Com. v. Echols-Mccullough, M.

J-S45009-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MALIQUE NASIR ECHOLS- :

MCCULLOUGH :

: No. 324 MDA 2024

Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-21-CR-0000480-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: APRIL 23, 2025

Appellant, Malique Nasir Echols-McCullough, appeals from the judgment

of sentence entered on December 19, 2023, following his convictions for

persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license,

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine) (hereinafter

“PWID”), and simple possession of a controlled substance (marijuana).1 We

affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. On February 10, 2023, Officer Daniel Antoni of the West Shore

Regional Police Department observed a blue Lincoln sedan with heavily tinted

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), 35 P.S.

§ 780-113(a)(30), and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), respectively. The

Commonwealth also charged Appellant with resisting arrest pursuant to 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, but Appellant was found not guilty of this offense at trial.

J-S45009-24

windows driving in the vicinity of Fifth and Market Streets in Lemoyne,

Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Officer Antoni pursued the vehicle over

the Market Street Bridge and effectuated a traffic stop on Front Street in

Harrisburg City, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Officer Antoni approached

the vehicle and requested identification from all three occupants. Appellant

was seated on the rear right passenger side of the vehicle.2 In response to

Officer Antoni’s inquiry, Appellant searched for identification inside a black bag

on his lap. As Appellant searched for identification, Officer Antoni observed a

firearm in the bag. After observing the firearm, Officer Antoni “asked

everyone in the car if anyone was on probation or parole,” and Appellant

“advised he was on state probation or parole” for a prior PWID conviction.

N.T., 8/28/2023, at 13 and 20-21. Because Appellant could not legally

possess a firearm as a felon on probation or parole, the police arrested

Appellant. In a subsequent search, the police recovered a loaded “Glock 27”

firearm, an extended magazine with nine rounds of ammunition, a bag of

marijuana, and a digital scale from the black bag on Appellant’s lap. Id. at

13 and 22. Police also recovered 22 grams of cocaine and several hundred

dollars in U.S. currency from Appellant’s pant pockets in a search of his person

incident to the arrest. Id. at 23. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with

the aforementioned charges.

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2 Officer Antoni identified Appellant at the suppression hearing. N.T.,

8/28/2023, at 8.

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On August 16, 2023, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to

suppress the evidence recovered by the police. Following a suppression

hearing on August 28, 2023, the trial court denied suppression and

immediately proceeded to trial wherein a jury convicted Appellant of the

narcotics and firearm offenses as set forth above. On November 1, 2023,

Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, and brief in support,

challenging the constitutionality of the firearm statutes under which he was

convicted in light of the United States Supreme Court’s examination of the

Second Amendment in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). On December 18, 2023, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate sentence of five to 10 years of imprisonment.3

After a hearing on Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court

denied relief by order entered on December 19, 2023. Appellant filed a timely

post-trial motion on December 29, 2023. On February 7, 2024, the trial court

denied relief. This timely appeal resulted.4

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3 More specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to ten years of

incarceration for persons not to possess a firearm, a concurrent term of three

to six years’ incarceration for PWID (cocaine), and a concurrent term of three-

and-one-half to seven years of incarceration for carrying a firearm without a

license. For simple possession of marijuana, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to pay the costs of prosecution. See NT., 12/18/2023, at 5-6.

4 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 5, 2024. He filed a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) on March 26, 2024. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 24, 2024.

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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues5 for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court err[] in denying [Appellant’s] omnibus

pretrial motion to suppress physical evidence?

2. Did the [trial] court err[] in denying [Appellant’s] motion for

judgment of acquittal[?]

3. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that [Appellant] was guilty of possession of with intent

to deliver [(PWID)] (cocaine)?

4. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that [Appellant] was guilty of either persons not to

possess a firearm or [carrying a firearm] without a license?

Appellant’s Brief at 11.

In his first issue, Appellant presents several reasons to suggest that the

trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence recovered during the

February 10, 2023 search. Id. at 18-22. First, Appellant argues that Officer

Antoni lacked jurisdiction to conduct the traffic stop in Dauphin County when

the officer first saw the vehicle in Cumberland County before crossing over

the Market Bridge. Id. at 18-20. More specifically, Appellant posits that there

were no safety issues precluding Officer Antoni from effectuating the traffic

stop “five blocks before the bridge” and that Officer Antoni “testified that he

was not actively pursuing the vehicle and did not turn on his [emergency]

lights until he was in Dauphin County.” Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).

Instead, Appellant maintains that Officer Antoni admitted that he “was actively

looking for any criminal activity[.]” Id. at 20. Next, Appellant argues that

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5 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of discussion.

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Officer Antoni’s “request to provide proof of identity after he verbally gave his

name … was an intrusion to [Appellant’s] right to privacy.” Id. at 21. Finally,

Appellant suggests that “[a]sking [him] questions about his parole status and

criminal history [wer]e part of an illegal detention and a violation of [his] right

to remain silent” pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Id.

at 22. For all of these reasons, Appellant argues that suppression of the

recovered evidence was warranted.

Our standard of review is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial

of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the

suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as

a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are

supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]

findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are

erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

This Court has observed:

For a [traffic] stop based on the observed violation of the Vehicle

Code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have

probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.

[Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super.

2010) (en banc) (“Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a

vehicle stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an

investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.”).

Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable

cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code

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violation, even if it is a minor offense. Commonwealth v.

Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008).

* * *

[Further,] we note that our United States Supreme Court has held

that any violation of the Motor Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop,

even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some

other crime. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 812–813 (1996)

(establishing a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a

traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext

for an investigation of some other crime); Chase, supra

(indicating that if the police can articulate the necessary quantum

of cause a constitutional inquiry into the officer's motive for

stopping the vehicle is unnecessary).

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Under the Motor Vehicle Code “[s]un screening and other materials [are]

prohibited.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e). More specifically, “[n]o person shall

drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which

does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the

windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 4524(e)(1). Further, this Court has held that “to possess probable cause

that a vehicle is in violation of [S]ection 4524(e)(1), an officer must only

observe that the tint on the vehicle's windows is so dark that it prohibits the

officer from seeing inside the car.” Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d

263, 270 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). In this case, Officer Antoni

testified that he stopped the vehicle in question because the two front windows

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were darkly tinted and he could not see inside the car.6 N.T., 8/28/2023 at 8

and 15. As such, the police had probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop.

Moreover, Section 8953 of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA)

provides, in pertinent part:

a) General rule.—Any duly employed municipal police officer who

is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of

his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to

enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the

functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing

those functions within the territorial limits of his primary

jurisdiction in the following cases:

***

(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any

offense which was committed, or which he has probable

cause to believe was committed, within his primary

jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in

fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the

offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(2). “Under [Section 8953(a)(2)], if a police officer

possesses probable cause that an offense has been committed in his or her

primary jurisdiction, and is in hot and fresh pursuit of the perpetrator of the

offense, the officer is vested with the same powers of law enforcement when

the officer crosses out of his or her primary jurisdiction.” Commonwealth

v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. Super. 2008). “This Court has clarified

____________________________________________

6 Officer Antoni testified that because it was dark outside and the car had

window tint, when he approached on foot following the traffic stop, he used a

flashlight to see inside the vehicle. N.T., 8/28/2023, at 10. The windows were

later tested and results indicated that the tint allowed “70 percent light

transmission.” Id. at 30.

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that ‘hot pursuit’ entails some sort of chase, though the chase need not involve

a ‘fender smashing Hollywood style chase scene’ or be newsworthy.”

Commonwealth v. Laird, 797 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2002), citing

Commonwealth v. McPeak, 708 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Super. 1998). We

have previously determined that there was no violation of the MPJA for

following a vehicle into another jurisdiction when “officers gave chase upon

first seeing [a] taillight infraction, but tempered the chase to avoid a

potentially hazardous traffic stop just before [a] bridge” and to be “reasonably

safe.” Id. (citation omitted). “This Court has held that the subjective question

of whether an officer's actions constituted hot and fresh pursuit should not

stand in the way of an otherwise valid arrest where extraterritorial pursuit is

in response to a specific crime that occurred in the primary jurisdiction.” Id.

at 999 (citation omitted).

Here, Officer Antoni witnessed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code,

specifically prohibited dark window tint pursuant to Section 4524(e)(1), and

had probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop. Officer Antoni, however,

testified that he witnessed the violation in Cumberland County, but waited to

effectuate the traffic stop in Dauphin County, “due to safety issues of pulling

a vehicle over on [the] Market Street Bridge” because there was “no side berm

to pull a vehicle over.” N.T., 8/28/2023, at 17. The trial court determined

that “[t]he evidence of record establishe[d] that the Lincoln’s driver was

observed in suspected violation of the Motor Vehicle Code in Lemoyne, within

the primary jurisdiction of” Officer Antoni, who “followed [the vehicle in which

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Appellant traveled] continuously toward and across the Market Street Bridge

and then onto Front Street” and that the “delay in effectuating the [traffic]

stop was motivated principally by safety concerns[.]” Trial Court Opinion,

4/24/2024, at 6 (record citations omitted). Moreover, the trial court rejected

Appellant’s suggestion that Officer Antoni was not in pursuit of the vehicle

based upon his testimony at the suppression hearing, noting that Officer

Antoni “was not using [] legal term[s] but [was] merely explaining that the

Lincoln had not fled.” Id. at 7 (record citations omitted). Based upon our

review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern no abuse of

discretion in denying suppression based upon the jurisdiction of the police

under the MPJA. In this case, the police gave chase upon first seeing the

window tint infraction, but properly tempered the chase to avoid a potentially

hazardous traffic stop and to be reasonably safe. As such, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on his claim that police lacked jurisdiction to stop the vehicle

at issue in another county.

We next consider Appellant’s claim that Officer Antoni’s post-stop

commands and inquiries constituted unlawful intrusions into Appellant’s

privacy. In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 313 A.3d 201 (Pa. Super. 2024)

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(non-precedential decision),7 appeal denied, 325 A.3d 445 (Pa. 2024), our

Court recently determined:

During a traffic stop, the officer may ask the detainee a moderate

number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain

information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. [I]f

there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation ... additional

suspicion may arise before the initial stop's purpose has been

fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the

new suspicions.

In the context of a traffic stop, the United States Supreme Court

held that the duration of police inquiries is determined by the

seizure's mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted

the stop and attend to related safety concerns. A stop becomes

unlawful when it lasts longer than is necessary to complete its

mission, the rationale being that the authority for the seizure ends

when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should

have been—completed. The Supreme Court elaborated that the

critical question is not whether the inquiry occurs before or after

the officer issues a ticket, but whether it prolongs—, i.e., adds

time to—the stop.

[In Rodriguez], the officers initiated a legitimate traffic stop

based on vehicle code violations relating to heavy window tint on

a vehicle that was not registered. Upon approaching the car and

using a flashlight to determine whether there were additional

occupants in the car, a firearm was observed in plain view.

[…H]aving observed a firearm in plain view at the beginning of an

investigative detention, and the additional suspicion that arose

before the stop's initial purpose was fulfilled, the officers were

permitted to investigate the new suspicions related to the firearm.

As this Court [has further] recognized[:]

The usual traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather

than a custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the

circumstances, the conditions and duration of the detention

____________________________________________

7 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive

value).

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become the functional equivalent of arrest. Since an

ordinary traffic stop is typically brief in duration and occurs

in public view, such a stop is not custodial for Miranda

purposes.

[This Court] explained [that a]n ordinary traffic stop becomes

custodial when the stop involves coercive conditions, including,

but not limited to, the suspect being forced into a patrol car and

transported from the scene or being physically restrained.

Based on the totality of the circumstances [in Rodriguez], we

[held] the traffic stop [did not] involve[] coercive conditions so as

to become custodial in nature.

At the time Rodriguez was briefly questioned in a public area about

being on probation/parole and having a gun license/permit, he

was not in custody and therefore not entitled to warnings before

even being asked to step out of his car.

Rodriguez, 313 A.3d 201, at *2-3.

Moreover, “police can require both the driver and the passengers in a

lawfully stopped vehicle to identify themselves regardless of whether there is

reasonable suspicion that the passengers are engaged in criminal activity.”

Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 17–18 (Pa. Super. 2020),

citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 664-665 (Pa. Super.

2004) (“In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for

identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Interrogation

relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not,

by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure”). Such inquiries do not

ordinarily call for Miranda warnings or trigger other Fourth Amendment

protections because “[a]sking a passenger for identification is reasonable; a

person's name, like his voice or handwriting, is revealed in a variety of daily

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interactions and there is no legitimate expectation of privacy associated with

one's identity.”). Id.

Based upon the totality of circumstances and applicable law, the trial

court’s denial of suppression was proper. First, as set forth above, the police

had probable cause to execute a valid traffic stop. Thereafter, it was

reasonable and legally permissible for the police to request that Appellant

provide proof of identity as a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle.

Moreover, this was an ordinary traffic stop, brief in duration and occurring in

public view; hence, it did not involve coercive conditions. As such, the traffic

stop was not custodial in nature and Miranda warnings were unwarranted

before the police briefly questioned everyone in the vehicle about their

probation/parole status. Since Officer Antoni observed a firearm in Appellant’s

possession, and learned shortly thereafter through permissible means that

Appellant was on state parole for a prior PWID conviction, Officer Antoni had

probable cause to effectuate an arrest for persons not to possess firearms.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first

appellate issue.

Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his

motion for judgment of acquittal wherein he challenged the constitutionality

of the firearms statutes under which he was convicted, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105

and 6106, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New

York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Appellant’s Brief at 23-33. Appellant argues that Bruen “changed the face of

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Second Amendment jurisprudence.” See id. at 23 and 27. More specifically,

Appellant argues that Sections 6105 and 6106 should be declared

unconstitutional since those provisions proscribe his possession of a firearm,

conduct that falls squarely within the text of the Second Amendment. See id.

at 26 (“possession of a handgun as alleged in the information clearly qualifies

as keeping and bearing arms”). Appellant reads the Second Amendment as

extending the right to bear arms to “all citizens,” regardless of prior criminal

convictions. Id. at 29.

“When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a criminal statute,

he raises a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo,

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 286 A.3d

767, 775 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “As the party challenging the

constitutionality of Section 6105, [an appellant] carries the high burden of

demonstrating Section 6105 clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Second

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” Commonwealth v.

McIntyre, -- A.3d --, 2025 WL 750585, at *5 (Pa. Super. 2025).

Our cases confirm that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his second

claim. Recently, this Court determined that “[s]tatutes that require a person

to obtain a license to carry a firearm [] do not violate the Second Amendment

where the statute does not require the applicant to show any special need and

requires the government to issue the license unless the applicant fails a

background check.” Commonwealth v. Mead, 326 A.3d 1006, 1015 (Pa.

Super. 2024), citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 79-80 (Bruen “does not prohibit

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States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for

self-defense. In particular, the [Bruen] decision does not affect the existing

licensing regimes—known as ‘shall-issue’ regimes—that are employed in 43

States. … Those shall-issue regimes may require a license applicant to undergo

fingerprinting, a background check, a mental health records check, and

training in firearms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among

other possible requirements.”). We have also observed that “Bruen does not

stand for the principle that convicted violent offenders … are ‘the people’ who

have a right to possess arms under the Second Amendment. Bruen in no

way said that felons are protected under the Second Amendment, nor can its

decision, with its hyper focus on ‘law-abiding’ citizens, be read as providing

the necessary support for such a determination. Instead, Bruen … did not in

any way call into doubt the government's ability to prohibit felons from

possessing firearms.” See McIntyre, 2025 WL 750585, at *8. Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief regarding his challenge to the constitutionality

of Sections 6105 and 6106.

In his third issue, Appellant argues that “the Commonwealth failed to

show that [Appellant] either delivered any drugs or that he had the intent to

do so” to support his conviction for PWID. Appellant’s Brief at 22. He claims

that although there was evidence that Appellant possessed a digital scale and

cocaine, “the Commonwealth’s expert admitted that it is possible that a drug

user could carry a scale or purchase larger amounts of drugs.” Id. Appellant

further posits there was “no additional supporting evidence such as phone

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communications of sales, large sums of money, [and/or] packaging materials”

or “owe sheets” in Appellant’s possession and that Appellant “testified

repeatedly, and credibly, that he was an addict and did not deliver drugs.”

Id. at 23.

Initially, we note that although Appellant characterizes this issue

pertaining to his PWID conviction as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, Appellant actually challenges the weight given to the evidence

presented. Appellant properly preserved this issue in his post-sentence

motion. On appeal, however, Appellant does not cite legal authority regarding

the weight of the evidence and fails to cite to the certified record in support

of his appellate claim, and for this reason we find Appellant’s third appellate

issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(c) (requiring citation to legal authority

and specific reference to the record in appellate briefs); see Commonwealth

v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 516 (Pa. Super. 2005) (an appellant waives a claim

where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his

appellate brief); see also Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 405, 416

(Pa. Super. 2019) (appellant waived challenge to weight of the evidence where

appellant's brief conflated weight and sufficiency claims and did not otherwise

develop weight claim). Further, as set forth below, assuming arguendo that

Appellant’s weight claim was not waived, it is also without merit.

We have previously determined:

Our standard of review in addressing weight of the evidence

claims is whether the trial court has exercised an abuse of

discretion by overriding or misapplying the law or rendering a

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judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of

discretion, not the underlying question of whether the verdict is

against the weight of the evidence. Where the record adequately

supports the trial court, the trial court has acted within the limits

of its discretion.

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial

judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict

is or is not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, for an

appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence,

the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the

verdict shocks the conscience of the court.

Commonwealth v. Williamson, 330 A.3d 407, 419 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, in ruling on Appellant’s weight claim, the trial court recognized:

[Appellant] was found to be in possession of a digital scale, several

hundred dollars in cash, and more than twenty-two grams of crack

cocaine – i.e., more than twenty-two times the quantity typically

purchased for personal consumption [according] to the expert

testimony [presented at trial. This was] more than sufficient to

support the jury’s finding that delivery was intended. Similarly,

with respect to the weight of the evidence presented to

demonstrate that intent, while [Appellant] emphasizes that

certain items [] generally indicative of an intent to deliver (e.g.

“owe sheets”) were absent from the roadside stop, none of these

are the conditio sine que of drug dealing, and their absence in no

way undermine[d] the other evidence to the extent that it shocks

the conscience.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/2024, at 4.

Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that the verdict did not shock the conscience of the court

so as to warrant relief on Appellant’s weight claim. The Commonwealth

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presented evidence that Appellant possessed a substantial quantity of

narcotics, a digital scale, and hundreds of dollars in cash that were not

indicative of personal drug use. The jury was free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence to determine the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.

Further, Appellant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion

in refusing to order a new trial because the evidence was so shockingly

tenuous, vague, and/or uncertain. As such, based upon the facts of record,

we discern no trial court error or abuse of discretion in rejecting Appellant’s

weight claim pertaining to PWID.

Finally, as set forth above, Appellant posits that there was insufficient

evidence to support his firearm convictions under Sections 6105 and 6106.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, upon further review, although Appellant lists

the issue in his statement of questions presented, there is no corresponding

argument section in his appellate brief and no citations to legal authority or

the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c) (requiring separate arguments

for each question argued, citation to legal authority, and specific reference to

the record in appellate briefs). Appellant does not even cite the firearm

statutes at issue and fails to specify which elements of the offenses were

allegedly unproven. See Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262

(Pa. Super. 2009) (“undeveloped sufficiency challenge” and failure to “specify

the allegedly unproven elements” of an offense … is deemed waived.”).

Instead, Appellant merely suggests, in boilerplate fashion, that “there would

have been no sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

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[Appellant] was guilty of either persons not to possess a firearm nor [carrying

a firearm] without a license but for [the] constitutional violation” as argued in

his second issue. Appellant’s Brief at 33. Having already determined that

there was no constitutional violation and for all of Appellant’s appellate

deficiencies, Appellant has waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his firearm convictions.8

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/23/2025

____________________________________________

8 We would otherwise find Appellant’s firearm sufficiency claims without

merit. Upon cursory review, Appellant stipulated at trial that he had a prior

felony conviction that made him ineligible to possess a firearm under 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b) and, therefore, also “did not have the ability to carry a

firearm without a license” under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. N.T., 8/28/2023, at

143. Moreover, the trial court rejected Appellant’s prior contention, which he

now abandons on appeal, “that the presence of a pistol in a bag on his lap, a

bag through which he was apparently rifling for his own identification, which

he apparently found therein, [was insufficient] to demonstrate that he actually

possessed the firearm.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/2024, at 5. We discern no

error.

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