Case law

McIntyre v. United States

447 F. Supp. 2d 54 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 5, 2006

The statute operates as a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. Muniz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.2003). … (Connolly clearly did not follow his own advice when he kept Bulger and Flemmi as informants.)

Greenspan v. MasMarques

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 25, 2024

The Complaints Board Defendants can remove posts on the website, and they created a function for users to report posts that are abusive or clearly false. Id. ¶¶ 159-60. … General advertisements on the website visible everywhere, however, are not sufficiently targeted to Massachusetts residents to qualify as commercial contact with the state. See Power v.

Sterry Street Auto Sales Inc. v. Cummins Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 23, 2020

To qualify for the program, engines must pass a full inspection performed by an authorized [defendant] deal or distributor . . . . … Plaintiff also clearly alleges that it suffered a loss of money or property, and that there was a causal connection between its loss and defendant’s actions.

Jean Claude Hakuzimana v. Ivory Systems, Inc. and Bristol Myers Squibb

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2026

The first two factors clearly support regarding BMS as a joint employer. … Ivory and BMS do not contest that Hakuzimana, a Black man of Rwandan descent, is a member of a protected class and that he was qualified for his job.

Doyle v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 17, 2025

“While the First Circuit has not clearly circumscribed who bears what burden of proof to establish the factual predicate to the imposition of sanctions, other courts have held that the burden is on the Rule 11 movant, and … As discussed, however, what qualifies as reasonable pre-suit inquiry must be considered “under the totality of the circumstances.” Navarro- Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1425 (citing Bus. Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 551).

Sarno Realty, Inc. v. Selective Insurance Company of the Southeast

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2022

“While the insured bears the burden of establishing coverage, . . . the burden is on the insurer to establish the applicability of an exclusion.” Finn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. … Clearly such an order would qualify as an enforcement action.

Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Technologies, Inc.

768 F. Supp. 2d 338 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 4, 2011

.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed.Cir.1998)(“One who simply provides the inventor with well-known principles or explains the state of the art without ever having a ‘firm and definite idea’ of the claimed combination as a whole does not qualify … Crampton’s email and testimony clearly reveal that he knew that Faro’s collaboration was significant and that it should have been disclosed to the patent office.

Schonton v. MPA Granada Highlands LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 2, 2019

Mass. 2003) (noting that “forty individuals [are] generally found to establish numerosity”). … The Court finds Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish this case from Dukes and establish commonality to be unavailing.

Serabian v. SAP America, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 23, 2018

established public policy.” … Second, even under FLSA jurisprudence, Serabian’s pay complaints would qualify as protected activity.

Ramos v. Kijakazi

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 12, 2024

J.O. clearly does not qualify for this disability designation, because he is ten years old. … Even if he had qualified for the listing between the ages of two and three, his disability would have had to be re-ascribed to another, body-system listing upon his attainment of age three. See 20 C.F.R.

Dickerson v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America

574 F. Supp. 2d 239 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 2, 2008

She accordingly qualified as disabled. Id. 4 . The letter recited the definition of total disability, but it differed from the definition present in the group insurance contract in one respect. … Lotufo checked clearly is a subset of the more general statement that "[t]he employee WILL BE ABLE TO return to work,” Dr. Lotufo’s failure to check the first box appears to be merely an oversight.

Fernandes v. Criterion Child Enrichment, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2024

These statements clearly meet the requirements of Rule 803(4). … At the first step for both claims, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she (1) was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) was “nonetheless qualified to perform the essential functions

John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, Inc.

186 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2002

Winchester-Willows wisely devote most of their time and paper to other arguments, given the low threshold of originality required to establish copyrightable work. … plans with permitting authorities nor distributing such plans to subcontractors for bidding purposes constitutes publication under the Copyright Act.”); 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, § 4.10 (“Placing a work in a public file ... clearly

Reed v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 21, 2020

However, clearly she was not able to do so in the months that followed the state agency consultants’ findings. … While the above position may be correct, we do not think that the ALJ was qualified to make an RFC assessment concerning the extent to which claimant's non-compliance with treatment was under her control and the

Sosa v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 2, 2019

The Court is required to dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune … Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] warden’s general responsibility for supervising a prison is insufficient to establish personal liability.”).2 Thus, to state a

Iron Workers District Council of New England Health and Welfare Fund v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 7, 2024

A party petitioning the government for redress is “generally immune from antitrust liability.” Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. … That immunity extends to citizens or groups who petition the legislature, the executive, administrative agencies or the courts. Cali. Motor Transp. Co. v.

Renkowicz v. Mici

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 2020

1915A authorize federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … Put another way, the complaint must clearly identify the claims and relief Renkowicz seeks as to each defendant and provide sufficient factual bases for each of the elements of the claims that he asserts.

State Street Trust Co. v. United States

37 F. Supp. 846 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 11, 1941

Wood, a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, having expressed his view, as did other witnesses qualified to express an opinion upon the subject, that the restricted Class “A” shares did not have a fair market value … Clearly enough, no reasonable person would undertake to pay as much for the restricted shares deliverable in a. year as for the unrestricted shares deliverable at once.

Saxena v. University of Massachusetts Medical School

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2023

Therefore, he fails to establish the first element. As to the second element, Plaintiff must establish that he is a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA. … Plaintiff has the burden to establish that he is a qualified individual. Joseph M. v. Becker College, 531 F. Supp. 3d 383, 396 (D.Mass. 2021).

Moura v. New Prime, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 9, 2018

However, the court qualified its support for the proximate cause standard: That being said, we are persuaded that strict adherence to a proximate cause standard in all circumstances is unnecessarily restrictive. … As to the third factor, the court in Cossart noted that the plaintiff “did significant work for [the defendants] in Massachusetts—as the defendants clearly foresaw he would.” Id. at 22. Again, the same is true here.