Case law

Soler v. United States Ex Rel. United States Department of Health & Human Services (In Re Soler)

261 B.R. 444 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota · Apr 26, 2001

After her bankruptcy filing in 1993, Sol-er began saving money which she used to establish a certifícate of deposit. Over a period of about seven years, she accumulated a CD of $20,000. … The evidence clearly demonstrates the debtor’s good faith, including her substantial efforts to repay her WHEAB loan.

Kimball Hill, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 30, 2020

Further, the Appellate Opinion states that this court “stated that creditors ‘may be held in contempt if they willfully violated the injunction,’ and that such ‘burden is met by establishing that [the creditors] (1) had … In Kimball II, the court stated that “[t]he evidence, in fact, demonstrates clearly that if any party was testing the waters, it was F&D.

Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. North Carolina · Oct 6, 2020

In the context of stay violations, bankruptcy courts typically require a debtor to show three elements: (1) significant harm, (2) that is clearly established, and (3) a causal connection with the … The testimony of the Plaintiff and Penley clearly established significant harm by describing the Plaintiff’s multiple asthma attacks that resulted in hospitalizations and her

Live Primary, LLC

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Mar 1, 2021

In July 2015, when the First Operating Agreement was executed, the prime rate was 3.25%, for which the startup business would never qualify as a commercial borrower. … This condition “must be performed or happen before a duty of immediate performance arises on the promise which the condition qualifies.”

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 20, 2023

However, the dated case law clearly establishes that—because a receiver’s authority is derived solely from the court, and because a receiver is subject only to the court's direction—a receiver has no power other than that … Clearly, counsel was under the impression that with the Court’s appointment of the Receiver having control over the assets, only the Receiver could put WCD into bankruptcy.

Matter of Claxton

30 B.R. 199 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia · May 12, 1983

That case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. … To qualify for protection, such transfers must be for present fair equivalent value.

Official Committee of Asbestos v. Asbestos Property Damage Committee (In Re Federal-Mogul Global Inc.)

330 B.R. 133 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · Sep 13, 2005

Peterson’s claiming rates that are established in his Increasing model. While Dr. … Clearly, this Court’s consideration of the question is for the purposes of this hearing and the pending United States bankruptcy proceedings.

Live Primary, LLC

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Mar 2, 2021

In July 2015, when the First Operating Agreement was executed, the prime rate was 3.25%, for which the startup business would never qualify as a commercial borrower. … This condition “must be performed or happen before a duty of immediate performance arises on the promise which the condition qualifies.”

Gemini Trust Company, LLC v. Genesis Global Capital, LLC

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Feb 7, 2024

May 4, 2004) (“Under New York law, ‘an assignment is a transfer or setting over of property, or of some right or interest therein, from one person to another, and unless in some way qualified, it is properly the transfer … This would clearly apply to the Additional GBTC Shares, which were never properly pledged, much less enforced upon. Nor does the case of Musso v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Royal Bus.

In Re Shea & Gould

214 B.R. 739 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Oct 24, 1997

That plan established a liquidation committee consisting of John B. Grant, Jr., James I. Hisiger, Peter C. Neger and Richard L. Spinogatti (the “Dissolution Committee”) to oversee the winding up of S & G’s affairs. … Thus, Chase clearly contemplated and assumed the risk that the ease might be dismissed for whatever reason when it consented to the use of its cash collateral.

Ohai v. PNC Bank National Association, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia · Feb 28, 2024

Plaintiff has also not established a basis under Rule 60(b)(1), (3)– (6) for setting aside the MicroBilt Order. … Whether PTI was the proper entity to request a credit report and whether the underlying mortgage was valid are legal issues that a credit agency “is neither qualified nor obligated to resolve.” Id.

Signature Bank v. Banayan

468 B.R. 542 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York · Jan 31, 2012

satisfactory to Signature to prepare rolling thirteen week *563 cash flow projections for the Obligors. 166 Bloch testified that Signature had “lost faith in [Debtor’s] ability to project what the needs of [AFC] were and clearly … Thus, the broad interpretation posits that a communication addressing the status of a single asset or liability qualifies as ‘respecting the debtor’s ... financial condition.’

Jamie Poole

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho · Aug 3, 2022

However, as noted, the Disclosure filed in this case was incomplete and does not clearly establish the financial agreement between Debtor and Youngblood. … Thus, Youngblood qualifies as a debt relief agency as Debtor claimed primarily consumer debts and nonexempt property valued at less than $204,425.

Christy L. Phipps

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho · May 4, 2022

But for the same fee, Youngblood also agrees to represent Debtor at the meeting of creditors, which clearly occurs post- petition. … The Code also defines “assisted person” as “any person whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than $204,425.5 Youngblood qualifies as a debt relief agency for

Process Am., Inc. v. Cynergy Holdings, LLC (In re Process Am., Inc.)

588 B.R. 82 · United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California · Jun 8, 2018

Thus, a plausible cause of action clearly exists. … In addition, "a claim may ... be set off without regard to whether it is contingent or unliquidated, as long as the claim qualifies as 'mutual' under applicable nonbankruptcy law...." 78 For the debts to be considered "mutual

Wissel, IV v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee fo

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 14, 2020

“While the plaintiffs would have the Court believe that the case sub judice is controlled by the In re Scarborough, supra, precedent, that case is clearly distinguishable.” … that Spacia was active in 2004, the Westfield Property would still qualify as the “debtor’s principal residence” under the plain language of § 101(13A).

Aleksey N Kozlov

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Alaska · Sep 1, 2026

For the reasons explained above, the court has rejected the argument that there were no qualified counsel available within the Pacific Northwest and finds this argument not to be credible. … This has been repeatedly established under § 330. See In re Nelson, 2017 WL 449581, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. HomeBanc Corp. (In re HomeBanc Mortgage Corp.)

573 B.R. 495 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · May 31, 2017

It did so in § 559.” 81 Judge Rendell also noted in her concurring opinion to AHMII that the language of Bankruptcy Code § 562 clearly uses the plural, referring to “commercially reasonable determinants of value,” so that … Bear Stearns’ objection to qualifying Mr. Ca-lahan as an expert of the sale of such collateral was overruled; although I noted that weight of Mr.

Krisjenn Ranch, LLC, Krisjenn Ranch, LLC, Series U v. DMA Properties, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Mar 24, 2021

KrisJenn argues that “its successors and assigns” was clearly meant to refer to the successors and assigns of Black Duck, not the ROW. … Analyzing the Assignment Agreements in their entirety, the Court finds that the phrase “its successors and assigns” qualifies Black Duck.

Larkin v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Larkin)

553 B.R. 428 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas · Jul 7, 2016

[citation omitted]. 38 Whether the agreement is a novation or an executory accord is a matter of intent. 39 The 2015 Loan Modification Agreement clearly expresses the parties’ intention to supersede any prior modification … Apr. 7, 2016) (to the extent Bank was the originator of the loan, it does not qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA); Campbell v.