Case law

LaMarche v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

236 F. Supp. 2d 34 · District Court, D. Maine · Dec 16, 2002

Thus, if LaMarehe can establish that any one of his several claims could entitle him to the proceeds, Armesto’s motion must be denied. … Nevertheless, because LaMarche has established that these annuities were "qualified retirement plans,” Docket No. 49, ¶ 4, I consider the foregoing assertion to be an appropriate inference for the Court to draw under the

GRUNDSTEIN

District Court, D. Maine · Mar 3, 2026

Here, Defendants argue, the Maine Board of Bar Examiners qualifies as an arm of the state and therefore Mr. Grundstein’s lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. … Grundstein is raising the issue of the Board’s $150 charge in this lawsuit, his allegations are clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Roger Edwards, Llc v. Fiddes & Son, Ltd.

226 F.R.D. 18 · District Court, D. Maine · Jan 26, 2005

The plaintiff clearly relied on its asserted revocation of acceptance of those goods in opposing the motion for summary judgment. Summary Judgment Decision at 15. … The defendant’s response, in relevant part, stated: “The Defendant qualifies the Plaintiffs SMF 1134 by stating that Fiddes expressed its refusal to recognize the Plaintiffs attempt at revocation and confirmed that Fiddes

Dionne v. Heckler

585 F. Supp. 1055 · District Court, D. Maine · Apr 20, 1984

Plaintiff contends that the “expert testimony of the treating physician should establish the Claimant’s disability.” Plaintiff’s brief at 13. Indeed, Dr. … Clearly, the AU’s finding was not contrary to the medical evidence on the record.

Greenier v. PACE, LOCAL NO. 1188

201 F. Supp. 2d 172 · District Court, D. Maine · Apr 23, 2002

Plaintiff may only invoke the protections of the ADA if he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). … Without specifying either the nature of his disability or the job for which he was qualified, Plaintiff simply states that he is a “qualified individual with disabilities.” (See Compl. at ¶ 24 (Docket # 1).)

COPAN ITALIA SPA v. PURITAN MEDICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC

District Court, D. Maine · Jul 25, 2025

If a statement is denied or qualified by the opposing party, or if an evidentiary objection is raised concerning the record evidence cited in support of a statement, the Court will review those portions of the summary judgment … It is well established that patents, as personal property, see 35 U.S.C. § 261, are protected by the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. See James v.

Duckworth v. MID-STATE MACHINE PRODUCTS

736 F. Supp. 2d 278 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 3, 2010

Claiming that Mid-State’s sole explanation for why it did not hire him in 2008 is that he was not “qualified” for the job, he says he was clearly qualified because he had ably performed the job previously for over six years … To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show: 1) that he was at least 40 years old at the time he was not hired; 2) that he was qualified for the position; 3) that he was not hired; and, 4) that the employer subsequently

HEWES v. PUSHARD

District Court, D. Maine · Mar 18, 2022

Individual government officials may be sued under § 1983 “for federal constitutional or statutory violations,” although “they are generally shielded from civil damages liability under the principle of qualified immunity … A governmental entity waives its immunity under the MTCA “to the extent it obtains insurance that provides coverage in areas where the entity would normally enjoy immunity.” City of Old Town v.

Oakstone v. Postmaster General

332 F. Supp. 2d 261 · District Court, D. Maine · Aug 18, 2004

Oakstone has sustained his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. … Oakstone has clearly demonstrated the first three criteria: (1) he is male; (2) he is qualified for the expediter position; and, (3) he has been denied training and placement in the position.

Beegan v. Associated Press

43 F. Supp. 2d 70 · District Court, D. Maine · Mar 11, 1999

, she continued to qualify for short-term disability benefits after the date upon which she was ordered back to work. … Beegan’s claim clearly requires the fact finder to determine whether his LTD benefits were wrongfully terminated. The only, way to answer this question is to examine the terms of the LTD Policy. Thus, Mr.

Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., Inc.

977 F. Supp. 520 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 15, 1997

Plaintiff must bear the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by proving that: (I) he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of … Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the leave required by the FMLA clearly includes both paid and unpaid leave.

Dall v. Chinet Co.

33 F. Supp. 2d 26 · District Court, D. Maine · Nov 23, 1998

Hence, with respect to amending the Plan, the Retirement Committee is clearly the named fiduciary. … It is clearly established that when an employer sets or amends the terms of its benefit plans or terminates the Plan altogether, it is not acting as a fiduciary under ERISA.

United Transportation Union v. Springfield Terminal Co.

675 F. Supp. 683 · District Court, D. Maine · Dec 28, 1987

As Defendant notes, the standards for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief in this Court are well established. … Lenfest, 799 F.2d 795 (1st Cir.1986), clearly defined the Court’s role in cases brought under the FRSA: Section 10(c) of the FRSA states plainly that “[a]ny dispute, grievance, or claim arising under this section shall be

GILBERT v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

District Court, D. Maine · Dec 9, 2024

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment, a state government may not be sued unless it voluntarily waives its immunity or the immunity is 2 “The Fifteenth Amendment promises that … Without establishing a threat of future harm, a hypothetical claim for prospective relief capable of surviving the doctrine of sovereign immunity would fail because the Court could not find that Plaintiff has the requisite

Smith v. Bradley Pizza, Inc.

314 F. Supp. 3d 1017 · District Court, D. Maine · May 14, 2018

Smith presents a statement by an "expert," Peter Hansmeier, without any credentials or other indicia of expertise that qualify Hansmeier to make accessibility determinations. … This ruling is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

LAUZON v. DODD

District Court, D. Maine · Jul 9, 2019

Finally, Defendants assert Defendant Beaupre (in his individual capacity) did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly-established constitutional rights and is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 25-29. … immunity.

Bergeron v. Henderson

185 F.R.D. 10 · District Court, D. Maine · Mar 30, 1999

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has provided guidance for the determination of whether the defendant has established good cause for failing to answer a legal complaint. … Specifically, Congress was concerned that there was no redress under state law against federal employers because of sovereign immunity. See id. at 826-27 , 96 S.Ct. at 1965 .

Moreau v. James River-Otis, Inc.

652 F. Supp. 1030 · District Court, D. Maine · Jan 7, 1987

These affidavits clearly set forth George Lambertson’s authority to speak for both international unions in their negotiations with the Company. … Thus the requisite elements of apparent authority are established. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 8 & 27 (1958).

We Who Care, Inc. v. Sullivan

781 F. Supp. 57 · District Court, D. Maine · Dec 19, 1991

Thus, they “clearly succeeded in obtaining a substantial portion of the benefit sought.” … Garcia, 829 F.2d at 400 (“The mere fact ... that one private counsel and one non-profit agency did not wish to handle Garcia’s claim does not establish limited availability of qualified attorneys for the case.”).

DUNNIGAN v. YORK COUNTY

District Court, D. Maine · Mar 13, 2023

right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” … Nor is he “entitled to qualified immunity based on the ‘clearly established’ prong either because the law on” an officer’s failure to intervene in a fellow officer’s excessive use of force “has long been clear in the First