State of Texas v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT October 27, 2023

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

VICTORIA DIVISION

The STATE OF TEXAS, GUN OWNERS §

OF AMERICA, INC., GUN OWNERS §

FOUNDATION, and BRADY BROWN, §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 6:23-CV-00013

§

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, §

TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND §

EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF §

JUSTICE, and STEVEN M. §

DETTELBACH, Director of the U.S. §

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms §

and Explosives, in his official capacity, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In the early 20th century, Congress sought to regulate what it perceived to be a

dangerous subset of firearms in an effort to curb organized crime. To that end, Congress

first passed the National Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”) and later the Gun Control Act of

1968 (“GCA”). These statutes remain two of the primary means for regulating and

licensing firearms at the federal level. They impose heightened requirements on the

manufacture, sale, and transfer of certain firearms, including short-barreled rifles

(“SBRs”). That is important in this case because pistols, revolvers, and handguns are not

subject to those enhanced requirements.

Since 2012, however, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(“ATF”) has seen a dramatic increase in the use of stabilizing braces on handguns. These

braces were originally designed to assist people with disabilities, or mobility or strength

issues so that they could safely handle heavy handguns. Over time, some of these

stabilizing braces have taken on a new function and appearance and have morphed into

what looks like a shoulder stock. As a result, handguns with those stabilizing braces

attached now look like a rifle.

In January 2023, the ATF promulgated a Final Rule that modified the ATF’s earlier

regulations addressing how the agency would determine whether a weapon is a “rifle”

for purposes of the NFA and GCA. One of the primary changes involves whether a

handgun is transformed into an SBR when certain stabilizing braces are attached. So, the

Final Rule instituted a six-part test for making this determination.

Plaintiffs have sued to invalidate the Final Rule alleging that it violates the

Administrative Procedure Act and the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that

the Final Rule places law abiding citizens at risk of unwittingly becoming felons

overnight. Plaintiffs ask for a preliminary injunction to prevent the rule from going into

effect. Specifically, Plaintiffs request a nationwide injunction on the rule to maintain the

status quo ante prior to the Final Rule’s promulgation at the start of the year.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt.

No. 16). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case challenges an agency’s final rule. Therefore, the regulatory history of the

Final Rule is an integral part of the Court’s analysis. The Court will review the relevant

statutes from which the ATF derived its authority to promulgate this Final Rule in order

to understand its impact and decide whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate.

A. STATUTORY HISTORY

In 1934, Congress passed the NFA. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872. The NFA was

Congress’s introduction to firearm regulation and “concentrated on particularly

dangerous weapons and devices such as machine guns, sawedoff shotguns and

silencers.” Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Sonzinsky v. United

States, 300 U.S. 506, 511–12, 57 S.Ct. 554, 554–55, 81 L.Ed. 772 (1937)). To ensure that it

covered only the most dangerous class of weapons, the NFA identified eight categories

of “firearms” that the statute would regulate. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).

The dispute in this case concerns two categories of firearms commonly referred to

as SBRs. Id. § 5845(a)(3), (4). These two subsections describe an SBR as “a rifle having a

barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length” or “a weapon made from a rifle if such

weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of

less than 16 inches in length.” Id. The NFA also defines a rifle:

The term “rifle” means a weapon designed or redesigned,

made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder

and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the

energy of the explosive in a fixed cartridge to fire only a single

projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the

trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may be

readily restored to fire a fixed cartridge.1

1 The GCA uses the same definition of rifle. See 18 U.S.C. § 921. Thus, any rules

promulgated by the ATF that affect this definition implicate both the NFA and the GCA. This

lawsuit, however, focuses primarily on the effects under the NFA.

Id. § 5845(c) (emphasis added). The “made or remade” phrasing within the definition is

construed broadly. Specifically, the NFA defines “make” to include “manufacturing . . .,

putting together, altering, any combination of these, or otherwise producing a firearm.”

Id. § 5845(i) (emphasis added). Taken together, these portions of the NFA mean that a

rifle—which alone would not be regulated by the NFA—can be put together or altered

by its owner in a way that renders it an SBR, subject to the NFA.

To be clear, the NFA does not ban SBRs—it regulates them. Such regulations

require, inter alia, (1) requesting permission to create the SBR, (2) paying a $200 tax for

every approved SBR made by an unlicensed person, (3) registering the SBR in the

National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, (4) and placing a serial number on

the SBR. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5821, 5822. Making or possessing an SBR in violation of any of

these requirements is a crime. See 26 U.S.C. § 5871. And if charged with violating the

statute, an offender could face up to 10 years in prison, up to $250,000 in fines, or both.

Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3). Therefore, whether a specific modification to a firearm would

convert it into an NFA-regulated SBR has tremendous ramifications for actual and

prospective gun owners alike.

The power to enforce and administer the NFA is vested in the U.S. Attorney

General. 18 U.S.C. § 926(a). The Attorney General has delegated that responsibility to

the ATF. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.130. Specifically, the ATF has the power to issue regulations,

i.e., the ATF can publish interpretations of Congress’ various gun statutes and offer

explanations on how gun owners can best comply. See 27 C.F.R. pts. 478, 479. Moreover,

the ATF has also made a practice of taking “classification requests,” in which firearm

manufacturers and members of the public can “submit weapons or other devices to the

ATF for a classification of whether the weapon or device qualifies as a ‘firearm’ under the

NFA.” NFA Handbook § 7.2.4 (Apr. 2009), https://perma.cc/P3NLG35G.

Near the end of 2020, the ATF turned its attention to a class of pistol attachments

generally described as stabilizing braces. (Dkt. No. 22 at 22–23). Namely, the ATF grew

concerned after “receiv[ing] an increasing number of classification requests for weapons

equipped” with brace attachments resembling “characteristics common to shoulder

stocks.” (Id. at 21).

In January 2023, the ATF addressed its concerns with its newest rule, “Factoring

Criteria for Firearms with Attached ‘Stabilizing Braces’” (the “Final Rule”). 88 Fed. Reg.

6478 (Jan. 31, 2023) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 478, 479). The Final Rule sought to

clarify the ATF’s interpretation of “rifle,” as defined in the NFA. 88 Fed. Reg. at 6574–75

(amending 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.11, 479.11). Under the Final Rule, the phrasing in the NFA’s

definition of rifle, “designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired

from the shoulder,” would now be read even more broadly than before, including:

a weapon that is equipped with an accessory, component, or

other rearward attachment (e.g., a “stabilizing brace”) that

provides surface area that allows the weapon to be fired from

the shoulder[.]

Id. at 6480. If a weapon after production or modification fits this description, the Final

Rule then employs six factors to determine whether the weapon is now converted into a

rifle under the NFA. Id. These factors include:

(1) Whether the weapon has a weight or length consistent

with the weight or length of similarly designed rifles;

(2) Whether the weapon has a length of pull, measured from

the center of the trigger to the center of the shoulder stock or

other rearward accessory, component or attachment

(including an adjustable or telescoping attachment with the

ability to lock into various positions along a buffer tube,

receiver extension, or other attachment method), that is

consistent with similarly designed rifles;

(3) Whether the weapon is equipped with sights or a scope

with eye relief that require the weapon to be fired from the

shoulder in order to be used as designed;

(4) Whether the surface area that allows the weapon to be

fired from the shoulder is created by a buffer tube, receiver

extension, or any other accessory, component, or other

rearward attachment that is necessary for the cycle of

operations;

(5) The manufacturer's direct and indirect marketing and

promotional materials indicating the intended use of the

weapon; and

(6) Information demonstrating the likely use of the weapon in

the general community.

Id. “If a firearm with an attached ‘stabilizing brace’ meets the definition of a ‘rifle’ based

on the factors indicated in this final rule, then that firearm could also be a short-barreled

rifle depending on the length of the attached barrel, thus subjecting it to additional

requirements under the NFA[.]” Id. While the ATF does not elaborate on how this rubric

will operate, e.g., whether each factor is weighted the same or some more than others, the

effects of the rubric are clear—almost every time a weapon is evaluated under this new

framework, it will be classified as a rifle. For example, in its “Final Regulatory Impact

Analysis,” regarding the Final Rule, the ATF estimates there would be only “1 percent of

‘stabilizing braces’ that, when attached to [a] firearm, would not result” in a rifle subject

to the NFA. (Dkt. No. 16-9 at 21). The Fifth Circuit has also noted that after promulgating

the Final Rule, the ATF has not issued a single example of a “pistol with a stabilizing

brace that would constitute an NFA-exempt braced pistol.” Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563,

575 (5th Cir. 2023).

The ATF estimates in its Final Regulatory Impact Analysis that the Final Rule

converted 2,970,000 weapons to NFA-regulated SBRs. (Dkt. No. 16-9 at 21). For this

group of affected gun owners, the Final Rule proposed five different avenues for

compliance. First, they could “[r]emove the short barrel and attach a 16-inch or longer

rifled barrel to the firearm, thus removing it from the scope of the NFA.” 88 Fed. Reg. at

6570. Second, the owners could register the firearm as an SBR. Id. This option would

also be exempt from the $200 “marking tax” that the NFA traditionally requires. Id. at

6571. Third, the stabilizing brace could be “permanently” removed, disposed of, or

altered so that it could never be re-attached. Id. at 6570. Fourth, the newly minted SBR

owners could simply turn their weapon over to the ATF. Id. And fifth, the owner could

destroy their firearm. Id. As defined by the ATF, destruction of a firearm means

rendering the weapon “not restorable to firing condition and . . . otherwise reduced to

scrap.” How to Properly Destroy Firearms, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and

Explosives, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/how-properly-destroy-firearms (last visited

October 27, 2023).

The Final Rule went into immediate effect on January 31, 2023. 88 Fed. Reg. at

6480. However, gun owners were given a grace period, until May 31, 2023, to choose

which compliance method, if any at all, they wished to pursue. Id. at 6570.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shortly after the Final Rule was rolled out, Plaintiffs filed this action against

Defendants the ATF, the United States Department of Justice, and Steven M. Dettelbach,

the Director of the ATF, in his official capacity. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs are comprised of

an individual—Brady Brown; two non-profit corporations—Gun Owners Foundation

(“GOF”) and Gun Owners of America (“GOA”); and the State of Texas. (Id. at 6–12).

Plaintiffs’ suit alleges that the Final Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”) and violates the Constitution in a myriad of ways. (Id. at 43–131).

Shortly after filing the lawsuit, Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction,

arguing that the Final Rule: (1) exceeds the ATF’s statutory authority, (2) violates the

Second Amendment, (3) unconstitutionally taxes the exercise of a constitutional right,

(4) violates the Fifth Amendment, (5) is not a proper exercise of Congress’ taxing power,

(6) is arbitrary and capricious, and (7) was not a logical outgrowth from the notice of

proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”). (Dkt. No. 16 at 15–28). Defendants timely responded,

(Dkt. No. 22), and notified the Court of a recently decided Northern District of Texas

order on the same issue. See Mock v. Garland, No. 4:23-CV-00095, ____ F. Supp.3d. ____,

2023 WL 2711630 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2023), rev’d and remanded, 75 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2023).

In that order, the court denied a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the same

Final Rule challenged here.2 (Dkt. No. 25).

2 Mock is not the only other case challenging this Final Rule. At this time, the Court is

aware of at least eight additional challenges to the Final Rule across the country. See Second

Amend. Found. v. ATF, No. 3:21-CV-00116 (N.D. Tex.) (Boyle, J.); Britto v. ATF, No. 2:23-CV-00019

(N.D. Tex.) (Kacsmaryk, J.); Texas Gun Rights v. ATF, No. 4:23-cv-578 (N.D. Tex.) (O’Connor, J.);

(continue)

In Mock, the district court denied a substantially similar motion for preliminary

injunction. See 2023 WL 2711630 at *8. The Mock plaintiffs appealed and sought

emergency injunctive relief in the interim. See Mock v. Garland, No. 23-10319, Dkt. No. 25

(5th Cir. May 17, 2023). In response, a motions panel for the Fifth Circuit enjoined the

Final Rule pending expedited appellate review of the district court’s decision. No. 23-

10319, Dkt. No. 52 (5th Cir. May 23, 2023). Because this case involves many of the same

challenges brought by the Mock plaintiffs, this Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ request

for preliminary injunction “pending resolution of the expedited appeal in Mock v.

Garland.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 7).

The Fifth Circuit has now ruled. See Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2023).

In Mock, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of an injunction, finding that

“plaintiffs will likely succeed on the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’)

challenge.” Id. at 567. The Fifth Circuit found that the Final Rule was not a logical

outgrowth of the NPRM, but it refrained from ruling on the other factors necessary for a

preliminary injunction and remanded the case for consideration of those remaining

factors. Id. After a status conference to discuss the impact of Mock on this case, the Parties

filed supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.3 (Dkt. Nos.

73–75). Plaintiffs’ Motion is now ripe for review.

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. ATF, 3:23-cv-01471 (N.D. Tex) (Lindsay, J.); Watterson v. ATF, No.

4:23-CV-00080 (E.D. Tex.) (Mazzant, J.); Colon v. ATF, 8:23-cv-00223 (M.D. Fla.) (Stenson Scriven,

J.); FRAC v. Garland, No. 1:23-CV-00024 (D.N.D.) (Hovland, J.); Miller v. Garland, No. 1:23-CV-

00195 (E.D. Va.) (Alston, J.).

3 After remand, the district court granted the preliminary injunction. Mock v. Garland, No.

4:23-CV-00095, ____ F. Supp.3d. ____, 2023 WL 6457920 (N.D. Tex., Oct. 2, 2023).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”

Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. ____, ____, 138 S.Ct. 1942, 1943, 201 L.Ed.2d 398 (2018)

(quotation omitted). Indeed, the decision to grant a preliminary injunction is “to be

treated as the exception rather than the rule.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe

Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, “[i]n each case, courts must balance the

competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or

withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24,

129 S.Ct. 365, 376, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (quotation omitted). And in determining

whether injunctive relief is proper, “courts of equity should pay particular regard for the

public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger

v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982).

A preliminary injunction “issue[s] only where (1) there is a substantial likelihood

that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable

harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the

threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will

not disserve the public interest.” Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). As

such, “[t]he party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each

of the four elements enumerated” for a preliminary injunction to be granted. Id. The last

two factors, “harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest[,] merge when

the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749,

1762, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009).

“[N]one of the [] prerequisites has a fixed quantitative value.” Texas v. Seatrain

Int’l, S. A., 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975). “Rather, a sliding scale is utilized, which

takes into account the intensity of each in a given calculus.” Id. (citing Siff v. State

Democratic Exec. Comm., 500 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1974)). For instance, “a preliminary

injunction does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff’s showing” of the first

element, “a likelihood of success on the merits.” Benisek, 585 U.S. at ____, 138 S.Ct. at

1943–44 (emphasis added). Thus, federal courts must consider whether the movant has

established the three other elements as well for a preliminary injunction to issue. Id. at

____, 138 S.Ct. at 1944.

III. DISCUSSION

Before the Court can reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court first revisits

Plaintiffs’ standing.

A. STANDING

To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs bear a burden to demonstrate that they

“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the

defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo,

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). Regarding

the weight of that burden, the Supreme Court has explained that “each element [of

standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff

bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct.

2130, 2137, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Thus, “[a]t earlier stages of litigation . . . the manner

and degree of evidence required to show standing is less than at later stages.” Speech

First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Oct. 30, 2020). Here, “[a]t

the preliminary injunction stage, the movant must clearly show only that each element of

standing is likely to obtain in the case at hand.” Id.

The Court finds that the latter two standing requirements of traceability and

redressability are comfortably satisfied in this case. This is because any injuries suffered

by Plaintiffs are attributable to the implementation of the Final Rule, and the requested

relief here—an order enjoining and, ultimately, vacating the Final Rule—would remedy

the alleged injury.4 The only standing element in serious dispute is the first—injury-in-

fact. Thus, the Court must decide whether Plaintiffs have clearly shown that they have

suffered or will suffer “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete,”

“particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 578

U.S. at 339, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136). The Court

discusses each Plaintiffs’ standing separately.5

4 It is worth noting that Defendants do make one traceability argument. Defendants argue

that any harm claimed by the Plaintiffs would be attributable solely to the NFA—not the Final

Rule. (Dkt. No. 22 at 27). Therefore, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs grievances are more

properly aimed at the NFA, as opposed to the Final Rule. (Id.). The Court is not persuaded.

While the NFA is the statute which sets out the heightened regulations of consequence and

penalties for non-compliance, the weapons that give rise to this suit would not be subject to the

NFA but-for the Final Rule. Thus, the Final Rule going into effect is causing harm to the Plaintiffs

for Article III purposes.

5 When multiple plaintiffs seek the same form of relief, generally only “one plaintiff must

have standing to seek each form of relief requested.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S.

433, 439, 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1651, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017). However, because the Court deems party-

specific injunctive relief to be the most proper remedy to Plaintiffs’ motion, each party must have

Article III standing to be entitled to such relief. See VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 4:22-CV-00691,

2023 WL 4539591, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2023) (explaining that party-specific injunctive relief

should not be granted to parties that have not “independently demonstrate[ed] standing”).

1. Brady Brown

Plaintiff Brady Brown alleges that he is injured by the ATF’s Final Rule because it

impermissibly broadens the NFA’s definition of “rifle,” thereby subjecting several of his

firearms to new, heightened regulations. The Supreme Court has spoken to this sort of

alleged injury. In Lujan, it explained that:

When the suit is one challenging the legality of government

action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be

averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the

trial stage) in order to establish standing depends

considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object

of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is

ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him

injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will

redress it.

504 U.S. at 561–62, 112 S.Ct. 2137 (emphasis added). “It follows from Lujan that if a

plaintiff is an object of a government regulation, then that plaintiff ordinarily has

standing to challenge that regulation.” Duarte ex rel. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 759 F.3d

514, 518 (5th Cir. 2014). Therefore, Brown’s ability to demonstrate injury-in-fact hinges

on whether he is covered by the ATF’s regulation—the Final Rule.

Plaintiff Brown’s Declaration, (Dkt. No. 16-14), which is not controverted, is

sufficient to establish that he is likely regulated by the Final Rule. Brown’s Declaration

states that, in his personal capacity,6 he lawfully possesses at least one “AR-15 style

6 Brown also owns a business inventory of weapons—including at least one more firearm

and stabilizing brace that would be subjected to NFA regulation under the Final Rule. (Dkt. No.

16-14 at 2). Brown alleges that even in his capacity as a firearms dealer, the Final Rule renders

him unable to lawfully transfer the offending firearms to another dealer. (Id.). A regulatory

action which threatens a movant’s ability to sustain his business can, in some cases, constitute

irreparable harm. Atwood Turnkey Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th

(continue)

firearm in pistol configuration equipped with a stabilizing brace” that would now

constitute an SBR under the Final Rule. (Id. at 2). And compliance with the Final Rule

will almost always require time expenditures and various compliance costs. See infra

III.B.2.a. Thus, Brown would suffer injury-in-fact under the Final Rule and, therefore, has

Article III standing to request injunctive relief.

2. GOA and GOF

Plaintiffs GOA and GOF are non-profit organizations who bring this suit and

request injunctive relief on behalf of their members and supporters. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8);

(Dkt. No. 16 at 31); (Dkt. No. 16–13 at 2). Defendants challenge whether GOF has

sufficiently alleged that it is a membership organization that can bring claims on behalf

of its members. (Dkt. No. 47 at 6). Defendants also contest whether both organizations

have sufficiently alleged facts to support associational standing at all. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5–

11).

“An association or organization can establish an injury-in-fact through either of

two theories, appropriately called ‘associational standing’ and ‘organizational

standing.’” OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 2017). “Associational

standing is a three-part test: (1) the association’s members would independently meet the

Article III standing requirements; (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are

germane to the purpose of the organization; and (3) neither the claim asserted, nor the

relief requested requires participation of individual members.” Texas v. Nuclear Regul.

Cir. 1989). However, because Brown has standing in his personal capacity, standing due to his

business-incurred costs need not be addressed.

Comm’n, 78 F.4th 827, 836–37 (5th Cir. 2023). In situations where a representational

plaintiff is not a traditional member-organization, the court will “exalt form over

substance . . . for purposes of determining Article III standing” and treat it as a

membership organization as long as it meets “the indicia of membership test.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 828–29 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2442, 53 L.Ed.2d 383

(1977). This test seeks to determine whether the entity “represents [its ‘members’] and

provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their

collective interests.” Id. at 828 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344–45, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441–42, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)).

One way to apply the indicia of membership test is to look at whether nonstandard

members “elect leadership, serve as the organization's leadership, and finance the

organization’s activities, including the case’s litigation costs.” Funeral Consumers All., Inc.

v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d 330, 344 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344–45, 97

S.Ct. at 2442). However, the Supreme Court has recently clarified that when “an

organization has identified members and represents them in good faith, our cases do not

require further scrutiny into how the organization operates” in order to sufficiently meet

the test. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

181, 201, 143 S.Ct. 2141, 2158, 216 L.Ed.2d 857 (2023).

GOA and GOF do not assert claims on their own behalf as organizations. Rather,

they assert claims on behalf of their “more than two million members and supporters

across the country,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 8); (Dkt. No. 16-13 at 2), so they are subject to an

“associational or representational standing” analysis. Friends of the Earth, 129 F.3d at 828.

GOA is “a non-profit membership organization . . . formed in 1976 to preserve and

defend the Second Amendment rights of gun owners.” (Dkt. No. 16-13 at 2). GOF is “a

non-profit legal defense and educational foundation . . . supported by gun owners across

the country[.]” (Id. at 2). As for their respective purposes, both organizations purport to

preserve and defend the rights of gun owners under the Constitution.7 (Id. at 3).

According to their Senior Vice President, “GOA and GOF routinely litigate cases across

the country in furtherance of their mission, on behalf of their members and supporters in

various states.” (Id. at 3). Many of GOA and GOF’s members and supporters, which

include individuals as well as industry members, “currently own pistols equipped with

stabilizing braces [and are effected by] the Final Rule in various ways.” (Id. at 3).

GOA and GOF assert their claims as though they are the same kind of entity.

Defendants point out, however, that GOA is a membership organization while GOF is

not. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5–6). As such, the Court first looks to whether GOF satisfies the

indicia of membership test before it proceeds to whether GOF can assert associational

standing. GOF did not provide explicit information regarding its organizational

structure and whether its supporters elect or serve as its leadership. It did, however,

assert that it is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, (Dkt. No. 16-13 at 2), which means that it is a

mission-driven organization financed by supporter or member donations, see 26 U.S.C §§

7 Although not explicitly stated, these two organizations appear to have ties to each other

as they share the same Senior Vice President and always refer to their actions, litigation, and

members in the collective. (See Dkt. No. 16-13).

501(c)3, 509. In other words, it is likely that GOF’s nonstandard members do finance the

organization’s activities and litigation costs. However, GOF has not defined the scope of

who it considers to be its “supporters,” and it is not this Court’s role to operate on

inferences or to impose an arbitrary scope on who those supporters might be. As such,

GOF has failed to allege an identifiable set of members. Despite not being a membership

organization, GOF could have representational standing on behalf of its supporters, but

the Court finds that it has not sufficiently identified them here. Therefore, GOF has not

satisfied the indicia of membership test as is required to have standing for a preliminary

injunction.

Turning to GOA, Defendants do not contest that GOA is a membership

organization, but rather argue that GOA fails to satisfy the elements of associational

standing. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5–11). The Court disagrees.

First, many of GOA’s members are simlar to Plaintiff Brown in that they are

individuals or businesses who own weapons whose classification was altered by the Final

Rule and who are now subject to injuries stemming therefrom. See supra III.A.1.

Consequently, GOA’s members would undoubtedly have standing in their individual

capacities, satisfying the first prong of associational standing. Next, GOA’s

organizational mission is to litigate when laws affect gun owners, and here they filed suit

to invalidate a federal regulation that reclassifies their members’ weapons and subjects

those weapons to heightened regulation. In other words, the interests that GOA seeks to

protect in this lawsuit are germane to the purpose of the organization. Finally, because

the claims asserted and relief requested involve invalidating a federal regulation based

on theories that do not require individualized proof, individual participation by GOA’s

members and supporters is not required to allow the claims to proceed. In sum, the Court

finds that GOA meets all the requirements for associational standing.

3. The State of Texas

Although Texas does not spend much of its briefing responding to Defendants’

standing arguments, the Court understands Texas to argue that the Final Rule would

cause Texas (1) sovereign injury, (2) quasi-sovereign injury, and (3) nonrecoverable

compliance costs. (Dkt. No. 29 at 38–39). In its May 31 Order, this Court previously

rejected Texas’s arguments regarding its alleged sovereign and quasi-sovereign injuries.

(Dkt. No. 51 at 4–5). The Court sees no reason to depart from its earlier ruling as to these

arguments. However, also in its May 31 Order, the Court found that Texas had standing

due to the nonrecoverable compliance costs that the Final Rule would impose. The Court

reasoned that Texas would suffer injury in the form of compliance costs incurred by its

agencies—e.g., state law enforcement—being forced to comply with the Final Rule. (Dkt.

No. 51 at 5). In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that injury via compliance costs

is often recognized in the context of government defendants who enjoy sovereign

immunity from monetary damages. See Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. FDA, 16 F.4th

1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding

that “complying with a regulation later held invalid almost always produces the

irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs”) (emphasis in the original). With

the benefit of time and supplemental briefing, the Court now reevaluates whether Texas

has provided evidence of an injury-in-fact in the form of nonrecoverable compliance

costs.8

To establish standing for preliminary injunction purposes, Texas must make “a

clear showing” of injury-in-fact under the Final Rule. Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 352

(5th Cir. 2017). In proving up its alleged compliance costs, Texas fails to make a “clear

showing,” and instead, asks the Court to speculate. Texas initially argued that its state

law enforcement officers who “possess previously legal handguns with stabilizing braces

will have to expend resources to register those weapons.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 29–30).

However, Defendants pointed out that Texas had not submitted any actual evidence to

“substantiat[e] the allegation that any of its law enforcement agencies possess pistols with

stabilizing braces in their inventories.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 60). Texas did not address this

point in its Reply. (Dkt. No. 29).

At this juncture, Texas has not even stated, let alone provided concrete evidence,

that any of its law enforcement agencies actually own a braced pistol subject to the Final

Rule. And according to Texas, it does not need to. (Dkt. No. 45 at 5). Because the ATF

estimates that there are at least three million attached braces in circulation, Texas asks the

Court to “find as a commonsense matter that Texas is highly likely either now or in the

future to incur compliance costs as a result of the rule.” (Id.). Essentially, Texas argues

8 Throughout the briefing, each Party seems to conflate the injury-in-fact standing

requirement with the irreparable harm showing required for a preliminary injunction. At this

stage of the case, the Court agrees that they are essentially two sides of the same coin. Compliance

costs, regardless of who suffers them, will not be recoverable because Defendants are protected

from monetary damages by sovereign immunity. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Thus, any finding of injury-

in-fact due to compliance costs would also support a finding of irreparable harm, and vice versa.

that because so many braces exist, surely at least one brace is owned by a Texas law

enforcement agency. The Court rejects Texas’s request to infer harm; this does not

constitute a “clear showing” of an injury. Texas has failed to meet its Article III burden

of establishing injury-in-fact under the Final Rule in order to merit injunctive relief.

The Court notes that this is only the preliminary injunction stage of this case.

Accordingly, any Party will be able to supplement the record with actual evidence

satisfying the standing requirement at the final merits stage.

B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Court will next evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion by working through

the four preliminary injunction factors articulated by the Fifth Circuit. Clark, 812 F.2d at

993.

1. Substantial Likelihood of Success

The first inquiry is whether a Plaintiff that has standing has established a

substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Id. The Fifth Circuit has already

decided “that the Final Rule fails the logical-outgrowth test and violates the APA.” Mock,

75 F.4th at 578. Because that holding pertained to the ATF’s rulemaking process, any

plaintiff challenging the Final Rule on APA grounds in the Fifth Circuit has the same

likelihood of success.9 Therefore, Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood to succeed on

the merits of their logical-outgrowth claim.

9 Both parties agree that the Court is bound by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mock v.

Garland. (Dkt. No. 73 at 5); (Dkt. No. 74 at 1).

Plaintiffs argue in their supplemental briefing that the Court’s analysis should not

stop there and should address the remaining grounds for setting the Final Rule aside.

(Dkt. No. 73 at 5). Defendants respond that evaluating other grounds would run contrary

to “[f]undamental rules of judicial restraint.” (Dkt. No. 74 at 2). At this stage of the

litigation, the Court agrees with Defendants.

“It goes without saying that constitutional questions should be avoided if there

are independent ‘ground[s] upon which the case may be disposed of.’” Teltech Sys., Inc.

v. Bryant, 702 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347,

56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936)). Since the Fifth Circuit has already decided that the

Final Rule violates the APA, it would be improper for this Court to now evaluate

constitutional issues. Further, the Supreme Court has encouraged lower courts to avoid

expending “’scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of

constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the

case.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565

(2009)). A finding that any of Plaintiffs’ additional claims are likely to succeed on the

merits would not affect the Court’s analysis regarding whether to issue a preliminary

injunction.

Again, this case is only at the preliminary injunction phase. Should the case be in

a different posture at the final merits stage, the Court may find it appropriate to address

the additional claims brought by Plaintiffs at that time.

2. Irreparable Harm10

Plaintiff Brown, according to his declaration, personally owns at least one “AR-15

style firearm in pistol configuration equipped with a stabilizing brace” that would now

constitute an SBR under the Final Rule. (Dkt. No. 16–14 at 2). Plaintiff Brown also owns

a business inventory consisting of at least one more such firearm. (Id.). Plaintiff GOA is

a non-profit organization who, in this suit, represents the interests of its members and

supporters.11 (Dkt. No. 16–13 at 2). GOA exists to advocate for the Second Amendment

rights of its members and supporters, and “routinely litigate[s] cases across the country

in furtherance of [its] mission.” (Id. at 3). These members and supporters include gun

owners across the nation, some of whom “purchase, transfer, possess, own, customize,

accessorize, and utilize” stabilizing braces or weapons equipped with stabilizing braces.

(Id.). Absent an injunction, the Court finds that Brown and the similarly situated

individuals represented by the GOA would be forced to comply with the Final Rule and

therefore suffer irreparable harm.

“A showing of irreparable harm requires a demonstration of ‘harm for which there

is no adequate remedy at law.’” Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th

10 Having found that only Plaintiffs Brown and GOA have established standing, the Court

will not address possible harms to the other Plaintiffs.

11 The Government seems to insist that GOA must assert exactly which individuals are

being represented and how each of them are being irreparably harmed. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5). The

Supreme Court has rejected this requirement. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751

v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546, 116 S. Ct. 1529, 1532, 134 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1996) (explaining that

“individual participation is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or

injunctive relief for its members” (cleaned up)).

Cir. 2013)). Harm is generally irreparable “if it cannot be undone through monetary

remedies.” Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2012)

(cleaned up). And in lawsuits arising from potentially invalid federal rules and

regulations, the federal government “generally enjoy[s] sovereign immunity for any

monetary damages.” Wages & White Lion Invs., 16 F.4th at 1142. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit,

“nonrecoverable costs of complying with a putatively invalid regulation typically

constitute irreparable harm.” Rest. L. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Lab., 66 F.4th 593, 597

(5th Cir. 2023).

Under the Final Rule, compliance will almost always come at a cost. When the

Fifth Circuit sent Mock back to the district court, the court evaluated the irreparable harm,

if any, that several private plaintiffs in the case would suffer. Mock, 2023 WL 6457920,

at *7. Because the Mock plaintiffs owned firearms and stabilizing braces that the Final

Rule would classify as an SBR, the plaintiffs had “no trouble establishing a substantial

threat of irreparable harm in the form of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Id. That logic

is equally applicable here.

The ATF gave affected gun owners until May 31, 2023, to register their stabilizing

braces. 88 Fed. Reg. at 6570. Because that deadline has now passed, complying with the

Final Rule would require the private Plaintiffs to do one of four things: (1) permanently

modify their weapon to remove it from the scope of the NFA, (2) dispose of or “alter”

their stabilizing brace so that it can never be reattached, (3) turn over their weapon to the

ATF, or (4) destroy their weapon completely. Id. As the ATF acknowledges, each of these

avenues come at a cost to gun owners. 12 Furthermore, even if a gun owner had registered

their weapon with the ATF prior to the May 31 deadline, the weapon must still be

“marked,” to reflect its new classification. Id. The ATF estimates that each engraving, or

marking, would cost gun owners anywhere from $30 to $65. Id. at 6563. And as the Fifth

Circuit noted regarding these engraving costs, “[t]here is no given process for undoing

or recouping those compliance costs.” Mock, 75 F.4th at 576 n.29. Thus, under the Final

Rule, Plaintiffs would incur costs regardless of their chosen method of compliance. And

because sovereign immunity would prevent them from recouping their costs from the

ATF, see 5 U.S.C. § 702, GOA and Brown would be irreparably harmed absent injunctive

relief.

3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

“[T]he balance of equities and consideration of the public interest [] are pertinent

in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or permanent.” Winter,

555 U.S. at 32, 129 S.Ct. at 381. This means the Court must “explore the relative harms to

[Plaintiffs] and [Defendants], as well as the interests of the public at large.” Trump v. Int’l

Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017)

(quoting Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305, 112

S. Ct. 1, 3, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1087 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers)).

12 For example, in the ATF’s “Final Regulatory Impact Analysis and Final Regulatory

Flexibility Analysis,” (Dkt. No. 16-9), it estimates the various harms that an individual would

incur by complying with the statute past the registration date: (1) $270 for disposing of a

stabilizing brace, (id. at 60), (2) $567 for adding barrel length to a weapon to remove it from the

“short barrel rifle” classification, (id. at 44), and (3) $2,500 to destroy or turn in the firearm and

brace altogether, (id. at 38).

Plaintiffs argue that no harm befalls the ATF if the Final Rule is enjoined because

that would merely maintain the status quo prior to its promulgation. (Dkt. No. 16 at 30).

In contrast, Plaintiffs urge that they will suffer substantial harm if the Final Rule stays in

effect, citing the threat of prosecution, the destruction of their property that was originally

legal when purchased, and compliance costs for a regulatory scheme that is

unconstitutional, among their concerns. (Dkt. No. 16 at 31); (Dkt. No. 29 at 39–40).

Additionally, they assert “there is no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful

agency action.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 31 (quoting Wages & White Lion Invs., 16 F.4th at 1143).

Defendants respond that the Final Rule benefits public safety by clarifying the law

Congress passed to regulate firearms it determined pose a greater risk to public safety.

(Dkt. No. 22 at 61). In other words, Defendants contend that the public benefits from

greater clarity by the ATF about which weapons are considered SBRs. Defendants further

urge that enjoining the Final Rule would create ambiguity about SBRs that would make

the public less safe. (Id.). Plaintiffs reply that Defendants cannot point to any concrete

public harm prevented by the Final Rule remaining in effect while this suit pends, and

that in the end, the only harm to Defendants is a delay in processing paperwork and

collecting a tax that it has already agreed to waive. (Dkt. No. 29 at 39–40).

The Court finds that the balance of equities tips in Plaintiffs favor because the Final

Rule’s effect on Plaintiffs is immediate and imminent while the effect on Defendants,

especially the ATF, is more administrative and speculative. Defendants’ arguments of

harm to the public are unavailing. Although Defendants can point to a few incidents

where pistols with stabilizing braces were used to harm the public, see (Dkt. No. 22 at 23);

(Dkt. No. 74 at 5–6), the NFA regulates, but does not ban, gun owners from possessing

these weapons. So, permitting the Final Rule to continue in effect would not necessarily

protect the public from any like incidents recurring. Further, the fact that the Final Rule

clarifies for gun owners which criteria the ATF uses to classify braced weapons as SBRs

is beneficial, but its absence—i.e., a return to the lack of direction provided by the ATF

for the last ten years—does not create a public harm if the Final Rule is temporarily

enjoined from enforcement. Conversely, Plaintiffs, who represent a portion of the public,

will suffer imminent harm, as discussed above. See supra III.B.2. While Defendants are

eager to provide improved guidance to gun owners about which weapons are classified

as SBRs, that does not mean that public harm necessarily results absent such guidance.

But for Plaintiffs, a pause in the Final Rule’s effect provides a safe harbor from immediate

injury. Further, Plaintiffs are correct that “there is generally no public interest in the

perpetuation of unlawful agency action,” League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838

F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up), and the Fifth Circuit has already found that the

Final Rule is likely unlawful, see Mock, 75 F.4th at 578. Therefore, the public interest and

balance of equities favor Plaintiffs.

C. SCOPE OF RELIEF

Plaintiffs collectively seek a nationwide injunction. (Dkt. No. 16 at 31). GOA and

GOF argue it is appropriate because their affected members live nationwide. Texas joins

in that request, arguing that piecemeal implementation across the country impacts

criminal prosecutions and fundamental rights. (Id. at 31); (Dkt. No. 29 at 34–35).

Defendants oppose such a broad injunction, asserting that principles of judicial restraint

counsel against granting relief to non-parties, particularly when the Final Rule is subject

to litigation in several other jurisdictions. (Dkt. No. 22 at 62). The Court agrees with

Defendants.

“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often

dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it

presents.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. at 579, 137 S.Ct. at 2087. “The purpose

of such interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties,

. . . but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” Id. at 580, 137 S.Ct. at

2087. “[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation

established[.]” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L.Ed.2d 176

(1979). And the injunctive relief “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than

necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Id. At this stage, only Plaintiffs

GOA and Brown have shown a likelihood of irreparable harm with respect to their

individual compliance costs. Injunctive relief nationwide or within the borders of the

State of Texas would be overbroad to protect the interests of the Parties with standing

before the Court. See VanDerStok v. BlackHawn Mfg. Grp. Inc., No. 4:22-CV-00691, 2022

WL 16680915, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2022) (observing that “an injunction must redress

the plaintiff’s particular injury, and no more”) (cleaned up).

In its May 31, 2023 Order, the Court held that the appropriate scope of the

preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal in Mock was limited. (See Dkt.

No. 51 at 7). Private Plaintiff organizations’ members, including Brown, and those

members’ household family members were entitled to relief from the Final Rule as were

individuals employed directly by the State of Texas or its agencies. (Id.). However, after

revisiting standing and irreparable harm, a different scope of relief is now required.

“Equitable remedies, like remedies in general, are meant to redress the injuries

sustained by a particular plaintiff in a particular lawsuit.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New

York, ____ U.S. ____, 140 S.Ct. 599, 600, 206 L.Ed.2d 115 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

To this end, “[w]hen a district court orders the government not to enforce a rule against

the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court redresses the injury that gives rise to its

jurisdiction in the first place.” Id. “But when a court goes further than that, ordering the

government to take (or not take) some action with respect to those who are strangers to

the suit, it is hard to see how the court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving

cases and controversies.” Id. Although preliminary injunctive relief is warranted, the

Court declines to grant it on a nationwide basis and instead limits relief to Brown, GOA

members, and their resident family members.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. 16). Therefore, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendants and all their respective officers, agents, servants, employees,

attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with

them are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from enforcing and

implementing the Final Rule against Plaintiffs Brady Brown and his

resident family members, as well as GOA’s current members and their

resident family members.

2. This preliminary injunction shall remain in effect pending a final resolution

of the merits of this case or until a further Order from this Court, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or the United States Supreme

Court.

No security bond is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on October 27, 2023.

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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