“If the [natural-parent] presumption is rebutted, then the court engages in a general ‘best interests’ analysis.”
How later courts described this case
- “If the [natural-parent] presumption is rebutted, then the court engages in a general ‘best interests’ analysis.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
Nov 06 2025, 8:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Christina Armstrong,
Appellant-Petitioner
v.
Katherine Armstrong,
Appellee-Respondent
November 6, 2025
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-JP-971
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court
The Honorable Michael T. Bohn, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-2001-JP-27
Opinion by Judge Scheele
Judges Brown and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JP-971 | November 6, 2025 Page 1 of 9
Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Christina Armstrong (Grandmother) and her daughter, Katherine Armstrong
(Mother), shared custody of Mother’s child, I.A. (Child). In 2023, both women
petitioned the trial court for sole legal and primary physical custody of Child.
The trial court ultimately found in favor of Mother, and Grandmother now
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the court’s modification of custody.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother is the biological mother of Child, and Grandmother is Child’s maternal
grandmother. After Child was born in March 2018, he and Mother lived with
Grandmother. In January 2020, Mother “had a mental health breakdown” and
briefly stayed in a mental health facility. App. Vol. II p. 65. At that time,
Grandmother filed a petition seeking custody of Child. Soon after, Mother and
Grandmother entered an “Agreed Entry on Custody” which was accepted by
the trial court. Id. at 66. The agreement gave them both joint legal and physical
custody of Child. Mother and Child continued to live with Grandmother.
[3] For the next three years, Mother and Grandmother “jointly cared for [Child.]”
Id. Grandmother watched Child while Mother worked and “took the lead” in
many of the caretaking tasks in Child’s life, including scheduling doctor’s
appointments and deciding which school Child would attend. Id. Grandmother
also typically paid for Child’s school supplies, extra curriculars, and provided
his health insurance.
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[4] In 2023, the relationship between Mother and Grandmother began to
deteriorate. Mother moved out of Grandmother’s house, initially staying with a
friend and later acquiring her own apartment. On March 10, Grandmother filed
a petition to modify custody, requesting that she be given sole legal and primary
physical custody of Child. In her petition, Grandmother asserted in part that
“there has been a substantial change in circumstances that warrants a
modification of legal and physical custody of” Child. Id. at 26. Mother then
filed her own petition also requesting custody be modified and that she receive
sole legal and primary physical custody of Child.
[5] A hearing was held in December 2024. At the hearing, Mother testified she no
longer had issues with her mental health, had obtained a two-bedroom
apartment, and had worked as a certified nursing aide and later a qualified
medication aide for almost three years. After the hearing, the trial court issued
an order awarding sole legal and primary physical custody of Child to Mother.
Grandmother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Grandmother challenges the trial court’s modification of custody of Child. As
an initial matter, we note that Mother has not filed an appellee’s brief. “When
an appellee fails to file a brief, we do not develop an argument on the appellee’s
behalf.” Romero v. McVey, 167 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We may
reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief establishes prima facie
error. Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the
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face of it.” Riggen v. Riggen, 71 N.E.3d 420, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation
omitted).
[7] “Child-custody determinations fall squarely within the discretion of the trial
court, and we reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” In re Paternity of L.J.,
223 N.E.3d 716, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Where the trial court enters findings
and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, we determine (1) whether
the evidence supports the findings and (2) whether the findings support the
judgment. Id. We do not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly
erroneous. Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the
witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id.
[8] A party seeking a change of custody must show that (1) modification is in the
best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one or more of
the factors laid out in Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-2.5. Ind.
Code § 31-14-13-6 (1999). Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2 (2002) provides that
the trial court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parents;
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(B) the child’s siblings; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest.
(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.
If the court finds “by clear and convincing evidence that the child has been
cared for by a de facto custodian[,]” the additional factors enumerated in
Section 31-14-13-2.5 should also be considered in determining whether to
modify custody. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.5 (1999).
[9] However, where a third party (including a de facto custodian) seeks to modify
custody in favor of the third party rather than the natural parent, our courts
engage in a three-step analysis. Matter of A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1140 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2024); see also In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001), trans. denied. First, the “natural parent seeking to modify custody
has the burden of establishing the statutory requirements for modification by
showing modification is in the child’s best interest, and that there has been a
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substantial change in one or more of the enumerated factors[.]” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v.
J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 2009). However, “as a practical matter this is
no burden at all.” Id. The first requirement—best interests—is “met from the
outset,” as there is a “‘strong presumption that a child’s interests are best served
by placement with the natural parent.’” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of B.H.,
770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002)). As to the second requirement, the burden is
“minimal” given a substantial change in any of the statutory factors—including
a change in the parent’s wishes for custody—suffices. Id. In short, “when
custody is at issue between a third party and a natural parent, we begin with the
presumption in favor of the natural parent.” A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d at 1140.
[10] Second, the third party may then rebut this presumption by showing clear and
convincing evidence “that the child’s best interests are substantially and
significantly served by placement with another person.” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at
287. Although not an exhaustive list, evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption may include the parent’s (1) present unfitness, (2) long
acquiescence in the third party’s custody, or (3) voluntary relinquishment or
abandonment of the child “such that the affections of the child and third party
have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar and
endanger the future happiness of the child.” Id.
[11] If the third party rebuts the parent presumption, the trial court proceeds to the
third step. A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d at 1141. The third party must demonstrate that,
based on the relevant custody statutes, a substantial change occurred and that
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the child’s best interests are substantially and significantly served by placement
with the third party. Id.
[12] In sum, to modify custody in favor of Grandmother here, the court
was required to begin with the presumption in favor of [Mother],
[Child’s] natural parent. Then, in the second step, the trial court
was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that the
natural-parent presumption was overcome. Lastly, if the trial
court so found, the trial court was required to find, also by clear
and convincing evidence, that, based on the relevant custody
statutes: (1) a substantial change occurred, and (2) modifying
custody was in the [Child’s] best interests.
Id. (emphasis added).
[13] Here, the trial court determined Grandmother failed to rebut the natural-parent
presumption in favor of Mother. Grandmother does not argue this was
erroneous. Rather, she argues that the trial court—notwithstanding the
presumption—should nonetheless have gone on to the third step and
determined whether a substantial change occurred and that the modification
was in Child’s best interests under Sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-2.5.
[14] We disagree. As detailed above, the court engages in a three-step analysis when
determining whether to modify custody in favor of a third party against a
natural parent. In the first step, as the trial court did here, we presume Child
should be placed with Mother. Second, we determine whether Grandmother
has rebutted this presumption by showing “that the child’s best interests are
substantially and significantly served by placement” with her. B.H., 770 N.E.2d
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at 287. The trial court found Grandmother failed to do this, and she does not
challenge this finding.
[15] At this point, the analysis ends, as only if the presumption is rebutted does the
trial court continue to the third step. See L.J., 223 N.E.3d at 720 (“If the
presumption is rebutted, then the trial court engages in a best-interests analysis
using the factors in Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-2.5.”);
A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d at 1141 (“If the third party overcomes the natural-parent
presumption, the trial court proceeds” to the next step and determines whether
the third party showed there was a substantial change and modification was in
the child’s best interests); In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001) (“If the [natural-parent] presumption is rebutted, then the court
engages in a general ‘best interests’ analysis.”), trans. denied.
[16] Accordingly, the trial court did not, and indeed was not required to, determine
whether Grandmother sufficiently showed a substantial change occurred and
that the modification was in Child’s best interests under Sections 31-14-13-2
and 31-14-13-2.5. Grandmother has not persuaded us that the trial court abused
its discretion by modifying custody of Child in favor of Mother. 1
1
Grandmother also contends the trial court erred in “reject[ing] Grandmother’s claim of de facto custodian
status.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. But the trial court made no determination as to whether Grandmother was a de
facto custodian because Grandmother did not rebut the natural-parent presumption. As explained above, this
is consistent with the analysis laid out in K.I., in which the best-interests factors under Sections 31-14-13-2
and 31-14-13-2.5—including whether there is a de facto custodian—are analyzed only if the natural-parent
presumption is rebutted.
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[17] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Bryan L. Ciyou
Ciyou & Associates, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Anne M. Lowe
Fugate Gangstad Lowe, LLC
Carmel, Indiana
PRO SE APPELLEE
Katherine Armstrong
Edinburgh, Indiana
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