Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • McLaughlin v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co.

    196 Wash. 2d 631 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 10, 2020

    III Our case law also establishes that when determining the meaning of undefined terms in an insurance policy, we look to the expectations of the average insurance purchaser. … That definition clearly and unambiguously excludes those travelling by car or cycle. This should resolve the only issue currently before the court.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • In Re Rosier

    105 Wash. 2d 606 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 10, 1986

    Rosier clearly raised the burden of proof issue in both his responsive pleading and trial brief. … It had never occurred to us that they were not, and now we had the opportunity to establish a precedent of substance.

    Cited 171 timesPublished
  • Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission

    91 Wash. 588 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 20, 1916

    Indeed, our statute is in these features the least qualified that can be found. … Obviously and clearly the qualifying “in the course of em.ployment” does not apply to “on the premises.” Had that been intended, the arrangement was natural and easy.

    Abrogated in part by Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853 (1995)Cited 111 timesPublished
  • Lincoln & Leslie Beauregard, Appellants/cross-respondents v. Anna Riley, Respondent/cross-appellant

    Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 24, 2019

    Riley filed a motion to strike the declaration of Anderson, contending Anderson was not qualified as an expert and her opinion was based on speculation. … Cause in fact is established by showing that "but for" the defendant's breach, the plaintiff's alleged injury would not have occurred. Boquch, 153 Wn. App. at 609.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Gray v. Pierce County Housing Authority

    123 Wash. App. 744 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 31, 2004

    PCHA clearly does not fall within the ambit of RCW 59.18.040(1). … The Grays gave up all claims to attorney fees when they settled with PCHA, leaving Gibson as the only class member qualifying under the fee-shifting provisions of RCW 59.18.290(1).

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • DEVELOPMENT SERV. OF AMERICA v. Seattle

    138 Wash. 2d 107 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1999

    This constitutes an unconstitutional extension of governmental power beyond established police power boundaries. 2. … City of Seattle, 108 Wash.2d 369, 378 , 739 P.2d 668 (1987), we qualified "such preference to property owners is only warranted to the extent ambiguity exists."

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • In Re Estate of Gallagher

    35 Wash. 2d 512 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 23, 1950

    Superior Court, 23 Wn. (2d) 357, 161 P. (2d) 188 , are clearly distinguishable on their facts. … That was the diagnosis established at that time.’ ” On the other hand, both Robert and his wife testified that he was mentally competent.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • In re the Personal Restraint of Morris

    189 Wash. App. 484 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 13, 2015

    Feldman clearly qualified as an expert. … Feldman could not establish the timing of the injury. 122 ¶65 Morris also asserts that if trial counsel had used the studies available on the issue of lucid intervals, “she could have established through Dr.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lumber Co.

    146 Wash. 543 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 10, 1928

    All franchises, liens, licenses, easements, rights, privileges or immunities appertaining to the property or properties of the company or connected with the business of the company above mentioned and any and all extensions … This mortgage covered generally a vast mechanical establishment.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • State v. Thomason

    Washington Supreme Court · Jul 7, 2022

    He asked for a total of 12 months, which he implied was equivalent to the amount of time he would have served if he had qualified for drug court. Id. at 8-9. … I also agree that Thomason has not established a downward departure is otherwise justified.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Hunter

    102 Wash. App. 630 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 18, 2000

    But we find that the legislature clearly contemplated the payment of drug fund contributions. … Furthermore, we do not think that this task is more appropriately accomplished by another branch because the judiciary is uniquely qualified, by virtue of knowing the facts of each case, to determine whether to impose a drug

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • State v. Clausing

    147 Wash. 2d 620 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 24, 2002

    The word “physician” is not qualified by “licensed” in the pattern instruction. 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 55.03, at 693 (2d ed. 1994) (WPIC). … Clausing’s only defense—the existence of a valid prescription—and relieved the State of the burden of establishing the “no prescription” element beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Cited 96 timesPublished
  • Card v. All City Bail Bonds

    District Court, W.D. Washington · Nov 13, 2024

    The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it. See 24 United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). 1 B. Mr. … Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). 10 For that reason, any amended complaint must clearly identify the defendant(s), the claim(s) 11 asserted, the specific facts that Mr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • In re Recall of Lauser

    Washington Supreme Court · Feb 26, 2026

    This is well documented in the police report and Fitzgerald presents no facts to establish otherwise. … The recall petition is legally insufficient because it does not state with specificity facts to allege Lauser’s conduct clearly violates RCW 9A.88.010.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter

    139 Wash. 2d 81 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1999

    The effect of the sanction on the attorney (sanction must not be clearly excessive); 4. … Given Dann and Haskell, Boelter clearly misrepresents the precedent in this area.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • In re the Marriage of Pape

    93 Wash. App. 96 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 20, 1998

    But such interpretation invites parenting plan modifications that conflict with the Legislature’s clearly stated policy of serving children’s best interests by fostering continuity of parent-child relationships and stability … Throughout the Parenting Act the Legislature has repeatedly made clear that the paramount concern is the best interests of the child, not the convenience of parents, in both the establishment and modification of parenting

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • M.L. v. craigslist Inc

    District Court, W.D. Washington · Apr 25, 2022

    An interactive computer service provider acts as a developer rather 20 than a publisher or speaker, and thereby does not qualify for § 230 immunity, “if it 21 contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct … Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits have interpreted [Section 22 230] to establish broad [] immunity[.]”). 1 records on its website

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Hamlin v. Merlino

    44 Wash. 2d 851 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 17, 1954

    It is a well settled principle that separate property continues to be separate through all of its changes and transitions as long as it can be clearly traced and identified; furthermore, that rents, issues, and profits from … Something more is required to establish the separate character of the property concerned. We stated in Berol v.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • Estevez v. Faculty Club of the University of Washington

    129 Wash. App. 774 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 28, 2005

    The burden is on the moving party to establish its right to summary judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Kahn, 90 Wn. … Thus, we hold that the Club does not have “meaningful conditions of limited membership” sufficient to qualify it for a “bona fide private club” exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2).

    Cited 51 timesPublished
  • Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc.

    308 F. Supp. 2d 1208 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Jul 30, 2003

    Courts have more briefly summarized the test in the trademark context: to prevail at the preliminary injunction phase, Plaintiff “must establish that it is likely to be able to show ... a likelihood of confusion.” … The mere fact that Defendant uses comparative advertising, however, does not immunize it against claims of infringement. See Lindy Pen Co. v.

    Cited 10 timesPublished

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