Case law

Commonwealth v. Murray

423 Pa. 37 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 6, 1966

That is all the Nardone case established and, in fact, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sent the case back for retrial because Nardone had not been given the opportunity to show how much of the prosecution evidence … Without the Act of 1957, the most malevolent scandalmonger could help himself at the banquet table of the most guarded secrets and commit burglary of the most precious jewels of family intimacies and yet be immune from the

American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Phico Insurance Company

537 Pa. 295 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 16, 1994

American Casualty filed a cross-application for summary relief seeking a declaration that DiRienzo qualified as a "health care provider" and that its policy was excess insurance under the Act and that therefore the CAT Fund's … This limitation is achieved by the creation of a "Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund" [hereinafter referred to as the Fund], established by a surcharge on insurance premiums. . . .

In Re: Trust B of Wells Apl of: V.M.I. Foundation

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 21, 2024

Wells Revocable Trust Agreement, establishing First Seneca as the corporate trustee. … Op., 9/30/2021, at 7 (“This was a man who clearly knew what he was doing. He was the President of a Bank and Trust Company. Wells wanted to make a gift in trust to his alma mater and he did.

Commonwealth v. Graham

607 Pa. 580 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 21, 2010

Thus, the General Assembly clearly recognized and accounted for the greater propensity for harm in actual-presence scenarios. … In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, "[t]he critical inquiry . . . does not require a court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Clifton v. Allegheny County

600 Pa. 662 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 29, 2009

Accordingly, a tax enactment will not be invalidated unless it “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” … Pursuant to Section 4656.16a of the Fiscal Code, a county CLR is established as follows: (a) The state Tax Equalization Board shall, annually, prior to July 1, establish for each county a common level ratio for the prior

In Re Private Sale of Prop. by the Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist.

185 A.3d 282 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 1, 2018

It contains no qualifying language or suggestion that a private sale is disfavored. … Read in context, it clearly has no applicability in cases decided under section 7-707(3).

Commonwealth v. Alburger

1 Whart. 469 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 28, 1836

That five public squares were thus laid off by the founder and the first purchasers here, in the original plan of the city in 1683, and were then dedicated to public uses, is thus a fact as clearly established as *476 any … For although the city has a qualified property in the ground, yet the corporation is but a trustee for the public, for whose use and benefit the squares were left open.

Mayer v. Hemphill

411 Pa. 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 26, 1963

Clearly, the end does not justify the means. … Cox, 321 Pa. 548 , 183 A. 924 , which is relied upon by appellee, is clearly distinguishable.

Albrecht, J., Aplt. v. UGI Storage Co.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 29, 2021

Rather, UGI Storage and CPG have commenced and will continue to pursue a comprehensive evaluation of its property rights within the 3,000 foot protective perimeter, in order to clearly … That assertion was made in the context of deciding whether or not a state may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to resist the taking of state property by a quasi-public entity invoking a de jure power of eminent domain delegated

Hughes, C., Aplts. v. UGI Storage Co.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 29, 2021

Rather, UGI Storage and CPG have commenced and will continue to pursue a comprehensive evaluation of its property rights within the 3,000 foot protective perimeter, in order to clearly … That assertion was made in the context of deciding whether or not a state may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to resist the taking of state property by a quasi-public entity invoking a de jure power of eminent domain delegated

Commonwealth v. Turpin, D., Aplt.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 26, 2019

Rather, to qualify as a multi-unit dwelling requiring a separate search warrant, there must be some indicia that the residence is divided into separate and substantially independent living units.” Id. at 16. … Clearly [sic] a result not contemplated by the policy reasons which underscore the enhanced privacy rights found in Article [I], Section 8.

Mertis, B. v. Oh Appeal of: Oh, M.D.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 18, 2024

Appellant asserts that the first exception, permitting an attorney to obtain information from her client, “clearly applies here.” Id. at 15. … In the court’s view, providing physicians immunity from liability for disclosing confidential information relevant to a malpractice claim aided in finding the truth and in disposing meritless claims at the earliest possible

Commonwealth v. Lee, D., Aplt.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 26, 2026

was restricted to felonies that involved a high risk that someone might be killed, and states that embraced the felony murder doctrine have limited the rule by, inter alia, setting forth specific felonies which would qualify … Court, explained in Bucklew: Methods of execution like [dragging the prisoner to the place of execution, disemboweling, quartering, public dissection, and burning alive] readily qualified

Commonwealth v. Paddy

609 Pa. 272 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 30, 2011

Murphy *310 testified that he was given immunity with respect to his involvement in relocating Ms. … established precedent”).

Commonwealth v. Holmes

621 Pa. 595 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 30, 2013

II The Commonwealth states that it will not address the Superior Court’s reasoning below, since it is “clearly erroneous to the extent that it relied upon its decision in Liston, which has since been overturned.” … It is within the context of this state procedural framework that counsel’s ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a procedural default.” 566 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1318 .

Commonwealth v. Henderson

496 Pa. 349 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 5, 1981

Per se rules such as the "interested adult" rule discard the interests of justice in an attempt to establish a mechanical and arithmetic system of constitutional criminal procedure and, further, reflect a low opinion of trial … The federal Constitution clearly does not require this extreme result. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

In Re: Prospect Crozer from the Delaware County Board of Assessment

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 17, 2024

Judge Braxton’s service on the Board qualified as a position of profit with a municipal corporation or political subdivision. … Because the Board is a statutory creature of a city government, a member of the Board clearly has a position with a municipal corporation or political subdivision.

PA Office of AG v. Supervising Judge of the 35th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 26, 2015

The information referenced in the article was not made available to Office ofAttorney General, however, was clearly available to the news reporter. See Exhibit D. … For emails to qualify as records "of'an agency, we look to the subject-matter of the records.

Commonwealth v. Contakos

499 Pa. 340 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 1, 1982

Justice McDermott ignore what is clearly the crucial issue in this case, and indeed in every criminal case: whether appellant was denied his right to a fair trial. … However, equally well established is the principle that ". . . the right to a public trial is not absolute; rather, it must be considered in relationship to other important interests." Commonwealth v.

Commonwealth v. Dunkle

385 Pa. Super. 317 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 13, 1989

In offering this testimony, the Commonwealth clearly hoped to legitimize the victim's lengthy delay in reporting the incident and her failure to recall certain details of the incident, thereby allowing the jury to accept … Upon careful review of the record, especially the testimony of the well-qualified expert in this case, I find that the testimony was both relevant and helpful, rather than irrelevant and prejudicial. See Commonwealth v.