Case law

La Lomia v. United States General Services Administration (In Re Art Metal, U.S.A., Inc.)

109 B.R. 74 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 13, 1989

The foregoing quotes from the 88 Annual Report and the 1990 Budget reflect clearly that none of the money utilized by the PBGC comes from the government (except as investment income). … As the Court stated, “the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit except where it has consented to be sued.” Id. at 1197 .

Sacks Realty Co. v. Batch

235 N.J. Super. 269 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 24, 1989

Nevertheless plaintiff has not evinced any ill-will or bad faith towards the tenants which even remotely would qualify as evidence that this action is a reprisal. … First, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.13 et seq. clearly and convincingly applies only to tenancies located in Atlantic City.

Hall v. St. Joseph's Hosp.

343 N.J. Super. 88 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 25, 2001

According to Shepard-Kegl, the three requirements of a qualified ASL interpreter are accuracy, confidentiality, and impartiality. … It is best for the qualified interpreter *1008 to be someone with no vested interest in the proceedings.

IANNUZZELLI v. ALLIANCE HC II LLC

District Court, D. New Jersey · Nov 8, 2022

that: (1) Defendants should be collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues; (2) the PREP Act does not preempt state law negligence claims; (3) there is no significant federal issue; and (4) Defendants do not qualify … § 247d-6d(c)(1)(B), which clearly indicates the intent to separate negligence from willful-misconduct claims.

D.S. v. Board of Education

188 N.J. Super. 592 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 15, 1983

The Education Act, however, is not silent on what qualifies as a free appropriate public education (FAPE). … The State Board tells us that, prior to enactment of the state regulation, responsibility for the maintenance of residentially-placed handicapped children was not clearly defined and varied by district and school.

C.R. VS. M.T. (FV-08-0021-19, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 13, 2019

This doctrine requires our conclusion that the qualifying phrase applies only to "other substance" and not "intoxicant." … voluntarily – may support a finding that the victim could not consent, we consider the level of intoxication required to support such a finding. 6 It is 4 To be sure, the Legislature could have made this point more clearly

CUEVAS v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY

District Court, D. New Jersey · May 20, 2021

Instead, municipal courts are “established, maintained, and directed solely by the municipality.” N.J.S.A. 2B:12–1. … (Id. at 3-6 (discussing, inter alia, the Municipal Court’s placement in the state judicial system and issues of immunity, judicial independence, and control).)

United States v. Sandlass

34 F. Supp. 81 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 17, 1940

The defendant has established the fact that the physical use of the right of way to the extent of forty feet has never existed. … The government as conceded by defendant cannot be penalized for its inactivity, and that immunity remains intact. The contention that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law has not been pressed.

Fred Krug v. New Jersey State Parole Board

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 11, 2025

Supreme Court precedent, “simply labeling a law ‘procedural’ . . . does not thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause.” … established law, the government may impose clearly established penalties.

Ffc, Ltd. v. New Jersey State Dol

316 N.J. Super. 437 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 2, 1998

Our Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[a] construction that will render any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless, is to be avoided." State v. … We have previously recognized that the Prevailing Wage Act is remedial legislation entitled to liberal construction to effectuate the public policy of this State to establish a prevailing wage level for workmen engaged in

Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.

107 F. Supp. 199 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 7, 1951

It was unable to show a conspiracy to establish a monopoly. … A contention to that effect is clearly out of harmony with the fundamental purposes of the act, and specifically with the prozñsion of section 22 authorizing the Board to investigate any violation of the act upon complaint

State v. Kane

335 N.J. Super. 391 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 30, 2000

Whatever else may be said, we are convinced that a medical diagnosis of a broken nose does not necessarily qualify the harm committed as "serious bodily injury" under NERA. … But even assuming that such injury was established, the transcript is barren of evidence indicating that the victim's condition was protracted, prolonged or extended in time.

In Re Civil Commitment of RZB

392 N.J. Super. 22 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 9, 2007

That intention is not consistently established by the record, given R.Z.B.' … R.Z.B. argues that the federal offenses for which he was convicted do not qualify as predicate convictions under the SVPA.

Webber v. McCormick

63 N.J. Super. 409 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 21, 1960

Plaintiff's testimony concerning the accident and the immediate and obvious injuries she suffered, corroborated by the testimony of the passenger in her car, together with the testimony of her doctor, established the causal … involving issues of fact not determined by a jury, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the trial judge to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly

Matter of Estate of Schock

226 N.J. Super. 67 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 14, 1988

Wickham established a "marital trust" for his wife, Mary S. Wickham, consisting *69 of 50% of the value of his adjusted gross estate. A sizeable amount was involved. Mrs. … The United Jersey Bank qualified as Executor thereunder. Her estate is valued in excess of $3,600,000. [2] Federal estate taxes will be assessed at a rate of about 53%.

Riverside General Hospital v. New Jersey Hospital Rate Setting Commission

98 N.J. 458 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 20, 1985

Stated simply, the Amendment establishes a three-step system for the setting of hospital rates. . … At the hearing a representative of Riverside testified that in 1979 Riverside was having trouble attracting qualified workers.

State v. Guice

262 N.J. Super. 607 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 14, 1993

Stevens Institute does not rise to the level of significant public use as established in Schmid and developed in later cases. … They were not told of an Ohio immunity statute which deprived them of the privilege. The Court found a due process violation.

Sarris v. AA Pruzick & Co.

37 N.J. Super. 340 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 11, 1955

The one: "The evidence as I see it, now clearly indicates that this defendant company had no control whatsoever over the electrician, who was supplied by it to the plaintiff's employer. … When light is used for construction purposes, a qualified electrician — that is a union agreement — a qualified electrician has to be on the premises to maintain and to furnish — by `furnish' I mean run any wires if necessary

McClellan v. Larchar

45 N.J. Eq. 17 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · Feb 15, 1889

It clearly does not affect any disposition the complainant may be desirous of making, by deed, during her life. … That such an expression implies a power of sale is established by abundant authority. In Attorney-General v.

D'Ercole v. MAYOR & COUNCIL, ETC.

198 N.J. Super. 531 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 16, 1984

preceding assessment roll thereof, in which case such ordinance shall remain inoperative until a proposition for the ratification thereof shall be adopted, at an election to be held for that purpose, by a majority of the qualified … The statute does not define what is meant by "any indebtedness" but it clearly excludes an indebtedness involving "current" expenses.