Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,119 results
1.03s
Mustafa v. Florida Department of Corrections
District Court, S.D. Florida · Oct 3, 2022
Under that provision, a federal court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court’s decision on the merits was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal … Nagle, 2 F.3d 385, 388 (11th Cir. 1993) (“A defendant has the burden of establishing cause and prejudice.”); Arthur v.
Cited 0 timesUnknownJules v. Commissioner of Social Security
District Court, S.D. Florida · Sep 27, 2019
To qualify for benefits, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (standard for DIB), 1382 (standard for SSI). … No. 19 at 11-12), the undersigned has nonetheless reviewed the ALJ’s credibility finding and concludes that the ALJ properly applied the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part pain standard to evaluate Plaintiff’s attempts to establish
Cited 0 timesUnknownKPR U.S., LLC v. LifeSync Corporation
District Court, S.D. Florida · Aug 27, 2023
An “inequitable conduct” defense, which is what Defendants rely upon, is one of the most potent defenses “because the penalty . . . is so severe, the loss of the entire patent even where every claim clearly meets every … However, “the materiality required to establish equitable conduct is but-for materiality.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
Cited 0 timesUnknownFruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · May 20, 2021
Indeed, many courts across the nation have approved class action settlements with similar non-cash settlement benefits, concluding that they do not qualify as a “coupon” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1712. … He also observed that the “caliber of the representation of both sides was, in [his] experience, exemplary[]” and that the Settlement was “clearly the result of difficult, non-collusive negotiations that were conducted
Cited 0 timesUnknownManiraj Ashirwad Gnanaraj v. Lilium N.V.
District Court, S.D. Florida · Aug 23, 2024
See DE 114 at 2. 5 The Second Amended Complaint does not clearly state when the EASA and the FAA issued final regulations for eVOTLs. … Second, the PSLRA includes a safe harbor provision “that immunizes certain ‘forward-looking’ statements from liability.” Id. at 1324.
Cited 0 timesUnknownRaymond H Nahmad DDS PA v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company
District Court, S.D. Florida · Nov 1, 2020
Finally, while Plaintiffs maintain that the anti-concurrent causation language contained in the virus exclusion rests on “shaky ground,” ECF No. [9] at 17, they fail to establish that the exclusion contains an ambiguity … distinguishable because the exclusion under that policy was limited to the “presence of any ‘fungi’ or bacteria on or within a building or structure,” and the injury at issue occurred in an outdoor spa, which did not qualify
Cited 0 timesUnknownAmerisure Insurance Company v. Seneca Specialty Insurance Company
District Court, S.D. Florida · Jun 18, 2020
COVERAGE The Seneca Policy clearly and unambiguously provides that Walmart is covered as an additional insured under the Policy “only with respect to liability for “bodily injury’ . . . caused, in whole or in part … Noting that this was not the first time that the court had “been called upon to interpret the identical insurance policy in materially identical cases,” the district court ruled that to qualify as an additional insured
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Aug 31, 2021
. ¶¶ 37, 40), which “identif[ies] individuals qualified to become Board of Directors members, consistent with criteria approved by the Board of Directors[;]” and has “sole responsibility” to formally recommend new Board … due care, Defendants do not face a substantial likelihood of liability for such claims because they are clearly precluded by the exculpatory clause.
Cited 0 timesUnknownU.S. Structural Plywood Integrity Coalition v. PFS Corporation
District Court, S.D. Florida · Mar 28, 2022
Third, noting that they neither stamp the plywood nor profit (directly) from the plywood’s sale, the Defendants contend that the stamps don’t qualify as “commercial advertising.” See Motion at 14– 15. … The district court dismissed the action because the allegations were insufficient to establish proximate cause. See id. at *3.
Cited 0 timesUnknownU.S. Structural Plywood Integrity Coalition v. PFS Corporation
District Court, S.D. Florida · Mar 3, 2021
Third, noting that they neither stamp the plywood nor profit (directly) from the plywood’s sale, the Defendants contend that the stamps don’t qualify as “commercial advertising.” See Motion at 14– 15. … The district court dismissed the action because the allegations were insufficient to establish proximate cause. See id. at *3.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Nov 13, 2020
“[J]udicial claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEO[] complaint,” but “allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. … Plaintiff proceeds under a hostile work environment theory.13 To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he suffered unwelcome harassment; (3
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Sep 5, 2022
Even accepting the Government’s untested premise, the use of a broad standard for potentially privileged material does not explain how qualifying material ended up in the hands of the Investigative Team. … risk that the Government’s filter review process will not adequately safeguard Plaintiff’s privileged and personal materials in terms of exposure to either the Investigative Team or the media—Plaintiff has sufficiently established
Cited 0 timesUnknownFrias v. Social Security Administration
District Court, S.D. Florida · Mar 31, 2023
App’x 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that “the ALJ clearly applied the correct legal standards” where she “followed this sequence correctly”); McDaniel v. … “The record does not,” in the ALJ’s view, “establish that [Frias] resides in a highly structured setting or is incapable of making an adjustment to a vocational setting.” Ibid.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Jul 10, 2025
“[T]he Eleventh Circuit went to great lengths to explain why the unique, case-specific facts in Doe qualified for admiralty jurisdiction.” Doe v. … The plaintiff must specifically establish an admiralty claim against the Rule B quasi in rem defendant; a claim within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction will not do.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Apr 2, 2021
In the Seventh Circuit, then, Bean wouldn’t qualify for the § 1 exemption. … Acknowledging this, Bean asks us to follow the less restrictive test established by the First and Ninth Circuits.
Cited 0 timesUnknownRodriguez v. GeoVera Specialty Insurance Company
District Court, S.D. Florida · Nov 19, 2020
Multiplier “In contingency fee cases that apply Florida law, once the lodestar is established, the [C]ourt must consider whether a multiplier is appropriate.” … The plaintiffs’ expert opines that “very few competent and qualified attorneys in South Florida would have taken these matters on a contingency basis but for the availability of a fee multiplier.” Id. at ¶ 46.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Florida · Feb 6, 2026
This, the Amended Complaint does not do: the Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Defendant Hadley’s access was not authorized at any point. … State, 392 So. 3d 599, 600–01 (Kilbane, J., concurring) (arguing that certain categories of communications may not be qualified by “reasonable expectation of privacy” language) (internal citations omitted).
Cited 0 timesUnknown
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