Case law

BI 40 LLC v. Tewksbury Living Group, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 13, 2025

Once the movant does so, “[t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. … See, e.g., Dkt. 248-30 at 2-3 (“The inability to get funds was clearly an issue relative to the ongoing operations of the facility.

BI 40 LLC v. Tewksbury Living Group, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 13, 2025

Once the movant does so, “[t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. … See, e.g., Dkt. 248-30 at 2-3 (“The inability to get funds was clearly an issue relative to the ongoing operations of the facility.

Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile De France v. New England Reinsurance Corp.

944 F. Supp. 986 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 7, 1996

Moreover, the evidence does not clearly establish which plaintiffs actually received the version of the 1982 AI described above. … Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Industrial General, supra, established a "test” for determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists.

J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp.

580 F. Supp. 1173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 1984

Yet none of the latter qualify as a ‘systems’ product, as currently defined, and none of them can be supplied by Onan in any ‘off the shelf’ sense.” … Westerbeke’s subsequent characterization at trial of this response as an “acceptance” of an alleged offer, however, does not supply the necessary mutual assent that is clearly missing.

Foreign Car Center, Inc. v. Salem Suede, Inc. (In Re Salem Suede, Inc.)

221 B.R. 586 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 24, 1998

If not, does the attempt to appeal from the order nevertheless qualify for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order? These are among the threshold questions in the present proceeding in this court. C. … My purpose is to identify as clearly as possible, given the limited nature of the record before me, the trialworthy issues that remain.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chipotle Mexican Grill

98 F. Supp. 3d 198 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2015

I can get quality food at many other places without the disrespect I received at your establishment. (Callaghan Complaint at 1-2). … The EEOC contends that the Carr affidavit establishes prima facie evidence that Connell was replaced by a “non-disabled person.”

ACLU of Massachusetts v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 24, 2020

ACLUM’s May Request clearly sought “[r]ecords containing some or all of the Address, including without limitation any prepared remarks, notes, talking points, and outlines . . . thereof.” Doc. No. 27 ⁋ 11. … Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (holding that “[t]o qualify [for Exemption 5’s protection], a document[’s] . . . source must be a Government agency”).

Washtenaw County Employees Retirement System v. Avid Technology, Inc.

28 F. Supp. 3d 93 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 27, 2014

Misrepresentation or Omission of a Material Fact In order to qualify as a material misrepresentation or omission, the plaintiff must indicate that a reasonable investor would have viewed the information as “having significantly … The Plaintiffs allege that the pre-July 2011 statements were clearly false. Furthermore, “[t]he need to restructure an entire division’s sales force was material to shareholders....

Hutchins v. Cardiac Science, Inc.

456 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2006

According to Plaintiff, the APA triggered the terms of Section 3.10[, which] ... clearly require that the stockholders of the Complient Corporation pay the LICENSOR, namely Hutchins, seven and one-half percent (7-1/2) of … Jan. 22, 2004) (dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of arbitral immunity), affd 108 Fed.

Searle v. RBS Citizens Bank N.A.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2018

Here, Plaintiffs have not established that Ditech/Green Treeis a “debt collector” as defined bythe FDCPA. … “The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in its favor.” Id.

San Francisco Health Plan v. McKesson Corp.

767 F. Supp. 2d 263 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 2011

Typically, the publishing company played no independent role in establishing AWP, other than applying this formulaic markup to the manufacturer’s price. 2. … Hartman’s damages methodology includes programs that use Red Book instead of FDB, this is not a persuasive argument for denying class certification, because the definition of each proposed class clearly excludes public payors

Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly and Company

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 3, 2022

“[T]he materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality[,]” id. … Lilly claims that the antibodies have clearly distinct functions because Galcanezumab binds to the mid-region of CGRP whereas Antibody G1 binds to the C-terminal end. [Id. at 7].

Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum

672 F. Supp. 2d 217 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 7, 2009

Legal Standard The plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the defendant’s fair use defense, asking the Court to find that fair use is foreclosed by the established facts of this case. … At summary judgment, a court considers whether sufficient facts have been established to warrant a decision as a matter of law.

Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee

454 F. Supp. 703 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 5, 1978

Clearly, a school committee can determine what books will go into a library and, indeed, if there will be a library at all. … Even though he could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him . he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision

In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation

225 F.R.D. 14 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 2, 2004

The Court’s role in this context is clear: it must “conduct a rigorous analysis of the prerequisites established by Rule 23,” Smilow v. … Having thus established the framework for its inquiry, the Court proceeds to consider the states included in the proposed settlement class.

United States v. Toth

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 20, 2019

for 2007 was warranted and not clearly unjust. … In its submissions, the Government has referenced UBS’s internal notes on the Account from the early 2000s, which discuss the Qualified Intermediary Agreement (“QI”) between the U.S. government and UBS Switzerland, effective

Turner v. Liberty Mutual Retirement Benefit Plan

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 11, 2023

In the case at hand, however, because the plaintiffs did not qualify for relief under § 502’s other provisions, relief under § 502(a)(3) was appropriate. Id. at 515. … Section 503 of ERISA establishes procedural requirements governing how an ERISA plan must process benefits claims.

United States v. Mehta

307 F. Supp. 2d 270 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 3, 2004

expenses of day-to-day life are more pressing,” than charitable contributions, Thur-ston, 358 F.3d 51 , 79, I can only assume that the Court had in mind the kinds of activities that a blue collar worker would engage in to qualify … One witness, clearly overcome with emotion, described Mehta’s help when his father was dying of cancer.

In Re Pharmaceutical Ind. Aver. Wholesale Price

509 F. Supp. 2d 82 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 17, 2007

The defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.1997). … Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 , 123 S.Ct. 366 , 154 L.Ed.2d 368 (2002) ("[a]ncillary jurisdiction . . . cannot provide the original jurisdiction that petitioners must show in order to qualify for removal under § 1441").

Lucchesi

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 11, 2026

where the moving party was arguing “on the facts of this case” that “the [plan in question] [wa]s a payroll practice . . . exempt from ERISA,” while the plaintiff alternatively “contend[ed] that the [plan in question] qualifie … Cir. 2016) (holding that a short-term disability plan was “clearly exempt from ERISA” where, inter alia, it constituted an employee’s normal compensation since it offered 100% and then 60% of their wages); Bassiri v.