Case law

People v. Lindsey

188 Cal. App. 2d 471 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 25, 1961

Has there been any promise of immunity or reward held out to you to induce you to make this statement? … The court further says, however: “The equally well recognized exceptions to this rule are clearly defined.

Atkins v. City of Los Angeles

8 Cal. App. 5th 696 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 14, 2017

Department of Corrections (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 [to establish a FEHA claim for discrimination “the plaintiff must prove he is qualified for the position for which an accommodation is sought,” not for another position … (See Licudine, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 899 [plaintiff introduced no evidence “establishing a reasonable probability that she could have become qualified and fitted to earn a lawyer‟s salary”].)

Bell v. State of California

63 Cal. App. 4th 919 · California Court of Appeal · May 6, 1998

Neither do their tactics in doing so do fall within the ambit of discretionary act immunity. … The action was clearly misconduct. The jury’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses was obviously paramount in the evaluation of the case.

BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION ETC. v. Wilson

57 Cal. App. 4th 967 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 18, 1997

Thus, it is a “well-established rule that subordinate political entities, as ‘creatures’ of the state, may not challenge state action as violating the entities’ rights under the due process or equal protection clauses of … Here, PERS’s pleadings did not clearly allege a section 1983 claim, because the pleadings alleged claims by a state agency against its own state through state officials acting in their official capacity.

People v. Jeffery

37 Cal. App. 4th 209 · California Court of Appeal · Jul 28, 1995

On appeal, defendant asserts the evidence did not independently establish a conspiracy or establish his participation in a conspiracy on December 11, 1992. … This fact need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .

Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Spengler

143 Cal. App. 3d 890 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 14, 1983

In 1953 the issue of whether a real estate salesperson was an employee for purposes of unemployment insurance was clearly settled by the enactment of section 650 of the Unemployment Insurance Code. … This evidence is insufficient to establish the kind of control over the manner in which Spengler performed his work that would indicate an employer-employee relationship. (S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Industrial Acc.

San Francisco Fire Fighters, Local 798 v. Retirement Board

143 Cal. App. 3d 604 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 3, 1983

We are not unmindful of the well-established rule that pension statutes should be liberally construed, and ambiguities resolved in favor of the applicant. (See LePage v. … However, we view the definition of “compensation” contained in section 8.595-1, when read together with section 8.595-10 regarding computation of retirement service credit, to clearly exclude from the computation for service

People v. Vargas

California Court of Appeal · Jan 19, 2016

qualifies her for resentencing. … For instance, private areas of commercial establishments may not qualify as an “establishment . . . open during regular business hours” as required by section 459.5. (Cf. People v.

Mansell v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System

30 Cal. App. 4th 539 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 28, 1994

While that rule is an aid to construction, it cannot vest a statute with a meaning it clearly lacks. … Further, it is established that “. . . an appellate brief ‘should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made.

Levy v. City and County of S.F.

California Court of Appeal · Sep 30, 2025

There are three areas of legislative regulation carved out of University of California’s Regents’ immunity. … It is also an exception to the University of California’s Regents’ immunity from legislative regulation. (Gomez, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)

People v. Perez

42 Cal. App. 3d 760 · California Court of Appeal · Oct 28, 1974

Thus, if the evidence of the prosecution establishes the fact of knowledge in such a way that there is clearly no real issue presented the prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative value and, in addition … Under these circumstances, the evidence of the prosecution had established the fact of knowledge in such a way that there was clearly no actual issue presented.

People v. Yates

California Court of Appeal · Jul 23, 2018

Compliance with a subpoena duces tecum may dispense with the need for a live witness to establish the business records exception if the records are produced by the custodian or other qualified witness, together with the affidavit … By filing a motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony under Sanchez, Yates’s counsel clearly demonstrated familiarity with Sanchez’s prohibition on an expert’s recitation of case-specific hearsay.

Boshernitsan v. Bach

California Court of Appeal · Mar 12, 2021

Unlike trusts, however, corporations can hold title to property, and a corporate owner or corporate trustee clearly would not qualify as a “landlord” under rule 12.14(a). (See Caressa Camille, Inc. v. … The tenants argue that allowing trustees to qualify as landlords “would create the potential for erosion of the two critical protective requirements designed to ensure that owner move-in and qualified relative move-in . .

People v. Gotham

185 Cal. App. 2d 47 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 29, 1960

Corpus Delicti Sufficiently Established Defendant contends the corpus delicti was not established aliunde the statements of defendant. With this we cannot agree. … The judge was clearly protecting the rights of defendant by “withholding” evidence which would prejudice him.

In re Josue G.

106 Cal. App. 4th 725 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 6, 2003

He was in good health, up-to-date on his immunizations, and developing normally. … While the minute order for the April 15, 2002, hearing indicates that the court applied the exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D), the reporter’s transcript clearly states otherwise.

City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port District

227 Cal. App. 2d 455 · California Court of Appeal · May 26, 1964

Registration rules should be construed to *468 permit the greatest number of qualified voters to exercise their rights. (Ley v. Dominguez (1933) 212 Cal. 587 [ 299 P. 713 ].) … Statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears.” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.

Richards v. Flower

193 Cal. App. 2d 233 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 21, 1961

Under this approach, our letter seems rather clearly to fall within the category of mere preliminary negotiations. … “Contract” and “acceptance” are both terms which have established meanings within the law of contracts.

People v. Beck

188 Cal. App. 2d 549 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 26, 1961

Hatch : And your plea of guilty is voluntary on your part without any offers of reward, immunity, or of lesser or lighter sentence ? The Defendant: That’s correct. Mr. … Clearly there was no duty on the part of the court to pursue the matter by asking what the claimed defense was.

Padgett v. Little

172 Cal. App. 4th 830 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 25, 2009

Tise established that a state court domestic relations order may be qualified even after a participant’s death, ‘[b]ecause a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest.’ [Tise, supra,] 234 F.3d at 421. … We see no distinction between qualified joint and survivor annuity benefits and qualified preretirement survivor annuity benefits for purposes of the QDRO qualification requirements.

In Re Marriage of Shelstead

78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 15, 1998

To establish an order is a QDRO, the parties must show it is a “domestic relations order” and that it is a “qualified” order. (See § 1056(d)(3)(A).) It is undisputed the February 1 order is a domestic relations order. … The order must “clearly specif [y]” the name and address of the participant and of the alternate payee and the amount and manner of the payments to be paid to the alternate payee. (§ 1056(d)(3)(C).)