Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Hi-Way Dispatch, Inc. v. United States

    858 F. Supp. 880 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 21, 1994

    Clearly then, the parties understood that summary judgment would be the Court’s vehicle for deciding the case. … To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.W. (Minor Child) and A.H. (Mother) and D.W. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 28, 2020

    App. 2020) (holding drug test results qualify as business records), trans. not sought, and In re A.B., 133 N.E.3d 754 (Ind. Ct. … In light of the applicable clear and convincing evidence standard, we review to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and whether the findings clearly and convincingly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Fryback v. State

    272 Ind. 660 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 5, 1980

    This witness was clearly qualified from a professional viewpoint; he stated among his several conclusory statements on at least one occasion after having been given the substance of the Hill test that in his opinion appellant … There is no hint of establishing any type of administrative remedy for policyholders. In fact they are not mentioned.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Payne v. State

    854 N.E.2d 7 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 31, 2006

    Seldin's "testimony" that Payne introduced evidence to establish that she was naive and very susceptible to being influenced. … At trial, Carter, a State's witness, refused to testify despite being offered use immunity and being ordered to testify by the trial court.

    Cited 44 timesPublished
  • Watkins v. State ex rel. Van Auken

    151 Ind. 123 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 26, 1898

    counties, as caused the' location and construction of the drain so sought; that during the summer of the year 1895 said drain, so constructed, became obstructed and in need of repairs, *125 when the relator, then being the qualified … Transposing such of these provisions as relate directly to the question in hand, it is clearly provided that under whatever law a drain is constructed, it is the duty of the surveyor of the county in which the proceedings

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Christina Armstrong v. Katherine Armstrong

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 6, 2025

    We may reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief establishes prima facie error. Id. … We do not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Estate of Owen v. Lyke

    855 N.E.2d 603 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 20, 2006

    She asserts Owen's appointment of trustees for the property diminished her rights in the "clearly stated life estate." 5 (Br. of Appellee at 7-8.) … The language ... clearly conveys the testatrix's intent to give [her son] the opportunity to buy the farm[.]").

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Yoon v. Yoon

    687 N.E.2d 201 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 21, 1997

    The findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, i.e., if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. … Sunsook objected on the ground that Jay was not qualified to provide expert testimony and the trial court sustained the objection.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Black v. Dept of Child Sevices

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 26, 2021

    Plaintiff has responded (ECF No. 20), arguing that her most recent complaint establishes jurisdiction. … Had Plaintiff’s first amendment only removed the minor’s identifying information, it might not qualify as an amendment for the purposes of Rule 15(a). But see Rogers v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • DUNLAP

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 2, 2026

    Dunlap was not subject to an objectively serious condition, they were not deliberately indifferent to the risk of asbestos exposure, and they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. … immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Robert Lewis III v. State of Indiana

    34 N.E.3d 240 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 17, 2015

    Wilkes, as I said, clearly makes it clear that the Court consider these things. … You clearly have the same option as the jury. THE COURT: Okay. Mr.

    Cited 41 timesPublished
  • The Estate of Robert Curtis, Sr., by its Personal Representative Theresa Brady v. Geico Geneeral Insurance Company

    71 N.E.3d 1157 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 2017

    Standard of Review [7] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well established: We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable … App. 1993) (finding that a passenger’s random act of violence did not qualify for coverage); Miller v. Loman, 518 N.E.2d 486, 492-93 (Ind. Ct.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • National Supply Co. v. Stranahan

    161 Ind. 602 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 7, 1904

    was by the lower court appointed the receiver of the two companies hereinbefore named, and duly qualified as such receiver. . … Especially is this true where, as in this case, it is clearly disclosed by the plain language of the act that it would be unreasonable to accord to it any other construction or interpretation than that given to it in the

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Baer v. State

    866 N.E.2d 752 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 22, 2007

    Rather, here first the defense, and then in response the State, each tried to enhance the role and responsibility of the jury for a result that might be more vulnerable to or more immune from appellate modification. … Packer does not, however, purport to announce a list of foundational requirements for establishing consent under the IWA.

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Michael Litton v. Jason Baugh

    122 N.E.3d 1034 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 2019

    A judgment is also clearly erroneous when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. … The court, in its discretion, may honor the infant’s or incompetent’s choice of next friend or guardian ad litem, but the court may deny approval or remove a person who is not qualified.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Newby v. State

    701 N.E.2d 593 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 30, 1998

    of establishing probable cause. … Thus, some showing that the informant did not possess illusions of immunity might well be essential. Id. (citations and parentheticals omitted).

    Cited 52 timesPublished
  • J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., and Terry L. Brown, Jr. v. The Guardianship of Kristen Zak (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 18, 2018

    Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing FILED the defense of res judicata, collateral … While the TPIS sets forth the requirements to ensure that a party qualifies for prejudgment interest, it does not contain the requirement that a request for prejudgment interest be filed prior to judgment

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Maritta Freeman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 20, 2018

    [8] In addressing this contention, we note that the admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the logic … Accepting for argument’s sake that this qualifies as a startling event, we must determine whether Freeman was under the stress of excitement caused by the event when she made the statement at issue.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re the Adoption of: N.I.D. (Minor Child), and C.C. (Mother) v. R.P. and K.P.

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 15, 2020

    Whether such placement qualifies as “custody of the child” could be argued. … C.C. argues that R.P. and K.P. did not qualify as nonagency guardians.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re the Marriage of: Amy Steele-Giri v. Brian K. Steele

    51 N.E.3d 119 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 15, 2016

    Additionally, there is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). … However, the GAL qualified her statement by stating she “would never suggest that a child be placed [in Mother’s home] because there is more money available.” (Id.)

    Cited 150 timesPublished

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