case.
i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
First, plaintiff has not established a likelihood of
success on the merits. Count I of the complaint alleges that BU
failed to make a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631. Even if plaintiff could
establish that he has a qualifying handicap because his mental
impairment “substantially limits one or more of [his] major life
activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (emphasis added), he is
unlikely to establish that his accommodation request was
reasonable and necessary, see Summers v. City of Fitchburg, 940
F.3d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 2019). Plaintiff does not explain why a
one-bedroom apartment rather than a studio apartment was
necessary to ensure he had equal opportunity to use and enjoy
his housing.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fare no better. To succeed
on his federal retaliation claim, plaintiff must show a causal
link between his protected activity and the defendant’s adverse
action. McCall v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., 2022 WL 683081, at *3
(11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022).
Plaintiff alleges that BU refused to renew his lease
agreement because he 1) requested an accommodation in April,
2023, and 2) notified BU that he planned to report its improper
inspection request to the City of Boston. Contrary to
plaintiff’s assertions, however, a review of the record suggests
that BU declined to renew his lease because he refused to sign
the aforementioned inspection form. BU risked incurring fines
and penalties if it failed to collect the signed inspection
form.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim brought pursuant to Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 186, § 18 is similarly unlikely to succeed. Even
though there is strong presumption that landlord actions such as
this one are retaliatory unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence, see South Boston Elderly Residences, Inc. v. Moynahan,
91 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 468 (2017), BU is likely to overcome that
presumption because of its purported independent justification
for its decision not to renew plaintiff’s lease (his refusal to
sign a required inspection consent form). Furthermore, it is
not clear that plaintiff actually engaged in protected activity
as defined by the statute.
Plaintiff has also made claims for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress but has proffered
no argument as to the likelihood of success on the merits of
such claims in his pleadings or at oral argument. The Court
accordingly declines to consider them.
ii. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiff, alternatively, has failed to show that he will
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. When
asked why monetary damages would not make him whole at the
motion hearing, plaintiff relied upon the presumption of such
harm for claims pursuant to civil right statutes, i.e. the Fair
Housing Act.
While some courts have historically presumed irreparable
harm in housing and civil rights cases, courts have recently
called into question that presumption in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006), which emphasized that courts should not presume
irreparable harm unless Congress clearly indicates that a
departure from the “long tradition of equity practice” is
warranted. Id. at 391-92 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Ariz.
Recovery Hous. Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 462 F.
Supp. 3d 990, 998 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding, post-eBay, that the
injunction-authorizing provision of the Federal Housing Act does
not mandate presumption). For its part, the First Circuit has
“consistently emphasized the importance of a showing of
irreparable harm in the calculus of injunctive relief.” EEOC v.
Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d 8, 13
(1st Cir. 2002) (“Irreparable harm is an essential prerequisite
for a grant of injunctive relief.”). While the Federal Housing
Act permits private persons to seek injunctive relief, it does
not mandate a presumption of irreparable harm. See 42 U.S.C. §
3613(c)(1).
Even if the Court were to presume irreparable harm that
presumption may be rebutted. Here, plaintiff asks the Court to
presume irreparable harm without further ado, but the Court
declines to do so for a few reasons.
First, plaintiff’s decision to file this lawsuit three
weeks after BU Housing confirmed that it would not let him renew
his lease undermines his claim that he faces imminent and
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. If the
harm plaintiff faced was imminent, he would have filed this
lawsuit immediately after BU Housing confirmed its decision
rather than waiting for three weeks.3
Second, BU has declared that plaintiff may remain in his
current residence until his lease expires in July, 2024 even
though he has purportedly violated his lease agreement multiple
times. That decision similarly undermines plaintiff’s claim of
imminent harm.
Finally, as alluded to earlier, plaintiff has provided no
reason why he cannot rent off-campus housing during the pendency
of this case or why reimbursement for such housing would not
make him whole if he prevails. See Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Harnett, 943 F. Supp. 2d 233, 242 (D. Mass. 2013), aff'd, 731
F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2013).
iii. Balance of Harms and Public Interest
Neither party has addressed the balancing of harms or
the interest of the public so the Court declines to
consider them.
3 The fact that plaintiff was traveling internationally for some portion of
that time does not alter the calculus.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction (Docket No. 3) is DENIED.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated: May 10, 2024