Reyes v. Washburn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JUAN MANUEL REYES, Case No. 2:21-cv-01175-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

SUSAN WASHBURN et al.,

Defendants.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Juan Manuel Reyes (“Reyes”), an adult in custody (“AIC”) of the Oregon

Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution (“EOCI”),

filed this action against several ODOC officials alleging constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) and various violations of state and federal law.

Previously, the Court granted in part and denied in part Reyes’ motion for leave to file a

fourth amended complaint. (See ECF Nos. 86, 88; see also ECF No. 92, granting Reyes leave to

amend his fourth amended complaint.) On February 5, 2025, Reyes filed a “revised” fourth

amended complaint, asserting ten claims against the following ODOC officials: David Pedro

(“Pedro”), J. Walker (“Walker”), T. Stewart (“Stewart”), Portia Villers (“Villers”), Mindy

Johnson (“Johnson”), Y. Rangel (“Rangel”), Amy Wray (“Wray”), Heather Nevil (“Nevil”), J.

Oblisk (“Oblisk”), Melissa Harvey (“Harvey”), and M. Leddy (“Leddy”) (together,

“Defendants”). (See generally Fourth Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 93.) Now before the Court

is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reyes’ FAC.

The Court has jurisdiction over Reyes’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367,

and all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’

motion.

BACKGROUND1

In the FAC, Reyes asserts the following ten claims:

(1) a First Amendment claim based on Rangel’s alleged refusal to return to Reyes a

letter Reyes prepared and printed to send to his attorney (see FAC at 8-9);

(2) an Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that Defendants prohibited

Reyes’ physical activity and exercise during the COVID-19 (“COVID”)

pandemic (see id. at 9-10);

(3) an Eighth Amendment claim based on Defendants’ alleged refusal to wear masks

during COVID (see id. at 11-12);

(4) First and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on Defendants’ alleged deletion of

documents from Reyes’ thumb drive in retaliation for Reyes helping other AICs

with legal work in June 2022 (see id. at 12-13);

1 Reyes pleads these facts in his fourth amended complaint, and the Court assumes they

are true for the purpose of deciding this motion. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d

992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe

them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”).

(5) a First Amendment claim based on Defendants’ alleged discipline of Reyes

and confiscation of his legal materials in retaliation for writing a letter to his

attorney in March 2023 (see id. at 13-14);

(6) First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on allegations that

Defendants disciplined Reyes, confiscated his legal materials, and prevented him

from sending documents to an attorney relating to his post-conviction relief case

(see id. at 14-18);

(7) a First Amendment claim based on Defendants’ alleged refusal to print, copy, or

mail Reyes’ documents in retaliation for him writing letters to state officials and

sharing legal information with other AICs (see id. at 18-19);

(8) a First Amendment claim based on Defendants’ alleged refusal to print, copy, or

mail Reyes’ documents in retaliation for Reyes filing complaints, grievances, and

lawsuits (see id. at 19-23);

(9) a First Amendment claim based on allegations that Defendants fined and

sanctioned Reyes in retaliation for helping another AIC prepare post-conviction

relief documents (see id. at 23-27); and

(10) First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on Defendants’ alleged

discipline of Reyes in retaliation for helping other AICs with legal work in

February 2024 (see id. at 27-32).2

2 Reyes also includes sporadic references to disability discrimination statutes. (See, e.g.,

FAC at 4, “[E]ach Defendant knowingly and willfully acted under the Color of State Law

violating Plaintiff’s civil rights under the State of Oregon and United States Constitution

including the provisions of [the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)], [and the

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)] stated in section I against a qualified disabled U.S. citizen and

military veteran”; id. at 35, “Plaintiff requests that [Defendants] . . . investigate pursuant to 28

CFR § 35.172 for any ADA/RA violations against defenseless . . . [AICs] in Oregon prisons[.]”)

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ claims against the individual defendants in their

official capacities on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims. (See Defs.’

Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 5-6, ECF No. 97.) Defendants also move to dismiss portions of

Reyes’ FAC against specific defendants on the ground that Reyes fails to allege facts supporting

that those defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. (See id. at

6-8.) Defendants further move to dismiss Reyes’ claims based on alleged violations of the

Oregon Constitution on the ground that those claims are not cognizable. (See id. at 12.)

With respect to his specific claims, Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ disability

discrimination claims on the grounds that he fails adequately to plead facts to establish that he

has a qualifying disability and that Defendants discriminated against him because of his

disability. (See id. at 8-12.) Defendants also move to dismiss Reyes’ first claim against Rangel

on the ground that the statute of limitations bars that claim. (See id. at 12-13.) Defendants move

to dismiss Reyes’ second claim on the ground that Reyes fails adequately to plead facts

demonstrating that any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. (See id. at 13-16.)

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ third claim on the ground that Reyes’ claim is

duplicative of his claim in another case. (See id. at 16-17.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6),

a plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

DISCUSSION

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of eight court filings: (1) the

Court’s Findings and Recommendation (“F&R”) dated October 31, 2023 (ECF No. 65); (2) the

order adopting the Court’s F&R dated January 30, 2024 (ECF No. 76); (3) the Court’s F&R

dated November 15, 2024 (ECF No. 86); (4) the order adopting the Court’s F&R dated

December 12, 2024 (ECF No. 88); (5) Reyes’ original complaint (ECF No. 2); (6) Reyes’

amended complaint (ECF No. 18); (7) Reyes’ second amended complaint (ECF No. 42); and (8)

the complaint in Alcalacarrillo, et al. v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., et al., No. 3:22-cv-00487-SB (D. Or.

filed Mar. 30, 2022) (“Alcalacarrillo Complaint”). (See Defs.’ Mot. at 5.)

A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United

States v. Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1103 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Robinson

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also

Abdulaziz v. Twitter, Inc., No. 21-16195, 2024 WL 4688893, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2024)

(taking “judicial notice of court filings in other proceedings related to th[e] case” (citing Aguilar,

782 F.3d at 1103 n.1)). Courts may also take judicial notice of court dockets. See Mendocino Ry.

v. Ainsworth, 113 F.4th 1181, 1186 n.2 (9th Cir. 2024) (granting request to take judicial notice of

a state court docket). Furthermore, a “court . . . may take judicial notice on its own.” FED. R.

EVID. 201(c)(1).

The Court denies as unnecessary Defendants’ requests for judicial notice of filings and

pleadings from this case. Specifically, Defendants’ first seven requests relate to filings and

pleadings from this case’s docket, which the Court may consider without taking judicial notice.

See Chaffey Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. FieldTurf USA, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-00204, 2017 WL

3048658, at *2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2017) (“The Court may of course take judicial notice of

filings and pleadings on its own docket, . . . [b]ut such requests are unnecessary; Defendants may

cite directly to the docket[.]” (first citing FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2); and then citing Colodney v.

Orr, No. 5:14-cv-01973, 2015 WL 1636818, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015), aff’d, 651 F. App’x

630 (9th Cir. 2016))).

As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice on its own of the Alcalacarrillo

docket. See Mendocino Ry., 113 F.4th at 1186 n.2 (granting request to take judicial notice of a

state court docket). With respect to Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the

Alcalacarrillo Complaint, the Court denies that request as irrelevant because it is no longer the

operative pleading. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 348-63, Alcalacarrillo, No. 3:22-cv-00487-SB (D.

Or. filed Aug. 2, 2022) (“Alcalacarrillo FAC”). The Court takes judicial notice of the

Alcalacarrillo FAC. See FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(1) (“The court . . . may take judicial notice on its

own.”) The Alcalacarrillo FAC reflects that Reyes is a plaintiff in that case and asserts an Eighth

Amendment claim against several ODOC officials including Pedro, alleging that the defendants

failed to protect AICs from COVID. (See Alcalacarrillo FAC.)

II. OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ claims against all of the defendants in their official

capacities on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 5-

6.) As the Court has explained, “the Eleventh Amendment bars Reyes’ claims for damages

against individual defendants in their official capacities.” Reyes v. Washburn, No. 2:21-cv-

01175, 2024 WL 5091756, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2024) (citing Reyes v. Washburn, No. 2:21-cv-

01175-SB, 2023 WL 9470076, at *2 n.3 (D. Or. Oct. 31, 2023), findings and recommendation

adopted, 2024 WL 343481 (D. Or. Jan. 30, 2024))), findings and recommendation adopted, 2024

WL 5090701 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2024). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Reyes’ claims for

damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

III. PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

Defendants move to dismiss several of Reyes’ claims against specific defendants on the

ground that Reyes fails to allege that each of the defendants was personally involved in the

alleged constitutional violation. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 6-8.)

A. Applicable Law

Under Section 1983, an official may only be liable “when culpable action, or inaction, is

directly attributed to them.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, A

defendant may be held liable under Section 1983 based on “either (1) his or her personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. at 1207 (quoting Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A supervisor need not be physically present or

“directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who are on the

scene inflicting constitutional injury.” Id. at 1205 (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d

630, 645 (9th Cir. 1991)).

B. Analysis

With respect to Reyes’ first claim, Defendants move to dismiss all of the defendants other

than Rangel on the ground that Reyes fails to allege facts supporting that any of the other

defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. (See Defs.’ Mot. at

7.) The Court agrees.

Specifically, within his first claim, Reyes only identifies and alleges facts relating to two

individuals, Rangel and a non-party. (See FAC at 8-9.) Thus, the Court dismisses all of the

defendants except Rangel from Reyes’ first claim because he fails to allege facts supporting that

those defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.3 See Swanson

v. Dep’t of Just., No. 6:22-cv-01304-MK, 2022 WL 19693710, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2022)

(dismissing the self-represented litigant’s complaint where the plaintiff “failed to describe facts

sufficient to demonstrate [two defendants’] personal involvement in a specific constitutional or

statutory violation”), findings and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3168696 (D. Or. Apr. 28,

2023), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 4910182 (9th Cir. June 28, 2023).

Reyes responds that Rangel’s supervisors, “Legore” and “Washburn,” are also implicated

in his first claim because they reviewed and signed Rangel’s allegedly falsified misconduct

report. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”) at 7, ECF No. 103.) Reyes, however, fails

to include allegations relating to Legore and Washburn in his operative FAC and fails to name

those individuals as defendants. (See generally FAC; id. at 4-5, listing the named defendants.)

Thus, to the extent Reyes’ FAC can be construed as asserting claims against Legore and

Washburn, the Court dismisses those claims.4 See Reyes, 2024 WL 5091756, at *3-4 (denying

leave to amend Reyes’ only claims implicating Legore, Neistadt, and Washburn). Further, to the

extent Reyes’ FAC can be construed as asserting his first claim against any defendant other than

Rangel, the Court dismisses those claims because Reyes fails to allege specific facts relating to

how those individuals were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. See

Flores v. Brown, No. 3:23-cv-00462-SB, 2025 WL 777582, at *9 (D. Or. Feb. 14, 2025)

3 As further explained below, the Court dismisses Reyes’ claim against Rangel on the

ground that it is untimely.

4 The Court dismisses Andrea Neistadt for the same reasons. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 3, 16, 18,

35-36, referring to Neistadt; see also FAC, not naming as a defendant or including factual

allegations against Neistadt.)

(dismissing claims against several ODOC officials “because [the plaintiff] ‘has not specified in

his pleadings any facts suggesting [each defendant]’s personal involvement in an alleged

constitutional violation’”) (citations omitted), findings and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL

775794 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2025).

For the same reason, the Court dismisses Reyes’ remaining claims as follows:

• Claim II against all defendants except Pedro, Walker, and Stewart;5

• Claim III against all defendants;6

• Claim IV against all defendants except Villers and Johnson;7

• Claim V against all defendants except Villers, Johnson, Oblisk, and Nevil;

• Claim VI against all defendants except Oblisk, Villers, and Johnson;

• Claim VII against all defendants except Johnson, Villers, and Wray;

• Claim VIII against all defendants except Johnson, Villers, and Wray;

5 Reyes “concede[s] that no other named Defendants were part of this particular negligent

action against him.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 7.)

6 In his response, Reyes clarifies that he intended to assert his third claim against Pedro,

Walker, and Stewart. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 9, “Defendants Pedro, Walker and Stewart [had] direct

links and cause of this flood gate being opened into a closed and vulnerable population and

environment.”) For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Reyes has failed adequately

to allege facts supporting that Pedro, Walker, and Stewart were personally involved in the

alleged constitutional violation or subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm. See Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe

the risk.”) (simplified); Flores, 2025 WL 777582, at *9 (dismissing claims against several

ODOC officials “because [the plaintiff] ‘has not specified in his pleadings any facts suggesting

[each defendant]’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation’”) (citation

omitted).

7 Reyes clarifies in his response that he “does not accuse Bolles in this particular incident

as she was no longer an EOCI employ[ee] at that time.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 10.) In light of the fact

that Reyes does not identify Bolles in any of his other claims and fails specifically to name

Bolles as a defendant in his FAC (see FAC at 5), the Court dismisses Bolles.

• Claim IX against all defendants except Villers, Johnson, Harvey, and

Leddy; and

• Claim X against all defendants except Nevil, Villers, and Johnson.

IV. OREGON CONSTITUTION

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ claims based on alleged violations of the Oregon

Constitution on the ground that “no private right of action exists for violations of the Oregon

Constitution and Reyes did not plead a claim under the Oregon Tort Claims Act.” (Defs.’ Mot. at

12, quoting Reyes v. City of Hillsboro, No. 23-35106, 2025 WL 586363, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 24,

2025).) The Court agrees and, to the extent the FAC can be construed as asserting claims based

on alleged violations of the Oregon Constitution, dismisses those claims on the ground that

Reyes fails to state a cognizable claim. See Reyes, 2025 WL 586363, at *1 (“[N]o private right of

action exists for violations of the Oregon Constitution and Reyes did not plead a claim under the

Oregon Tort Claims Act.” (citing Hunter v. Eugene, 787 P.2d 881, 884 (Or. 1990))).

V. PLEADING DEFICIENCIES

A. Federal and State Disability Discrimination Claims

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ federal and state disability discrimination claims on

the grounds that he fails to allege a qualifying disability or that any defendant discriminated

against him because of that disability. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 8-12.) Reyes responds that he suffers

from several qualifying disabilities, including “Long COVID.” (See Pl.’s Resp. at 20-23.)

1. Qualifying Disability

With respect to Reyes’ alleged disability, the Court previously granted Reyes leave to

amend to assert his disability discrimination claims and rejected Defendants’ argument that

Reyes failed to allege a qualifying disability. See Reyes, 2024 WL 5091756, at *5-6 (“Construing

Reyes’ FAC liberally, . . . the Court concludes that Reyes’ proposed amendment is not futile.”).

Specifically, “[i]n his FAC, Reyes include[d] additional allegations that he suffers from ‘medical

issues that have been and still are being treated for the major side effects of contracting COVID-

19, twice, and the administered vaccines and boosters” and Reyes also “include[d] allegations

about his ongoing medical issues that he alleges are associated with ‘Long COVID.’” Id. The

Court found that Reyes’ allegations were sufficient to support a reasonable inference that he

suffered from a qualifying disability based on his “long-term COVID-19 symptoms[.]” Id.

(citation omitted). Defendants argue that Reyes’ revised FAC “differed from the proposed FAC”

that the Court previously analyzed and that “Reyes does not allege that he suffers from Long-

COVID in the [revised] FAC.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 10.)

The Court disagrees. Specifically, in Reyes’ motion for leave to file an amended

complaint, Reyes alleged that he has “been and still [is] being treated for the major side effects of

contracting COVID-19, twice, and the administered vaccines and boosters.” (Reyes’ Mot. Leave

File Fourth Am. Compl. (“Reyes’ Mot.”) Ex. 1 at 4, ECF No. 80-1); see also Reyes, 2024 WL

5091756, at *5 (“In his FAC, Reyes includes additional allegations that he suffers from ‘medical

issues that have been and still are being treated for the major side effects of contracting COVID-

19, twice, and the administered vaccines and boosters.’ Reyes also includes allegations about his

ongoing medical issues that he alleges are associated with ‘Long COVID.’”).

Similarly, in the revised FAC, Reyes alleges that he has “been and still [is] being treated

for the major side effects of contracting COVID-19, twice, and the administered vaccines and

boosters.” (FAC at 4.) Thus, consistent with its previous finding, the Court finds that Reyes’

allegations support a reasonable inference that he suffers from long-term COVID symptoms,

which can be a qualifying disability. See Brown v. Roanoke Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 586 F.

Supp. 3d 1171, 1176-77 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations that “she was

COVID-19 positive, that she suffered from severe weakness, fatigue, brain fog, high blood

pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, fever, and swollen eyes” were sufficient to establish a

disability for her ADA claim, in part because Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

guidance stated that more severe, long-term COVID symptoms can be considered a disability);

cf. Baum v. Dunmire Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00964, 2022 WL 889097, at *5 (D. Colo.

Mar. 25, 2022) (finding that the decedent’s fifteen-day COVID illness did not qualify as a

disability under the ADA because “the common theme in th[e] regulatory guidance is that

COVID-19 may be a disability when it is long-term—lasting for months—not when it is acute”)

(citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reyes’ disability

discrimination claims on the ground that Reyes fails to allege that he suffers from a qualifying

disability.

2. Discrimination

With respect to Defendants’ argument that the Court should dismiss Reyes’

discrimination claims on the ground that he fails sufficiently to allege facts supporting that

Defendants discriminated against him because of his alleged disability, the Court agrees.

As the Court previously explained, “each of [Reyes’] disability discrimination claims

requires a showing of discrimination because of a qualifying disability[.]” Reyes, 2023 WL

9470076, at *11 (citations omitted). Reyes alleges that his legal work was “an activity and

service under the” relevant statutes and that Defendants “retaliate[d] with a Disciplinary Report

. . . for assisting other AICs with research [which] violates all of these protective rules and Acts.”

(FAC at 12; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 21, “An inference of disability discrimination is clearly

evident and well known at the EOCI law library, especially against Plaintiff for being a legal

advocate for other AICs.”) Reyes fails to allege that Defendants discriminated or retaliated

against him because of his alleged disability. Thus, the Court finds that Reyes has failed

adequately to allege facts to state a disability discrimination claim upon which relief can be

granted. See Reyes, 2023 WL 9470076, at *11-12 (dismissing Reyes’ federal and state disability

discrimination claims in part because he failed to allege that Defendants treated him differently

because of his disability). Accordingly, to the extent that Reyes’ FAC can be construed as

asserting disability discrimination claims, the Court grants Defendants’ motion and dismiss those

claims.

B. Eighth Amendment

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ Eighth Amendment claim alleging that Defendants

deprived him of meaningful physical activity and exercise (Claim II), on the ground that Reyes

fails sufficiently to allege facts to satisfy either the objective or subjective prong of an Eighth

Amendment claim. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 13-16.)

1. Applicable Law

To establish a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment based on conditions of

confinement, Reyes must meet two requirements. “First, the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (simplified).

Second, “a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, for conditions

of confinement claims, “is one of deliberate indifference[.]” Id. (simplified).

2. Analysis

a. Objective Prong

With respect to the objective prong, Reyes alleges that Defendants “prohibited all

outdoor activities, sports, exercise and work out of their unit.” (FAC at 10.) Reyes further alleges

that Defendants deprived him and “all other AICs from any physical exercise, walking, running,

sports or any other outdoor and out of unit activities for the health and wellbeing of all AICs.”

(Id. at 11.)

As the Court previously explained, “Reyes can satisfy the objective prong by

demonstrating a ‘denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities[.]’” Reyes, 2024

WL 5091756, at *5 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Court further explained that

“deprivation of a ‘single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise . . . .’ is a

sufficiently serious deprivation.” Id. (first quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991);

and then citing Norbert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 10 F.4th 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2021)).

Consistent with its previous finding, the Court finds that Reyes’ allegations, including

that Defendants deprived him and “all other AICs from any physical exercise, walking, running,

sports or any other outdoor and out of unit activities” (FAC at 11), are sufficient to satisfy the

objective prong of his Eighth Amendment claim. See Norbert, 10 F.4th at 932 (“[P]recedents

from other circuits are consistent with our observation that ‘the Constitution requires jail officials

to provide outdoor recreation opportunities, or otherwise meaningful recreation, to [AICs].’”

(quoting Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018))); cf. Reyes, 2023 WL 9470076, at

*9 (finding that Reyes’ pleadings were insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim because

“Reyes has not pled that he was denied all exercise between January 2020 and December 2020”).

b. Subjective Prong

With respect to the subjective prong, the Court finds that Reyes has failed sufficiently to

allege facts to support that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.

Specifically, “deliberate indifference” is established only when “the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In the FAC, Reyes alleges that Defendants “executed these violations

of civil rights in response to unclear and unfounded threat[s] to the penological safety and

security or any other justification of any policy . . . reasonably related to legitimate penological

goals, objectives, interests or goals of the institution.” (FAC at 10.) Reyes fails to allege that any

defendant was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm caused by the limitation on

out-of-cell or out-of-dorm exercise during the early days of COVID. Thus, the Court finds that

Reyes has failed sufficiently to allege facts to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence[.]”);

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (“[T]he prison official must not only be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, but that person must also

draw the inference. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the

official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”) (simplified).

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reyes’ Eighth Amendment

physical activity and exercise claim (Claim II).

VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendants move to dismiss Reyes’ retaliation claim against Rangel (Claim I) on the

ground that the statute of limitations bars that claim. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 12-13.)

A. Applicable Law

“[T]he statute of limitations in a [Section] 1983 suit is the same as provided under state

law for tort claims alleging personal-injury[.]” Addison v. City of Baker City, 758 F. App’x 582,

585 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)). “The statute of

limitations for personal injury claims under Oregon law is two years.” Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT.

§ 12.110(1)). “Accrual is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run[.]” Soto v.

Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 2018) (simplified). “Although state law determines the

statute of limitations for [Section] 1983 claims, federal law governs when a claim accrues.” Id.

(citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows

or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. (simplified).

B. Analysis

Reyes bases his retaliation claim against Rangel primarily on conduct that allegedly

occurred on September 10, 2019. (See FAC at 9, “September 10, 2019 Ms. Y Rangel, law library

coordinator, refused to return a printed letter prepared to mail out to an attorney.”) Reyes further

alleges that “Rangel ‘lied’ in the written conduct report about the chain of events” and that “[a]

copy of this [d]isciplinary hearing report is provided” (id. at 9), however, Reyes failed to include

with his FAC the relevant disciplinary hearing report. (See generally id.) Reyes first asserted

allegations against Rangel relating to the relevant events in his Motion to File a Third Amended

Complaint, filed on January 9, 2024. (See Mot. Leave File Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) at 8, ECF

No. 71.) Reyes attached the relevant disciplinary hearing report to his TAC. (See TAC Ex. 1 at

32-33, ECF No. 71-1.) Reyes also attached to his TAC a letter affirming the relevant disciplinary

decision. (See id. at 49.) The relevant documents make clear that Reyes’ claim is based on events

that took place in or before December 2019. (See id.)

The Court finds that Reyes knew or should have known of his retaliation claim against

Rangel in or before December 2019. See Evans v. Nelson, No. 2:19-cv-01210-MK, 2022 WL

20335877, at *9 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2022) (finding that the statute of limitations barred the

plaintiff’s claims because the “[p]laintiff should have known about his injury at the time the

discipline took place”) (citation omitted), findings and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL

4490515 (D. Or. July 12, 2023). Thus, the statute of limitations bars Reyes’ claim because more

than two years elapsed before he first alleged the claim in his TAC. (See generally TAC, filed on

January 9, 2024.)

Further, the Court finds that Reyes’ claim does not relate back to his original complaint,

first amended complaint, or second amended complaint. “Under [Rule] 15(c), an amended

complaint that is otherwise barred by the statute of limitations could be deemed timely if it

‘relates back to the date of the original pleading’ in certain circumstances.” Moore v. Thurnau,

No. 2:21-cv-00483-YY, 2024 WL 5340463, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2024), findings and

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 239093 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2025). “An amendment to a

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim

or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be

set out—in the original pleading[.]” Holloway v. Clackamas River Water, No. 20-35888, 2022

WL 3227723, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B)).

In his original, first amended, and second amended complaints, Reyes did not name

Rangel as a defendant or assert a First Amendment claim based on the conduct at issue in this

claim. (See generally Compl., Am. Compl., Second Am. Compl.) Thus, the Court finds that

relation back does not apply and Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Rangel is untimely. See

Holloway, 2022 WL 3227723, at *1 (“[The district court] properly rejected [the plaintiff]’s

contention that the claim relates back to the original complaint and therefore is timely because

the original complaint made no reference to the conduct on which the claim is based.”) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Rangel.8

8 It further appears that claim preclusion bars Reyes’ claim against Rangel. (See Order,

Reyes v. Washburn et al., No. 2:19-cv-01562-AC (D. Or. filed May 21, 2020) (dismissing Reyes’

amended complaint with prejudice, which included a claim against Rangel and others relating to

the same disciplinary proceedings); see also Wojciechowski v. Kohlberg Ventures, LLC, 923 F.3d

685, 689 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits

in a case precludes a successive action between identical parties or privies concerning the same

claim or cause of action.”) (simplified); id. at 689 n.4 (“The dismissal of the action with

prejudice constitutes a final judgment on the merits[.]”) (simplified).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 97), and dismisses the following claims with

prejudice:9

(1) Reyes’ plea for damages arising from his Section 1983 claims against the

Defendants in their official capacities;

(2) Reyes’ disability discrimination claims;

(3) Reyes’ claims against Bolles, Legore, Neistadt, and Washburn;

(4) Reyes’ First Amendment claim based on Rangel’s alleged refusal to return to

Reyes a letter Reyes prepared and printed to send to his attorney (Claim I); and

(5) Reyes’ Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that Defendants prohibited

his physical activities and exercise during COVID (Claim II).

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9 Reyes has now had multiple opportunities to amend his complaint, and he has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and “points to no additional facts that [he] might

allege to cure these deficiencies[.]” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d

1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended (Aug. 26, 2008) (affirming dismissal with prejudice for

failure adequately to plead a required element of the claim) (citation omitted). Accordingly,

except as indicated otherwise, the Court dismisses Reyes’ claims identified by the Court with

prejudice. See Beverly v. County of Orange, No. 22-55080, 2022 WL 14003695, at *1 (9th Cir.

Oct. 24, 2022) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim with prejudice where

“[t]he district court properly accounted for [the plaintiff]’s pro se status; it had already granted

[the plaintiff] leave to amend her complaint and provided guidance to remedy the pleading’s

deficiencies, but [the plaintiff] failed to follow that advice”) (simplified); DCD Programs, Ltd. v.

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that “a district court’s discretion

over amendments is especially broad where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more

opportunities to amend [the plaintiff’s] complaint”) (simplified).

The Court also dismisses Reyes’ Eighth Amendment claim based on Defendants’ alleged

refusal to wear masks during COVID without prejudice but without further leave to amend

(Claim III).10 Reyes may proceed only on the following claims:

(1) Reyes’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Villers and Johnson based

on their alleged deletion of documents from Reyes’ thumb drive in retaliation for

helping other AICs with legal work in June 2022 (Claim IV);

(2) Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Villers, Johnson, Oblisk, and Nevil based

on their alleged discipline of Reyes and confiscation of his legal materials in

retaliation for writing a letter to his attorney in March 2023 (Claim V);

(3) Reyes’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Oblisk, Villers,

and Johnson based on allegations that they disciplined Reyes, confiscated his

legal materials, and prevented him from sending documents to an attorney relating

to his post-conviction relief case (Claim VI);

(4) Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Johnson, Villers, and Wray based on

their alleged refusal to print, copy, or mail Reyes’ documents in retaliation for

Reyes writing letters to state officials and sharing legal information with other

AICs (Claim VII);

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10 In light of the Court’s conclusion that Reyes fails adequately to plead facts supporting

his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against any individual defendant, the Court does

not address Defendants’ argument that Reyes’ claim is duplicative of his claim in Alcalacarrillo.

In an effort to avoid any potential preclusive effect on Reyes’ COVID-related claims in

Alcalacarrillo, the Court dismisses the relevant claim without prejudice but without leave to

amend.

(5) Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Johnson, Villers, and Wray based on

their alleged refusal to print, copy, or mail Reyes’ documents in retaliation for

Reyes filing complaints, grievances, and lawsuits (Claim VIID;

(6) Reyes’ First Amendment claim against Villers, Johnson, Harvey, and Leddy

based on their alleged imposition of fines and sanctions on Reyes for helping

another AIC prepare post-conviction relief documents (Claim IX);

(7) Reyes’ First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Nevil, Villers,

and Johnson based on their alleged discipline of Reyes in retaliation for helping

other AICs with legal work in February 2024 (Claim X); and

(8) Reyes’ claims for injunctive relief against the relevant defendants in their official

capacities.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2025.

SF Yavic / fecermer

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 20 — OPINION AND ORDER