GRUNDSTEIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

ROBERT GRUNDSTEIN, J.D., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25-cv-00402-JAW

)

MAINE BOARD OF BAR )

EXAMINERS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

In this pro se action against the Maine Board of Bar Examiners for embargoing

a pro se litigant’s July 2021 Maine bar exam test score, the court grants a motion to

dismiss the complaint based on principles of sovereign immunity, the failure to allege

viable claims against the defendants in their personal capacities, the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, and principles of claim preclusion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On June 21, 2024, Robert Grundstein, J.D.1 filed a complaint in the United

States District Court for the District of Vermont against the Maine Board of Bar

Examiners (the Board) and its individual members (Individual Defendants), seeking

1 Mr. Grundstein has been a prolific litigator across the country against state bar associations.

The Court does not detail his litigation history apart from this case but notes that as long ago as 2012,

another district court described Mr. Grundstein’s “pattern of vexatious tactics” against another state

bar association as “com[ing] extremely close to the line between . . . earnest attempts to correct a

perceived injustice . . . and patently frivolous and harassing conduct.” Grundstein v. Wash. State Bar

Ass’n, No. C12-569RSL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, at *16-17 (D. Wash. Sep. 7, 2012); see also

Grundstein v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, No. C12-569RSL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114581, at *2 (D. Wash.

Aug. 13, 2012) (Mr. Grundstein “is no stranger to this Court. Neither is his claim”).

declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the Board had violated his rights

by refusing to accept the results of a remote bar examination that Mr. Grundstein

took in Vermont. Verified Compl. for Decl. Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and Inj.

(ECF No. 1) (Compl.). On September 6, 2024, the Board and Individual Defendants

moved to dismiss his complaint. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. (ECF No. 2). On

June 10, 2025, a United States District Judge for the District of Vermont granted the

Board Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice to refiling in a court where

venue is proper. Opinion and Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 5).

On June 13, 2025, Mr. Grundstein filed a motion for the Vermont District

Judge to reconsider his decision and to transfer venue from Vermont to the District

of Maine, thereby saving a new filing fee and in his view streamlining the

administrative conduct of the case. Mot. to Transfer Juris./Venue (ECF No. 7). On

August 4, 2025, the Vermont District Judge granted the motion to transfer, noting

that if the Defendants continue to pursue dismissal, “their arguments may be

considered by a federal judge in Maine without questions of venue or personal

jurisdiction complicating the analysis.” Opinion and Order at 3 (ECF No. 9). On

August 5, 2025, the case was transferred from the District of Vermont to the District

of Maine. Civil Docket for Case No. 2:24-cv-00685-wks (ECF No. 10).

On August 26, 2025, the Board and Individual Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) (Defs.’ Mot.). Mr. Grundstein filed his

response on September 17, 2025. Pl. Br. in Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss and Req. for

Hr’g (ECF No. 13) (Pl.’s Opp’n). On October 1, 2025, the Board and Individual

Defendants filed their reply. Defs.’ Combined Reply in Support of Their Mot. to

Dismiss & Resp. to Pl.’s Req. for Oral Arg. (ECF No. 15) (Defs.’ Reply).

On September 17, 2025, within his response to the motion to dismiss, Mr.

Grundstein filed a request for an order or writ of mandamus. Mot. for Order or Writ

of Mandamus (ECF No. 14) (Pl.’s Writ Mot.). On October 8, 2025, the Defendants

responded to Mr. Grundstein’s motion for order or writ. Defs.’ Combined Resp. to Pl.’s

Mot. for Order or Writ of Mandamus and Mot. for Hr’g (ECF No. 16) (Defs.’ Opp’n).

B. The Allegations in Robert Grundstein’s Complaint

In his June 21, 2024 complaint, Mr. Grundstein alleged that he took and

passed the July 2021 Maine bar exam. Compl. ¶ 1. Mr. Grundstein alleged that it

was a remote examination, which he took in Vermont. Id. Mr. Grundstein said that

the remote examination was pre-inspected, tested, and approved by audio and video

security devices. Id. ¶ 2. Mr. Grundstein explained that the examination has three

discrete and severable portions: (1) the MPT/a written half day exam designed to test

brief writing and the ability to follow instructions, (2) a half day six question essay

examination, and (3) a full day multi-state exam. Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Grundstein said that

it is possible to do badly or have a defect on one part of the examination but retain

enough of the remaining materials to pass the exam but “Maine threw out the whole

thing.” Id. ¶ 4.

Following the test, Mr. Grundstein asserted the Board “embargoed Plaintiff’s

score” and refused to release or reveal it. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Grundstein stressed that the

Board has never accused him of “malfeasance.” Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Grundstein alleged that

this “misplaced malevolence” is consistent with the policies of Melissa Hansen,

“director of the exam.”2 Id. ¶ 14.

Based on these factual allegations, Mr. Grundstein set forth five counts: (1)

Count One: violations of the Fifth Amendment under Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S.

539 (1974), of the right of confrontation under Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and

of due process under Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), (2) Count Two: violation of

the contracts clause under Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926), (3) Count Three:

violation of the ex post facto clause, (4) Count Four: violation of Maine Bar Rule 202;

and Count Five: Vermont civil conversion. Compl. at 1-10. Mr. Grundstein seeks

injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Id.

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. The Motion to Dismiss

1. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants first raise sovereign immunity of

the Board and against the Board Members sued in their official capacities under the

Eleventh Amendment. Defs.’ Mot. at 8-10. Next, asserting that Mr. Grundstein has

already litigated and lost these same issues in state court, the Defendants contend

that his federal lawsuit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine. Id. at 10-12.

2 This is how Mr. Grundstein describes Ms. Hansen in the complaint. Compl. ¶ 14. However,

as the Board of Bar Examiners’ letterhead confirms, Ms. Hansen is the Executive Director of the

Board, not the director of the examination. Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 1, Letter from Ann M. Courtney to

Robert Grundstein (Oct. 20, 2021) (Courtney Letter).

33 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), prohibits “the lower federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by” parties who lost in state court and who are

“challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance

Third, the Defendants maintain that the lawsuit is barred by principles of res

judicata (claim preclusion). Id. at 12-14. Fourth, the Defendants separately analyze

each count and argue that each is non-meritorious. Id. at 14-18.

2. Robert Grundstein’s Opposition

In response, citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Mr. Grundstein states

that as he is not seeking monetary damages, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

his lawsuit. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Next, Mr. Grundstein contends that the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine does not bar his lawsuit because he did not attempt to litigate in

state court the federal constitutional issues presented in this lawsuit. Id. at 3-4.

Saying that he has spoken to Bar administrators in Massachusetts and Vermont, who

assured him that their states would not have embargoed his score, Mr. Grundstein

argues that the Maine practice is contradicted by the practice in other states. Id. at

4. Finally, Mr. Grundstein states that the state tort claims in his pending lawsuit

were never litigated in state court. Id. at 7.

3. The Defendants’ Reply

Noticing that Mr. Grundstein added factual allegations in his response not

contained in his complaint, the Defendants urge the Court not to consider them.

Defs.’ Reply at 2. Next, citing authority, the Defendants say that Ex Parte Young does

not allow Mr. Grundstein’s lawsuit because the state is the real party in interest in

his lawsuit. Id.

v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted), because “the proper forum

for challenging an unlawful state court ruling” is the state appellate system followed by a petition for

review by the United States Supreme Court. Davison v. Gov’t of P.R.-P.R. Firefighters Corps., 471

F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Turning to claim preclusion, the Defendants reject Mr. Grundstein’s effort to

deflect the Rooker-Feldman bar, saying that, because Mr. Grundstein is not making

a generalized constitutional challenge but is contending that the state actions are

unconstitutional as applied to him, the bar applies. Id. at 3-4. The Defendants next

respond to Mr. Grundstein’s claim preclusion arguments, saying that his response

was so inadequate that the Court should deem the issue waived. Id. at 4-5. The

Defendants make the same waiver argument concerning Mr. Grundstein’s response

to the Defendants’ analysis of his constitutional claims, namely that his response is

so insufficient, it should be deemed a waiver. Id. at 5.

Finally, the Defendants urge the Court to adopt the Vermont District Judge’s

rationale in his decision dismissing the lawsuit in Vermont in which he concluded

that the allegations were insufficient to state a cognizable claim. Id. at 5-6.

B. The Motion for Writ of Mandamus

1. Robert Grundstein’s Mandamus Motion

Within Mr. Grundstein’s opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is his

request for writ of mandamus against the Board. Pl.’s Writ Mot. at 6-7. Mr.

Grundstein does not argue this aspect of his motion, but he does state that the Board

is compelled to release his score under Rule 7 of the Maine Rules for Admission to the

Bar. Id.

2. The Defendants’ Opposition

The Defendants question whether Mr. Grundstein is actually requesting a writ

of mandamus, given his “nontraditional layout.” Def.’s Reply at 2. The Defendants

instead view Mr. Grundstein’s references to mandamus as separate from the general

declaratory and injunctive relief he has sought in the complaint. Id. at 2-3. However,

if he is seeking a writ of mandamus, the Defendants oppose his motion because he

has failed to demonstrate each legal requirement before a writ of mandamus may

issue. Id. at 3.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Which Documents the Court May and May Not Consider

In their motion, the Defendants argue that the Court may take into account in

deciding the motion the docket entries from the United States District Court for the

District of Vermont before the case was transferred to the District of Maine. Defs.’

Mot. at 4. The Defendants also attached five exhibits to their motion to dismiss: (1)

Attachment One: an October 20, 2021 letter from Ann M. Courtney, Esq., Chair of

the state of Maine Board of Bar Examiners, informing Mr. Grundstein that his MEE

score was embargoed; (2) Attachment Two: a November 1, 2021 letter from Robert

Grundstein to Attorney Courtney, requesting that the Board reconsider its embargo

decision; (3) Attachment Three: Order dated December 22, 2021 of the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court denying Mr. Grundstein’s requests for reconsideration of the

Board’s embargo decision and for a refund for the fees he paid to take the bar

examination; (4) Attachment Four: Mr. Grundstein’s appeal dated November 13,

2021, of the Board decision; and, (5) Attachment Five: Order Dismissing Petition for

Writ of Mandamus from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court dated April 13, 2022. Id.

at 4 n.6.

“Ordinarily . . . any consideration of documents not attached to the complaint,

or not expressly incorporated therein, is forbidden, unless the proceeding is properly

converted into one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Watterson v. Page, 987

F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). However, “courts have made

narrow exceptions for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the

parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for

documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id. (citing caselaw). Moreover,

“[u]nder First Circuit precedent, when ‘a complaint’s factual allegations are expressly

linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which

is not challenged),’ then the court can review it upon a motion to dismiss.” Diva’s Inc.

v. City of Bangor, 411 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting

Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir.

2001)). The Court may also consider facts susceptible to judicial notice. Rodriguez-

Ramos v. Hernandez-Gregorat, 685 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2012).

The docket entries from the United States District Court for the District of

Vermont before it was transferred to this Court are susceptible to judicial notice.

Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2004). A court may take

judicial notice of its own docket, a principle that extends to the filings in the Vermont

case once it was transferred to this District and became a part of the record in this

case. Doustout v. G.D. Searle & Co., 684 F. Supp. 16, 17 n.1 (D. Me. 1988).

Also, the Court may consider the documents attached to the Defendants’

motion to dismiss because they are what they appear to be and their authenticity has

not been challenged, see FED. R. EVID. 901, 1003, they are official public records, and

they are documents central to the plaintiff’s claims. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).

In his response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing that Maine’s

practice contradicts the practice in other states, Mr. Grundstein wrote that he had

spoken with Bar administrators in Massachusetts and Vermont, who confirmed that

“there was no significant or proven offense and that Plaintiff’s bar score should be

released without embargo, penalty or opprobrium.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. The Defendants

objected to the Court’s consideration of these factual assertions because they are not

contained in the Plaintiff’s complaint. Defs.’ Reply at 2.

The Court agrees with the Defendants. “[I]t has long been the rule that

assertions in a lawyer’s memorandum are not the same as allegations in a complaint.”

Olszewski v. Hutchins, No. 1:24-cv-00209-JAW, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19395, at *26

(D. Me. Jan. 28, 2026); Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship v. Petro. Mktg. Grp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 453,

462 n.8 (D. Mass. 2018) (disregarding plaintiff's assertions made in its brief when no

similar allegations appeared in the complaint); Folan v. Santander Consumer USA

Inc., No. 1:25-cv-11341-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116325, at *9 n.8 (D. Mass. June

18, 2025) (declining to consider assertions raised only in plaintiff's reply to

defendant's opposition brief and not alleged in the complaint); Ortiz v. Jimenez-

Sanchez, 98 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 n.5 (D.P.R. 2015) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ oppositions

introduce a plethora of new factual allegations and legal theories. But the plaintiffs

cannot, of course, add allegations or claims by furnishing them for the first time in

an opposition to a motion to dismiss”). The Court will not consider in ruling on this

motion to dismiss the additional facts asserted in Mr. Grundstein’s opposition to the

motion to dismiss not contained in the complaint.

B. Additional Facts

The five documents attached to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss establish

that on October 21, 2021, Attorney Ann M. Courtney, Chair of the state of Maine

Board of Bar Examiners, wrote Mr. Grundstein and informed him that based on its

review of the monitoring videos from the July 2021 Maine Bar Examination, the

Board was notified that he had violated a testing condition for the taking of the MEE

portion of the examination because he had used scratch paper during the MEE

portion of the examination. Courtney Letter at 1. Attorney Courtney informed Mr.

Grundstein that his Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) score for the July 2021

examination “has been permanently embargoed with the National Conference of Bar

Examiners.” Id.

Next, on November 1, 2021, Mr. Grundstein wrote to Attorney Countney and

asked that the embargo decision be reconsidered. Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 2, Letter from

Robert Grundstein to Maine Bd. of Bar Examiners (Nov. 1, 2021).

Third, on November 13, 2021, Mr. Grundstein filed an appeal and request for

enlargement of time with the Supreme Judicial Court for the state of Maine,

challenging the Board embargo decision. Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 4, Appeal from Bd. of

Bar Examiners Dec. and Req. for Enlargement of Time (Nov. 13, 2021).

Fourth, on December 22, 2021, Associate Justice Ellen Gorman of the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court denied Mr. Grundstein’s request for a refund of the $150 late

fee that he paid to the Maine Board of Bar Examiners and his appeal from the Board’s

decision not to release his UBE score because of a violation of a Board rule during the

UBE examination. Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 3, Order Denying Reqs. for Relief, Supreme

Judicial Ct., State of Me. (Dec. 22, 2021) (Law Ct. Order).

Finally, on April 13, 2022, Associate Justice Andrew M. Horton issued an order

dismissing Mr. Grundstein’s petition for writ of mandamus. Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 5,

Order Dismissing Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, Supreme Judicial Ct., State of Me. (Apr.

13, 2022).

C. Sovereign Immunity: the Board and its Members in their Official

Capacities

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend

to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. As a general principle, “[s]tates and their agencies are

entitled to sovereign immunity ‘regardless of the relief sought.’” Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t

of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S. 159,

167 n.14 (1985)). As the United States Supreme Court first explained in 1890 in Hans

v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), sovereign immunity has two parts: first that each

State is a sovereign entity in our federal system, and second that it is inherent in the

nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its

consent. Id. at 13; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Mr.

Grundstein has not alleged that the state of Maine has consented to his lawsuit or

that Congress has authorized it.

To the contrary, the Maine Legislature has enacted a statute that provides it

does not waive sovereign immunity “except where such waiver is explicitly stated by

law,” 14 M.R.S. § 8118, and Maine has strictly limited the instances where it has

authorized a claim against the state. See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A (authorizing a lawsuit

for its negligent acts in owning, maintaining or using a vehicle, for its negligent acts

in the construction, operation or maintenance of public buildings, for discharge of

pollutants, and for road construction and street cleaning or repair) & § 8104-B (gives

examples of actions for which the state is not amendable for suit). Mr. Grundstein

makes no claim that a Maine statute authorizes his lawsuit.

In addition, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to a state’s agencies and

its arms. Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding

that the University of Puerto Rico is “an arm of the Commonwealth” and therefore

entitled to sovereign immunity). Maine statutory law allows the Supreme Judicial

Court of Maine to create a board of bar examiners, 4 M.R.S. § 801, and provides that

“[a]ll procedural, administrative and budgetary actions of a board of bar examiners

shall be subject to rules established by the Supreme Judicial Court and are deemed

to be actions of the Supreme Judicial Court.” Id. The Court concludes that the Maine

Board of Bar Examiners is an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 433 (1982) (noting that the local District Ethics Committee acts as an arm of the

New Jersey Supreme Court in receiving and investigating complaints and holding

hearings); Grundstein v. Vt. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 748 F. Appx. 425, 427 (2nd Cir.

2019) (“Grundstein challenged an order of the Vermont Board of Bar Examiners . . .

which is an extension of the Vermont Supreme Court”); Mullane v. Mass. Bd. of Bar

Examiners, No. 20-cv-11382-DJC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171888, *5 (D. Mass. Sep.

10, 2021) (“[T]he Massachusetts Supreme Court retains the ultimate authority to

decide a person’s fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth, and bar admissions

proceedings conducted by the [Board of Bar Examiners] are an extension of that

authority”) (internal citations and punctuation omitted); Grundstein v. Wash. State

Bar Ass’n, No. C12-569RSL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114581, at *6-8 (D. Wash. Aug.

13, 2012) (concluding that Younger abstention applied to Mr. Grundstein’s federal

claim because there were ongoing state proceedings and bar proceedings implicate

important state interests).

In his response, Mr. Grundstein justifies his lawsuit against the Board and its

members by explaining that he is not seeking monetary damages against the

Defendants, only injunctive and declaratory relief, and therefore in his view, the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar his complaint because he is asserting that the

Defendants violated his due process, property, confrontation, and contract rights.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

The Defendants point out, however, that Ex Parte Young applies only when a

federal court commands a state official to “do nothing more than refrain from

violating federal law.” Defs.’ Reply at 2 (quoting Va. Office for Prot. & Advoc. v.

Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)). But, Defendants say, “Ex Parte Young ‘does not

apply “when the state is the real, substantial party in interest”’” Id. (quoting

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)). Here,

Defendants argue, the Maine Board of Bar Examiners qualifies as an arm of the state

and therefore Mr. Grundstein’s lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Court concludes that the Defendants have the better argument. In

Virginia Office, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Ex Parte Young

doctrine “has existed alongside our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence for more than

a century, accepted as necessary to ‘permit the federal courts to vindicate federal

rights.’” Va. Office, 563 U.S. at 254-55 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105). The

Virginia Office Court wrote that Ex Parte Young “rests on the premise—less

delicately called a ‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do

nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State of sovereign-

immunity purposes.” Id. at 255 (citation omitted). But the Supreme Court stressed

that the Ex Parte Young doctrine “is limited to that precise situation, and does not

apply when the state is the real, substantial party in interest, as when the judgment

sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with public

administration.” Id. (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Thus, “when the

State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a

suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive

relief.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-02.

In Muirhead v. Mecham, 427 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005), the First Circuit explained

the test to determine whether the relief sought is considered against the sovereign,

writing that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks specific performance, the answer to the inquiry

about relief hinges on whether the redress obtained against the officer will, in

practical effect, be obtained through the sovereign.” Id. at 18 (citing Larson v.

Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949)). Viewed under

Muirhead, the Court easily concludes that Mr. Grundstein is demanding relief from

the Board and its members that can only be obtained “through the sovereign.” Id.

Mr. Grundstein is effectively arguing that the Board and its members must not apply

their own rules concerning the taking of the MEE portion of the bar examination,

thus to obtain his requested relief, the “effect of the judgment would be to restrain

the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.” Id. (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372

U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).

The Court concludes that Mr. Grundstein’s claims against the Board and its

members in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

D. The Board Members in Their Personal Capacities

“[S]overeign immunity provides no protection against personal-capacity suits.”

Clemente Props., Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, 165 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2026). In general,

personal capacity claims “‘must be premised on . . . [a defendant’s] own acts or

omissions’ which deprived a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities protected

under federal law.” Perez v. Springfield Police Dep’t, No. 25-30063-MGM, 2025 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 230471, at *7-8 (Mass. D. Nov. 24, 2025) (quoting Justiniano v. Walker,

986 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2021)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court reviewed

Mr. Grundstein’s complaint to determine whether there are any allegations that

would support his lawsuit against members of the Board in their individual capacities

and found no allegations that would plausibly generate a personal capacity lawsuit

against any of the defendants.

The only specific allegations against any defendant that could even remotely

generate a personal capacity claim are contained in paragraph 14 and the conclusion

of the complaint. After describing the Board’s embargo, Mr. Grundstein alleges: “This

embargo is consistent with the misplaced malevolence in Defendant’s office as

administered by Melissa Hansen, director of the exam.” Compl. ¶ 14. Next, in his

conclusion, Mr. Grundstein complains about an additional $150 the Board charged

him after it returned his check. Id. ¶ 4. He states, “This sort of bad Faith has

consistently been a part of transactions with the Maine Board of Bar Examiners and

Melissa Hansen/Director.” Id. ¶ 5.

As regards Mr. Grundstein’s allegations against Ms. Hansen, although a court

is required to accept as true a complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and draw

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, courts disregard “conclusory legal

allegations” and factual assertions that are “too meager, vague, or conclusory to

remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture.” Cangrejeros de

Santurce Baseball Club, LLC v. Liga de Béisbol Profesional de P.R., Inc., 146 F.4th 1,

11 (1st Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). Here, Mr. Grundstein fails to allege facts

underlying his conclusory allegations against the Executive Director of the Maine

Board of Bar Examiners to justify his conclusory allegations. As for Mr. Grundstein’s

malevolence allegation against Ms. Hansen, Mr. Grundstein’s complaint otherwise

alleges that the Maine Board of Bar Examiners, not Ms. Hansen, made the decision

to embargo his score. Compl. ¶ 6 (“Defendant Board of Overseers (sic) embargoed

Plaintiff’s score”). Moreover, the October 20, 2021 letter notifying him of the Board’s

decision came from Chair Courtney, not Ms. Hansen. Courtney Letter at 1. As for

the $150 fee that underlies Mr. Grundstein’s bad faith allegation against Ms. Hansen,

Justice Gorman of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Board’s rules

“specifically provide that fees paid to the Board are nonrefundable.” Law Ct. Order

at 3 (citing ME. BAR ADMISS. R. 6(d)). There are simply not enough facts alleged in

the complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss for the personal capacity allegations

against Ms. Hansen.

Indeed, in addition to the absence of any viable personal capacity allegations,

as Mr. Grundstein has limited his claim of relief to declaratory and injunctive relief,

there is no reason to conclude that if the Board members and Ms. Hansen acted in

their personal, as opposed to official, capacities, they would have the authority to

provide Mr. Grundstein the relief he seeks against them as individuals. See Lewis v.

Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 161-63 (2017); Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia,

165 F.4th 1, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2026).

E. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Claim Preclusion

Although the Court could stop with its conclusions that Mr. Grundstein’s

claims fail because they violate the Eleventh Amendment and because they have

failed to provide a basis for proceeding against the Defendants in their individual

capacities, in the interest of completeness, the Court addresses whether Mr.

Grundstein’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and claim preclusion.

As noted earlier, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923), prohibits “the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction

over cases brought by” parties who lost in state court and who are “challenging state-

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,” Lance v.

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quotation marks omitted), because “the proper

forum for challenging an unlawful state court ruling” is the state appellate system

followed by a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court. Davison v.

Gov’t of P.R.-P.R. Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only in the ‘limited circumstances’

where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state

proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state court judgment and

seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’” Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v.

Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)); see

Grundstein v. Lamoille Super. Dkt. Entries/Orders, 821 F. App’x 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2020).

First, to the extent Mr. Grundstein is raising the issue of the Board’s $150

charge in this lawsuit, his allegations are clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. On December 22, 2021, Justice Ellen Gorman, Justice of the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court, addressed and rejected his claim for a refund of the $150

late fee, noting that Rule 6(d) of the Maine Bar Admission Rules provided that “fees

paid to the Board are nonrefundable.” Law Ct. Order at 3. Thus, Justice Gorman

rejected this specific claim on December 22, 2021, long before June 21, 2024, when

Mr. Grundstein filed this federal lawsuit in the District of Vermont, and in raising

this issue again in this federal lawsuit, Mr. Grundstein’s complaint on this point is

clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman.

Whether his constitutional claims are similarly barred by Rooker-Feldman is

more nuanced. In Exxon Mobil Corporation. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation,

544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Supreme Court discussed whether the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine necessarily precludes a federal court action once a state court action has been

resolved and observed that “[d]isposition of the federal action, once the state-court

adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law.” Id. at 293. The

Exxon Mobil Court mentioned that both the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738, and claim and issue preclusion effects would be implicated, if the losing state

court litigant attempted to raise issues in federal court that could have been raised

in the final state court adjudication. As the First Circuit has explained, “[r]es judicata

-- also known as claim preclusion -- is a longstanding legal doctrine that ‘a final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating claims

that were or could have been raised in the prior action.’” Rivera-Rosario v. LSREF2

Island Holdings, Ltd., Inc., 79 F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2023). (quoting Haag v. United

States, 589 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2009)); accord Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough, 86 F.4th

453, 459 n.4 (1st Cir. 2023).

Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, as codified in 28

U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must apply Maine claim preclusion rules to Maine state

court judgments. Under Maine law, claim preclusion prevents relitigating claims if

“(1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final

judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision

in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action.” 20

Thames St. LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Me. 2017 LLC, 2021 ME 33, ¶ 15, 252 A.3d

516 (quoting Wilmington Tr. Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne, 2013 ME 94, ¶ 7, 81 A.3d 371).

The first two elements are met here, because, as explained above, Mr. Grundstein

raised a challenge to the Board’s embargo decision against the same or substantially

identical parties (i.e., the Board and its officials) for which the Law Court reviewed

and issued final judgment on December 22, 2021. See Law Ct. Order.

As to the third element of Maine claim preclusion, even though Mr. Grundstein

did not raise his constitutional claims in his state court challenge, the Court

concludes that he could have done so, and therefore he is precluded under principles

of claim preclusion from raising in this court what he could have raised in the state

court litigation. Mr. Grundstein’s constitutional claims arise from the Board’s

embargo decision previously reviewed by the Maine Law Court, and he alleges no

new or different facts to distinguish his constitutional claims from those that could

have been litigated in the prior state court action. See 20 Thames St. LLC, 2021 ME

33, ¶ 17, 252 A.3d 516 (quoting Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 12, 990 A.2d 538)

(explaining that the third element of Maine claim preclusion applies a “transactional

test, examining the aggregate of connected operative facts that can be handled

together conveniently for purposes of trial to determine if they were founded upon

the same transaction, arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts, and sought

redress for essentially the same basic wrong”). Nor could Mr. Grundstein claim that

the state court could not have addressed the constitutional claims he raises here. The

First Circuit has long held that “state courts, consistent with the imperatives of the

Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, are fully competent to adjudicate federal

constitutional and statutory claims properly presented by the parties.” Casa Marie,

Inc. v. Super. Ct., 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal footnote omitted).

F. Mandamus Request

Based on the Court’s conclusion that his pending complaint is non-meritorious,

the Court denies Mr. Grundstein’s request for a writ of mandamus, because his

request is premised on the success of his underlying allegations against the

Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 12) and DENIES the

Plaintiff’s Motion for Order or Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 14). The Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 3rd day of March, 2026