Geronimo, J. v. Commonwealth Environmental Systems

J-A25024-25 2026 PA Super 56

JUSTO ALCALA GERONIMO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

COMMONWEALTH ENVIRONMENTAL :

SYSTEMS, L.P., AND GOLDEN EAGLE :

STAFFING : No. 31 EDA 2025

:

:

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH :

ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS, L.P. :

Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at

No(s): 240800427

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2026

Commonwealth Environmental Systems, L.P. (“CES”) appeals from the

interlocutory order denying a self-styled “Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings”

filed by CES and co-defendant Golden Eagle Staffing.1 This joint motion

sought to stay a personal injury action filed by Justo Acala Geronimo, a

temporary laborer, in civil court, pending an appeal to the workers’

compensation appeal board (“the Board”) as to whether CES, as the owner of

the premises, or Golden Eagle Staffing is the statutory employer pursuant to

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Golden Eagle Staffing did not participate in this appeal.

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Section 302(b) of Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”).2 For

the following reasons, we quash the appeal.

Mr. Geronimo’s civil action alleges that he was injured on February 3,

2023, while working at CES’s landfill as a temporary laborer employed by

Golden Eagle Staffing, which contracted with CES to staff the landfill. See

Complaint, 8/2/24, at ¶¶ 9-12. While Mr. Geronimo was tending to waste

material at the landfill, a large fence fell on him, causing severe injuries that

led to the amputation of his left leg below the knee. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 18.

However, before initiating a civil suit, Mr. Geronimo first filed with the

Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry a claim for worker’s

compensation. On July 12, 2024, a workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”)

determined that CES was the statutory employer, and therefore financially

responsible to Mr. Geronimo under the Act. One day prior to the

commencement of the tort action against both CES and Golden Eagle Staffing,

CES, through its workers’ compensation insurer, appealed the WCJ decision.

That appeal remains pending before the Board. Subject to the Board’s

decision, CES is currently determined to be the legal employer under the Act.

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2 Codified at 77 P.S. §§ 461-62, the statutory employer doctrine provides that,

based on the determination of five enumerated factors, a contractor who

subcontracts part of the work may be liable for workers’ compensation

benefits paid to the subcontractor’s injured employees in exchange for tort

immunity. See Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 325 A.3d 691, 703

(Pa.Super. 2024) (“If either section . . . is applicable, a statutory employer “is

immune from suit by an injured worker for common law negligence[.]”).

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Meanwhile, back in the trial court, on November 4, 2024, CES filed the

pertinent joint motion requesting the trial court to stay the tort action at the

discovery stage until the Board decides whether CES or Golden Staffing was

the statutory employer. The motion asserted that because the Act limits an

employer’s financial liability to an injured employee to statutory remedies, the

Board’s decision is “crucial to determining which parties are responsible for

compensating [Mr. Geronimo] for his injuries pursuant to the . . . Act, and

which may remain potentially exposed to . . . the present litigation.” Joint

Motion to Stay, 11/4/24, at ¶ 16. The defendants below argued that

proceeding with the tort action would prejudice whichever party was

ultimately determined to be the statutory employer, as it would be immune to

Mr. Geronimo’s tort claims.3 They reasoned, “litigation here against both

[d]efendants simultaneously would expend unnecessary resources by all the

parties, as one [d]efendant will inevitably be found to be [Mr. Geronimo’s]

employer, preventing [him] from pursuing claims against the same in the

instant matter.” Id. at ¶ 18.

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3 The Act exempts employers from tort liability thusly:

The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and

in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal

representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin

or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or

otherwise on account of any injury or death[.]

77 P.S. § 481(a) (footnotes omitted).

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The trial court denied the motion. CES filed a timely appeal and

complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of errors

complained of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). It presents five issues for our

review:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused

its discretion because it has allowed [Mr. Geronimo] to illegally

pursue a tort claim against its employer in direct violation of the

Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481(a)?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or

otherwise abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s Motion to

Stay Proceedings until the resolution of the appeal before the

Workers’ Compensation Board of Appeals, which will confirm

Appellee’s rightful employer, and thereby which entity’s financial

liability for Plaintiff’s injuries will be exclusive and in place of any

and all other liability?

3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused

its discretion by refusing to genuinely take into account

Appellant’s arguments in support of its Motion to Stay

Proceedings?

4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused

its discretion by taking into account improper/impermissible

arguments by [Mr. Geronimo] within [his] untimely opposition to

the Motion to Stay Proceedings?

5. Whether the trial court further erred as a matter of law and/or

abused its discretion by continuing to adjudicate motions filed by

[Mr. Geronimo] after the case had been appealed to the Superior

Court, thereby exacerbating the potential for confusion, delay,

and contradictory rulings?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

As the December 16, 2024 order denying CES’s motion to stay the tort

litigation is interlocutory, we begin our analysis by assessing whether it is an

appealable, collateral order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

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Procedure 313.4 The appealability of an order pursuant to the collateral order

doctrine is a question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary. See Lobos Management v. Powell, 330

A.3d 438, 441 (Pa.Super. 2025).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court codified the collateral order doctrine

in Rule 313, which provides as follows:

(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from

a collateral order of a trial court or other government unit.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved

is too important to be denied review and the question presented

is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case,

the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313.

Our High Court recently outlined the relevant principles as follows:

The definition of a collateral order contains three prongs. To

qualify as a collateral order: “(1) the order must be separable

from, and collateral to, the main cause of action; (2) the right

involved must be too important to be denied review; and (3) the

question presented must be such that if review is postponed until

after final judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost.”

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4 The order is not appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311, and CES

did not request permission to appeal the interlocutory order as authorized by

Pa.R.A.P 312. Rather, it invoked Rule 313, relating to collateral orders, as the

basis for this court’s jurisdiction. See Appellant’s brief at vi. Prior to the

appeal being assigned to this panel, Mr. Geronimo filed with this Court an

“Application to Quash” the appeal as interlocutory. On March 3, 2024, this

Court denied the request for relief without prejudice to Mr. Geronimo’s ability

to file a new application after the appeal was assigned to the merits panel.

Mr. Geronimo revived the quashal request in his appellee brief, and CES filed

a reply brief arguing in favor of finding that the appealed-from order satisfies

Rule 313’s definition of a collateral order.

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Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 248 (2011) (citing

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b)). The collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly

construed, and each of the three prongs of the standard must be

clearly present. J.C.D. [v. A.L.R.], 303 A.3d[ 425,] 430 ([Pa].

2023).

Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826, at 831-32 (Pa. 2026) (citation

altered).

As noted, the three essential elements of a collateral order are

“separability, importance, and irreparable loss.” Commonwealth v.

Pownall, 278 A.3d 885, 902 (Pa. 2022). Instantly, CES appeals the trial court

order denying the joint motion to stay the trial court proceedings. Orders

concerning the stay of a civil proceeding are generally considered separable.

See, e.g., Keesee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“[I]ssue

concerning the denial of their motion to stay the civil proceedings . . . can be

decided without reaching the merits of [the] underlying causes of action.

Therefore, the first prong of the collateral order doctrine has been satisfied.”)

As to the second and third prongs of the collateral order doctrine, CES

contends that the right it asserts concerning the Act’s application is too

important to be denied review because it implicates the “ongoing litigation of

a claim against a statutory employer . . . [that] is in direct violation of [the

Act”]. Appellant’s reply brief at 2. Asserting that “it is inarguable that the

violation of an existing statute implicates public policy,” CES continues that it

would suffer irreparable harm if it was forced to incur significant litigation

expenses in defending ongoing tort litigation that might prove unnecessary.

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Id. at 2-3; see also Appellant brief at 5, 7, 8-9 (outlining costs and sanctions

associated with ongoing discovery).

Mr. Geronimo counters that (1) the harm CES alleges is purely

speculative; and (2) CES failed to demonstrate that the claim will be

irreparably lost absent immediate appellate review. See Appellee brief at 13-

14, 16-17.5 For the following reasons, we agree that CES failed to establish

either of the “importance” or the “irreparable loss” prongs of the collateral

order doctrine.

Historically, neither speculative claims nor a party’s interest in limiting

the costs of litigation has been deemed a sufficient cause for a collateral

appeal. See Gunn v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 971 A.2d

505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“Appellant's interest in conserving the resources

of the parties and avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation preparation does

not constitute a sufficiently compelling interest so important and deeply rooted

in public policy as to qualify for immediate appellate review.”). As we

explained in Gunn, generally, “speculative concerns do not rise to the level of

a right too important to be denied immediate appellate review.” Id. at 512.

Further, beyond the speculative litigation expenses, CES’s right to invoke

statutory immunity under the Act will not be irrevocably lost because CES can

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5 Upon the application of Mr. Geronimo’s counsel, Harris Pogust, Esquire, we

admitted Brenna Legaard, Esquire, pro hac vice for purposes of this appeal in

association with Attorney Pogust, who remained attorney of record.

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always invoke immunity once the Board determines that it is the statutory

employer.

As to the potentially unnecessary costs of litigation if CES were not

permitted to immediately appeal the interlocutory order denying the stay, our

Supreme Court recently addressed a similar issue in Chilutti. There, it held

that the trial court order staying civil litigation pending the result of arbitration

was not a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313(b). In so doing, the High

Court distinguished the facts of that case from the facts involved in Pridgen

v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 427 (Pa. 2006), adhered to on

reargument, 916 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2007), which we discuss infra, and expressly

rejected the proposition that the potential expenditure of substantial litigation

expenses is sufficient to meet the third prong of the collateral order doctrine.

Id. at *6. It explained,

[t]his Court has focused on the cost of litigation in assessing the

third prong of the collateral order doctrine on at least one

occasion, [Pridgen,] but that ruling was premised upon federal

law supporting a clear policy of cost containment in aviation

litigation. If expenditure of resources when such expenditure

could be avoided through an interlocutory appeal sufficed for

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 purposes, then

every interlocutory order presumably would satisfy the irreparable

loss prong of the collateral order rule. The exception would devour

the rule.

Chilutti, 349 A.3d at 834 (quoting J.C.D. , 303 A.3d at 442-43 (Pa. 2023)

(Wecht, J. concurring)) (cleaned up). As the arbitration dispute involved

neither a legislative policy to contain litigation costs or a claim of immunity,

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the Supreme Court concluded that “Pridgen simply is inapplicable to this

matter.” Id.

Surprisingly, although Chilutti had not been decided when the parties

briefed their respective positions, neither party nor the trial court discussed

the Supreme Court’s holding in Pridgen, which arguably supports the notion

that, in certain situations similar to the case at bar, the expenditure of

substantial litigation expenses may satisfy the third prong of the collateral

order rule. Considering our de novo review of an order’s appealability

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, and Pridgen’s potential applicability

here, further review of that case is warranted.

Pridgen involved the denial of a motion for summary judgment that

was based upon the eighteen-year statute of repose outlined in the General

Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”). The purpose of GARA was, at

least in part, to “limit excessive product liability costs, while at the same time

affording fair treatment to persons injured in general aviation aircraft

accidents.” H.R.Rep. No. 103–525(I). Phrased differently, the statute of

repose was enacted in order to combat “the tremendous increase in the

[aviation] industry's liability insurance costs.” Id. The central idea was,

“freed from excessive liability costs, manufacturers will be able to sell aircraft

at lower prices[,] . . . spend more on research and development[, and] . . .

compete with foreign companies.” Id. As our High Court explained in its

opinion on reargument, “the legislative history makes clear that Congress

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enacted GARA to ameliorate the impact of long-tail liability on a declining

American aviation industry in furtherance of the national interest.” Pridgen

v. Parker Hannifin, Corp., 916 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. 2007) (Pridgen II).

We previously summarized Pridgen’s relevant facts as follows:

A thirty-one-year-old Piper PA32–260 airplane crashed on

departure from a local Ohio airport in 1999, killing or seriously

injuring all aboard. Representatives of the victims commenced

civil actions in negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty

against the designer, manufacturer, seller, overhauler, and

repairer of the Lycoming engine that was installed in the aircraft.

Defendants asserted GARA's statute of repose as a bar to the

action.

In re Reglan Litig., 72 A.3d 696, 700 (Pa.Super. 2013). The trial court

denied summary judgment, we quashed the appeal, and our Supreme Court

reversed. In concluding that the order was immediately appealable pursuant

to Rule 313(b), the High Court reasoned,

the substantial cost that [a]ppellants will incur in defending this

complex litigation at a trial on the merits comprises a sufficient

loss to support allowing interlocutory appellate review as of right,

in light of the clear federal policy to contain such costs in the public

interest. Consistent with [a]ppellees’ arguments, we realize that

future litigants may seek to extend our determination here more

broadly to other statutes of repose. Nevertheless, balancing the

potential vindication of the interest in freedom from tort claims

created by Congress through GARA against the state interest in

curtailing piecemeal appellate review, we find that the former

prevails relative to the review of controlling legal issues in the

present cases.

Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433 (footnote omitted).

Thus, on its face, Pridgen would appear to support the conclusion that

the issue concerning the requested stay of the tort proceedings pending the

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determination of the statutory employer involves an important issue that will

be irreparably lost if review of the stay denial is postponed until final

judgment. Indeed, like Pridgen, the instant case involves potential immunity

under a statutory framework that implicates litigation cost savings. However,

for the reasons that follow, Pridgen’s perceived applicability to this case is

ephemeral.

First, while undoubtedly meaningful to CES, the costs associated with

the instant tort litigation are significantly less substantial than those incurred

in complex litigation, like product liability cases involving the design,

manufacture, and repair of aviation engines. Indeed, as to the specific

discovery-related costs that CES seeks to avoid at the early stage of the tort

litigation, i.e., responding to interrogatories, requests for admissions, and

production of documents, either CES or its insurer will nevertheless incur in

defending the workers’ compensation claim. Hence, the relative resources

sought to be preserved by staying the litigation are markedly different in this

case from those associated with the complex litigation at issue in Pridgen.

More importantly, unlike the statute of repose at issue in Pridgen, tort

immunity is not the Act’s fundamental objective. While immunity is an

important component of the Act, it is merely a pecuniary means to a

benevolent end. Indeed, the Act’s immunity provisions do not inure to the

statutory employer’s independent benefit. In actuality, the Act provides tort

immunity not for the financial benefit of any specific employer, company, or

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industry, but rather as an incentive for employers to compensate injured

employees under the statutory scheme. This humanitarian objective in no

way mirrors GARA’s clear federal policy to contain litigation costs for what was

then viewed as a struggling industry.

Accordingly, insofar as cost containment is not the fundamental

objective of the Act’s immunity provision, this case aligns with the general

rule outlined in Chilutti, rather than the narrow policy-based exception

favoring a specific industry that was at issue in Pridgen. It necessarily follows

that, like the Chilutti Court concluded in that case, Pridgen is inapplicable

here. See Chilutti 349 A.3d at 834 (reasoning, “[i]f expenditure of resources

when such expenditure could be avoided through an interlocutory appeal

sufficed for Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 purposes, then

every interlocutory order presumably would satisfy the irreparable loss prong

of the collateral order rule [and t]he exception would devour the rule.”)

For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying the joint

request for a stay does not qualify as a collateral order.

Appeal quashed.

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Date: 03/23/2026

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