CUEVAS v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RYAN CUEVAS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 20-17555 (SDW)(LDW)

v. OPINION

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CITY OF

JERSEY CITY, and THE

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE May 20, 2021

COURTS OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court are Defendants the State of New Jersey and the Administrative Office of

the Courts of New Jersey’s (the “State Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 11-1) and Defendant

the City of Jersey City’s (“Jersey City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 13-

1) Plaintiff Ryan Cuevas’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”)) pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). This opinion is issued without oral

argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated herein, the State Defendants’ Motion is

GRANTED, and Jersey City’s Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a deaf individual who communicates primarily in American Sign Language

(“ASL”). (Compl. ¶ 11.) On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff received a parking ticket and a summons

to appear before the Municipal Court of New Jersey in Jersey City (“Municipal Court”). (Id. ¶

12.) On November 20, 2019, Plaintiff received a mail notice that his hearing had been rescheduled

to January 22, 2020. (Id. ¶ 13.) In advance of this hearing, Plaintiff made a payment on the parking

ticket and called the Municipal Court to request an ASL interpreter. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff was

told that he would “need to appear in court on January 22, 2020 and request an interpreter.” (Id. ¶

15.) On the scheduled date, Plaintiff appeared for his arraignment and no interpreter was provided

by the Court. (Id. ¶ 17.) As a result, the hearing was rescheduled to March 4, 2020. (Id.)

A week prior, Plaintiff had received a letter stating that the Motor Vehicle Commission

(“MVC”) intended to suspend his registration unless a $100 “restoration fee” was paid, because

he had “failed to present proof of liability insurance.” (Id. ¶ 16.) In early February, Plaintiff

returned to the Municipal Court to request reinstatement of his license pending his postponed

arraignment hearing. (Id. ¶ 19.) Again, he was not provided an interpreter. (Id.)

Over the next few months, Plaintiff had additional calls (conducted through a Video Relay

Service) with the Municipal Court to attempt to understand what an arraignment was, why no

interpreter had been provided to him, and how to ensure an interpreter would be present at his

rescheduled arraignment. (Id. ¶¶ 20–22.) On one such call, Plaintiff was told that “he must show

up . . . to ask the Judge for an ASL interpreter,”1 and that he “cannot request an interpreter in

advance, [because] only the Judge can request an interpreter.” (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) At the hearing on

March 4, 2020, after waiting for an hour, Plaintiff was passed a note that stated “We do not have

a sign language inter. Sorry we must reschedule.” (Id. ¶ 22.)

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff then endured months of additional delays. (Id.

¶¶ 22–24.) At a virtual hearing on August 5, 2020, Plaintiff was eventually able to access an ASL

1 The Complaint references both a March 4, 2020 and April 1, 2020 date but it is unclear if there is a typo, or if two

dates were provided to Plaintiff by the Municipal Court. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 21 (discussing the ”upcoming March

4, 2020 hearing” and stating that Plaintiff “must show up on April 1, 2020”); 23 (stating that the “April 1, 2020

hearing was postponed to May 6, 2020”).)

interpreter, and the judge presiding over the hearing “waived Plaintiff’s restoration fees and

reinstated the suspended license.” (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) It took additional phone calls and visits to courts

and agencies to lift the suspension, clear the restoration fee, and reinstate the license. (Id. ¶¶ 28–

30.)

On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff brought this action. (Id.) The Complaint alleges the

following claims: (I) Violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (all Defendants); (II) Violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (all Defendants); and (III) Violations of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5–1, et seq. (Jersey City). (Id. ¶¶ 40–72.) On February

5, 2021, the State Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) the

Municipal Court is not a program provided by the state, and, therefore, the State Defendants are

not responsible for providing interpreters and (2) the Municipal Court’s employees are not state

employees. (D.E. 11-1.) On February 26, 2021, Jersey City also moved to dismiss the Complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted because he had not “establish[ed] that he was excluded from any service, program, or

activity because of his disability.” (D.E. 13-1 at 1.) All briefing for the State Defendants’ Motion

(D.E. 14, 15, 16) and Jersey City’s Motion (D.E. 18, 19) was timely filed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint

must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d

Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket assertion, of an

entitlement to relief”). In considering a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may

be entitled to relief.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (external citation omitted). However, “the tenet

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Iqbal standard).

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Defendants’ Motion

Pursuant to Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity,2 or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, the RA states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a

disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program

or activity3 receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Accordingly, “[t]he same

standards govern both the RA and the ADA claims.” See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion

2 The ADA defines “public entity” as “any State or local government” and includes “any department, agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State ... or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)–(B).

3 The RA defines “program or activity” as the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or of a local government” or “the entity of such State or local government that distributes

such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the

assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1).

Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013). To state a claim under either act, Plaintiff must prove

that (1) he is an individual with a disability as defined by the statutes; (2) he is otherwise qualified

to participate in the program at issue; and (3) he was precluded from participating in the program

or receiving its services or benefits because of his disability. CG v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Educ.,

734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir.)).

First, as discussed in detail in Ali v. City of Newark, a city Municipal Court “is not a

‘program’ provided by the State Defendants under New Jersey state law.” Civ. No. 15-8374, 2018

WL 2175770, at *4 (D.N.J. May 11, 2018). The crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that the

Municipal Court repeatedly failed to provide him with an ASL interpreter.4 (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 15,

17–22, 25–26, 32.) As the State Defendants do not operate the Municipal Court, employ the

Municipal Court’s staff, or manage its interpreter services, they cannot be held liable under the

ADA or RA for these programs’ failures. See Ali, 2018 WL 2175770, at *4 (“This is because State

Defendants do not establish, fund, provide resources to, maintain, or direct the day-to-day

operations of municipal courts in New Jersey, like the [Jersey City] Municipal Court.”). Instead,

municipal courts are “established, maintained, and directed solely by the municipality.” N.J.S.A.

2B:12–1. For these reasons, the Municipal Court’s programs and policies are local, rather than

4 On March 1, 2021, Jersey City filed a letter asking this Court to refrain from dismissing the State Defendants, alleging

that the Complaint “makes several allegations against employees of the Administrative Office of the Courts” and the

MVC. (D.E. 15 at 2.) However, as noted by Plaintiff’s counsel, “the City mistakenly alleges that the ‘Administrative

Office of the Court’ referenced” in the Complaint “is ‘the Administrative Office of the Court, which is an agency of

the State,’” when that term actually refers to the “Municipal Court’s administrative office.” (D.E. 18 at 9.)

As for the reference to the MVC, two paragraphs in the Complaint, (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30), describe an employee who

“informed plaintiff that his license was still suspended and that he was required to pay a restoration fee,” (D.E. 15 at

3). These paragraphs do not allege that Plaintiff asked for an interpreter at the MVC or suggest that the agency

committed any illegal act. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.) Nor do any of the specific enumerated causes of action mention the

MVC. (Id. ¶¶ 40-70.) Plaintiff’s plausible ADA and RA claims are based on the Municipal Court’s failure to provide

him with an ASL interpreter as an accommodation—not his frustrating trip to the MVC. (Id. ¶¶ 2 (discussing “repeated

requests for an interpreter”), 32 (“Despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to arrange an ASL interpreter in advance of the

scheduled hearings, the Municipal Court’s employee declined to take steps to provide the requested

accommodation.”), 37 (“Defendants’ policy – whether formal or informal – of not arranging an interpreter prior to the

judicial proceeding results in a failure of their legal duty to make timely, reasonable accommodations.”).)

state-run, under the ADA and RA. To the extent that there is any overlap between state and local

entities in running the Municipal Court, the ASL interpreter services that Plaintiff was denied are

clearly provided locally.5 Ali, 2018 WL 2175770, at *5 (collecting cases); Chisholm v.

McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2001).

Second, the Ali opinion directly addressed the question of whether New Jersey municipal

court employees are state employees, answering it in the negative. Ali, 2018 WL 2175770, at *5;

see also N.J.S.A. 2B: 12–10(a) (“A county or municipality shall provide for an administrator and

other necessary employees for the municipal court and for their compensation.”). Nothing in the

parties’ briefing suggests a reason to depart from Ali’s conclusion on this point, which is further

reinforced by state law. (See also Compl. ¶ 6 (acknowledging that “the City of Jersey City employs

the administrative staff of the [Jersey City6] Municipal Court”).) Therefore, the claims raised

against the State Defendants must be dismissed.

B. Jersey City’s Motion

As for Jersey City’s Motion, Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient to survive dismissal. The

Complaint adequately alleges that Plaintiff is an individual with a disability, was otherwise

5 Despite being represented by an attorney who took part in the Ali case and, seemingly, chose not to appeal its

outcome, Plaintiff spills much ink arguing that the Ali court erred. (See, e.g., D.E. 14 at 2.) Plaintiff relies on various

pre-Ali cases to argue that the Municipal Court somehow transcends its funding and statutory origin to become a state

entity. (Id. at 3-6 (discussing, inter alia, the Municipal Court’s placement in the state judicial system and issues of

immunity, judicial independence, and control).) However, the Ali court considered similar arguments and rejected

them, stating that it was “not convinced” that “the State Defendants retain some control” simply “because the

municipal courts are part of the state court system,” and concluding that access to the “Municipal Court is not a

program provided by State Defendants.” Ali, 2018 WL 2175770, at *4. This Court agrees with the Ali court’s

reasoning.

Plaintiff also makes statutory arguments regarding the RA and ADA’s language. However, the fact that the statutes

provide for either state or local liability is irrelevant to whether the State Defendants are properly named in this case.

(D.E. 14 at 8.) The statutes do not transform the Municipal Court into a state entity—that question has already been

decided by issues of funding, state and local law, and legal precedent.

6 This Court assumes that any references to the Newark Municipal Court are typos. (See Compl. ¶ 6.)

qualified to participate in a public program, and was denied the benefits of that program or was

discriminated against because of his disability. See Chambers, 587 F.3d at 189.

Despite Jersey City’s suggestions to the contrary, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he

suffered a cognizable wrong under the ADA, RA, and NJLAD7, even though he may not have

been wholly “excluded from” the Municipal Court. (See D.E. 13-1 at 8, 12, 13 (seeming to argue

that Plaintiff was not wronged because he was never outright “denied” an interpreter), 14 (seeming

to defend the use of handwritten notes as adequate forms of communication to individuals with

hearing impairments), 15 (suggesting that Plaintiff was always treated with “courtesy”).) Here,

the Complaint plausibly alleges that Plaintiff was subjected to “shame, anxiety, frustration,

emotional distress, fear,” “humiliat[ion],” and “discrimination” due to the Municipal Court’s

failures to provide an interpreter. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–38.) In addition, the Complaint alleges that

Plaintiff endured undue delay due to the Municipal Court’s “failure . . . to make timely, reasonable

accommodations.” (Id.) Accepting the version of events articulated in the Complaint as true,

Plaintiff clearly states a plausible claim to relief, by asserting that he was not provided the same

access to the Municipal Court as an individual without a hearing impairment.

CONCLUSION

The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 11) is GRANTED, and Jersey City’s

Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 13) is DENIED. An appropriate Order follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.

7 Title II’s principles, which are “interpreted consistently” as to the ADA and RA, “apply equally to … NJLAD

claims.” Chin v. Rutgers, 697 F. App’x 751, 754 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315,

324 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001)).