Case law

Young v. Clear Lake Yacht Basin, Inc.

337 F. Supp. 1305 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 19, 1972

These findings by the Court resolve the question of whether the warranty of seaworthiness is owed by any defendant to the plaintiff herein, since the plaintiff simply cannot qualify to be characterized as falling within the … If any such legal duties are theoretically owed to seamen or land-based marine workers by the Company under the facts of this case, they are clearly inapplicable to the plaintiff who does not qualify under either category

Goins v. Clear Creek Independent Schood District

District Court, S.D. Texas · Dec 26, 2024

Qualified Immunity Because the court finds that Ms. … . § 1981 and § 1983 for failure to plead all of the required elements, the court does not reach the question of the District’s, Cooper’s and O’Pry’s qualified immunity. IV.

Barfield v. Barnhart

285 F. Supp. 2d 827 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 8, 2002

A five-step sequential process is utilized by the ALJ to determine whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f)(1991); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d at 390 ; Leggett v. … The claimant has the burden of establishing the first four steps of the five-step sequential process by establishing a severe impairment which prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work.

Division 80 LLC v. Garland

District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 23, 2022

“That’s probably because federal agencies generally enjoy sovereign immunity for any monetary damages.” Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. U.S. … Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it does not qualify as irreparable.”).

Boltex Mfg. Co. v. Ulma Piping U.S. Corp.

389 F. Supp. 3d 507 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 28, 2019

defining or qualifying those terms for consumers. … Clearly, Defendants have shown at least one buyer who insisted that the flanges sold to him be made in America with U.S. sourced steel.

Garcia v. City of McAllen, Texas

District Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 1, 2020

that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force [ ] was objectively unreasonable.”61 Although the individual right to be free from excessive force is clearly … negligence, when the shooting event on which they based their claim was actually an intentional tort.”128 For example, when a plaintiff’s Texas Tort Claims Act claims against a law enforcement agency arose from an officer’s “clearly

Myers v. Barnhart

285 F. Supp. 2d 851 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 27, 2002

A five-step sequential process is utilized by the ALJ to determine whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § m.1520(b)-(f)(1998); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d at 390 ; Leggett v. … The claimant has the burden of establishing the first four steps of the five-step sequential process by establishing a severe impairment which prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work.

Matthews

District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 25, 2026

“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) who is otherwise qualified; (3) who worked for a program or activity … She asserts that she brought her claims “clearly, precisely, and very specifically” and that she has “NOT had the opportunity to present [her] EVIDENCE to the Judge and Jury to show how GREAT the harm was and still is.”

Dickerson v. Bailey

212 F. Supp. 2d 673 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 17, 2002

The plurality held that North Dakota’s liquor control laws did not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and that the federal regulations requiring the government to purchase alcoholic beverages from the most … This right or privilege is an explicit exception to prohibitions established elsewhere in the Code. § 11.01(c).

Armstrong v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.

122 F. Supp. 2d 739 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Nov 17, 2000

The Court must answer three questions to decide if a given plan qualifies as an ERISA plan. First, does the plan “exist.” McNeil, 205 F.3d at 189 . … Defendants have clearly made some contribution to the plan as a whole.

Gellerman v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Insurance

376 F. Supp. 2d 724 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 28, 2005

Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.2002) (“When a minimal basis for a conflict is established, we review the decision with ‘only a modicum less deference than we otherwise would.’ ”); MacLachlan v. … Regardless, the job description clearly states that the required lifting range is 15-20 pounds, and the defendants abused their discretion by failing to account for the requirement.

LeRoy v. City of Houston

592 F. Supp. 415 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 31, 1984

First, the cases the City cites in support of its Motion are clearly distinguishable. … Miller, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1803 (1972 and Supp.1984): [In a class action] [m]ost frequently fees are awarded when the plaintiff-representative successfully establishes or protects a fund or property

Pliler v. Asiatic Petroleum Company (Texas), Ltd.

197 F. Supp. 212 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 14, 1961

These facts appear established by the pleadings, affidavits and depositions. Plaintiffs’ decedents, Messrs. Pliler and Frayard, were working in South America as employees of a drilling contractor, C. A. … Assuming with plaintiffs that Art. '2031b effected no expansion of Texas law, relevant case law clearly says no personal jurisdiction here. Two cases from this district are in point. Nielsen v.

Cowin v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Cowin)

538 B.R. 721 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 29, 2015

The plaintiffs must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [their] claim is not dischargeable.” Id. at 287 , 111 S.Ct. 654 . … But Cowin does not argue that his violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act or the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act lack the intent necessary to qualify as “larceny” or “willful and malicious injury.”

Quintanilla v. K-Bin, Inc.

8 F. Supp. 2d 928 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 23, 1998

The first three elements of Plaintiff's ease are clearly established. … In this case, the plain facts presented by Plaintiff clearly rebut Shintech’s bald contentions that it does not direct or control K-Bin’s employees.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Fulcrum Enterprises, LLC

20 F. Supp. 3d 594 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 19, 2014

“While federal law clearly contemplates summary judgment in circumstances where there is truly no evidence of an essential element ... [,] the party moving for summary judgment must make some showing that evidence on an essential … R.Evid. 702 ("A witness who is qualified as an expert ... may testify ... if ... the expert’s ... specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”).

Classic Performance Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance

464 F. Supp. 2d 652 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 13, 2006

It is well established, however, that § 2201 is merely procedural, and that it extends only to those controversies within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gaar v. … The merit of Plaintiffs argument then clearly depends on the language of the exclusion itself.

State of Texas v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

District Court, S.D. Texas · Oct 27, 2023

has also made a practice of taking “classification requests,” in which firearm manufacturers and members of the public can “submit weapons or other devices to the ATF for a classification of whether the weapon or device qualifies … Here, “[a]t the preliminary injunction stage, the movant must clearly show only that each element of standing is likely to obtain in the case at hand.” Id.

Tower Tire & Auto Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

392 F. Supp. 1098 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 10, 1975

expounded upon the per se character of the antitrust violation alleged and concluded that, . the purpose of destroying a competitor by means that are not within the area of fair and honest competition is a purpose that clearly … The manufacturer/distributor cases apparently never did hold that a vertical realignment was immune to the extent that it could be employed as a part of a broader conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws with impunity.

Warner

District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 3, 2026

A claim has no arguable basis in fact if, “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v. … provide any facts to establish the three Shipp elements.