Case law

David E. Matney v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 27, 2014

Greeson was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony against Matney. Greeson, Adams, and other witnesses testified. … To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. 2003).

Jerry Cooper v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 4, 2014

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of Feb 04 2014, 10:19 am establishing the defense of … She clearly and repeatedly stated that Cooper threw the gun in her lap after he panicked when Officer Lichtsinn initiated the traffic stop.

Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Charlene Frierson and Roderick Frierson

49 N.E.3d 1075 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 21, 2016

[13] Empire argues that its policy clearly and unambiguously excluded UM and UIM coverage except in five states, none of which are Indiana, and that Enterprise accordingly paid no premium for UIM coverage … DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. 1999), “that a commercial umbrella policy providing excess automobile liability coverage qualified as ‘an automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability policy’ and insurers

Cagle v. Flick

3 F. Supp. 2d 982 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 30, 1998

Thus, a suit in which a *989 medical provider may claim recovery through subrogation does not qualify. … Clearly, the equities do not weigh in favor of the Flicks.

Monroe Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Langreck

816 N.E.2d 485 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 25, 2004

Langreck, as a student member of IURC, qualified as a named insured under the policy. … Established precedent and scholarly commentary provides that in coverage priority disputes between a primary insurer that purports to be excess in limited circumstances and an insurer who issues a true exeess or umbrella

DeWhitt v. State

829 N.E.2d 1055 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 2005

Here, although DeWhitt moved to dismiss the information, he was clearly beyond the time limit in which to do so. … DeWhitt has not established that his trial counsel's performance was defi-clent.

Collins v. Hall

991 F. Supp. 1065 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 23, 1997

While this purpose is clear, much is unclear: no clearly defined criteria determined whose names would appear on the list; there was no established length of time during which one’s name would remain on the list; no procedure … Ascertaining and applying Indiana law of defamation, along with its privileges, exceptions and immunities, to the facts before the court is hardly “within [the] ‘no brainer’ exception to the duty to relinquish federal jurisdiction

Susan Mwangi and Joe Mwangi v. Nicholas Bobelinski and Classic Seamless Gutter, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 11, 2020

The trial court also stated that it had attempted to connect Susan with the pro bono program in the county, but her income and assets were too high to qualify. Id. at 83. … A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable deductions that may be drawn therefrom.

Sikora v. Fromm

782 N.E.2d 355 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 8, 2003

Thus, upon remand expert medical testimony would be required to establish causation. Id. … Here, unlike the Daub and Schloot cases, Plaintiff's Exhibit Two was admitted *361 following the medical explanations of two qualified experts, Dr. Staub and Dr. Kos-tidis.

Capitol Builders, Inc. v. Shipley

439 N.E.2d 217 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 31, 1982

Two elements must be established to qualify a witness as an expert: *228 1) the subject of the inference must be so distinctly related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of laymen; … Clearly, Tiekie and Rodke, having been engaged in the bricklaying trade for a combined total of nearly fifty years, were qualified to give their opinions as to matters arising in the course of that trade.

LBL Development, LLC v. St. John Plan Commission, Town of St. John, Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 23, 2023

“The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the [legislative body] has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” City of Carmel v. … [38] Therefore, the plain language of the two ordinances establishes that the Council designated R-1 zoning for the Property.

Jones v. State

800 N.E.2d 624 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 19, 2003

An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citing Huffines v. … The statements to the mother did not qualify as present sense impressions. See Jones, 780 N.E.2d at 373.

Farmers' Bank v. Orr

25 Ind. App. 71 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 25, 1899

The proceedings to establish the gravel road described in the complaint were had under the act of April 8, 1885 (Acts 1885, pp. 162-169). … pleadings, (b) Again, it fully appears that appellee remained silent, with a full knowledge of the facts that he thus concealed, and hence, the second element of an estoppel was present, (c) The facts charged in these pleadings clearly

Tippecanoe County Assessor v. D and J Black Second Limited Partnership

Indiana Tax Court · Oct 17, 2025

Nonetheless, the Court also noted that a non-attorney’s expertise in the assessment process does not make them qualified in the practice of law, specifically referencing constitutional claims as a type of issue that qualifies … Some of Grossman’s claims appear to be constitutional in nature and clearly constitute the practice of law.

Tippecanoe County Assessor v. Lawrence L Mock

Indiana Tax Court · Oct 17, 2025

Nonetheless, the Court also noted that a non-attorney’s expertise in the assessment process does not make them qualified in the practice of law, specifically referencing constitutional claims as a type of issue that qualifies … Some of Grossman’s claims appear to be constitutional in nature and clearly constitute the practice of law.

Gross v. Max

906 F. Supp. 2d 802 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 30, 2012

It’s hard to see how the circumstances of this case qualify as particularly extraor *814 dinary or unusual. See, e.g., Janssen v. … Any 'deliberate, clear and unequivocal' statement, either written or oral, made in the course of judicial proceedings qualifies as a judicial admission.”); United States v.

Edgerock Development, LLC v. C.H. Garmong & Son Inc

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 3, 2025

Those same examples are also listed earlier in the statute when establishing which vendors and which work qualify for a lien. … And again, that list mirrors the examples earlier in the statute establishing which vendors and which work qualify for a lien.

Kiel Brothers Oil Co. v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management

819 N.E.2d 892 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 2004

An administrative decision should be reversed only if it is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … In addition, with respect to the owner or operator's contribution under the Indiana Act, the Indiana Legislature has established the ELTF.

TUCKER v. ASCENSION HEALTH ALLIANCE, INC.

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 8, 2019

To establish a prima facie case, “a plaintiff must show that: (1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] applied for and was qualified for an open position; (3) despite [her] qualifications, [she] was rejected … Tucker has established her prima facie case. See dkt. 40 at 16 (“Ms. Tucker was qualified for some of the job openings, but as to those openings her claims still fail because she cannot demonstrate pretext.”)3.

Larry E. Jaggers v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 3, 1998

of the information had not been established). … However, Leon cautioned that certain police conduct would not qualify for this exception, including where (1) the magistrate is “misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was