Reddicks v. Alves

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

___________________________________

)

CHARLES REDDICKS, )

) CIVIL ACTION

Petitioner, ) No. 23-10455-WGY

)

v. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT NELSON B ALVES, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

YOUNG, D.J. December 4, 2024

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Through this petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Charles Reddicks (“Reddicks”)

requests this Court vacate his convictions for second-degree

murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a

loaded firearm without a license, and order his release from

custody. Pet. 16, ECF No. 1. Reviewing Reddicks’ claim

pursuant to the demanding standards that govern, this Court is

constrained to deny Reddicks’ petition for the reasons explained

below.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural History

In January 2016, a jury convicted Reddicks of second-degree

murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a

loaded firearm without a license. Pet. 1; Commonwealth v.

Reddicks, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2021) (unpublished). Reddicks

appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court (“the

Appeals Court”), which affirmed his conviction on April 8, 2021.

Reddicks, 99 Mass. App. Ct. Reddicks filed an application for

further appellate review (“FAR”) with the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court, which was denied on August 2, 2021.

Commonwealth v. Reddicks, 448 Mass. 1102 (2021). Reddicks filed

this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 27, 2023.

Pet.

B. Factual Background

“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant

shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

2254(e)(1). This memorandum therefore incorporates the factual

recitation of the Appeals Court.

In Commonwealth v. Reddicks, the Appeals Court recited that

on the evening of April 27, 2012, Reddicks drove to the victim’s

home in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of Boston to purchase

approximately one pound of marijuana, which he had set up

earlier via text messages. No. 19-P-71, 2021 WL 1307911, at *1.

After a call placed from Reddicks’ cell phone to the victim’s

cell phone, the victim exited his apartment with a sample of

marijuana. Id. Soon after, the victim retrieved additional

marijuana, and returned to the back hallway. Id. Three shots

were then fired at the victim, two of which struck him,

resulting in his death. Id. A witness, Leanne Parker

(“Parker”), later told police that she had observed a Black man

with long dreads or curls exit a blue vehicle and walk toward

the victim’s house while talking on the phone, shortly before

the shooting. Id. at *2. Parker then heard gunshots and

observed the man run from the house into the blue car and drive

away. Id. The police traced a partial license plate number to

a vehicle registered to Reddicks’ grandmother. Id. Out of the

six registered drivers living at that address, the police

determined that Reddicks was the only one fitting Parker’s

description. Id. Sergeant Detective Daley (“Daley”) testified

about this investigative process at trial. Id. at *8. Reddicks

was interviewed by Detective Callahan (“Callahan”) and Daley,

and admitted to driving the blue vehicle on the day of the

homicide and to sending text messages to the victim to purchase

marijuana. Id. at *2. Reddicks, however, stated that he had

never met the victim in person and denied involvement in the

homicide. Id. Reddicks was ultimately indicted for murder,

armed robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a

loaded firearm without a license, and possession of ammunition

without a license. Id.

Prior to trial, the trial justice allowed the

Commonwealth’s motion seeking to conduct a Criminal Offender

Record Information (“CORI”) inquiry of prospective jurors. Id.

During jury empanelment, the CORI inquiry revealed that six

jurors had not disclosed all or part of their criminal record on

their jury questionnaires. Id. Four of those jurors were

seated in the jury box without further inquiry. Id. After voir

dire, the other two jurors were struck by the Commonwealth,

exercising peremptory challenges. Id. at *2-3.

Prior to trial, Reddicks sought the exclusion of statements

he made in his interview with Callahan and Daley. Id. at *9-10.

Reddicks also moved to exclude two photographs depicting him

holding a firearm, obtained in an unrelated prior case, alleging

the invalidity of the search warrant that permitted the

photographs to be obtained from his cell phone. Id. at *7.

Those motions were denied. Id. at *7, *10. At trial, Reddicks

objected to the testimony of his friend, Thomas Washington

(“Washington”), who testified that several months before the

homicide he saw Reddicks in possession of a firearm, and

objected again to the admission of the photographs, alleging

that those pieces of evidence were prior bad act evidence. Id.

at *6. When deciding the motion in limine and at trial, the

court informed Reddicks’ counsel that a cross-examination of

Washington suggesting that he was lying might open the door to

Reddicks’ conviction for possessing the firearm in question.

Id. at *11. Reddicks’ counsel did not cross-examine Washington.

Id.

The jury convicted Reddicks of murder in the second degree,

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded

firearm without a license. Id. at *1.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant

shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

Habeas petitions seeking relief from state court

convictions are reviewed under the highly deferential standard

codified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which

provides, in part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“Section 2254(d)”).

“A state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law if it ‘contradicts the governing law set forth in

the Supreme Court’s cases or confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme

Court’ but reaches a different result.” Companonio v. O’Brien,

672 F.3d 101, 109 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting John v. Russo, 561

F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2009)). “Clearly established law” refers

only to the holdings of Supreme Court decisions and the

governing legal principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the

time the state court renders its decision, and does not extend

to the dicta of Supreme Court decisions. Howes v. Fields, 565

U.S. 499, 505 (2012); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72

(2003).

The “unreasonable application” branch applies when the

state court identified the correct legal principal but applied

it unreasonably to the facts in the case at hand. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000). A habeas court reviewing

this prong must ask if the state court’s application was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. A petitioner meets

this standard upon a showing that “the state court’s ruling on

the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

103 (2011).

An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs when a

state court’s determination of facts is “objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-

court proceeding.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003). Substantial deference is accorded to the state trial

court’s factual determination under this standard. Brumfield v.

Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). Factual determinations are not

deemed unreasonable “merely because [the court] would have

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Id. at

313-14 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). Even

where “‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’

about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not

suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.’”

Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v.

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-342 (2006)).

These standards apply only to claims that were adjudicated

on the merits in state court proceedings. Pike v. Guarino, 492

F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2007). A federal claim not adjudicated on

the merits is reviewed de novo. Id.

Even if a federal court uncovers an error under Section

2254(d), relief is appropriate only if the error found “had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993)).

“Relevant factors to be considered in determining whether the

jury was substantially swayed by the error include: ‘(1) the

extent to which the error permeated the proceeding, (2) the

centrality of the issue affected by the error to the case as

actually tried, and (3) the relative strength of the properly

admitted evidence of guilt.’” Pettiway v. Vose, 100 F.3d 198,

200-01 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Levasseur v. Pepe, 70 F.3d 187,

193 (1st Cir. 1995)).

B. The Appeals Court’s Decision Allowing CORI Inquiry of

Prospective Jurors and the Subsequent Peremptory

Challenges of Two Jurors Was Reasonable.

Reddicks first argues that the practice of running criminal

records searches for prospective jurors violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to

an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment because it

disproportionally excludes jurors of color from juries. Pet’r’s

Mem. Supp. Pet. (“Pet’r’s Mem.”) 23-27, ECF No. 2. Reddicks

argues that the review of criminal records of prospective jurors

in his case specifically caused the exclusion of Black jurors

for pretextual reasons. Id. at 20.

The Commonwealth argues that habeas corpus relief cannot be

granted, as no clearly established Supreme Court precedent

exists concerning the practice of running criminal records

searches for prospective jurors. Resp’t’s Mem. Opp’n Pet.

(“Resp’t’s Mem.”) 19-24, ECF No. 15. In addition, the

Commonwealth argues that the Appeals Court correctly applied the

relevant Supreme Court precedents concerning the striking of two

jurors. Id. at 24-28.

This Court concludes that Reddicks has not met his burden

of proving that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law. Reddicks’ petition on the first ground

is thus denied.

1. Background

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine

seeking a CORI inquiry of the prospective jurors. Reddicks,

2021 WL 1307911, at *2. Reddicks opposed the motion and, in the

alternative, requested that the prospective jurors’ information

also be run through the victim/witness database. Id. The trial

justice allowed the Commonwealth’s motion and ordered that the

prospective jurors’ information be checked with both the CORI

database and the victim/witness database. Id.

During jury empanelment, the inquiry revealed that six

jurors, all of whom were Black, had not disclosed all or part of

their criminal record on their juror questionnaires. Id. at *2,

*4. As to four of them, the Commonwealth and Reddicks agreed

that no further inquiry was necessary. Id. at *2. During voir

dire, juror no. 47 informed the trial justice that all of her

undisclosed charges were dismissed and that she did not know

that she was required to disclose dismissed charges. Id. The

trial justice credited the juror’s explanation and informed

counsel that there was no reason to excuse the juror for cause.

Id. The Commonwealth then exercised a peremptory challenge, and

Reddicks objected. Id. The trial justice excused juror no. 47

over Reddicks’ objection. Id.

It was also discovered that juror no. 122 had not disclosed

a number of charges and convictions that had occurred over a

fourteen-year period. Id. at *3. The juror explained that

those charges and convictions were sealed and that he did not

know that he was required to disclose sealed charges and

convictions. Id. The trial justice accepted his explanation

and declined to excuse the juror for cause. Id. The

Commonwealth exercised a peremptory challenge, and Reddicks

objected, arguing that the Commonwealth’s practice of inquiring

into prospective jurors’ criminal records resulted in the

systematic exclusion of Black jurors. Id. The judge noted the

objection, but excused juror no. 122, explaining that even

though he accepted the two jurors’ explanations, those

explanations did not excuse them from fully revealing their

criminal history. Id.

2. The Appeals Court Decision

Following Reddicks’ appeal of the trial justice’s ruling

allowing the Commonwealth to conduct a CORI inquiry on

prospective jurors and the Commonwealth’s peremptory challenges

to jurors nos. 47 and 122, the Appeals Court issued a ruling

affirming the trial justice’s decisions. Id. at *1. Concerning

the practice of running prospective jurors’ CORI, the Appeals

Court explained:

The defendant, however, has failed to provide us

with the factual basis or the constitutional standard

to [determine that the practice of running prospective

jurors’ CORI is unconstitutional]. In supporting his

claim, the defendant has done no more than argue that

prospective jurors who are African-American are more

likely to have a criminal record, and as such, are

more likely to be excluded from jury service for that

reason. In doing so, he cites law review articles

that assert this very proposition. To be sure, the

SJC, in recent decisions, has acknowledged that there

is systemic racism present in the Commonwealth's

criminal justice system that leads to disproportionate

stops, frisks, searches, and in turn, arrests of

people of color. However, this observation, alone,

does not provide us with a basis for declaring

unconstitutional a practice specifically sanctioned by

the SJC.

To begin with, the defendant has not set forth

the standard to be applied to his claim. The

Commonwealth argues that, to show systemic

discrimination in jury selection, the defendant must

demonstrate that “(1) the group allegedly

discriminated against is a ‘distinctive’ group in the

community, (2) that the group is not fairly and

reasonably represented in the venires in relation to

its proportion of the community, and (3) that

underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of

the group in the jury selection process.” We agree.

It is undisputed that African-American jurors are

a distinctive group in the community, and specifically

that the two jurors who were ultimately excluded in

this case as a result [sic] the CORI inquiry were

African-American. The defendant, however, has not

provided us with sufficient information regarding the

number of African-American jurors in his venire or in

past Suffolk County venires. Nor is there any

information in the record about the racial composition

of the community from which the venire was drawn.

Accordingly, the defendant has failed to carry his

burden. While “[a] criminal defendant is

constitutionally entitled to a jury selection process

free of systematic discrimination against his grouping

in the community,” on this record, we cannot conclude

that permitting the Commonwealth to check the CORI of

prospective jurors is inconsistent with that right.

Moreover, we note that, contrary to the

defendant's contentions, the CORI inquiry conducted by

the Commonwealth did not result in the exclusion of

jurors simply for having a criminal record. In fact,

the judge did not excuse for cause any of the jurors

who had a criminal record but failed to disclose it,

and perhaps more significantly, the majority of the

jurors who failed to make the requisite disclosure,

all of whom were African-American, were seated on the

jury without a voir dire being conducted. Only juror

no. 47 and juror no. 122, who arguably had more

significant charges on their record, were questioned

by the judge about their lack of disclosure. Though

the judge recognized that individuals with dismissed

charges or sealed records often misinterpret their

obligation with regard to disclosure, and found that

both jurors’ omissions were inadvertent, the

prosecutor had an independent duty to ensure that “a

qualified and impartial jury” was selected. A

properly exercised peremptory challenge serves that

purpose.

Id. at *3-4 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)

(citations omitted). Concerning the Commonwealth’s two

peremptory challenges, the Appeals Court further explained:

First, when the prosecutor exercised a peremptory

challenge to juror no. 47, the defendant objected, but

not on the ground of discriminatory exclusion.

Rather, defense counsel stated that she was preserving

her objection to the Commonwealth conducting a CORI

inquiry in the first place. At this point, no mention

of discriminatory purpose had been made, and

accordingly, the defendant’s objection failed to

“trigger an obligation on the judge’s part to make a

finding whether the presumption of propriety was

rebutted.” While a trial judge may raise a Batson-

Soares violation sua sponte, the judge here did not

abuse her discretion in failing to do so where the

challenge was in direct response to the juror failing

to disclose her criminal record.

Secondly, after it was learned that juror no. 122

had an extensive and undisclosed criminal record, the

prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge, and the

defendant objected raising the issue of race for the

first time. However, in his objection, the defendant

did not argue that the prosecutor was improperly

challenging the juror based on the juror’s race, nor

did he specifically raise a Batson-Soares objection.

Instead, he argued that the practice of checking

prospective jurors’ CORI, in Suffolk County, leads to

the exclusion of African-American jurors from the

jury. It is the defendant’s burden to not only state

his objection to the Commonwealth’s peremptory

challenge, but also to state the grounds for that

objection. Although we agree with the defendant that

he need not specifically cite Batson-Soares, a general

objection is likely insufficient to preserve such a

challenge.

Moreover, even if we were to determine that the

defendant properly raised a Batson-Soares objection to

the strike of prospective juror no. 122, a conclusion

we do not reach, “[w]e will not overturn the judge’s

ruling if there is a sound basis in the record for her

ruling.” The judge, in her response to defense

counsel's objection, implicitly determined that the

requisite showing of impropriety had not been made.

While rebutting the presumption of propriety is “not

an onerous task,” the defendant must show “that the

totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an

inference of discriminatory purpose.”

Here, the strike exercised by the Commonwealth

against juror no. 122 “appeared to be made for obvious

reasons that did not raise any inference of bias.”

Initially, juror no. 122 was seated on the jury and

the Commonwealth expressed contentment with the juror.

It was only after the CORI inquiry revealed that juror

no. 122 failed to “faithfully disclose [his] criminal

history” that the Commonwealth exercised a peremptory

challenge. The judge, accordingly, determined that

the Commonwealth was entitled to exercise such a

challenge at that point because the juror's CORI was

“a piece of information that was not available to [the

prosecutor] at the time of his vetting.” Though the

defendant is also African-American, there were, in

total, five African-American jurors seated on the

sixteen-person jury. Based on the totality of the

facts and circumstances here, the judge did not abuse

her discretion in concluding that the defendant failed

to meet his burden of showing the impropriety of the

prosecutor's peremptory challenge to prospective juror

no. 122.

Id. at *5-6 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)

(citations omitted).

3. The Appeals Court’s Decision Was Not Based on an

Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court

Precedent.

a. The CORI Inquiry of Prospective Jurors

i. Reddicks’ Equal Protection Claim Under

the Fourteenth Amendment

The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the principle

that racial discrimination during jury selection violates the

Equal Protection Clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84

(1986). Purposeful racial discrimination denies a defendant the

protection that a jury trial is intended to secure and the right

to a jury “composed of the peers or equals of the person whose

rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his

neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal

status in society as that which he holds.” Id. at 86 (quoting

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). Moreover,

racial discrimination does not only harm the defendant, but also

harms the excluded jurors and extends to “touch the entire

community.” Id. at 87. It is relevant here to note that Batson

was decided in the context of a prosecutor’s use of peremptory

challenges purposefully to discriminate against and exclude all

Black persons on the venire. Id. at 100. Later Supreme Court

cases applied and extended Batson to other forms of

discrimination. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127

(1994) (holding that intentional discrimination based on gender

in the use of peremptory strikes during jury selection violates

the Equal Protection Clause); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400

(1991) (holding that defendant may object to race-based

exclusion of jurors through peremptory challenges, whether or

not defendant and excluded jurors share the same race); Flowers

v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019) (finding Batson violation

based on a pattern of strikes spanning several trials and other

circumstantial evidence).

Reddicks argues that the Appeals Court imposed too high a

burden when it assessed whether there was systemic

discrimination against a protected class within the venire.

Pet’r’s Mem. 18-20. Reddicks reaffirms that he claims a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on the exclusion

of two jurors and that the Appeals Court confused his claim with

a claim alleging systemic exclusion of Black jurors. Id.

Therefore, Reddicks argues that the Appeals Court ought have

applied the Batson test. Id.

The habeas corpus standard commands this Court to look at

the application of any clearly established Supreme Court

precedent and to determine whether this application was

reasonable. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008)

(habeas relief pursuant to Section 2254(d)(1) not authorized

where no Supreme Court cases gave a “clear answer to the

question presented, let alone one in [the petitioner’s] favor”);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of

holdings from this Court . . . it cannot be said that the state

court ‘unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’”

(citation omitted)).

Here, Reddicks challenges the practice of running searches

of prospective jurors’ criminal records. Pet’r’s Mem. 17-27.

Batson and its progeny, however, address the discriminatory use

of peremptory challenges, and do not address whether checking

prospective jurors’ criminal records during empanelment violates

the Equal Protection Clause. Batson and its progeny, therefore,

cannot be applied as clearly established federal law governing

this issue. Wright, 552 U.S. at 125. As no clearly established

law exists on this issue, this Court necessarily defers to the

Appeals Court’s thorough decision. Carey, 549 U.S. at 77.

ii. Reddicks’ Right to an Impartial Jury

Claim Under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments

The Supreme Court has held that a trial by jury requires an

impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the

community. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946)

(citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)).

The Supreme Court has explained this to mean that “prospective

jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic

and intentional exclusion of a group.” Id. at 192-93 (quoting

Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220). In both Ballard and Thiel, the Supreme

Court reaffirmed this principle -- at the heart of the jury

system -- in the context of the exclusion of a whole group from

the jury panel. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193 (“[T]he purposeful and

systematic exclusion of women from the panel in this case was a

departure from the scheme of jury selection which Congress

adopted . . . .”); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 224 (“[A] blanket

exclusion of all daily wage earners, however well-intentioned

and however justified by prior actions of trial judges, must be

counted among those tendencies which undermine and weaken the

institution of jury trial.”).

Here, Reddicks cites to Ballard and Thiel, arguing that the

Commonwealth’s practice violated Reddicks’ right to an impartial

jury of his peers. Pet’r’s Mem. 26. Those cases are, however,

distinguishable from Reddicks’ case and cannot be considered as

clearly established federal law for the purpose of the petition

review. Indeed, Reddicks challenges the exclusion of two Black

jurors, not the exclusion of all Black jurors from the panel.

Pet’r’s Mem. 17-23. Therefore, as no clearly established law

exists on this issue, this Court again necessarily defers to the

Appeals Court’s decision. Carey, 549 U.S. at 77; Wright, 552

U.S. at 126.

b. The Peremptory Challenges

In Batson, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed that

“racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal

Protection Clause” and that “[s]election procedures that

purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public

confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” 476 U.S.

at 85, 87. To make a claim of racial discrimination in the

exercise of peremptory challenges, the defendant must first

establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id.

at 92-97. When the defendant has made his prima facie case, the

“burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral

explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id. at 97. Finally,

the court must decide whether the explanation is adequate or if

it is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 97-98.

The issue in this case is whether the Appeals Court’s

determination at the first step of Batson was reasonable. Under

Batson, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by

showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an

inference of discriminatory purpose.” Johnson v. California,

545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94). A

defendant may do so by “offering a wide variety of evidence.”

Id. at 169. First, the defendant is “entitled to rely on the

fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory

challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits

‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. State of Georgia, 345

U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).

In evaluating whether discrimination occurred, courts may

consider a variety of factors including:

statistical evidence about the prosecutor’s use of

peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors as

compared to white prospective jurors in the case;

evidence of a prosecutor’s disparate questioning and

investigation of black and white prospective jurors in

the case; side-by-side comparisons of black

prospective jurors who were struck and white

prospective jurors who were not struck in the case; a

prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the record when

defending the strikes during the Batson hearing;

relevant history of the State’s peremptory strikes in

past cases; or other relevant circumstances that bear

upon the issue of racial discrimination.

Flowers, 588 U.S. at 301-02. The presence of an apparent race-

neutral reason for the strike is another important factor.

Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014). Courts

note that the composition of the jury itself is a factor that

should be assessed in context, and that the presence of one or

several Black jurors cannot be the only reason to allow a

Batson-challenged strike. Id. at 299-300; Commonwealth v.

Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 325 (2017). Courts around the country

have held that the fact that a juror has a criminal record or

failed to disclose it is an adequate race-neutral reason to

strike a prospective juror. See United States v. Forrest, 402

F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a record of criminal

charges and a negative reaction to being called as a juror are

adequate race-neutral reasons to excuse a juror); United States

v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a

prospective juror’s criminal record is a proper race-neutral

reason for excusing him); Fields v. Thaler, 588 F.3d 270, 277

(5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a juror’s failure to disclose his

own conviction for driving while under the influence is a race-

neutral reason to strike the juror); United States v. Brown, 553

F.3d 768, 796 (5th Cir. 2008) (observing that a prospective

juror’s lack of veracity on his juror form as to a criminal

conviction provides a clearly legitimate reason for the exercise

of a peremptory challenge); Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass.

455, 468 (2022) (affirming the trial judge’s ruling excusing a

juror who did not disclose multiple prior arrests and charges,

which raised concerns as to his candor and level of

comprehension).

Here, the Appeals Court rejected Reddicks’ challenge to the

peremptory strikes of juror no. 47 and juror no. 122, holding

that no Batson objection was properly raised, and that, even if

it was, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that Reddicks had failed to raise an inference of

discrimination, as required by the first step of the Batson

test. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *5-6. In reaching this

conclusion, the Appeals Court considered that even the juror

whose removal was challenged on race-based grounds was excused

for the obvious reason that he had failed faithfully to disclose

his criminal history on the jury questionnaire. Id. at *6.

Both jurors provided explanations for their failure to disclose,

and the trial justice credited those explanations as “absolutely

reasonable” when declining to excuse the jurors for cause. Id.

at *2-3. The fact that those jurors were not excused for cause,

however, does not prevent the prosecution from exercising

peremptory challenges against them. Flowers, 588 U.S. at 293

(observing that “peremptory strikes traditionally may be used to

remove any potential juror for any reason”).

Moreover, the trial justice took into consideration that

there were in total five Black jurors seated on the sixteen-

person jury. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *3, *6. Information

regarding other potentially relevant factors is scarce: here,

the record reflects that all six jurors who failed faithfully to

disclose their criminal history were Black, and that two of them

were excused by the Commonwealth. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at

*2-3. The Appeals Court had no opportunity to engage in a side-

by-side comparison between the jurors or a broader inquiry into

discriminatory patterns, as it was presented with no information

regarding the racial composition of the venire, of past venires,

or of the community from which the venire was drawn. Id. at *4.

By contrast, in Flowers the Supreme Court devoted a significant

part of its analysis to the State’s dramatically disparate

questioning of Black and white prospective jurors, and to side-

by-side comparisons of Black prospective jurors who were struck

and white prospective jurors who were not struck. 588 U.S. at

307-15. There, the record was detailed enough that the Supreme

Court was able to identify that the State had asked the five

struck Black prospective jurors a total of 145 questions,

against twelve questions asked to the eleven seated white

jurors. Id. at 308. In addition, the Court was able to

identify that while the State struck a Black prospective juror

because she knew several defense witnesses, it did not strike

three white prospective jurors who also knew many individuals

involved in the case. Id. at 312. Those factors, along with

the concerning history of the State’s peremptory strikes in

Flowers’ first four trials and the fact that in the trial at

issue the State had struck five of the six Black prospective

jurors, led the Supreme Court to conclude that at least one of

the peremptory strikes was motivated in substantial part by

discriminatory intent. Id. at 304-07. See also Johnson, 545

U.S. at 173 (holding that a prima facie case under Batson had

been established when “the inference of discrimination was

sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge that ‘we are

very close,’ and on review, the California Supreme Court

acknowledged that ‘it certainly looks suspicious that all three

African-American prospective jurors were removed from the

jury’”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 265-66 (holding that

clear and convincing evidence showed that the prosecution’s

strikes were racially determined when: no facts other than race

could explain the strikes; the prosecution used shuffling and

disparate questioning during the selection; the prosecution

expressed pretextual positions; and the prosecution’s notes

showed the use of a jury selection manual that included racial

stereotypes); Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 304 (holding that an

inference of racial discrimination was raised when the side-by-

side comparison of a white juror and a Black juror showed that

the only significant difference between them was race, and the

government struck only the Black juror).

For these reasons, this Court concludes that the Appeals

Court’s decision that Reddicks did not establish a prima facie

case of discriminatory intent was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

This Court therefore denies Reddicks’ petition for a writ of

habeas corpus on this ground.

C. Reflections on Batson and Massachusetts Jury Practice

The text in Section II.B above satisfactorily sets forth

the factual record, identifies the controlling legal principles,

and properly applies them. Yet, the result is far from

satisfactory.

Why?

Because Massachusetts classifies a significant cohort of

its citizens as “criminal offenders” even though none of them

has ever been convicted of any crime. What’s more, this group

is disproportionately composed of people of color. Elizabeth

Tsai Bishop et al., Harvard Law Sch., Crim. Just. Pol’y Program,

Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System 36

(2020), https://hls.harvard.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2022/08/Massachusetts-Racial-Disparity-Report-

FINAL.pdf. Significantly, the Massachusetts Criminal Offender

Record Information (“CORI”) system includes arrest records along

with records of conviction. So it is that a citizen whose sole

brush with the law is his arrest at a boisterous party which got

out of hand, the charges later dropped, will continue to turn up

as a “criminal offender” though he is, of course, presumed

innocent of the dropped charges and his conduct is otherwise

spotless. One need to look no further to recognize the systemic

racism which Chief Justice Budd lamented in Commonwealth v.

Williams. 481 Mass. 443, 451 n.6 (2019) (Budd, J.).

Within our criminal justice system, explicit and implicit

bias are both prevalent. Willamette Univ. Coll. of L. Racial

Just. Task Force, Remedying Batson’s Failure to Address

Unconscious Juror Bias in Oregon, 57 Willamette L. Rev. 85, 88

(2021). Explicit bias is related to an individual’s conscious

beliefs. Id. Good examples of explicit bias are overt racism

and racist comments. Id. Explicit and implicit bias are

related but differ in that implicit bias is an unconscious bias

that operates via attitudes or stereotypes that affect our

understanding, decisions, and actions in an unconscious manner.

Id. at 89. (citing Cheryl Statts et al., Kirwan Inst. for the

Study of Race & Ethnicity, State of the Science: Implicit Bias

Review 62 (2015)).

Implicit bias can affect every individual. Id. Because

implicit bias is unconscious, it can occur without individuals

realizing that it influences their thoughts and actions. Id.

Research has established that people can hold implicit bias

against their own group and against out-of-group members. Id.

at 89-90. There is no exception for those directly involved in

the criminal justice system, including judges, lawyers, and

potential jurors. It therefore has affected the legal system in

many ways and continues to do so today. Id. at 89-91; Melissa

L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit

Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U. Rich. L.

Rev. 1039, 1051-57 (2019).

The courts, and society in general, have been aware of the

presence of explicit bias for years. Hon. Mark W. Bennett,

Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:

The Problems of Judge Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of

Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 151

(2010). This assessment is heightened as studies on judicial

decision-making have shown that judges rely heavily on their

intuition when they decide problems, and often feel compelled to

make decisions quickly. Id. at 156-57; L. Song Richardson,

Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom,

126 Yale L.J. 862, 882 (2017) (reviewing Nicole Van Cleve, Crook

County: Racism and Injustice in America’s Largest Criminal Court

(2016)). There is some evidence that, with sufficient

motivation, training, and information, however, judges and

lawyers can compensate for the influence of those biases.

Bennett, supra, at 157; Teyah S. Giannetta et al., Eliminating

Bias in the Courtroom?: A Content Analysis of Judges’ Opinions

Regarding Implicit Bias Training, 54 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 28

(2023) (“[M]ost judges believed judicial education on implicit

bias would aid courts in reducing implicit bias in the

courtroom.”).

An American citizen has the right to serve on a jury

regardless of race, national origin, or gender. See Strauder,

100 U.S. at 310; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146; Carter v. Jury Comm’n

of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970). Demographic

characteristics have, however, for decades, been used by lawyers

to shape juries to their advantage. Anna Offit, Race-Conscious

Jury Selection, 82 Ohio St. L.J. 201, 207 (2021).

Moreover, the history of opposition to Black citizens’

service on juries is significant, long, and part of a larger

history of systemic discrimination and violence against Blacks.

Timothy J. Conklin, The End of Purposeful Discrimination: The

Shift to an Objective Batson Standard, 63 B.C. L. Rev. 1037,

1047-49 (2022). The Supreme Court first wrote on the issue in

Strauder v. West Virginia, in which the Court held that race-

based exclusions from jury service were unconstitutional and

violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.; Strauder, 100 U.S.

at 310. More than fifty years after Strauder, discrimination

persisted, and even though more Black citizens were called for

jury service, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges

often prevented them from being seated as jurors. Conklin,

supra, at 1047-49. In 1984, the Supreme Court established a

more searching purposeful discrimination threshold. Batson, 476

U.S. at 96-98. The Court later extended the same prohibition to

gender and sex-based peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at

146.

The Batson standard and its progeny, however, have not

eradicated discrimination in juror selection. Conklin, supra,

at 1049. Since its publication Batson has engendered many

criticisms. Id. at 1038-39. While Justice Thurgood Marshall

agreed with the majority holding, he argued in a concurring

opinion that the three-step analysis had two core flaws: (1) a

lawyer who intends to discriminate purposefully could easily

provide an unprejudiced reason for the strike; and (2) a lawyer

who does not intentionally discriminate may still be

consciously, or unconsciously, motivated by discriminatory

reasons. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).

Justice Marshall also argued that a judge’s ruling on a

peremptory challenge could similarly be distorted by “conscious

or unconscious racism.” Id. This led Justice Marshall to argue

that peremptory challenges should be prohibited in criminal

trials. Id.; Conklin, supra, at 1038.

Indeed, a major problem with the Batson standard is its

inability to address situations where honest, well-intentioned

lawyers and judges nevertheless discriminate because of the

influence of implicit bias. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-

Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85

B.U. L. Rev. 155, 179–80 (2005). As explained earlier,

unconscious discrimination occurs almost inevitably due to the

normal cognitive processes that form stereotypes. Id. It

therefore seems that the more we know about implicit bias, and

how it is formed and maintained, the more the Batson standard

becomes irrelevant and ineffective. See Bennett, supra, at 163-

65. Indeed, as stated in Batson’s majority opinion, peremptory

challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits

“those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery, 345 U.S. at 562).

What to do?

- abolish peremptory challenges?

It is not surprising to note that the most recurring

solution proposed by scholars to Batson’s flaws is the abolition

of peremptory challenges. Bennett, supra, at 165-69; Conklin,

supra, at 1089-91; Page, supra, at 245-46; Willamette Univ.

Coll. of L. Racial Just. Task Force, supra, at 117-19; Colleen

P. Graffy, Harry M. Caldwell & Gautam K. Sood, First Twelve in

the Box: Implicit Bias Driving the Preemptory Challenge to the

Point of Extinction, 102 Or. L. Rev. 355, 400-403 (2024).

Frankly, this is unlikely in view of the unanimous support of

peremptory challenges by the trial bar nationwide.

- limit peremptory challenges?

Since it was decided, courts have continued to identify

flaws in the application of Batson, Conklin, supra, at 1039

n.10, and since 2018 at least seven state supreme courts -- in

California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Utah,

and Washington -- and the Oregon Court of Appeals have

considered implicit bias’s effect on Batson’s efficacy, id. at

1057 n.119. California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington

have commissioned working groups to study the role of implicit

bias in jury selection, among other issues, and to recommend

modifications to their states’ Batson framework. Id. at 1058.

The Supreme Court of Washington took a significant step in

2018, adopting a new rule (General Rule 37 or GR37) and

framework for discerning litigant bias.1 Offit, supra, at 242.

1 GR37 was the product of the collaborative labor of a

workgroup convened by the Supreme Court of Washington, drawing

on input from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and

Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA), among

others. See Proposed New GR 37 - Jury Selection Workgroup:

Final Report, Wash. State Cts. (2018),

Stating in a related case that the Batson protections are not

sufficient to combat racial discrimination, State v. Jefferson,

192 Wash. 2d 225, 239 (2018), the court replaced the third part

of the Batson test with a new inquiry into whether an “objective

observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of

the peremptory challenge,” Wash. Ct. Gen. R. 37(e). The new

rule adds that the objective observer would be someone aware

that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, along with

purposeful discrimination, result in the unfair exclusion of

jurors. Wash. Ct. Gen. R. 37(f). Moreover, the new rule

prohibits using certain characteristics and dispositions as

neutral reasons for strikes because of their historical

association with racial exclusion. Wash. Ct. Gen. R. 37(h).

The new rule encourages parties to object to suspect peremptory

strikes and to deliberate during voir dire. Offit, supra, at

244. As this rule implicitly recognizes, increased knowledge

about implicit bias should push judges and lawyers to recognize

and emphasize that various non-racial experiences and

characteristics are inherently linked to race and therefore may

constitute illegitimate grounds for striking and dismissing

potential jurors. Id. at 246. Rule 37 includes, for example,

http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20

Orders/OrderNo25700-A-1221Workgroup.pdf.

having prior contact with law enforcement officers or living in

a high-crime neighborhood as presumptively invalid reasons for a

strike.2 Wash. Ct. Gen. R. 37(h).

Washington is not the only state to have reformed the

Batson standard. Willamette Univ. Coll. of L. Racial Just. Task

Force, supra, at 104. California adopted rule AB-3070, which

specifies presumptively invalid reasons for excluding a juror.

Id. The presumption of invalidity may be overcome only if the

party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and

convincing evidence that the rationale for using the challenge

was unrelated to a prospective juror’s membership in a protected

class, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective

juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.3 Id.

2 A growing scholarly consensus asserts that making these

experiences a legitimate basis for challenging jurors will

result in discriminatory empanelment. Offit, supra, at 246

(citing Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the

Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 592, 602

(2013)). Scholars also argue that emphasizing the influence of

implicit bias and its consequences can push lawyers to avoid

using this kind of information as part of their decision-making

process during jury selection. Id.

3 It is, of course, a misnomer to call this a “presumption”

of invalidity. It is nothing of the sort. Cf. Fed. R. Evid.

301; Peter Murray, Basic Federal Evidence 65-69 (2024). This is

not a true presumption at all; it is a powerful burden shifting

rule. Of course, the Supreme Court of California is in good

company. The so-called “presumption” of patent validity and

“presumption” of presidential official acts work the same way

and are similarly imprecise.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a similar

step, recognizing the reality of Black citizens’ disparate

treatment in the criminal justice system when it stated that a

“juror may not be excused for cause merely because he or she

believes that African-American males receive disparate treatment

in the criminal justice system.” Williams, 481 Mass. at 451;

see Offit, supra, at 243-44.

- Enhance the role of the trial judge?

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the job of enforcing

Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges,” who “possess

the primary responsibility to enforce Batson and prevent racial

discrimination from seeping into the jury selection process.”

Flowers, 588 U.S. at 302.

With this in mind, here’s a protocol that I’ve learned to

follow to address Batson’s deficiencies.

Every time a peremptory challenge is exercised against a

racial or ethnic minority, I ask, “Why?” Simply asking the

question operates as a strong deterrent to any further such

peremptory challenges against minorities in that particular

case.

My experience has been that in about half of the cases

counsel responds with an appropriate, case specific, race-

neutral explanation. The Court then allows the challenge

without comment.

In a very few cases, counsel’s demeanor coupled with a

deer-in-the-headlights response so obviously masks a racial

motivation that it becomes my duty to call it out on the record,

disallow the challenge, and seat the juror. After all, it is

the juror’s constitutional right to serve. See Carter, 396 U.S.

at 330; but see United States v. Bowles, 751 F.3d 35, 38 (1st

Cir. 2014) (Souter, J.) (deeming it possible error to seat a

juror based on sua sponte Batson inquiry without prior

indication of discriminatory purpose or pattern4).

Most often, counsel’s answer, while facially race-neutral,

calls for further inquiry. For example, suppose counsel

challenges based on the fact that the juror works in the health

care field and another unchallenged white juror does as well.

That disparity needs to be followed up. Usually the resultant

colloquy results in the challenged juror being excused after

I’ve expressed varying levels of skepticism or disapprobation.

The practical result is that a juror –- perhaps impartial and

fully qualified –- is excused. Consistently, however, once the

colloquy has occurred, no other potential juror from that racial

4 One may question whether this reasoning remains sound now

that Flowers has firmly reiterated that even a single

discriminatory peremptory challenge in a criminal case violates

the Equal Protection Clause. 588 U.S. at 300, 303.

Nevertheless, this Court is mindful that it may apply Supreme

Court precedent in the face of established First Circuit

precedent only at its peril. United States v. Moore-Bush, 963

F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2020).

or ethnic group will be challenged. That’s about the best I can

do to breathe life into Batson.

D. The Appeals Court’s Decision Affirming the Denial of

the Motion to Suppress Reddicks’ Statements Was

Reasonable.

Reddicks argues that the Appeals Court erred in affirming

the trial justice’s decision that several statements Reddicks

made during an interrogation were voluntary, when evidence

showed that the detectives used improper interrogation tactics.

Pet’r’s Mem. 27-31. The Commonwealth argues that the trial

justice correctly applied the voluntariness test and that, in

affirming the lower court’s decision, the Appeals Court

considered all relevant factors. Resp’t’s Mem. 34-38.

This Court concludes that Reddicks has not met his burden

of proving that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law. Reddicks’ petition on this second

ground is thus denied.

1. Background

During an interview with two police detectives, Reddicks

made several statements which he later filed a motion to

suppress. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *2, *9-10. The motion

was denied. Id. The trial justice found that the detectives

improperly conveyed to Reddicks that the interview was his only

opportunity to tell his side of the story, and improperly

suggested that his silence and denials could be used against him

in court. Id. at *10. The trial justice, however, concluded

that despite those improper tactics, Reddicks’ statements were

voluntary. Id.

2. The Appeals Court Decision

On appeal, Reddicks argued that the trial justice erred in

denying the motion to suppress, arguing that considering the

detectives’ improper tactics, his statements were not voluntary.

Id. at *9. The Appeals Court affirmed the trial justice’s

denial of the motion to suppress, explaining:

The defendant next claims that statements made by

him during an interview with Detective Callahan and

Sergeant Detective Daley were not voluntary and should

have been suppressed. “[I]n reviewing a ruling on a

motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary

findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an

independent review of his ultimate findings and

conclusions of law.” “[W]e ‘review de novo any

findings of the motion judge that were based entirely

on the documentary evidence.’”

“A voluntary statement is one that is ‘the

product of a rational intellect and a free will,’ and

not induced by physical or psychological coercion.”

“The test for voluntariness is ‘whether, in light of

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

making of the statement, the will of the defendant was

overborne to the extent that the statement was not the

result of a free and voluntary act.’” “Factors

relevant to the totality of the circumstances include

whether promises or other inducements were made to the

defendant by the police, as well as the defendant's

age, education, and intelligence; experience with the

criminal justice system; and his physical and mental

condition, including whether the defendant was under

the influence of drugs or alcohol.” In addition, “the

‘use of false information by police during an

interrogation is deceptive and is a relevant factor

indicating a possibility that the defendant's

statements were made involuntarily.’”

During the interview, Detective Callahan made

statements to the defendant suggesting that the

defendant’s silence and denial could be used against

him in court. Specifically, Detective Callahan

stated,

“[T]his is a golden opportunity to give

your version of the story because a year

down the road, two years down the road we're

going to be in a courtroom and I'm going to

be sitting across from you, maybe both, or

Rich Daley and if I’m there, it’s me, I'm

going to be looking at you. I’m going to be

sitting up there in a suit and tie. I'm

going to be looking at you, and I'm going to

be saying I gave him, Sergeant Daley gave

him, the opportunity to offer a reason as to

why he did what he did, as opposed to not

saying anything and me looking over at the

jury as I’m looking back to you and

everything that is going to come out of our

investigation to the jury is going to be

that Charles Reddicks is a cold-blooded

killer. That he robbed dude, shot dude over

nothing.

As opposed to you telling us, there's

got to be a viable reason you do what you

did. You can -- Charles you can deny it all

you want but you're there, we’ve got you

there.”

We agree with the motion judge that these

statements were improper and were akin to the “now-or-

never” language that was deemed impermissible in

[Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262 (2004)]. In an

attempt to get the defendant to confess his motive for

the murder, the detective improperly suggested to the

defendant that his failure to provide that

information, and his denial of committing the murder,

could be used against him in court, which is “plainly

untrue.” We, however, also agree with the motion

judge that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving

that the defendant’s statements were nevertheless

voluntary.

On the date of the interview, the defendant was

eighteen years old, and was a student at the Community

Academy. During the interview, the defendant admitted

to knowing someone by the name of “Mario,” admitted to

sending him text messages on the date of the homicide

to purchase marijuana, and further admitted to knowing

the difference between an automatic weapon and a

revolver. However, none of the incriminating

statements made by the defendant were tied to “or

otherwise made in response to the pressure tactics

employed by the officers.” The improper statements

made by Detective Callahan were designed to elicit a

motive for the murder, or put another way, a

confession. Throughout the interview, however, the

defendant never wavered in denying his involvement in

the murder. In short, the detective’s improper

tactics were unsuccessful. As the motion judge

concluded, the defendant’s behavior during the

interview reflects “a young man who made limited,

carefully chosen responses.” The defendant remained

calm during the interview, and acted in a manner that

revealed that he was not “at the mercy of the

interrogating officers.” Based on the totality of the

circumstances here, the defendant's will was not

overborne by the improper statements made by the

detective. There was no error in the denial of the

motion to suppress.

Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *9-10 (footnotes omitted)

(citations omitted).

3. The Appeals Court’s Decision Was Not Based on an

Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court

Precedent.

A statement or confession must be voluntary in order to be

admitted into evidence, pursuant to both the Fifth Amendment

protection against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dickerson v. United States,

530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme

Court strongly affirmed that the right against self-

incrimination applies during all in-custody interrogations, and

that to ensure that every accused person or suspect can properly

exercise this privilege, the accused “must be adequately and

effectively apprised of [his or her] rights and the exercise of

those rights must be fully honored.” 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).

Moreover, no distinction should be drawn between inculpatory

statements and exculpatory statements, as the latter are often

used to impeach the defendant’s testimony, demonstrate untruths,

and prove guilt by implication. Id. at 476-77. Therefore, no

incriminating statements made during in-custody interrogations

can be used unless the defendant received a full warning of his

rights, including the right to remain silent, and voluntarily

and effectively waived those rights. Id. at 475-77. The

“[o]pportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to [the

accused] throughout the interrogation.” Id. at 479. The

requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, however,

dispense with the voluntariness inquiry, which remains the

“ultimate test.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602

(1961); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).

The test is as follows:

Is the confession the product of an essentially free

and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if

he has willed to confess, it may be used against him.

If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his

capacity for self-determination critically impaired,

the use of his confession offends due process.

Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.

The determination of voluntariness “depend[s] upon a

weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of

resistance of the person confessing.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at

434 (alteration in original) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346

U.S. 156, 185 (1953)). To make this determination, courts

consider the totality of the circumstances, including the

characteristics of the accused, such as age and education, and

the details of the interrogation, such as the length of the

detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning,

and the use of physical force. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.

Here, Reddicks challenges whether his will, in making the

incriminating statements, was overborne by the detectives’

improper statements during his interrogation or, in other words,

whether Reddicks’ statements were voluntary, considering the

detectives’ improper interrogation tactics. The Appeals Court

took into consideration the fact that Reddicks was eighteen

years old on the date of the interview, that he was a high

school student, and the substance of what he admitted to after

the detective improperly used false statements. Reddicks, 2021

WL 1307911, at *10. In doing so, the Appeals Court correctly

applied the test of voluntariness pursuant to applicable Supreme

Court precedent. Indeed, the detectives’ statements were

designed to elicit from Reddicks either a motive for the

homicide or a confession. Id. Nevertheless, Reddicks continued

to deny his involvement in the homicide altogether. Id. Given

the need to balance the circumstances of pressure against the

power of resistance of the person confessing, the nature of

Reddicks’ admission was relevant to the voluntariness analysis.

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434; see also Commonwealth v. Durand, 457

Mass. 574, 596-98 (2010). Here, despite his age and the

detectives’ improper statements, Reddicks continued to deny his

involvement in the homicide. This shows Reddicks’ resistance to

the detectives’ improper tactics and allows this Court to

conclude that the Appeals Court’s decision that Reddicks’

statements were voluntary was reasonable.

Reddicks has not met his burden of proving that the Appeals

Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, and his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on this ground is thus

denied.

E. The Appeals Court’s Decision Affirming the Allowance

of Evidence from Reddicks’ Cell Phone Search and

Barring Him from Challenging the Search Again Was

Reasonable.

Reddicks argues that the Appeals Court’s decision that

Reddicks had the same opportunity and incentive to litigate a

motion to suppress evidence derived from a search of his cell

phone in a prior case was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts. Pet’r’s Mem. 31-33. Moreover, Reddicks argues

that the Appeals Court should have considered a change in the

relevant law between the motion to suppress in the prior case

and the one in the present case, and that not doing so was

contrary to established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 33-38.

The Commonwealth argues that this Court is barred from reviewing

the claim because the Appeals Court rejected the claim on an

independent state-law ground. Resp’t’s Mem. 39.

This Court concludes that Reddicks has not met his burden

of proving that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law or based its decision on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Reddicks’ petition on this ground

is thus denied.

1. Background

On March 2, 2012, the police applied for a search warrant

for Reddicks’ cell phone in connection with an unrelated prior

case. Suppl. Answer 267-71, ECF No. 11-1; Reddicks, 2021 WL

1307911, at *7. The police seized photographs of the defendant

holding a silver revolver with a black handle. Reddicks, 2021

WL 1307911, at *7. Reddicks was charged with assault and

battery with a dangerous weapon and carrying a firearm without a

license. Id. at *6 n.15. Reddicks, arguing that the warrant to

search his cell phone lacked the required probable cause, sought

to suppress the evidence discovered on his phone. Suppl. Answer

240-45, 254-66. The motion to suppress was denied, Suppl.

Answer 346-348, and Reddicks subsequently pleaded guilty to the

charges in the case, Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *7. Before

trial in the present case, Reddicks moved to exclude the

photographs seized during Reddicks’ previous case. Reddicks,

2021 WL 1307911, at *7; Suppl. Answer 158-170. The trial

justice allowed the introduction of the photographs. Suppl.

Answer 110.

2. The Appeals Court Decision

On appeal, Reddicks argued that the search warrant

authorizing the search of his cell phone lacked the requisite

probable cause. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *7. The

Commonwealth opposed Reddicks’ claim, arguing that Reddicks was

collaterally estopped from re-litigating this issue because it

had already been resolved during the earlier assault and battery

case. Id. The Appeals Court affirmed the trial justice’s

denial of Reddicks’ motion to suppress, on the ground of

collateral estoppel. Id.

3. The Appeals Court’s Affirmation of the Trial

Justice’s Ruling Was Based on a Reasonable

Determination of the Facts and Reasonable

Application of Supreme Court Precedent.

The independent and adequate state ground doctrine

precludes federal district courts from addressing state

prisoners’ claims in habeas corpus actions when the state court

has resolved the claim on a state-law ground that is

“independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31 (1991).

Habeas relief will be barred as long as the state “regularly

follows the rule and has not waived it by relying on some other

ground,” Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2011), and

the rule is not applied so exorbitantly as effectively to defeat

review of federal claims, Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376

(2002).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that a

defendant is estopped from relitigating an issue when (1) the

issues in the two proceedings are identical; (2) the party

estopped had sufficient incentive to litigate the issue fully

and vigorously; (3) the party estopped was a party to the

previous litigation; (4) the applicable law is identical in both

proceedings; and (5) the first proceeding resulted in a final

judgment on the merits such that the defendant had sufficient

incentive and opportunity to appeal. Commonwealth v. Cabrera,

449 Mass. 825, 829 (2007). This doctrine is firmly established

in Massachusetts jurisprudence. See Commonwealth v. Williams,

431 Mass. 71, 74 (2000); Commonwealth v. Ringuette, 60 Mass.

App. Ct. 351, 356-57 (2004).

a. Factual Reasonableness

Here, the Appeals Court concluded that Reddicks had

sufficient incentive to litigate the validity of the search

warrant due to the “nature of the significant charges against

[him].” Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *7. Reddicks was charged

in the prior case with assault and battery with a dangerous

weapon and carrying a firearm without a license. Id. at *6

n.15. In addition, the Appeals Court took into consideration

that Reddicks pleaded guilty in the prior case and, in doing so,

gave up his right to challenge the denial of his suppression

motion via trial and appeal, rendering the judgment final with

regard to the suppression issue. Id. at *7. In the present

case, Reddicks is serving a life sentence with the possibility

of parole after fifteen years for second-degree murder, a

concurrent sentence of five years to five-years-and-one-day for

carrying a firearm without a license, and an additional one-day

sentence for carrying a loaded firearm without a license. Pet.;

Suppl. Answer 112-13. This Court credits that there is a

significant difference between the nature of the charges in the

prior case and those in the present case. This difference,

however, especially considering that Reddicks pled guilty in the

prior case, is not significant enough to conclude that the

Appeals Court applied the collateral estoppel doctrine

exorbitantly.

Therefore, this Court concludes that the Appeals Court’s

decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts.

b. Reasonable Application of Supreme Court

Precedent

Reddicks argues that after the initial motion to suppress

was decided the law applicable to this issue significantly

changed, such that the usual rules of collateral estoppel should

not have applied. Pet’r’s Mem. 35-36. Reddicks cites to three

decisions that he argues significantly changed the probable

cause requirement for a cell phone search warrant: Commonwealth

v. White, 475 Mass. 583 (2016); Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473

Mass. 496 (2016); and Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).

Id. at 36. Reddicks moved to exclude the contents of the cell

phone search conducted in the prior case on January 12, 2016,

and the motion was denied on the same day. Suppl. Answer 110.

White and Dorelas were decided by the Supreme Judicial Court

after the trial justice considered Reddicks’ motion in limine,

and thus are not considered in this Court’s analysis.5 White,

5 Even though they were issued too late to be used in this

case, the two Supreme Judicial Court cases cited by Reddicks did

operate to work an important change in the determination of the

probable cause requirement to search cell phones. The Supreme

Judicial Court concluded that “probable cause to search or seize

a person’s cellular telephone may not be based solely on an

officer’s opinion that the device is likely to contain evidence

of the crime under investigation,” White, 475 Mass. at 584–85,

but “[r]ather police first must obtain information that

establishes the existence of some ‘particularized evidence’

related to the crime,” id. at 589-90 (quoting Dorelas, 473 Mass.

at 502). It is only when the police “believe, based on training

or experience, that this ‘particularized evidence’ is likely to

be found on the device in question, [that] they have probable

cause to seize or search the device in pursuit of that

475 Mass. at 583; Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 496. In Riley, the

Supreme Court held that a cell phone seized incident to an

arrest generally may not be searched without first obtaining a

warrant, but did not deal with the probable cause standard or

particularity requirement applicable to the search warrant.

Riley, 573 U.S. at 385-86. Therefore, Riley did not

significantly change the law governing a cell phone search

warrant’s particularity requirement. Reddicks thus fails to

show that the law governing the particularity requirement

applicable to cell phone search warrants changed significantly

between the denial of the motion in limine in the prior case and

the denial in the case under consideration here.

This Court thus concludes that the Appeals Court correctly

applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and that the

independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes it from

addressing Reddicks’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claims

concerning the search of his cell phone.

This Court therefore denies Reddicks’ petition for a writ

of habeas corpus on the ground that the search of his cell phone

violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights.

evidence,” White, 475 Mass. at 589 (citing Dorelas, 473 Mass. at

498, 503), and even then police must conduct their search with

“special care” to avoid searching files not related to the

warrant, Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502. Dorelas was decided on

January 14, 2016, a mere two days after Reddicks’ motion in

limine was decided. Dorelas, 473 Mass.

F. The Appeals Court’s Decision Affirming the Admission

of Evidence Showing Prior Firearm Possession Was

Reasonable.

Reddicks attacks the admission of evidence showing his

prior firearm possession as “only marginally relevant” and

prejudicial, and argues that the Commonwealth improperly used

the evidence during its closing argument to make a propensity

argument in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pet’r’s Mem.

at 38-40. In addition, Reddicks asserts that this Court ought

review the claim de novo because the Appeals Court did not make

mention of the Commonwealth’s allegedly improper comment in its

closing. Id. at 40. The Commonwealth argues that it cannot be

concluded from the mere absence of a mention of the allegedly

problematic closing argument that the trial justice bypassed the

federal due process issue entirely. Resp’t’s Mem. 49-53.

This Court concludes that Reddicks is not entitled to

review de novo on this ground and that the Appeals Court’s

decision was reasonable.

1. Background

At trial, a friend of Reddicks testified that he observed

him in the possession of a silver revolver with a black handle

several months before the homicide. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911,

at *6. Moreover, the Commonwealth introduced two photographs

from Reddicks’ phone picturing him holding a silver revolver

with a black handle. Id.

2. The Appeals Court Decision

Reddicks objected to the admission of this evidence at

trial, but the Appeals Court decided that the trial justice did

not err in admitting the evidence, explaining:

[E]vidence that the defendant possessed a weapon

prior to the commission of a weapons related crime may

be admissible “to show that the defendant had access

to or knowledge of firearms and bullets.” “The

critical questions are whether the weapons-related

evidence is relevant and, if so, whether the probative

value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by

its prejudicial effect.” The decision to admit such

evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial

judge, and we will not disturb that decision “absent

palpable error.”

Here, the Commonwealth introduced the two

photographs of the defendant holding a silver

revolver, as well as the testimony of Washington, to

demonstrate that the defendant had access to firearms,

and more specifically revolvers, just four months

prior to the homicide. There was testimony before the

jury that, of the possible seventeen firearms that

could have been used as the murder weapon, fifteen of

those firearms were in fact revolvers. Accordingly,

the challenged firearm evidence was relevant, and we

discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's

determination that the probative value of this

evidence was not substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect. Further, immediately following

Washington’s testimony, the judge provided a limiting

instruction to the jury cautioning them that they were

only permitted to consider the defendant's prior

possession of a firearm as evidence that the defendant

had “familiarity with or access to firearms.” The

judge specifically instructed the jurors that there

was no evidence that the firearm, testified to by

Washington, was the same firearm used during the

homicide. We presume the jury followed these

instructions, and perceive no prejudicial error by the

admission of this evidence.

Id. at *6-7 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).

3. The Appeals Court’s Affirmation of the Trial

Justice’s Ruling Was Based on a Reasonable

Determination of the Facts and Reasonable

Application of Supreme Court Precedent.

“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court

and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that

the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the

absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to

the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011);

see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298-301 (2013). The

presumption may be cast aside only when “the evidence leads very

clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently

overlooked in state court.” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 303.

Here, the Commonwealth argues that by examining whether the

admission of the evidence constituted a prejudicial error, the

Appeals Court adjudicated the federal constitutional issue on

the merits, therefore precluding review de novo. Resp’t’s Mem.

50-53; see Lyons v. Brady, 666 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2012)

(holding that the Supreme Judicial Court adjudicated the

petitioner’s federal due process claim on the merits, even

though it did not elaborate its reasoning, because the

constitutional argument was included in the petitioner’s brief

and the court concluded that there was no merit in the

allegations of error). This Court agrees with the Commonwealth,

especially considering that the record does not present any

evidence that the Appeals Court overlooked any federal claim.

As the Commonwealth points out, there is no clearly

established Supreme Court precedent that addresses whether the

admission of propensity evidence violates the Due Process

Clause. Resp’t’s Mem. 53. At the same time, however, “[a]

misbegotten evidentiary ruling that results in a fundamentally

unfair trial may violate due process and, thus, ground federal

habeas relief.” Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 484

(1st Cir. 2011).

Here, the Appeals Court’s application of state evidence

standards conformed with federal evidentiary principles, which

in turn supports an inference that due process was honored. See

Robertson v. Ryan, No. 16-CV-10609, 2019 WL 2501481, at *8 (D.

Mass. June 17, 2019) (Burroughs, J.). In addition, the

prosecutor referred to the testimony and the firearms

photographs in his closing argument to argue to the jurors that

they could infer that Reddicks had access to revolvers, which

was likely the type of firearm used for the murder. Resp’t’s

Answer, Ex. 10, Trial Tr. Morn. Day Nine 53-54, ECF No. 11-11.6

6 The prosecutor’s closing argument on this issue stated:

You know that Charles Reddicks had access to

guns, and I’m saying guns with an S, plural, to make

sure the Court Reporter gets it and you get it because

This is consistent with the trial justice’s limiting instruction

that the evidence could only be considered as showing Reddicks’

access to or familiarity with firearms. Reddicks, 2021 WL

1307911, at *7.

Keeping in mind the strict habeas corpus review standard,

this Court concludes that the Appeals Court’s decision was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, nor was it

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. This Court therefore denies Reddicks’

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the use

of propensity evidence during closing arguments violated his

federal due process rights.

you have evidence that he had access to firearms,

multiple.

First, you’ve got Thomas Washington who testified

from that witness stand that he saw Charles Reddicks a

few months before the murder sticking a silver-colored

revolver with a black handle inside of his waistband.

And, yes, it looks an awful lot like the picture

we have here. But here’s the scariest part of the

whole story. We don’t know if the gun that Thomas

Washington saw him with in December is the same gun

that's pictured here.

We don’t know if it’s the same gun that’s

pictured here. All we know is that it’s a silver

revolver. All of them are revolvers.

Trial Tr. Morn. Day Nine 53.

G. The Appeals Court’s Decision Affirming the Trial

Court’s Indirect Restriction of the Scope of Cross-

Examination Was Reasonable.

Reddicks argues that the Appeals Court’s decision to uphold

the trial justice’s indirect restriction of his cross-

examination of a witness was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Pet’r’s Mem. 40-42. The

Commonwealth opposes, and argues that the Appeals Court’s

decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

any clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Resp’t’s Mem.

72-74.

This Court concludes that Reddicks has not met his burden

of proving that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law or based its decision on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Reddicks’ petition on this fifth

ground is thus denied.

1. Background

Prior to trial, Reddicks filed a motion in limine seeking

to exclude the testimony of Thomas Washington (“Washington”),

wherein he planned to testify that he had observed Reddicks

commit a shooting with a weapon similar to the one used in the

crime at issue in 2011. Suppl. Answer 233-45. The trial

justice excluded any testimony relating to the commission of a

prior shooting; however, Washington’s observation of Reddicks in

possession of a firearm was determined relevant and admissible.

Resp’t’s Resp., Ex. 1, Mots. Lim. Tr. 72-73, ECF No. 11-2. The

trial justice warned Reddicks’ defense counsel that if she

suggested on cross-examination that Washington was lying about

his observation, this could open the door to the introduction

into evidence of Reddicks’ prior conviction. Id. at 76-78;

Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *11.7 Defense counsel did not

cross-examine Washington. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *11.

2. The Appeals Court Decision

On appeal, Reddicks argued that he was impermissibly

restricted from cross-examining Washington. Id. The Appeals

Court disagreed. Id.

7 The trial justice stated the following during the motion

in limine hearing:

If you start attacking Mr. Washington’s

credibility and arguing to the Court, don’t believe

Mr. Washington, he’s a liar, you know, my client never

possessed that gun, that is a false narrative, because

we all know that your client admitted to it.

I’m just warning you, Ms. Scapicchio, I don’t

want to make any prejudgments here, the farther you go

down that road, I think that that conviction could

come in. If you argue not to believe Mr. Washington,

it strikes me as unfair to the Commonwealth not to

introduce the conviction if that’s the tack you’re

going to take.

It’s uncontroverted your client pled guilty to

doing just that. If you take the tack that Mr.

Washington is a liar, don’t believe him, your client’s

conviction -- you could be opening the door to the

admission of your client's conviction.

Mots. Lim. Tr. 76-77. Before Washington’s examination, the

trial justice gave the same warning. Resp’t’s Resp., Ex. 4,

Trial Tr. Day Three 222-24, ECF No. 11-5.

3. The Appeals Court’s Affirmation of the Trial

Justice’s Ruling Was Based on a Reasonable

Determination of the Facts and Reasonable

Application of Supreme Court Precedent.

a. Factual Reasonableness

Here, the Appeals Court ruled that the trial justice “did

not wholly restrict [Reddicks] from cross-examining

[Washington].” Id. Indeed, during the hearing on the motion in

limine and before Washington’s examination, the trial justice

warned defense counsel that if she was to argue that Washington

was lying and should not be believed, the prior conviction

“could come in.” Mots. Lim. Tr. 76-77. The trial justice only

used general terms and warned defense counsel against making the

argument that Washington was lying. See Reddicks, 2021 WL

1307911, at *11. The trial justice did not, however, state that

“any avenue of questioning [would] have opened the door to the

conviction and underlying facts,” as Reddicks alleges. Pet’r’s

Mem. 41.

The Appeals Court’s determination that the trial justice

did not “wholly restrict” the possibility of cross-examination

was therefore not based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts, and this Court denies Reddicks’ petition for a writ of

habeas corpus on this ground.

b. Reasonable Application of Supreme Court

Precedent

The right to cross-examination is not an absolute right and

may be restricted by trial judges for appropriate purposes.

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (“[T]he

Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in

whatever way, and to whatever extent . . . .”); Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“[T]rial judges retain wide

latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to

impose reasonable limits on . . . [defense counsel’s] cross-

examination [for bias] based on concerns about, among other

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant.”).

Here, had defense counsel made the argument that

Washington’s testimony was a lie, when the Court knew that

Reddicks himself had pled guilty to the conduct alleged and the

Commonwealth might then have introduced the conviction itself,

it could have confused the issues for the jury. The trial

justice’s comments on the cross-examination were therefore not

improper. Indeed, Reddicks’ counsel was allowed to cross-

examine Washington as she wished. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at

*11. The trial justice only stated that, if Reddicks’ counsel

were to cross-examine on this issue, those questions might by

their very nature open the door to evidence of Reddicks’ prior

conviction. Id. Reddicks’ right to cross-examine was thus not

significantly diminished.

Therefore, the Appeals Court’s decision was not based on an

unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and this

Court denies Reddicks’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus on

this ground.

H. The Appeals Court’s Decision Affirming the Allowance

of the Detective’s Testimony Was Reasonable.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of

Daley. Id. at *8. The Appeals Court described Daley’s

testimony as follows:

At trial, Sergeant Detective Daley testified that,

upon interviewing Parker on the date of the murder, he

obtained a partial license plate number and a physical

description of the defendant and the vehicle he was

operating. Another detective conducted a query of the

partial license plate number in the Registry of Motor

Vehicles database and discovered that the vehicle was

a 1992 blue Ford Escort registered to Catherine

Reddicks at 116 Millet Street. The detective then

conducted a search of that address in the Registry of

Motor Vehicles database and learned that three males

and three females were registered drivers at that

location. At this point, Sergeant Detective Daley

testified that only one of those registered drivers

looked similar to the physical description provided by

Parker; that individual was the defendant. Sergeant

Detective Daley then identified the defendant in

court. Contemporaneously, the judge instructed the

jury that they were not to consider Sergeant Detective

Daley’s testimony as an identification of the

defendant by Parker.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

1. The Appeals Court Decision

On appeal, Reddicks argued that Daley’s testimony was

improper lay opinion and constituted both an impermissible in-

court identification of Reddicks and an improper identification

of Reddicks’ grandmother Catherine Reddicks’ vehicle from

surveillance footage presented at trial. Id. at *2, *9. The

Appeals Court rejected those claims, explaining:

The defendant is correct that “[m]aking a

determination of the identity of a person from a

photograph or video image is an expression of an

opinion,” and that such an identification by a lay

witness is admissible only “when the witness possesses

sufficiently relevant familiarity with the defendant

that the jury cannot also possess.” However, the

defendant is incorrect in his assertion that this is

what occurred here.

Sergeant Detective Daley was not shown a

photograph of the defendant to identify at trial.

Rather, the detective merely testified that he

obtained a photograph of the defendant from the

Registry of Motor Vehicles database, and connected the

defendant to the crime based on the physical

description provided by Parker as well as the partial

license plate number that led him to the defendant's

address. Contrary to the defendant's claim, at trial

there was no lay opinion identification made by

Sergeant Detective Daley based on a photograph of the

defendant.

Additionally, there was no “back-door” admission

of an in-court identification of the defendant by

Parker. . . . Parker did not identify the defendant

in-court, and Sergeant Detective Daley did not testify

that she had. Instead, Daley merely testified to the

steps taken by the detectives during the course of the

investigation that ultimately led them to narrow their

focus on the defendant. This was permissible in light

of the fact that, in his defense, the defendant

attacked the nature and quality of the police

investigation. . . .

The defendant also claims that Sergeant Detective

Daley improperly identified Catherine Reddicks’s

vehicle from Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority surveillance footage presented at trial.

However, contrary to the defendant’s contentions,

Sergeant Detective Daley did not identify at trial the

blue Ford Escort from video surveillance footage.

Daley testified only to the steps he took in locating

the vehicle and connecting it to the crime based on

the partial license plate number he obtained from a

witness on the date of the murder.

Id. at *8-9 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).

2. The Appeals Court’s Affirmation of the Trial

Justice’s Ruling Was Based on a Reasonable

Determination of the Facts and Reasonable

Application of Supreme Court Precedent.

a. Factual Reasonableness

As the Appeals Court observed, determining the identity of

a person from a photograph or video image is an expression of an

opinion. Id. at *8. A lay witness identification in this

manner will therefore only be admissible when “the subject

matter to which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or

described to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at

the time,” and “the witness possesses sufficiently relevant

familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also

possess.” Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 475 (2019)

(citations omitted). The lay witness here, however, did not

make such an identification.

Here, the Appeals Court pointed out that the prosecutor did

not show Daley a photograph of Reddicks to identify during

trial. Reddicks, 2021 WL 1307911, at *8. Rather, Daley’s

testimony was only a description of the steps that detectives

had taken in their investigation. Id. at *9. Similarly, the

Appeals Court observed that Daley did not identify in court

Reddicks’ grandmother’s vehicle from the surveillance video

introduced at trial, but rather described the steps that led him

to the car in his investigation. Id. Moreover, the Appeals

Court pointed out that Daley did not testify that Parker had

identified Reddicks in court. Id. Finally, the trial justice

gave a limiting instruction informing the jury that the

testimony should not be construed as an identification of

Reddicks by Parker. Id. at *8.

The Appeals Court’s rulings that Daley’s testimony did not

constitute a lay opinion identification, and that there was no

“back-door” in-court identification of Reddicks by Parker or of

Reddicks’ grandmother’s car, were reasonable interpretations of

the factual record.

b. Reasonable Application of Supreme Court

Precedent

Reddicks argues that the state court’s decision allowing

Daley’s testimony violated his federal due process rights.

Pet’r’s Mem. 44. Reddicks would be entitled to habeas corpus

relief if he could show that the state court’s evidentiary

decisions rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Coningford,

640 F.3d at 484.

Here, the Appeals Court reasonably determined that Daley’s

testimony was relevant and admissible. See Reddicks, 2021 WL

1307911, at *8-9. Moreover, the jury received the trial

justice’s very clear instruction that the testimony was offered

“for the limited purpose of helping [the jury] understand what

steps the police took in this investigation and why they took

them, and for no other reason.” Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. 8, Trial

Tr. Day Seven 97, ECF No. 11-9.

Therefore, even were this Court to hold that the challenged

evidentiary decisions were erroneous, those decisions simply did

not render Reddicks’ trial fundamentally unfair in light of the

record as a whole. This Court denies Reddicks’ petition for a

writ of habeas corpus on this ground.

III. CONCLUSION

Reddicks has not met his burden of proving that the Appeals

Court’s decision pertaining to any of his current claims

involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent

or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Moreover, even had any of Reddicks’ arguments passed muster, any

error therefrom had no substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, Reddicks’

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, is DENIED and

this action is DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to enter a

separate order of dismissal and close the case.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Rule 11(a) of Rule

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

courts, a certificate of appealability is hereby issued as to

all issues raised in the petition because Reddicks has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

inasmuch as “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that

the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ William G. Young__

WILLIAM G. YOUNG

JUDGE

of the

UNITED STATES8

8 This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass. 1841-

1865), would sign official documents. Now that I’m a Senior

District Judge I adopt this format in honor of all the judicial

colleagues, state and federal, with whom I have had the

privilege to serve over the past 46 years.