Doyle v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

__________________________________________

)

)

SEAN DOYLE et al., )

)

Plaintiffs )

)

v. )

) Case No. 24-cv-12030-DJC

)

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, )

successor by merger to FEDEX GROUND )

PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

__________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, J. July 17, 2025

I. Introduction

After a dismissal of a FLSA collective action, thirty-eight plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) have filed

this lawsuit against Defendant Federal Express Corporation, successor by merger to FedEx Ground

Package System, Inc. ( “FedEx”), for failing to pay overtime wages owed to Plaintiffs in violation

of the Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. D. 1, 14. FedEx has moved to

dismiss the amended complaint as a sanction for violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 by Plaintiffs’

counsel Litchten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. (“LLR”). D. 27. For the reasons stated below, the Court

DENIES FedEx’s motion for sanctions without prejudice. Id.1

1 Plaintiffs also moved to reassign this case to Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson

who presided over the prior collective action. D. 46. Considering Judge Robertson’s upcoming

retirement, D. 59-1 at 59, LLR has indicated at the hearing that it is withdrawing the motion.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion as moot. D. 46. The Court ALLOWS FedEx’s motion

for additional pages for its memorandum in support of the Rule 11 motion nunc pro tunc. D. 23.

II. Legal Standards

“Rule 11(b) permits, but does not require, the court to sanction an attorney for the filing or

signing of a paper for ‘any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or

needlessly increase the cost of litigation,’ or for asserting or denying factual contentions that either

lack evidentiary support or are unlikely to have such support after an opportunity for investigation

or discovery.” Augustyniak Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Astonish Results, L.P., No. 11-cv-464S-PAS, 2013

WL 998770, at *7 (D.R.I. Mar. 13, 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). “Rule 11(b) allows

sanctions only for misconduct in presenting ‘a pleading, written motion, or other paper – whether

by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it.’” Balerna v. Gilberti, 708 F.3d 319, 323 (1st

Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). “While the First Circuit has not clearly circumscribed

who bears what burden of proof to establish the factual predicate to the imposition of sanctions,

other courts have held that the burden is on the Rule 11 movant, and that ‘[a]ll doubts regarding

whether Rule 11 has been violated should be resolved in favor of the signer of the paper.’”

Augustyniak Ins. Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 998770, at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting McMahon

Sec. Co. v. FB Foods, Inc., No. 04-cv-1791-SCB, 2006 WL 2092643, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 27,

2006)).

III. Factual and Procedural Backgrounds

FedEx operates a package pickup and delivery business that serves customers throughout

the United States. D. 14 ¶ 48. As alleged, FedEx employs thousands of package delivery drivers

who (a) work for FedEx through intermediary employers called “independent service providers”

(ISPs); (b) are classified as “employees” of the FedEx ISPs; (c) have worked more than forty hours

per week delivery packages for FedEx but are not paid time-and-a-half compensation for hours

worked beyond forty each week; and (d) drive, in whole or in part, vehicle with a gross vehicle

weight rating of 10,001 pounds or less. Id. ¶ 49.

In 2017, LLR filed an FLSA collective action against FedEx, Roy v. FedEx Ground

Package System, Inc., 17-cv-30116-KAR (D. Mass.). The case was conditionally certified by the

Court on November 27, 2018, resulting in approximately 550 individuals opting into the case

(“opt-ins”). D. 28 at 7; Roy, 17-cv-30116-KAR, D. 64.2 On August 18, 2023, FedEx moved to

decertify the conditional class. Roy, 17-cv-30116-KAR, D. 347. On March 29, 2024, the Court

granted the motion and decertified the class. Roy, 17-cv-30116-KAR, D. 408. Following

decertification, LLR asked for, and received a 120-day tolling period to allow the dismissed opt-

ins to file their claims individually. Roy, 17-cv-30116-KAR, D. 419.

On August 6, 2024, LLR filed the initial complaint for this action on behalf of Plaintiffs,

D. 1, amended on September 25, 2024, D. 14. On the same day, LLR also filed a complaint in

another action, Alleyne et al. v. Federal Express Corporation, 24-cv-12031-RGS, D. 1, amended

on October 3, 2024, D. 21. The plaintiffs in both this case and Alleyne consist of former Roy opt-

ins. D. 38 at 9. On December 2, 2024, FedEx now has moved for Rule 11 sanctions against LLR

and requests dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. D. 27. The Court heard the parties and

took the matter under advisement. D. 61.

2 Concurrently, LLR also represented a collective of approximately 30,000 opt-ins pursuing

identical claims against FedEx in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Claiborne v. FedEx

Ground Package System, Inc., 18-cv-01698-RJC (W.D. Pa.), which was conditionally certified on

September 30, 2019. D. 38 at 8-9. On April 30, 2024, the plaintiffs in that case voluntarily

decertified their collective action and requested the court to dismiss all opt-ins without prejudice

and toll the statute of limitations for them to pursue their claims individually through August 6,

2024 (120 days). Id. at 9. The court granted that motion on May 2, 2024. Id. LLR has filed two

actions after Claiborne was decertified: Abner v. Federal Express, No. 24-cv-01129-RJC (W.D.

P.A.) and Brannon v. Federal Express, No. 24-cv-01128-RJC (W.D. Pa.). D. 28 at 5.

IV. Discussion

A. At This Juncture, FedEx Has Not Shown That LLR Has Violated Rule

11(b)(1)

FedEx alleges that LLR has violated Rule 11(b)(1) by filing this action “only to ‘harass,

cause unnecessary delay, [and] needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” D. 28 at 19 (alteration

in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)), because (1) there is no indication that the named

plaintiffs are valid and (2) LLR will not be able to get the plaintiffs to participate fully in discovery,

id. at 14, 17.

1. Invalid Plaintiffs

FedEx alleges that LLR has breached its duty to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry

because it did not fully communicate the rights and responsibilities entailed in being a plaintiff

here to the Roy opt-ins but only signed them up for this litigation based on “nothing more than

[their] basic information [] and confirmation that they are not an employee of FedEx.” Id at 15.

Rule 11 imposes on litigants “the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts

and the law” prior to filing a pleading. Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1425 (1st Cir.

1992) (quoting Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991)).

“Whether or not this duty has been breached depends on the objective reasonableness of the

litigant’s conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1425 (citing

Bus. Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 551). Factors relevant to this consideration include “the complexity

of the subject matter, the party’s familiarity with it, the time available for inquiry, and the ease (or

difficulty) of access to the requisite information.” Id.

Here, LLR asserts that it relied upon representations made in the opt-in consent forms in

Roy in selecting the plaintiffs in this matter. D. 38 at 16, 18-19. These forms contain declarations

“under penalty of perjury” that the opt-in had “delivered packages for FedEx within the statute of

limitations, and that they were not paid for overtime to which they were entitled during that time

period.” Id. at 19. Here, where LLR only had 120 days from the date of decertification to

investigate and file claims “of more than 400 individuals who were former opt-in to the Roy

litigation,” “who (for the most part) had not engaged in substantial discovery,” id. at 16, it is not

unreasonable for LLR to rely upon sworn declarations of same to determine whether they should

be included as plaintiffs in this case. See CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp.,

951 F.2d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1991) (articulating that “[t]he shorter the time the more reasonable it is

for an attorney to rely on the client or forwarding counsel”).

Moreover, to the extent that FedEx relies upon two social media posts containing

communications to opt-in plaintiffs regarding this case and a screenshot of a sign-up portal for

same as evidence that LLR has failed to adequately communicate the requisite information to opt-

ins, D. 28-8; D. 28-9; D. 28-10, FedEx cannot presume to know what the firm communicated to

its clients or what LLR counsels did to vet their clients claims based solely on same. Indeed, “Rule

11 does not require a party or an attorney to disclose any privileged communications or work

product to show that a pleading, motion, or other paper is substantially justified.” TEGG Corp. v.

Beckstrom Elec. Co., No. 08-cv-435, 2008 WL 5216169, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008).

Moreover, as discussed, the burden is on FedEx to establish that LLR has breached its duty and is

liable for sanctions under Rule 11. Augustyniak Ins. Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 998770, at *7 (citing

McMahon Sec. Co., 2006 WL 2092643, at *2). Where, as here, there is doubt regarding whether

Rule 11 has been violated, it “should be resolved in favor of” LLR, “the signer of the paper.” Id.

(quoting McMahon Sec. Co., 2013 WL 998770, at *2).

Lastly, even assuming arguendo that LRR has failed to adequately inform the opt-ins about

their obligations as litigants, it is difficult to ascertain the link between this alleged failure and

FedEx’s argument that this failure was an attempt to “increase[] the costs of litigation for FedEx

in an attempt to harass FedEx into settlement.” D. 28 at 16. Even if the Court considers LLR’s

alleged threat to pursue more claims unless FedEx settles, D. 28-1 ¶¶ 25-29, FedEx has not, on the

present record, plausibly shown a link between this alleged failure to inform and an intent to harass

at this stage of the litigation. See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Dignity Viatical Settlement Partners,

L.P., 171 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that the fact that “counsel on both sides tended to

push the envelope in search of a winning theory” does not support “the imposition of [Rule 11]

sanctions”).

2. Inability to Engage Plaintiffs in Discovery

FedEx next argues that Rule 11 sanction is appropriate because “[i]t’s beyond belief that

38 plaintiffs, many of whom have already demonstrated their unwillingness to participate only as

opt-ins in the Roy collective, will each fully participate” in the discovery process in this case. D.

28 at 17. This allegation is more concerning to the Court as the Plaintiffs will need to participate

in discovery here and must do so in a timely and prompt manner as will be prescribed by the Court.

FedEx contends that nine of the thirty-eight Plaintiffs in this action “did not fully comply with

their discovery obligations in Roy” and seven other plaintiffs “did not fully comply with their

limited discovery obligations” because “they did not produce all of the documents they said they

had in their possession up through the time FedEx filed its decertification motion.” Id. at 17-18.

Considering these past difficulties, FedEx contends that it is doubtful that LLR can adequately

handle the discovery in this case, particularly in light of the number of other plaintiffs it is also

representing in the other pending cases. Id. at 18. This inability, FedEx asserts, shows that LLR

has filed this case against it “only to ‘harass, cause unnecessary delay, [and] needlessly increase

the cost of litigation.’” Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)).

Contrary to LLR’s suggestion otherwise, prior history of judicial rebukes, sanctions, or

violations, whether in related or unrelated cases, is relevant in determining both the applicability

and scope of a Rule 11 sanction. See Fusco v. Medeiros, 965 F. Supp. 230, 235 n.3 (D.R.I. 1996)

(considering the discovery sanctions awarded in the matter “to be highly relevant to the

determination of the nature and purposes of the Rule 11 sanctions” to be imposed); Kramer v.

Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 104 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that it is “appropriate to consider past conduct”

and noted thirty six “publicly reported instances of violating rules of professional

conduct”), aff'd, 52 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 1995); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412, 1418

(D.D.C. 1985) (taking into consideration the plaintiff’s previous bad faith conducts in related

litigation), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986). FedEx’s assertion that the same discovery

difficulties that arose in Roy is “prologue,” D. 28 at 18, for what will happen in this case is too

speculative to sustain Rule 11 sanctions at this point. See Nemsky v. ConocoPhillips Co., 574

F.3d 859, 868-69 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming the lower court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions because

the court would need to engage in a speculative “chain of inferences” to conclude that the

plaintiff’s conduct was sanctionable). Even assuming arguendo that LLR will face some of the

same discovery issues in this case as it did in Roy, that in and of itself is insufficient at present to

support FedEx’s assertion that LLR had filed this action “only to ‘harass, cause unnecessary delay,

[and] needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b)(1)). The Court might come to a different conclusion if similar discovery difficulties

are encountered here in discovery from the thirty-eight Plaintiffs, but that is not the present record

before the Court.

FedEx’s reliance on In re Engle Cases, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2017) does warrant

a different outcome. There, the sanctioned law firm filed over three thousand “Engle-progeny

complaints” after the class action at issue was decided. Id. at 1186-87. As it turned out, many of

the plaintiffs never authorized the firm to file suit and many others “had died well before” the firm

filed the complaint. Id. at 1183-84. Notably, the court only learned about this after it had sent

questionnaires directly to the plaintiffs, a process which counsel had resisted. Id. at 1184. In total,

“[i]t was this obstructive, deceptive, and recalcitrant behavior that, in combination with the

hundreds of frivolous complaints, compelled the Court to initiate sanctions proceedings.” Id.

Here, there is no evidence that LRR had filed these claims without the named plaintiffs’ consent.

Moreover, FedEx has offered no evidence to show that LRR has engaged the type of deceptive

behavior at issue in Engle.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court denies the motion for sanctions under Rule

11(b)(1).

B. At This Juncture, FedEx Has Not Shown That LLR Has Violated Rule

11(b)(2)-(3)

FedEx next alleges that LLR has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3), which requires an

attorney to certify that his or her claims have legal and evidentiary support. D. 28 at 21. As

alleged, LLR has violated the rule (1) because it has failed to allege “accurate facts for many of

the plaintiffs’ claims” and (2) because it has not requested pay documents from the plaintiffs’

employers. D. 28 at 21-24.

1. Failure to Allege Accurate Facts

FedEx alleges that “[d]espite having access to documents produced in Roy demonstrating

that some of the [p]laintiffs were paid over time . . . , that some did not work overtime for

significant amount of time, and that some [p]laintiffs drove only heavy vehicles for significant

amount of time and for certain [ISPs] (making them exempt from overtime), LLR proceeded with

blanket allegations, claiming damages for all years driven.” Id. at 21. FedEx then proceeds to

point to alleged discrepancies between the allegations raised in the complaint and the evidence in

Roy. Id. at 21-22.3

The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to prevent lawyers from “advocating for a frivolous

position, pursuing an unfounded claim, or filing a lawsuit for some improper purpose.” CQ Int’l

Co. v. Rochem Int’l, Inc., USA, 659 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2011). Rule 11 “should not be employed

as a discovery device or to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the pleadings;

other motions are available for those purpose.” Am. Mod. Home Ins. Co. v. United Yacht Sales,

No. 16-cv-40127-TSH, 2017 WL 5760914, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 11, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 1993 Amendments). To the extent that LRR’s

allegations later will be undermined by evidence, FedEx will have an opportunity to make that

showing at summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)

(holding that one of the “principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose

of factually unsupported claims or defenses”).

Additionally, FedEx also argues that LLR failed to investigate information contained in

scanner and vehicle data from the Roy case which allegedly contain relevant data concerning hours

worked. D. 28 at 22. As discussed, however, where LLR had a short amount of time to sift through

information of the Roy opt-ins prior to filing this action, their reliance upon the opt-in consent

forms in this particular case appears, at this juncture, to constitute reasonable pre-filing

investigation.

3 FedEx also relies upon the fact that LLR included one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Ayala-

Robles, in both this and the Alleyne complaint to support its argument that LLR has pleaded

inaccurate facts in violation of Rule 11(b)(2)-(3). D. 28 at 23. LLR, however, has indicated in its

opposition that it included Ayala-Robles in the Alleyne matter erroneously and that it has

dismissed him from that case. D. 38 at 7 n.3.

2. Failure to Request Pay Documents

Lastly, FedEx argues that LLR should be sanctioned because it has failed to request the

plaintiffs’ “pay documents from their employer and reviewing documents to ensure factual

viability of their overtime claim.” D. 28 at 23. To support this argument FedEx cites cases that

have sanctioned counsel under Rule 11 for a failure to do so before filing a suit. Id. at 24 (citing

Estrada v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 14-23388, 2018 WL 1836007, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2018)

(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1811907 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16,

2018), aff’d, 810 F. Appx. 743, 743 (11th Cir. 2020)). As discussed, however, what qualifies as

reasonable pre-suit inquiry must be considered “under the totality of the circumstances.” Navarro-

Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1425 (citing Bus. Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 551). Accordingly, in the absence

of guidance from the First Circuit, the Court declines here to adopt a bright-line rule requiring the

requiring pre-suit inspection of certain documents by LLR before filing this lawsuit.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES FedEx’s motion for sanctions without

prejudice. D. 27. Because the conduct of discovery will be critical to manage here, particularly

given the number of plaintiffs, the Court refers all pre-trial matters in this action, including

scheduling and discovery, to Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley.

So Ordered.

/s Denise J. Casper

United States District Judge