Case law

Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH

126 F. Supp. 2d 16 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 2000

They are to review that record, apply the established rules of claim construction to determine the scope of the invention and then design around it. Id. … The claims, it suggests, refer to “dominant selectable phenotypes” only in the context of processes utilizing amplification. 24 And in that setting, both mutant and wild-type host cells would qualify.

FAMILYFIRST BANK v. Kusek

657 F. Supp. 2d 258 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2009

This common law rule of priority, however, is qualified by section 6323 of the Code, which provides, in part, that the tax lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid against a judgment lien creditor until notice of the … As is true in Progressive, the I.R.S. could not have anticipated its current priority status because its recorded lien was clearly junior to Burek’s lien.

Rivera v. Kelly

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 22, 2025

The clause applies “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question … After the Court explained the necessity of a serious sentence, the Clerk clearly announced that sentence: THE CLERK: Judge, may the sentence be imposed?

Brown v. FL Roberts & Co., Inc.

419 F. Supp. 2d 7 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 3, 2006

The record does not suggest that Plaintiff ever asked, or was qualified, to be transferred to this other division. 4 III. … Plaintiff has clearly met this requirement: he described his religious beliefs to his immediate supervisors, Fuller and Spears, and to the Vice President in charge of his division, Smith.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 10, 2018

Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act Congress enacted the first version of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act in 1938 to establish a system of unemployment insurance … This Court disagrees with the conclusion of that court that the RUIA preemption provision “does not clearly define the type of sickness provisions RUIA preempts” which led that court to

In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation

42 F. Supp. 3d 231 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2014

But when the concessions are contingent on the actions of others, they are not so clearly discrete. … Eaton Corp., 646 F.Supp.2d 663, 667 (D.Del.2009) (holding that experts looking at but-for worlds must qualify and discuss data in support of conclusions).

Acadia Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co.

679 F. Supp. 2d 229 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 21, 2010

recovery outside the policy’s coverage. 55 To determine the scope of coverage the court begins by comparing the policy language with the facts alleged in the complaint. 56 If the complaint in the underlying action does not clearly … Rather, Plaintiff would have this court use the extrinsic facts in Attorney Rehnborg’s letter as independent predicates establishing a duty to defend.

Cox v. City of Boston

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 14, 2024

immunity. … The City argues only that summary judgment is warranted because Cox has failed to establish a constitutional deprivation by the Individual Defendants.

Reddicks v. Alves

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 2024

Therefore, as no clearly established law exists on this issue, this Court again necessarily defers to the Appeals Court’s decision. … application of clearly established federal law.

World Gym, Inc. v. Baker DO NOT DOCKET IN THIS CASE - ALL ENTRIES ARE TO BE MADE IN THE LEAD CASE

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 24, 2020

Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in [their] favor.” Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.) v. … As to the second consideration, Plaintiffs cannot establish a “reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability,” Am.

South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. Zobel

830 F. Supp. 643 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 11, 1993

Accordingly, clearly established principles of federalism and comity also require that this court not attempt to assert federal jurisdiction over this dispute. … This conclusion is not qualified by the fact that the decision from which the plaintiffs seek relief is preliminary in nature.

Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A.

571 F. Supp. 2d 251 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 2008

Plaintiffs have identified the practice at issue: establishing a par rate keyed to objective indicators of creditworthiness while simultaneously authorizing additional charges keyed to factors unrelated to those criteria. … Plaintiffs Miller and Austin, in particular, alleges that she received a sub-prime loan even though she qualified for a prime-market rate. 7 .

AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG

946 F. Supp. 2d 205 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 11, 2013

It is well established that “[f]ederal courts are empowered to issue civil contempt sanctions to ‘protect! … A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.” Id.

World Gym, Inc. v. Baker

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 24, 2020

Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in [their] favor.” Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.) v. … As to the second consideration, Plaintiffs cannot establish a “reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability,” Am.

Britell v. United States

204 F. Supp. 2d 182 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 29, 2002

CHAMPUS first notes that the Supreme Court has established clearly that justifications advanced in support of legislative classifications need not have been articulated at the time the legislation was first contemplated — … Since the distinctions being drawn here are not “invidious” ones, CHAMPUS argues, they do not trigger equal protection analysis, and therefore do not even qualify for rational basis review.

Doucot v. IDS Scheer, Inc.

734 F. Supp. 2d 172 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 10, 2010

“The ‘reasonably’ qualifier is important: there is no ambiguity if one of the two proffered meanings is unreasonable.” Id. (citing Murphy v. … Doucot’s claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Count IV of the Second Amendment Complain are clearly undercut.” (Docket Entry # 38).

Roach v. MIDDLETON AUTO SALES, INC.

623 F. Supp. 2d 139 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 8, 2009

They contend that Roach has not made an expert disclosure or provided a written report as required by the rule, 10 and has not demonstrated that Zaher is qualified. Id. Assets and CUNA are correct. … Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment is properly entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

Robison v. Johnson

352 F. Supp. 848 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 4, 1973

As is clearly evident from these definitions, plaintiff and members of his class, who have performed alternate service under 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) and applicable regulations, do not qualify for veterans’ benefits. … For the Court held that the mandatory sex classification, established “merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection

United States v. Jaber

362 F. Supp. 2d 365 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 16, 2005

In Wilson, the court noted that the Guidelines are entitled to “heavy” weight, and that deviation from Guidelines ranges is only appropriate in unusual cases, for clearly identified and persuasive reasons. … Had the 57-71 months of the Guidelines range been a 60 month mandatory minimum, he would have qualified for safety valve relief.

In Re Celexa & Lexapro Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation

751 F. Supp. 2d 277 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 10, 2010

In September, 2002, the FDA denied Forest’s application for a pediatric indication for Celexa, finding that the Lundbeck study “is a clearly negative study that provides no support for the efficacy of Celexa in pediatric … Applying the Camacho test, the Court finds that Wilcox has adequately pled facts establishing that Forest’s conduct was unfair.