“Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”
How later courts described this case
- “Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT December 28, 2024
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
ROLISHA D. GOINS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-3248
§
CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT §
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., §
§
Defendant. §
§
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Rolisha Goins sues her former employer, the Clear Creek Independent School District,
alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. Ms. Goins, an African-American woman, worked at
Westbrook Intermediate School as a teacher and coach between August 2016 and July 2023. After
she was notified that the Westbrook Board of Trustees voted to propose the non-renewal of her
employment contract, Ms. Goins resigned from her role. Ms. Goins sues the District, Westbrook’s
principal, Stephanie Cooper, and former District Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources,
Dr. Casey O’Pry, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race
discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge. Both Cooper and O’Pry are Caucasian.
The District, Cooper, and O’Pry move to dismiss Ms. Goins’s amended complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket Entry No. 13). Ms. Goins filed
an untimely response to this motion. (Docket Entry No. 18). The defendants move to strike Ms.
Goins’s response as untimely. (Docket Entry No. 19).
Based on the pleadings, the motion, and the applicable law, the court grants the motion to
dismiss Ms. Goins’s claims against all the defendants. The court denies the motion to strike Ms.
Goins’s complaint. The reasons for these rulings are explained below.
I. Background
Ms. Goins’s employment with the District began in August 2016. (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶
8). She was assigned to work at Westbrook. (Id.). On March 7, 2023, O’Pry informed her that
she was to be placed on administrative leave without pay pending an investigation because she had
left campus early during work hours on several occasions. (Id. ¶ 9). She was informed that during
her administrative leave, she could not enter the building or make contact with any Westbrook
students or personnel. (Id.). On March 28, the HR told Ms. Goins that a recommendation would
be made to the District’s Board of Trustees to not renew her contract. (Id. ¶ 10). HR also told
her that she could, in the alternative, choose to resign and avoid this recommendation. (Id.).
On April 24, the Trustees met to discuss whether Ms. Goins’s contract should be renewed.
(Id. ¶ 11). Ms. Goins appeared at this meeting and opposed the recommendation made to non-
renew her contract “as a continuing act of retaliation and discriminatory treatment based on race,
color, and sex.” (Id.). She also alleges that she “addressed the ongoing harassment and hostile
work environment she experienced at Westbrook Elementary School due to the direct effects of
[Cooper].” (Id.).
On May 11, Ms. Goins requested permission to pick up her personal items from her
classroom. (Id. ¶ 12). The District informed her that she could not collect her items directly, but
that the items would be boxed up for her and brought to the parking lot of one of the school’s
buildings. (Id.). Ms. Goins alleges that when she received the boxes, some items that did not
2
belong to her were included, and some items that did belong to her, such as staplers or hole
punchers, which she had purchased with her own funds, were not included. (Id.).
On May 15, the Board notified Ms. Goins that it had voted to propose nonrenewal of Ms.
Goins’s contract. (Id. ¶ 13). The Board’s letter informed her that she had 15 days to request a
hearing on the proposed nonrenewal. (Id.). Ms. Goins requested a hearing, which the Board set
for June 19. (Id. ¶¶ 13,14). Ms. Goins objected to this date because it fell on the Juneteenth
holiday. (Id. ¶ 15). Upon Ms. Goins’s request, the hearing was rescheduled for July 19. (Id.). On
June 23, the District again suggested to Ms. Goins that she voluntarily resign rather than face a
vote on the nonrenewal of her contract. On the same day, Ms. Goins made another request to the
District that it return her remaining belongings. (Id.). “[U]nder pressure,” Ms. Goins opted for
voluntary resignation to avoid the difficulties that vote of nonrenewal would cause in her search
for future employment. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17).
Ms. Goins resigned on June 27. (Id.). Ms. Goins alleges that the District required her to
waive her right to file a discrimination charge as a condition of her voluntary resignation. (Id. ¶
18). Ms. Goins states that on July 11, she learned that the District had accepted her resignation.
(Id. ¶ 20). On July 17, she was told she could schedule a pick-up of her remaining personal items
from the District. (Id. ¶ 21). She picked up the items on July 19. (Id. ¶ 30).
Ms. Goins alleges that “her forced resignation/termination from [the District] and its
acceptance was the result of a pattern of discrimination and ongoing harassment against her based
upon race, color, and sex.” (Id. ¶ 19). She also alleges that she “was consistently treated differently
by [] Cooper … [as] compared to her white colleagues in a continuous scheme of separate incidents
and acts with the same goal of creating pretexts to terminate and/or remove Plaintiff from her
position.” (Id. ¶ 19). As examples, she alleges that she was: (1) “sanctioned or written up for”
3
using her computer or cell phone for personal use during the school day, or running personal
errands during “a conference break;” and (2) wrongly sanctioned and ultimately terminated for
leaving the school’s campus 10 to 15 minutes early on several occasions to referee basketball
games, which white colleagues regularly did without punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29). Ms. Goins also
alleges that Ms. Cooper created a hostile work environment by: (1) “baseless[ly]” accusing her of
having an inappropriate relationship; (2) requesting that Ms. Goins’s fellow teachers “spy on her;”
(3) asking the school technology department “track” her school-issued laptop use; and (4) changing
or eliminating any positive feedback about her work in written reports. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27).
II. The Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a),
which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Rule 8 “does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must include “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Lincoln
4
v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “[W]hen the
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic
deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the
parties and the court.” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 558).
III. Analysis
A. Threshold Issues
The defendants move to strike Ms. Goins’s response as untimely. (Docket Entry No. 19).
Because the defendants filed their motions to dismiss her first amended complaint on November
5, 2024, her response was due on Tuesday, November 26, 2024. Ms. Goins concurrently filed a
motion for leave to file a response and her response itself on December 2, 2024, in violation of the
local rules for this district. (Docket Entry No. 18). The defendants also assert that Ms. Goins’s
counsel did not attempt to confer with counsel before filing the motion for leave or the response
itself. See S.D. Tex. Local R. 11.4; (Docket Entry No. 19 at 2). Ms. Goins’s response states that
the response was filed late because of an “inadvertent scheduling error.” (Docket Entry No. 18 at
8).
Motions to strike are used to attack “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter” in a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Such motions are viewed
with disfavor and are rarely granted. See 5C Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice And Procedure § 1380 (3d. ed.). The court denies the motion to strike Ms. Goins’s
response.
5
Ms. Goins states in her reply that she seeks to “file this response incorporating her prior
response and exhibits.” (Docket Entry No. 18 at 2). She refers to her prior response to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss her original complaint. (Docket Entry Nos. 8, 11). The motion to
dismiss her original complaint was mooted by the filing of her First Amended Complaint. See
Garcia v. City of Amarillo, Texas, 2018 WL 6272461, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2018) (“[A]n
amended complaint, which supersedes the original complaint as the operative live pleading,
renders moot a motion to dismiss the original complaint.”). A court reviewing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider “(1) the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached
to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201.” Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir.
2019). The court will not consider Ms. Goins’s response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss her
original complaint or any appended exhibits, (Docket Entry No. 8), in deciding the motion to
dismiss Ms. Goins’s First Amended Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 13).
B. The Claims Under Title VII
The defendants assert that Ms. Goins’s claims under Title VII must be dismissed as
untimely. (Docket Entry No. 13 at 14). “To bring a suit under Title VII … a complainant must
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Melgar v.
T.B. Butler Publ'g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). “In Texas, a person claiming
unlawful discrimination or retaliation must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within
300 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.’” Burgess v. Texas Children's
Hosp., 2018 WL 6266906, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018) (quoting EEOC v. WC&M Enters.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2007)). The 300-day limitations period “begins to run from the
time the complainant knows or reasonably should have known that the challenged act has
6
occurred.” Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2000). A discrimination claim
not brought within the filing deadline is time-barred. Mack v. John L. Wortham & Son, L.P., 541
F. App’x 348, 355 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “[A] motion to dismiss for failure to comply with
Title VII's statutory filing period, like other statutes of limitations defenses, is properly decided
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Boone v. Union Carbide Corp., 205 F. Supp.2d 689 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
Ms. Goins filed her EEOC charge on April 18, 2024. (See Docket Entry No. 10 ¶ 1). Three
hundred days before April 18, 2024 is June 23, 2023. The defendants argue that any claims based
on conduct that Ms. Goins alleges to have occurred before June 23, 2023 are time-barred. (Docket
Entry No. 13 at 15). The defendants argue that the 300-day window to file the EEOC charge began
either on the date that the Trustees held a meeting on nonrenewing Ms. Goins’s contract, which
was April 24. Alternatively, they argue that the 300-day period started on the date that Ms. Goins
was informed by letter that the Trustees would propose nonrenewal and suggested that she instead,
voluntarily resign, which was May 15. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 15). Ms. Goins’s untimely
response asserts that it is her voluntary resignation on June 27, after the District “used the threat
of a final vote on the nonrenewal” of her teaching contract, that should be considered the adverse
employment action. (Docket Entry No. 18 at 6).
The court agrees that Ms. Goins’s charge was filed late. The notice that the Trustees would
vote to propose nonrenewal is the adverse employment action at issue, particularly given that Ms.
Goins has admitted she only resigned to avoid a vote of non-renewal. Although Ms. Goins did not
voluntarily resign until June 27, “[t]he operative date from which the limitations period begins to
run is the date of notice of the adverse action, not the date the adverse action takes place," Hartz
v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 275 F. App’x at 287 (5th Cir. 2008). That was on May 15,
7
when Ms. Goins received the District’s letter. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that
when, as here, a plaintiff is told that his or her contract will not be renewed, the limitations period
begins on the last day of employment. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980).
Ms. Goin’s argument that the limitations period began on June 27, the day she tendered her
resignation, is merely a variation on the argument that the Court rejected in Ricks.
Goins appears to rely on the continuing-violation doctrine to extend the limitations period.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the timeline for filing charges with the EEOC may be
extended when the plaintiff experienced ongoing discrimination. “Where it is applicable, the
continuing violation doctrine applies to excuse the 300-day exhaustion requirement only as to the
course of conduct that constitutes that violation.” Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir.
1998). “[T]he continuing violation doctrine embraces two types of cases. The first includes cases
in which the original violation occurred outside the statute of limitations, but is closely related to
other violations that are not time-barred. In such cases, recovery may be had for all violations, on
the theory that they are part of one, continuing violation.” Hendrix v. Yazoo City, 911 F.2d 1102,
1103 (5th Cir. 1990).
Ms. Goins asserts that the District’s failures, over the course of nine weeks, to return her
self-purchased school supplies in a timely fashion are closely related discriminatory acts that
should serve to extend the limitations period on her claims. The court disagrees. For an
employment action to be considered materially adverse, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345
(2006). The District’s failure to timely return Ms. Goins’s school supplies cannot be said to
dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. This is
8
particularly so because Ms. Goins made two requests for the return of the items, once on May 11
and again on June 23, and ultimately received the items. Compare Kwong v. Christus Health, 2023
WL 3437302 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 2023) (holding that the plaintiff had experienced a materially
adverse employment action where employer repeatedly delayed in returning the plaintiff’s
personal items over a period of over four months, threatened to destroy them if she did not pick
them up by a certain date, and finally shipped them to plaintiff’s home where they arrived in
damaged condition).
“The second type of continuing violation is one in which an initial violation, outside the
statute of limitations, is repeated later; in this case, each violation begins the limitations period
anew, and recovery may be had for at least those violations that occurred within the period of
limitations.” Hendrix, 911 F.2d at 1103. This second type is inapplicable. Ms. Goins does not
allege multiple instances of the Trustees proposing to vote for nonrenewal of her contract over a
period of years, but rather only a single instance.
Equitable tolling may serve to extend the filing deadline when a plaintiff alleging
discrimination under Title VII fails to file their charge within the 300-day window. See Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (“Filing a timely charge of discrimination
with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that,
like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). A plaintiff bears
the burden to justify equitable tolling, which courts apply “sparingly.” Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc.
636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 113 (2002)). Under Fifth Circuit precedent, three grounds may support equitable tolling in
Title VII cases: (1) the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2) the
plaintiff’s unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because the defendant intentionally
9
concealed them; and (3) the EEOC’s misleading the plaintiff about the nature of the rights.
Granger, 636 F.3d at 712. Ms. Goins fails to state facts that would allow the court to infer that
any of these three grounds would apply.
C. The Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
a. Race Discrimination
Ms. Goins’s complaint is construed as alleging both racially disparate treatment as well as
a racially hostile work environment in violation of § 1981 and § 1983. (Docket Entry No. 7 ¶¶ 31-
40).
“Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual
relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so
long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual
relationship.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). “In a commercial
context, in order to establish a prima facie case under § 1981, the plaintiff must show that (1) he
or she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis
of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the
statute.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2004).
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an individual of
federally guaranteed rights ‘under color’ of state law.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804
F.3d 398, 411 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (2012)). “One such
federal right is conferred by the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits a state from ‘denying to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” Id. at 412 (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1). In order to “state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause and section 1983, the plaintiff must allege” in her complaint that “[she] received treatment
10
different from that received by similarly situated individuals and that (2) the unequal treatment
stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Id. (quoting Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414, 424
(5th Cir. 2004)).
The Fifth Circuit has held that the “inquiry into intentional discrimination is essentially the
same for individual actions brought under sections 1981 and 1983, and Title VII.” Caldwell v.
Lozano, 689 Fed. Appx. 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2017). Where as here, there is no direct evidence of
racial animus, the racial discrimination claims under § 1981 and § 1983 are analyzed under the
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Jackson v. Cal-
W.Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010)
Under this framework, Ms. Goins bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. For her prima facie case, she must show that she (1) is a member of a
protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some
adverse employment action by her employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside her
protected group or was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside the
protected group. Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2021). It is undisputed
that Ms. Goins is a member of a protected group, was qualified for her position, and suffered an
adverse employment action by her employer. The question is whether her complaint alleges facts
sufficient to infer that Ms. Goins was treated less favorably than similarly situated white
employees.
The court finds that Ms. Goins’s allegations fail to satisfy this fourth element. “To show
that someone is a comparator, a plaintiff must show that the proffered comparator and the plaintiff:
‘(1) held the same job or responsibilities; (2) shared the same supervisor or had their employment
status determined by the same person; (3) have essentially comparable violation histories; and (4)
11
have engaged in nearly identical conduct’ that resulted in the adverse employment action at issue.”
Thornton v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 2787886 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2024) (quoting
Ross v. Judson Indep. School Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2021)). Ms. Goins alleges that she
wrongly sanctioned and ultimately terminated for leaving the school’s campus 10-15 minutes early
on several occasions to referee basketball games, for using her computer or cell phone for personal
use during the school day, and for running personal errands during “conference breaks.” (Docket
Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 22, 29). She alleges that white colleagues regularly did the same and were not
disciplined for these actions. (Id.).
These allegations fail to indicate that white employees who left campus early to referee
sports competitions were similarly situated to Ms. Goins as to their job titles, supervisors, or
disciplinary histories. She alleges only that they were white, part of the coaching staff, and “arrived
at the site of the games at the same time.” (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 29). Similarly, Ms. Goins’s
allegations that she was “sanctioned for the same or similar commonplace activity as white
colleagues,” such as using electronics for personal use or running errands during the school day,
provide insufficient detail to infer that the white colleagues in question were similarly situated.
Without more, the court cannot infer that any comparators were similarly situated to Ms. Goins.
Her prima facie case for racially disparate treatment fails.
To state a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must plead facts that could show:
(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3)
the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Daywalker v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 641 F. Supp. 3d 362 (S.D. Tex. 2022)
(alterations adopted) (citing Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)). The
12
harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment,” and it cannot be “measured in
isolation.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “A hostile
work environment exists when the workplace is ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment.’” Johnson v. Halstead, 916 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993)).
Ms. Goins claims that she “was subjected to unwelcome harassment and discrimination
based on her race and color” and that “Defendants’ race, color based harassment and
discrimination concerned Plaintiff’s employment contract, caused a hostile work environment and
were [a] continuous pattern of similar acts.” (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 34, 39). She alleges that the
District, Cooper, and O’Pry created a racially hostile work environment by falsely accusing her of
conducting an inappropriate relationship with a student, requesting that Ms. Goins’s fellow
teachers “keep tabs” on her, asking the school technology department “track” her school-issued
laptop use, and changing or eliminating positive feedback about her work in written reports.
(Docket Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 24-27). But “[a]ctionable harassment must involve ‘racially
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insults.’” Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000)). Ms. Goins “has not
demonstrated how such harassment has a racial character or purpose.” Narasirisinlapa v. SBC
Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 WL 832509, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2006). Her claims fail as to the third
element because she pleads no facts indicating a relationship between her race and the alleged
harassment by the District, Cooper, and O’Pry. Taking all of Ms. Goins’s allegations as true and
13
drawing reasonable inferences in her favor, she has not alleged facts raising an inference that she
was either treated less favorably or harassed because of her race.
b. Retaliation
Ms. Goins alleges that the District, O’Pry, and Cooper unlawfully retaliated against her for
“[c]hallenging and complaining about harassment and discrimination based on race and color.”
(Docket Entry No. 10 ¶ 44). Fifth Circuit precedent establishes that claims for retaliation under
Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 are analyzed “under the same rubric of analysis.” Johnson v.
Halstead, 916 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Davis v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 Fed.
Appx. 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2011). “Suit must be brought under Section 1983, however, as Section
1981 does not itself provide for an independent cause of action.” Davis, 448 Fed. Appx. at 491).
To state a prima facie case for retaliation under § 1981 and § 1983, a plaintiff must plead
facts showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). Ms. Goins alleges
that the defendants retaliated against her because she “filed a formal complaint of discrimination
against [the District] and Cooper on or about May 27, 2021.” (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶ 44). She
also asserts that she engaged in protected activity by appearing at a public meeting of the District’s
Trustees in opposition to the recommendation of nonrenewal of her contract, and that the District
retaliated against her as a result. (Id.).
The defendants assert that Ms. Goins’s retaliation claims fail as to causation, because she
asserts “no discriminatory, harassing or retaliatory conduct or actions by Defendants between May
27, 2021, and March 7, 2023, when the Plaintiff received notice that she was being placed on
administrative leave.” (Docket Entry No. 13 at 16). Causation requires the plaintiff to point to
14
evidence showing that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but-for the
protected conduct. See Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2005). “At the
prima facie case [stage], a plaintiff can meet his burden of causation simply by showing close
enough timing between his protected activity and his adverse employment action.” Garcia v.
Prof’l Contract Servs., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019).
Ms. Goins alleges a series of harassing and discriminatory acts, including asking other
teachers to spy on her, and writing her up for using her personal devices during the school day.
(Docket Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 22-27, 29). However, Ms. Goins asserts only that these acts “occurred
over the course of her tenure,” which began much earlier than the formal complaint of
discrimination that she made on May 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 22). For temporal proximity to serve as
evidence of retaliation, the “protected act and the adverse employment action must be very close
in time to establish causation by timing alone.” Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).
Fifth Circuit precedent establishes that periods of two and a half months, two months, and six and
a half weeks are close enough to show a causal connection. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.,
969 F.3d 571, 578 (5th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Ms. Goins does not allege when these acts
occurred in relation to her formal complaint in May 2021. This record does not support an
inference of causation.
Ms. Goins also asserts that the statements that she made during the April 24, 2023
hearing—that she opposed the recommendation made to non-renew her contract “as a continuing
act of retaliation and discriminatory treatment based on race and color bias”—were protected
activity. (Docket Entry No. 18 at 8). She asserts that the defendants retaliated against her by
voting to propose nonrenewal on May 15th. (Id. at 4). The defendants argue that on March 28,
15
HR told Ms. Goins that the Trustees would receive a recommendation of nonrenewal unless she
resigned. (See Docket Entry No. 13 at 26; Docket Entry No. 18 at 7). The defendants contend that
Ms. Goins “cannot establish retaliation for engaging in protected activity that happened after the
decision has been made about an adverse employment activity.” (Docket Entry No. 13 at 26 n.4).
“Complaining to supervisors about racial harassment,” as Ms. Goins alleges she did during
the April 24 hearing, “is a protected activity.” Carrera v. Commercial Coating Servs. Int’l, Ltd.,
422 F. App’x 334, 339 (5th Cir. 2011). But the court agrees with the defendants that Ms. Goins’s
allegation that that HR informed her of its plan to recommend proposing nonrenewal on March
28, four weeks before Ms. Goins’s complaints of discrimination on April 24, defeats causation.
“[A]dverse action before engaging in a protected activity cannot form the basis of a retaliation
claim as there is no causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action as necessary to state a claim for retaliation.” Thomas v. Burrows, 2023 WL 1783694, at *8
(E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2023) (quoting reference omitted). Ms. Goins’s retaliation claims fail because
she cannot show that her protected activity caused the District, Cooper, and O’Pry to retaliate
against her.
c. Constructive Discharge
Ms. Goins alleges that she was constructively discharged in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and §1983. She claims that she was “constructively discharged and forced to resign due to
Defendants[’] continuing course of racially discriminatory acts and harassment.” (Docket Entry
No. 10 ¶ 49). She further states that she “underwent an [sic] extended period of being banned from
her worksite and was ultimately forced to resign from her position.” (Id. ¶ 52). To state a claim
for constructive discharge, Ms. Goins “must allege facts showing that because of [her] race, [she]
was subjected to ‘working conditions that were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would
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have felt compelled to resign.’” King/Morocco v. Ron Carter Hyundai, 2019 WL 13468696, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2019) (alterations adopted) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brown v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2001). “A valid hostile work environment claim is a
‘lesser included component’ of the ‘graver’ constructive discharge claim. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. U.S. Drug Mart, Inc., No. 23-50075, 2024 WL 64766, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024).
Ms. Goins’s claim for constructive discharge fails for the same reason that her claim for
hostile work environment fails – because she alleges no facts that would allow the court to infer
that she was compelled to resign because of her race. As with her claims for hostile work
environment, Ms. Goins “offers only her subjective belief that race was a motivating factor in this
dispute, which is insufficient to state a claim for race-based harassment.” Dixon v. Moore Wallace,
Inc., 2006 WL 1949501, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2006), aff'd, 236 F. App’x 936 (5th Cir. 2007)
d. Qualified Immunity
Because the court finds that Ms. Goins has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted as to her claims under Title VII, which must be dismissed as time-barred, and as to her
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 for failure to plead all of the required elements, the
court does not reach the question of the District’s, Cooper’s and O’Pry’s qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion
The court grants the motion to dismiss Rolisha Goins’s first amended complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket Entry No. 13). The court denies the
motion to strike the response to the motion to dismiss. (Docket Entry No. 13).
Ms. Goins’s claims are dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. The court
will separately enter a final judgment.
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SIGNED on December 26, 2024, at Houston, Texas.
LW CrTeo
Lee H. Rosenthal
United States District Judge
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