Case law

Burgdorfer v. Thielemann

153 Or. 354 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 18, 1936

One of the reasons leading to this conclusion is that the purpose of such oral testimony is not to establish an agreement, but to prove fraud. … that in this action, where all the facts are alleged, and it is charged in effect that the defendant fraudulently prevented the consummation of the original contract in order to deprive plaintiff of his commission, it was clearly

State v. Langley

214 Or. 445 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 19, 1958

Suppose that the district attorney knew that a gambling establishment was in operation in a particular building, but did not know who the proprietor of the establishment was. … In maldng an investigation he qualifies himself to make and swear to the information.” In Speer v.

PacifiCorp v. North Pacific Canners & Packers, Inc.

District Court, D. Oregon · Feb 3, 2023

Priority under § 507 “is to be strictly construed” because “preferential treatment of a class of creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by Congress.” … creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by Congress.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc.

325 Or. 55 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 20, 1997

. *61 The text of ORS 734.640(1) does not clearly reveal whether it applies to a workers’ compensation recovery. … ORS 656.593 does not guarantee that all of Bird’s judgment for damages will be reduced to “proceeds.” 13 ORS 18.410 provides, in part: “(1) This section establishes a procedure to obtain a satisfaction for a judgment for

De Jaray v. Lattice Semiconductor Corporation

District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 6, 2022

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). … ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 556 (2014) (describing immunity from antitrust liability); see also Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg.

Wells v. Oregon Ry. & N. Co.

15 F. 561 · District Court, D. Oregon · Mar 19, 1883

An allegation will not be expunged from a bill as impertinent unless its impertinence clearly appears; for if it is erroneously struck out the error is irremedial. Story, Eq. Pr. § 267. … In answer-to the applications for the injunctions the defendants filed the affidavits of their respective managers; but neither of these contradict or qualify the facts here stated, except in one particular.

DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

District Court, D. Oregon · Apr 7, 2025

In enacting the FRSA, Congress did not clearly express an intent to preclude ADA claims. … There is clearly no ‘intolerable conflict’ between the two statutes.”).

State v. White

341 Or. 626 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 9, 2006

The state argued that the foregoing holding in Barnum established “unequivocally that separate convictions are appropriate when the entry and remaining are done with intent to commit different crimes.” … Subsection (2) clearly is irrelevant to the present case: There is no claim that defendant’s criminal conduct was directed against more than one victim.

Justice v. Rockwell Collins, Inc.

117 F. Supp. 3d 1119 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jul 22, 2015

First, plaintiff cannot establish the third element. … Aug. 20, 2014) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C, § 1981 claim where they were “clearly not parties to any contract [with the defendant] based on the allegations in the second amended complaint”).

Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc.

730 F. Supp. 1525 · District Court, D. Oregon · Feb 15, 1990

Each of these statutes qualifies as a racketeering activity under both RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1), and ORICO, O.R.S. 166.715(6). … In this case, TFC does not clearly allege that Richmark was enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of its position in Ever Bright or its involvement in or control over the affairs of Ever Bright.

Kelsey v. Cain

District Court, D. Oregon · Apr 20, 2020

Gulick and Hemphill were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs and, further, are entitled to qualified immunity. … Gulick and Hemphill are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s claim against Superintendent Cain fails because no reasonable juror could find that Mr.

Oregon Research Institute, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

4 Or. Tax 433 · Oregon Tax Court · Jun 25, 1971

The court finds plaintiff qualified as a scientific institution entitled to property tax exemption under ORS 307.130 as to real or personal property “owned or being purchased” by it. 2. … For the court to hold that the plaintiff was “purchasing” the subject property would be a decision based upon mere speculation and not the facts established before the court.

Berger Farms v. First Interstate Bank

148 Or. App. 33 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 7, 1997

Casey, 487 US 131, 138 , 108 S Ct 2302 , 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1988) (recognizing that states may establish procedural rules governing litigation in their own courts). … Inclusion of the phrase “district court” in section 4, and omission of that same qualifying language in section 3, indicates that Congress intended section 3 to apply in state courts. See Russello v.

Oxley v. Linnton Plywood Ass'n

205 Or. 78 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 25, 1955

Defendant’s common stock was to be sold only to persons who could qualify as members of the association, such qualifications being that they would be engaged in the production of defendant’s products. *82 On February 24, … By the use it made of the Bubidew report, defendant clearly adopted it as its own. Therefore, it forms an integral part of an admission against interest by the defendant.

Dep't of Human Servs. v. T. L. B. (In re K. C. P.)

294 Or. App. 514 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 24, 2018

As we will explain, we conclude otherwise: The evidence presented at trial clearly and convincingly establishes that terminating mother's parental rights is in K's best interests. … Instead, an arrangement that would accommodate a continuing relationship with his mother was clearly within that child's best interests. Id. at 504 , 356 P.3d 1135 .

Reyes v. Washburn

District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 26, 2025

With respect to his specific claims, Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ disability discrimination claims on the grounds that he fails adequately to plead facts to establish that he has a qualifying disability and that Defendants … ’ argument that Reyes failed to allege a qualifying disability.

Columbia Riverkeeper v. Caswell, Jr.

District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 7, 2025

As such, the Levee and Refinery Harms do not "lie at the end of a highly attenuated chain of possibilities but [are] rather a credible threat that qualifies as an actual and imminent harm." … First, if a taking occurred, the opinion "carrie[d] with it the assurance of immunity[,]" and the absence of such opinion "raise[d] the potential of liability[.]" Id.

State v. White

341 Or. 624 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 9, 2006

The state argued that the foregoing holding in Barnum established "unequivocally that separate convictions are appropriate when the entry and remaining are done with intent to commit different crimes." … Subsection (2) clearly is irrelevant to the present case: There is no claim that defendant's criminal conduct was directed against more than one victim.

Hoge v. Washburn

District Court, D. Oregon · Feb 12, 2024

A plaintiff may also qualify for a preliminary injunction by showing that there are serious questions going to the merits of his claim and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, so long as the other Winter … Importantly, and particularly relevant to this case, a request for a mandatory injunction seeking relief well beyond the status quo is disfavored and shall not be granted unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving

Pereida-Alba v. Coursey

356 Or. 654 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 15, 2015

Rather, the post-conviction court ruled in its letter opinion that “no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have made the choice complained about in the post-conviction proceeding.” … The court explained that, “[i]f the store employees are to be believed, there was clearly a Robbery I. If the peti- tioner in this case is believed there was at most a Robbery III and maybe only a Theft.”