Case law

Commonwealth v. Markun

185 A.3d 1026 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · May 1, 2018

As described by the United States Supreme Court: The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established … Pearson’s description of qualified immunity as providing immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability, describes this situation.

Galette, C. v. NJ Transit

293 A.3d 649 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 21, 2023

Accordingly, we will not discuss her further. 2 It is well-established that “a defense of governmental immunity is an absolute defense and is non-waivable,” thus, “it may be raised at any time[.]” Snead v. … Specifically, the Court has recognized that the historical circumstances of the passage of the Eleventh Amendment clearly evince an intent “to preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits.”

Yoder, J. v. McCarthy Const., Inc

291 A.3d 1 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 31, 2023

Whether [JNOV] is required because [McCarthy] is clearly entitled to statutory[-]employer immunity? 2. … McCarthy’s Brief at 9.11 First Issue In McCarthy’s first issue, it asserts that JNOV is required because it is clearly entitled to statutory-employer immunity. Id. at 20.

Barber v. Lynch

275 Pa. Super. 333 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 7, 1980

and qualified privilege or immunity. … The preliminary objections of Appellees do not specifically use the term “qualified privilege” or “qualified immunity”.

Boyle, J. v. Meyer, J.

2025 Pa. Super. 198 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 9, 2025

Grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper “only when the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.” Id. … Defendants contend that - 13 - J-A17017-25 the PREP Act establishes a liberal causation standard to invoke immunity, requiring only that a covered countermeasure has “played some

Com. v. Echols-Mccullough, M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 23, 2025

at 26 (“possession of a handgun as alleged in the information clearly qualifies as keeping and bearing arms”). … Further, Appellant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order a new trial because the evidence was so shockingly tenuous, vague, and/or uncertain.

Walsh v. Borczon

2005 Pa. Super. 256 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 11, 2005

Vincent Hospital’s (“hospital’s”) motions for summary judgment based upon the qualified immunity the Act affords mental health care providers unless they have committed gross negligence; and whether patient has waived her … challenge to physician’s claim to a qualified immunity under the Act by failing to raise that argument in opposition to physician’s motion for summary judgment.

Jones, B. v. McGreevy, D.

270 A.3d 1 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 11, 2022

This claim is meritless, as the record clearly establishes that McGreevy was the sole beneficiary and sole trustee of the separate share trust created by his deceased father. … immune and exempt from attachment, levy and execution.

Kelly v. Thackray Crane Rental, Inc.

2005 Pa. Super. 169 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · May 5, 2005

In McDonald , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established the test for determining whether a party qualifies as a statutory employer under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. … According to the McDonald Court, a party must establish the following elements to qualify as a statutory employer: (1) An employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner. (2) Premises occupied

Com. v. Nunez, O.

238 A.3d 420 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 14, 2020

Further, “[t]he burden of proof under the [Act] is not on the Commonwealth; rather, the defendant must establish that he is entitled to immunity under the Act.” Commonwealth v. … In sum, because Appellant did not qualify for immunity under the Act, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm his judgment of sentence.

McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., Inc.

724 A.2d 938 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 22, 1998

(“Lepore”), qualifies as a statutory employer. … Thus, the requisite vertical relationship between Heneo, Le-pore, and Hamada is established.

Wagner v. Waitlevertch

2001 Pa. Super. 100 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 30, 2001

Did the trial court err in dismissing the case before discovery could be conducted to determine the respective roles of the Defendants and whether or not either or both were entitled to qualified immunity? … Because we have concluded that Appellant failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, we need not address Appellant’s second issue regarding Appellees’ defenses of qualified immunity.

Com. v. Nunez, O.

2020 Pa. Super. 198 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 14, 2020

Further, “[t]he burden of proof under the [Act] is not on the Commonwealth; rather, the defendant must establish that he is entitled to immunity under the Act.” Commonwealth v. … In sum, because Appellant did not qualify for immunity under the Act, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm his judgment of sentence.

Potts v. Step By Step, Inc.

2011 Pa. Super. 150 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 22, 2011

Gross Negligence Although the MHMRA does not define gross negligence, our Supreme Court has established a definition in relation to the immunity provision of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. § 7114, a provision … The Court specifically stated that requiring mental health employees and employers to defend jury trials where only ordinary negligence has been established “would gut the limited immunity provision ... of any meaning and

Hinkal, M. v. Pardoe, G.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 22, 2016

J-E03010-15 to be qualified to follow a doctor’s orders are in fact so qualified, and accept responsibility for their actions.” … the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is

Patton v. Worthington Associates, Inc.

2012 Pa. Super. 74 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 27, 2012

The Peck decision states that "we endorse the principle that, for purposes of Section 203 statutory employer immunity, statutory employer status should be found only where all five elements of the McDonald test are clearly … Peck, 814 A.2d at 189 (a general contractor who meets the McDonald test qualifies as the statutory employer and is immune from suit by the subcontractor's employee).

Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Fulton County

195 Pa. Super. 517 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 15, 1961

It is generally true, that all property not clearly exempt from taxation and within the purview of taxing statutes is subject to tax'. … To qualify, therefore, for *521 tax exemption it must be established that the property is being used for a public purpose and, while a declaration by the legislature as to the existence of a public purpose is entitled to

McKibben v. Schmotzer

700 A.2d 484 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 11, 1997

Her exercise of “significant policy-making functions as the most important public official in the Borough of [Dormont, Mayor Schmotzer] clearly qualifies as a ‘high public official’ under the criteria established in Montgomery … Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1199 (Mayor of Yeadon qualifies as a “high public official”).

Geronimo, J. v. Commonwealth Environmental Systems

2026 Pa. Super. 56 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 23, 2026

See Appellee brief at 13- 14, 16-17.5 For the following reasons, we agree that CES failed to establish either of the “importance” or the “irreparable loss” prongs of the collateral order doctrine. … For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying the joint request for a stay does not qualify as a collateral order. Appeal quashed.

Hughesville Borough School District v. Wolf Township School District

40 Pa. Super. 311 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 14, 1909

That is, if a township without a high school were surrounded by two or more townships in which there were high schools, the children qualified for entrance to the high school which they propose to attend would be entitled … Seldom do we find a title to an act of assembly which more clearly indicates its scope and contents than the one under consideration.