The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
DUSTIN GRAHAM GILBERT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 2:24-cv-00371-JAW
)
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH )
AND HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Defendant )
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff commenced this action against the Maine Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) alleging that when he was a resident of Riverview Psychiatric
Center (Riverview) in 2022, he requested but did not receive a ballot to vote in the 2022
election. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without
prepayment of fees, (ECF No. 3), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No.
5.) In accordance with the governing statute, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint
is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s filings, unless Plaintiff amends the complaint to
allege an actionable claim, I recommend the Court dismiss the complaint.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges in relevant part:
While at [Riverview] during the 2022 election I was not afforded my right to
vote. I was in their custody with no way to obtain a ballot … and there was
a sign up sheet for voting. I signed up with the first name on the list. My
ballot never came. I pleaded with staff to get my ballot, and nothing was
done.
(Complaint at 7.) 1
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for
individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding
without prepayment of fees, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective
defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A self-represented
plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must construe his complaint
1 Although Plaintiff does not specify the election for which he requested a ballot, for purposes of the
preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I assume Plaintiff is referencing the November 2022 election.
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‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032-JDL, 2019 WL 5764661,
at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This
is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a
claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that he “was not afforded [his] right to vote” when he was a civil
inpatient at a psychiatric hospital. Although states have an interest in limiting voter
participation to those who are “able to understand the nature and effect of the voting act
itself,” and although federal law provides that states may restrict voting participation where
there is a finding of “mental incapacity,” courts have recognized that states may not deprive
an individual of her or his fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to vote,
merely because the person has a mental illness or is committed to a psychiatric hospital.
See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48–59 (D. Me. 2001); 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)(B).
Plaintiff does not allege that Maine law explicitly limits voting based on mental
illness or hospitalization, and the statutes are to the contrary. See, e.g., 34-B M.R.S.
3803(1) (“A patient in a psychiatric hospital or residential care facility . . . is entitled to
exercise all civil rights, including . . . the right to vote . . . unless” (A) the chief
administrative officer determines that it is necessary to impose a restriction for the medical
welfare of the patient, (B) the patient has been adjudicated incompetent, or (C) the exercise
of the right is restricted by other statute or rule). Although Plaintiff references the Fifteenth
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Amendment,2 he provides no facts that suggest his race was in any way relevant to his
claim. Rather, Plaintiff evidently contends that Riverview breached a legal obligation to
facilitate his right to vote in the 2022 election.
Plaintiff, however, provides only limited facts in support of his claim. Plaintiff
asserts only that (1) he wrote his name on a sign-up sheet, (2) he asked “staff” for his ballot,
and (3) he did not receive a ballot. Plaintiff did not describe, for example, why he was at
Riverview, when he was there, who he contacted, when he contacted them, what he said to
them, or what any staff member did afterward. Without information regarding the
circumstances of Plaintiff’s stay at Riverview or the timing and nature of his efforts to vote,
a factfinder could not plausibly infer that his inability to vote was due to a staff member
intentionally preventing him from obtaining and casting a ballot, as opposed to any other
factual possibility, such as inadequate time, an innocent mistake, or a determination that
Plaintiff was ineligible for any other reason. In other words, the factual content of the
complaint is inadequate to move a discernible legal claim “across the line from conceivable
to plausible” entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
The absence of factual detail is also problematic because the relief Plaintiff seeks—
an award of monetary damages—is not available against the only named defendant, DHHS.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment, a state
government may not be sued unless it voluntarily waives its immunity or the immunity is
2 “The Fifteenth Amendment promises that the ‘right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 15,
§ 1.” Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009).
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clearly abrogated by valid federal legislation. Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart,
563 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2011). Nothing in the complaint suggests there has been a waiver
or abrogation of the State’s sovereign immunity.
“[T]he exception to [sovereign] immunity laid out in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), allows federal courts to grant prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing
violation of federal law, in part because a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State.” Doe v. Shibinette, 16
F.4th 894, 903 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted). Even
if Plaintiff had named a state official rather than a state agency, and even if Plaintiff’s
request for “some sort of remedy to the problem of not getting civil in-patients their ballot
that’s to the plaintiff’s liking” (Complaint at 7) could be construed as a request for
prospective injunctive relief, because Plaintiff is no longer at Riverview and has not alleged
that he will be again, the complaint does not “establish a real and immediate threat” that
Plaintiff will again suffer the same harm. Without establishing a threat of future harm, a
hypothetical claim for prospective relief capable of surviving the doctrine of sovereign
immunity would fail because the Court could not find that Plaintiff has the requisite
standing to obtain prospective relief. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105
(1983).3
3 Although I have not considered whether Plaintiff could allege a plausible claim with additional facts, I
note that there could be some additional legal impediments to Plaintiff’s ability to assert an actionable
claim. See Beall v. Hogan, No. GJH-16-3678, 2017 WL 3701851, at *3–4 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2017) (finding
that staff of state psychiatric hospital had “no obligation to provide [Plaintiff] with an absentee ballot” and
sovereign immunity barred official capacity claims).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, after a review of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, unless within the fourteen-day period to file an objection to this
Recommended Decision, Plaintiff amends the complaint to allege an actionable claim, I
recommend the Court dismiss the matter.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 9th day of December, 2024.
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