The opinion
Filed 9/30/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
SUSANNAH LEVY et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A172068
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN (San Francisco City & County
FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. No. CGC24612166)
Defendant and Respondent.
In 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1334 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1334), adding section 512.1 to the Labor Code.1
(Stats. 2022, ch. 845, § 2.) Section 512.1 extends the meal and rest breaks
and premiums already enjoyed by private sector health care workers under
section 512 to healthcare employees directly employed by specified public
employers. (§ 512.1, subd. (a).) As used in section 512.1, “ ‘[e]mployer’
means the state, political subdivisions of the state, counties,
municipalities, and the Regents of the University of California.” (§ 512.1,
subd. (e)(2).)
Plaintiffs are nurses directly employed by the City and County of
San Francisco (City), who, on behalf of a class of similarly situated City-
employed nurses represented by the Service Employees International
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless
otherwise indicated.
1
Union Local 1021 (the union), alleged that the City has failed to comply
with section 512.1 since it took effect. The City demurred. It argued that
the Legislature failed to provide a clear intention that the law applies to
charter cities, like the City. In the alternative, the City argued that
applying the law to charter cities would be unconstitutional.
The trial court sustained the demurrer. The court agreed with the
City’s statutory interpretation and did not address the constitutional
question. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Context Prior to Senate Bill 1334’s Introduction
1. Public Entities Not Subject to General Laws, Including Section
512’s Meal Period Requirements
“[T]raditionally, ‘absent express words to the contrary, governmental
agencies are not included within the general words of a statute.’ [Citation.]
The Legislature has acknowledged that this rule applies to the Labor
Code.” (Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage Dist. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 729, 736.) Section 512 “do[es] not expressly apply to
public entities.” (Johnson, at p. 733.) Accordingly, Johnson held that
section 512’s meal period requirements for employees did not apply to a
water storage district “designated as a ‘public agency of the State of
California.’ ” (Johnson, at p. 733.)
2. Regents of the University of California’s Authority over Internal
Affairs, Including Time-Keeping Procedures
“ ‘The California Constitution establishes the Regents [of the
University of California] as a “public trust . . . with full powers of
organization and government.” (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a).)’
[Citation]” (Gomez v. Regents of University of California (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 386, 393 (Gomez).) “ ‘ “[A]s a constitutionally created arm
2
of the state” ’ ” the Regents of the University of California “ ‘ “have virtual
autonomy in self-governance” ’ ” and enjoy “ ‘general immunity from
legislative regulation.’ ” (Ibid.)
There are three areas of legislative regulation carved out of
University of California’s Regents’ immunity. (Gomez, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) “ ‘First, the Legislature is vested with the power of
appropriation, preventing the [R]egents from compelling appropriations for
salaries.’ [Citation.] ‘Second, it is well settled that general police power
regulations governing private persons and corporations may be applied to
the university. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Third, legislation regulating public agency
activity not generally applicable to the public may be made applicable to
the university when the legislation regulates matters of statewide concern
not involving internal university affairs.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Nonetheless, ‘[c]ourts have consistently held the Regents are
exempt from statutes regulating the wages and benefits of employees and
other workers, including those pertaining to prevailing wages, overtime
pay, and indemnification for the cost of work uniforms and maintenance,
on the ground those matters are internal affairs of the university that do
not come within any of the exceptions to constitutional immunity.’ ”
(Gomez, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 394.) Gomez held that neither the
Labor Code nor Wage Order No. 4 established that the minimum wage
laws apply to the Regents. (Gomez, at pp. 400–404.)
3. Charter Cities’ Constitutional Home Rule Authority over
Employees’ Compensation, Including Meal and Rest Periods
“California law recognizes two types of cities. A city organized under
the general law of the Legislature is referred to as a general law city. (Gov.
Code, § 34102.) A municipality organized under a charter . . . is a charter
3
city. (Gov. Code, § 34101.)” (City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 (Redondo Beach).)
The California Constitution grants substantial “home rule” powers to
local governments that adopt a charter to operate their own government.
(Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 3–6.) To wit, a charter city may “ ‘make and
enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs’; with
respect to such matters, the cities’ charters ‘supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith.’ (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).)” (City and County of San
Francisco v. Regents of University of California (2019) 7 Cal.5th 536, 545
(San Francisco v. Regents).)2 When legislation that applies to charter cities
conflicts with their home rule authority, courts utilize a four-part
analytical framework to determine whether the city’s authority must cede
to the state’s. (State Building & Construction Trades Council of California
v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 556 (Vista), citing California Fed.
Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16–24 (Cal.
Fed.).)3
2 Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution
provides: “It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations
provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this
Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to
municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.”
3 “First, a court must determine whether the city ordinance at issue
regulates an activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal affair.’
[Citation.] Second, the court ‘must satisfy itself that the case presents an
actual conflict between [local and state law].’ [Citation.] Third, the court
must decide whether the state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide
concern.’ [Citation.] Finally, the court must determine whether the law is
‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern [citation] and
4
A charter city has explicit home rule authority over its employees’
compensation. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b); Sonoma County
Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d
296, 316.) Courts have held that such authority extends to employees’
meal and rest periods linked to compensatory pay. (Curcini v. County of
Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 645 [“[T]he provisions of Labor Code
section 512 prescribing meal periods, and Labor Code section 226.7
providing a premium wage as compensation for missed meal and rest
periods, are matters of compensation within [a chartered county’s]
exclusive constitutional purview.”] (Curcini); Dimon v. County of Los
Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282–1283 [same] (Dimon).)
We take judicial notice of the City’s status as a consolidated charter
city and county. (The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 841, 852 [taking judicial notice of city charter].) “San
Francisco, as California’s only consolidated city and county, enjoys the
greater degree of autonomy that comes with charter city status. (Cal.
Const., art. XI, § 6, subd. (b).)” (San Francisco v. Regents, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 545, fn. 2.)
‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance
[citation]. ‘If . . . the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute
is one of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its
resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the conflicting charter
city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto and the Legislature
is not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from addressing the statewide
dimension by its own tailored enactments.’ ” (Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 556.)
5
B. Senate Bill 1334’s Legislative History4
Senate Bill 1334 was introduced in February 2022, as “[a]n act to
add Section 512.1 to the Labor Code, relating to employment.” (Sen. J.
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) p. 2960). The Legislative Counsel’s digest notes
that Senate Bill 1334 sought to statutorily entitle “employees who provide
direct patient care or support direct patient care in a general acute care
hospital, clinic, or public health setting directly employed by specified
public sector employers” to meal periods and rest breaks. (Legis. Counsel’s
Dig., Sen. Bill 1334, as introduced Feb. 18, 2022, p. 1, italics added.) The
bill was designed to “require these employers, if they fail to provide an
employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with the bill, to pay
the employee” a premium wage. (Ibid.) The bill also contemplated an
exemption for employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement so
long as such an agreement provided for meal and rest breaks and
“include[d] a prescribed monetary remedy” for missed breaks. (Ibid.)
As originally introduced, the bill defined “ ‘Employer’ ” to mean “the
state, political subdivisions of the state, municipalities, and the Regents of
the University of California.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 1334, as
introduced Feb. 18, 2022, p. 3.)
An April 2022 bill analysis of Senate Bill 1334 by the Senate
Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement (April 2022 bill
analysis) framed Senate Bill 1334’s key issue as follows: “Should
employees providing direct patient care in a general acute care hospital,
clinic or public health setting – and working for specified public sector
employers including the University of California – be statutorily entitled to
4 We take judicial notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill 1334.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)
6
take a 30-minute meal period and a 10-minute rest period like employees
providing the same care in the private sector already receive?” (Sen. Com.
on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1334,
as amended Mar. 29, 2022, p. 1, italics added.)
Comments to the April 2022 bill analysis emphasized that “existing
labor code provisions entitle private sector employees” to meal and rest
breaks and a premium wage compensation if a required meal or rest break
is not provided. (Sen. Com. on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement,
Analysis of Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended Mar. 29, 2022, p. 3.) The
comments continued: “In general, California Labor Code regulates private
employment unless a provision explicitly states that it applies to public
sector employment.” (Ibid.) The comments further acknowledged that
“[e]mployees providing patient care in a public health setting and at the
University of California may currently be entitled to a meal and rest period
. . . negotiated as part of” a collective bargaining agreement and the
comments explained that Senate Bill 1334 would “eliminat[e] the need for
these rights to be collectively bargained.” (Ibid.)
The April 2022 bill analysis also provided a statement from the bill’s
author, which explained: “ ‘Section 512, the provision on meal periods,
does not state that it applies to public employees and the Appeals Court in
Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage District ruled that it did not. Wage
orders may apply to the public sector but the Appeals Court in Gomez v.
Regents of the University of Cal. held that Wage Order 4 did not apply to
the [University of California]. Senate Bill 1334 will explicitly include
public sector workers who provide direct patient care, or support direct
patient care, in a hospital, clinic, or public health setting in Section 512 of
the California Labor Code guaranteeing enforceable missed meal breaks
7
and rest periods for UC Nurses and other public sector workers. Better
rested nurses will provide higher quality patient care for Californians.’ ”
(Sen. Com. on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement, Analysis of Sen.
Bill 1334, supra, as amended Mar. 29, 2022, p. 3.)
Subsequent in the legislative process, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations issued a report which reiterated that covered employees
“working for specified public sector employers” would be statutorily
entitled to meal and rest breaks under the bill. (Sen. Com. on
Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1334, as amended April 6, 2022, p. 1.) In
summarizing the bill’s fiscal impacts, the Appropriation Committee report
focused on “costs to the University of California,” and it stated that “[t]he
bill would not have a fiscal impact to the Department of State Hospital
(DSH), because it only applies to General Acute Care Hospitals licensed
under Health & Safety (H&S) Code Section 1250(a).” (Sen. Com. on
Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended April 6, 2022,
p. 1.) A staff comment included in the report stated, “The only state-
operated general acute care hospitals appear be the UC hospitals.” (Id. at
p. 2.)5
The bill passed the Senate in May 2022. (Assem. J. (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) p. 5059.)
After taking up the legislation, the Assembly Committee on Labor
and Employment recommended “adding ‘counties’ to the definition of
employer so that the definition conforms to the definition of employee.”
(Assem. Com. on Labor and Employment, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1334, as
5 Subsequent legislative history in the Senate generally repeated the
same projected fiscal impacts as well as the author’s comment about the
purpose of the bill. (See Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d
reading of Sen. Bill 1334, as amended Apr. 6, 2022, pp. 5–6.)
8
amended Apr. 6, 2022, p. 3.) At the time, Senate Bill 1334 “[d]efine[d]
employee to mean an employee who provides direct patient care or
supports direct patient care in a general acute hospital, clinic, or public
health setting.” (Id. at p. 1.)
Subsequently, the Assembly Committee on Appropriations issued a
report that echoed the fiscal impacts projected by the Senate based on the
bill’s purpose to “explicitly include public sector workers who provide or
support direct patient care in a hospital, clinic, or public health setting in
Section 512 . . . guaranteeing enforceable meal breaks and rest periods.”
(Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1334, as amended Apr.
6, 2022, pp. 1–2.) Namely, the report concluded that Senate Bill 1334
would result in “[c]osts in the low millions of dollars annually to the
University of California (UC) system.” (Id. at p. 1.) It also stated that
Senate Bill 1334 would cause “[m]inor and absorbable costs to the Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE),” although DLSE could not
“anticipate the extent to which public employers may violate” Senate Bill
1334’s provisions. (Id. at p. 1.) In summarizing existing law, the report
cited the same legal precedent as the April 2022 bill analysis regarding the
inapplicability of wage and hour laws to public agencies and nurses
employed by the UC system. (Id. at p. 2.)
In due course, the Assembly added “counties” to the bill’s definition
of “Employer.” (Assem. J. (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) p. 5898; Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading of Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as
amended Aug. 15, 2022, at p. 1.) The Senate concurred in the amendment,
and Senate Bill 1334 enacted section 512.1 without further changes to the
definition of “Employer.” (Assem. J. (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) p. 6563;
§ 512.1.)
9
C. Senate Bill 1334’s Text
Section 1 of the enacted version of Senate Bill 1334 adopted the
Legislature’s findings in support of the law. (Stats. 2022, ch. 845, § 1.) In
this uncodified section, the Legislature stated that “[m]eal and rest periods
are essential worker protections that reduce accidents, improve
productivity, and promote employee wellbeing” and “meal and rest periods
are important to ensuring quality care” by combatting fatigue. (Id., subds.
(a), (b).) The Legislature also made a finding that “[p]rivate sector hospital
employees . . . are guaranteed meal and rest periods and a remedy of one
hour premium pay for missed meal and rest breaks while such employees
in the public sector lack these basic protections, even though they perform
the same duties.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The next legislative finding declared: “Worker health and safety and
high-quality patient care are matters of statewide concern and are the
basis of numerous laws and regulations.” (Stats. 2022, Ch. 845, § 1, subd.
(d).) The last finding stated that the statute would “ensure[] equity” for
covered employees. (Id., subd. (e).)
Section 2 of Senate Bill 1334 added section 512.1 to the Labor Code,
which took effect on January 1, 2023. (Stats. 2022, ch. 845, § 2; § 512.1.)
Subdivision (a) of section 512.1 specifies that “[a]n employee directly
employed by an employer shall be entitled to one unpaid 30-minute meal
period on shifts over 5 hours and a second unpaid 30-minute meal period
on shifts over 10 hours, as provided by Section 512.” (§ 512, subd. (a).) The
provision also permits mutual waiver of a meal period and on-duty meal
periods in accordance with the laws governing the private sector. (Ibid.)
Similarly, subdivision (b) extends rest break rights to the same covered
10
employees as provided by the laws governing the private sector. (Id.,
subd. (b).)
“If an employer fails to provide to an employee a meal period or rest
period in accordance with this section,” subdivision (c) of section 512.1
entitles the employee to a premium wage of “one additional hour of pay at
the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each workday that the
meal or rest period is not provided.” (§ 512.1, subd. (c).) Subdivision (d)
exempts employees who are “covered by a valid collective bargaining
agreement that provides for meal and rest periods, and, if the employee
does not receive a meal or rest period as required by the agreement,
includes a monetary remedy that, at a minimum, is equivalent to” the
premium wage compensation specified in subdivision (c). (Id., subd. (d).)
As used in section 512.1, “ ‘[e]mployee’ means an employee who
provides direct patient care or supports direct patient care in a general
acute care hospital, clinic, or public health setting.” (§ 512.1, subd. (e)(1).)
“ ‘Employer’ means the state, political subdivisions of the state, counties,
municipalities, and the Regents of the University of California.” (Id.,
subd. (e)(2).)
D. The Memorandum of Understanding
Prior to section 512.1’s effective date, the City and the union (as the
recognized representative of the non-supervisory registered nurses unit
employed by the City) negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, or
memorandum of understanding (MOU). The MOU set the terms and
conditions of nurses’ employment by the City for the period from July1,
2022 to June 30, 2024, and it included a provision regarding meal and rest
breaks.
11
As to meal periods, the MOU stated nurses were to “be provided an
opportunity to take a thirty (30) minute meal break per eight (8) or twelve
(12) hour shift.” Nurses were also entitled to compensation if they were
“required to work through the meal period and [were] not provided a meal
period free of duty at a later time,” in which case the nurse was to “be paid
for the time at the one-and-one-half-time overtime rate.”
As to rest breaks under the MOU, nurses were to be provided a 15
minute rest break for every 4-hour work period “when operationally
feasible.” The MOU further stated that “[e]very effort will be made to
ensure that the nurse has the opportunity to take rest periods,” but it
permitted “[c]urrent practices [to] continue by agreement of the parties.”
Otherwise, the MOU entitled nurses to “a fifteen (15) minute fifty percent
(50%) non-pensionable premium of their base hourly rate for each missed
rest break.”
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors approved an ordinance
adopting and implementing the MOU, giving it the force of law.
E. The Proceedings
Plaintiffs sued the City, alleging that “[s]ince January 1, 2023, the
City has failed to provide meal and rest periods, and/or one additional hour
of pay, to Plaintiffs and the proposed class as required by § 512.1.”
Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of an estimated 2,200 nurses
employed by the City. They sought to recover the alleged unpaid
premiums for missed meal and rest breaks, with interest and other fees
and costs, as well as a declaratory judgment that the City is required to
comply with section 512.1.6
6 The complaint also contained a cause of action for civil penalties
under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The City demurred to
12
The City demurred on two grounds. First, the City argued section
512.1 “does not apply to charter cities, including the City.” Second, the
City argued that if section 512.1 did apply to the City, it would violate the
constitutional home rule doctrine because the law “does not pertain to a
matter of statewide concern” and “is not narrowly tailored to its purported
goals.”
Following a hearing, the trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. The court ruled that “the ‘clear statement’ rule set forth in
binding case authority” applied and found no clear indication of the
Legislature’s intent for section 512.1 to apply to charter cities based on the
statutory text or legislative history. Plaintiffs appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s statutory interpretation of
section 512.1, arguing that the City, as a charter city and county, falls
within the statute’s “broad definition” of “ ‘employer.’ ” Plaintiffs maintain
that the Legislature evidenced its “clear intent” to regulate a municipal
function because an uncodified section of the enacting statute provides the
Legislature’s finding that the law addresses “ ‘matters of statewide
concern.’ ” Plaintiffs further urge this court to resolve the constitutional
question that such a statutory interpretation would raise, arguing that
section 512.1 survives constitutional scrutiny because the law
appropriately regulates these purported matters of statewide concern.
that cause of action. While the demurrer was pending, the Supreme Court
issued its ruling in Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040
(Stone), holding that PAGA exempts public employers from penalties for
violations of Labor Code provisions carrying their own penalties. (Id. at
pp. 1049–1050.) Plaintiffs subsequently stipulated to withdraw their
opposition to the demurrer to the cause of action for alleged PAGA
violations.
13
We are unpersuaded that the plain meaning of the statute’s
definition of “Employer” extends to the City. The other aids of statutory
interpretation reinforce this analysis. Faced with statutory ambiguity, we
decline to construe the statute in a manner that contravenes the City’s
constitutional home rule authority.
A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory
Interpretation
We independently review orders sustaining a demurrer and issues of
statutory interpretation. (Stone, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1052.)
When construing a statute, our fundamental task is to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent and effectuate the law’s purpose. (Stone, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) To determine legislative intent, we principally look
to the statute’s actual words. (Ibid.) We scrutinize the words themselves,
ascribing to them their plain and commonsense meaning, and we construe
them in context of the entire statutory framework, harmonizing the
various parts of the enactment. (Stone, at p. 1052.) “If the language is
clear, ‘ “its plain meaning controls” ’ ” because we presume the Legislature
meant what it said. (Ibid.)
“ ‘On the other hand, if the language allows more than one
reasonable construction, we may look to such [extrinsic] aids as the
legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction.’ ”
(Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838 (Even Zohar).) We also will consider the
Legislature’s statements in an uncodified section of a statute. (Doe v.
Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 40, 69). A canon of statutory construction
of relevance here is “the familiar principle that we should address and
resolve statutory issues prior to, and if possible, instead of, constitutional
questions [citation], and that ‘we do not reach constitutional questions
14
unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.’ ”
(Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hunter) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245, 1275,
fn. 31.)
B. Section 512.1, subdivision (e)(2)’s Plain Meaning Does Not
Establish that the Statute Applies to the City
Plaintiffs contend that the plain language of section 512.1’s
definition of “Employer” applies to the City because “[t]he City is a
‘count[y],’ ‘a political subdivision[],’ and a ‘municipalit[y].’ ” The City
disagrees. Relying on Redondo Beach, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 902, the City
does not engage in plain meaning analysis, but instead contends that
“[c]ourts demand a clear indication that a California statute applies to
charter cities before considering the difficult constitutional question of
whether application of the statute would impinge on charter cities’ home
rule authority,” and that no such clear indication is present here. We find
both arguments unconvincing.
We agree with Plaintiffs that an analysis of section 512.1 should
begin “as always” with discerning the statutory text’s plain meaning
because that is “the ‘most reliable indicator’ of legislative intent.” (Even
Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 838; Klein v. United States of America (2010)
50 Cal.4th 68, 77 [“ ‘the statutory language is generally the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent’ ”].) If the statutory language is certain, we
need no clearer indication of intent. (See In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94,
107 [“If the text reflects a plain meaning, we need go no further.”];
Conservatorship of T.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1361, 1379 [“ ‘If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an end, for
there is no need for judicial construction.’ ”].) Here, however, a literal
construction of the statutory language does not yield certainty.
15
Section 512.1 regulates the meal periods, rest breaks, and
compensatory premium wages of “[a]n employee directly employed by an
employer” with an exception not relevant here. (§ 512.1, subds. (a)–(d).)
Subdivision (e)(2) of the section defines “Employer” by enumerating,
separately, “the state, political subdivisions of the state, counties,
municipalities, and the Regents of the University of California.” (§ 512.1,
subd. (e)(2).) The statute’s drafting supports a constrained reading of those
terms because section 512.1, subdivision (e)(2) states that “ ‘Employer’
means” the following enumerated entities. (Italics added.) In statutory
drafting, “means” generally constrains the scope of the ensuing definition.
(See Stone, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
There is no dispute that the City is a consolidated charter city and
county pursuant to Article XI, Section 6 of the California Constitution.
(See ante, section I.A.3 [judicial notice]; San Francisco v. Regents, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 541.) None of the enumerated terms unambiguously
encompass a “city and county” or “municipality and county.”
Moreover, as a charter city and county, the City’s constitutional
status is that of a charter city. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 6, subd. (b); see San
Francisco v. Regents, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 545, fn. 2.) For this
independent reason, the terms “counties” and “political subdivisions”
(which plaintiffs assert applies to the City due to “its capacity as a county”)
do not clearly apply to the City.
Similarly, the term “municipalities” does not clearly apply to the City
either. To be sure, in isolation, the term reflects a plain meaning that
facially applies to the City. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “municipality”
as “[a] city, town, or other local political entity with the powers of self-
government.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024). But we do not view
16
words in isolation; plain meaning is derived within the statutory context.
(Stone, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) Because section 512.1 regulates
specified governmental entities, there is patent uncertainty whether the
term “municipalities” encompasses local governments that are
“ ‘ “ ‘supreme and beyond the reach of legislative enactment’ ” ’ ” as charter
cities, including the City, are. (Redondo Beach, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 910.)
Section 512.1 does not state that “Employer” means any
municipality. (Cf. Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish &
Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411, 430 [“ ‘Generally, “any” means all or
every.’ ”] (Siskiyou); Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
552, 569 [finding a wage order’s minimum wage provisions applied to
charter cities because it used the term “ ‘any city’ ”].) Accordingly, there
are two plausible interpretations of “municipalities”: those subject to
general laws or all.
Although we are reluctant to embrace fully Redondo Beach’s
approach to the plain meaning rule,7 the case is instructive. Redondo
7 In our view, Redondo Beach is analytically flawed in two ways.
First, despite purportedly turning on the constitutional avoidance canon,
Redondo Beach first ventured into the constitution merits of the Cal.
Fed./Vista inquiry, finding a conflict between the VPRA and the charter
city’s charter. (Redondo Beach, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) Then the
court analyzed the statute, putting the cart before the horse.
Second, Redondo Beach appears to improperly expand the context in
which to assess statutory text’s plain language. The court began its
statutory analysis with the plain meaning rule and properly explained the
rule does not look at words in isolation but construes them within the
entire statutory scheme. (Redondo Beach, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 911–912.) Rather than construe the VRPA’s words in the context of the
pertinent statutory scheme, however, the court looked at a far broader
context of how the Legislature has used, and how courts have construed,
17
Beach dealt with a challenge to the California Voter Participation Rights
Act (VRPA) on the ground it improperly infringed a charter city’s plenary
authority to schedule its own elections for local offices. (Redondo Beach,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) The law applied to “ ‘ “political
subdivision[s],” ’ ” which it “defined as ‘a geographic area of representation
created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited
to, a city . . . .’ ” (Id. at pp. 906–907.) The Attorney General issued an
opinion concluding “ ‘the Legislature intended the Act to apply to charter
cities’ ” based on “the purported plain meaning of ‘city’ and ‘political
subdivision.’ ” (Id. at pp. 917, 907.) The Secretary of State likewise
contended “the plain language of the VRPA . . . establishes the
Legislature’s intent that the VRPA applie[d] to all cities . . . .” (Id. at
p. 912.) The court disagreed, stating this conclusion failed to “confront[]
the inherent ambiguity of those terms” due to the legal distinction between
charter cities and general law cities. (Id. at p. 917.) The same ambiguity
presents itself here.
Because we find the statutory definition of “Employer” susceptible of
more than one meaning in these circumstances, we consider whether other
principles of statutory interpretation resolve the ambiguity.
terms like “political subdivision” and “city” in other enacted statutes. (Id.
at pp. 912–913.) Based on that judicial precedent, the court declared it
needed a “clear indication” of intent in the VRPA’s text that the law was
intended to apply to charter cities than “the use of a general term” like
“political subdivision” or “city.” (Id. at p. 913.)
18
C. Other Aids of Interpretation Do Not Reflect the Legislature’s
Intent for Section 512.1 to Cover the City
1. The Legislative Findings Do Not Invoke the Home Rule
Doctrine
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature’s finding that “[w]orker health
and safety and high-quality patient care are matters of statewide concern”
(Stats. 2022, ch. 845, § 1, subd. (d)) invokes the constitutional home rule
doctrine and therefore manifests “clear intent” to apply section 512.1 to
charter cities. We are not persuaded.
First, “matters of statewide concern” is not a term of art that
exclusively invokes the home rule doctrine. It is also an exception to the
University of California’s Regents’ immunity from legislative regulation.
(Gomez, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) Specifically, “ ‘legislation
regulating public agency activity not generally applicable to the public may
be made applicable to the university when the legislation regulates matters
of statewide concern not involving internal university affairs.’ ” (Ibid.,
italics added.) Despite this overlap of terminology, the home rule doctrine
and the Regents’ autonomy are distinct. (Id. at p. 402 [refusing to apply
home rule analysis because it found no “case wherein a court applied the
four-part [home rule] test . . . to an entity other than a charter city”].)
Notably, Senate Bill 1334’s legislative history demonstrates that the
Legislature focused on the bill’s impact on the University of California
throughout the legislative process. The April 2022 bill analysis, quoting
the bill’s author, explicitly mentioned the holding in Gomez, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at page 398 that “ ‘Wage Order 4 did not apply to the UC.’ ”
(Sen. Com. on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement, Analysis of Sen.
Bill 1334, supra, as amended Mar. 29, 2022, p. 3.) The author’s comments
then emphasized that the bill would benefit “UC Nurses and other public
19
sector workers.” (Ibid.) The Senate Appropriations Committee’s staff
determined that “[t]he only state-operated general acute care hospitals
appear be the UC hospitals” and mentioned no other hospitals. (Sen. Com.
on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended Apr. 6, 2022,
p. 2.) Both the Senate and Assembly Appropriations Committees only
mention fiscal impacts to the University of California and the Division of
Labor Standards and Enforcement. (Id., at p. 1; Assem. Com. on
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended Apr. 6, 2022,
p. 1.)
Second, whether a subject is a “matter of statewide concern” is “only
one side of the coin of home rule” and one step in a four-part constitutional
analysis. (Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 13; Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 556.) Moreover, “legislative declarations that a subject is one of
statewide concern do not ipse dixit make it so.” (Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d
at p. 24, fn. 21.) The issue is a question of law, in which the court must
decide whether “ ‘under the historical circumstances presented, the state
has a more substantial interest in the subject than the charter city.’ ”
(Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558.) Courts have settled that meal and rest
breaks and related compensation premiums are not matters of statewide
concern. (See Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 629; Dimon, supra,
166 Cal.App.4th 1276.)
Here, the Legislature’s findings make no mention of those cases, how
conditions have changed since those cases, or how section 512.1 is narrowly
tailored to address the purported matters of statewide concern. If it had
intended to challenge the constitutional status quo, the Legislature
presumably would have provided a robust legislative record. (See Vista,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 557–558 [explaining that “the [legal] inquiry is not
20
wholly removed from historical, and hence factual, realities” and therefore
“[c]ourts accord great weight to the factual record that the Legislature has
compiled”].) Merely declaring that “[w]orker health and safety and high-
quality patient care are matters of statewide concern” (Stats. 2022, ch. 845,
§ 1, subd. (d)) does not demonstrate that the Legislature intended to
challenge the legal precedent that meal and rest breaks and premium
wages are not matters of statewide concern. (See People v. Smith (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 741, 764 [“As the Supreme Court repeatedly has observed,
‘ “ ‘ “[T]he Legislature ‘does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
Third, other provisions of the Labor Code establish that where the
Legislature intends to regulate charter cities it knows how to expressly
invoke the home rule doctrine in the legislative findings. For example, as
the trial court observed, about a year after Senate Bill 1334 was enacted
the Legislature amended another section of the Labor Code with Senate
Bill No. 616 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 616) (Stats. 2023, ch. 309,
§ 1). Senate Bill 616 adopted the Legislature’s finding that “establishing
uniform statewide regulation of certain aspects of paid sick leave is a
matter of statewide concern and is not a municipal affair as that term is
used in Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution. Therefore,
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of this act amending Sections 245.5, 246, and 246.5 of
the Labor Code apply to all cities, including charter cities.” (Stats. 2023,
ch. 309, § 4, italics added.)
The trial court also took notice of the more recent Senate Bill No. 159
(2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 159) (Stats. 2024, ch. 40, § 27). Among
many statutory changes, Senate Bill 159 amended minimum wage
schedules for covered health care employees as codified in section 1182.14.
The Legislature’s findings stated that “access to quality health care and
21
the stability of the health care system is a matter of statewide concern and
is not a municipal affair as that term is used in Section 5 of Article XI of the
California Constitution. Therefore, this section occupies the whole field of
wages, salary, or compensation for covered health care facility employees,
and applies to all cities and counties, including charter cities, charter
counties, and charter cities and counties during the stabilization period
provided by this section.” (§ 1182.14, subd. (a)(6), italics added.) Then, in
another subdivision, section 1182.14 expressly prohibits “any city, county,
city and county, including charter cities, charter counties, and charter
cities and counties” from enacting laws “applicable to a covered health care
facility . . . [that] relates to wages or compensation for covered health care
facility employees” and states such laws are void. (§ 1182.14, subd. (j)(1),
(2).) The next paragraphs then make clear “this subdivision does not
preclude any employer, including . . . charter cities, charter counties, and
charter cities and counties” from taking certain other actions. (Id.,
subd. (j)(3)–(6).)
The trial court’s analysis contrasting Senate Bill 616 and Senate Bill
159 against Senate Bill 1334 was astute. The language in both Senate Bill
616 and Senate Bill 159 “indisputably conveys the Legislature’s ‘clear
intention’ that [each] legislation appl[ies] to charter cities” while “[n]o
remotely comparable language is found in SB 1334.”
Plaintiffs’ argument that “other Labor Code sections are not in pari
materia with section 512.1” is off base. Here, we are not construing the
meaning of the language “a matter of statewide concern” as used in the
uncodified section of Senate Bill 1334 in light of other Labor Code sections.
(Cf. People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1167–1168 [“ ‘ “It is an
established rule of statutory construction that similar statutes should be
22
construed in light of one another [citations], and that when statutes are in
pari materia similar phrases appearing in each should be given like
meanings.” ’ ”].) Instead, we are inquiring whether that phrase
demonstrates that the Legislature intended to invoke the home rule
doctrine. In that inquiry, it is not improper to consider and contrast other
statutes where the Legislature has unambiguously invoked the home rule
doctrine. (Cf. Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1139, 1155 [comparing Public Resources Code, section 4516.5,
subd. (d) to Gov. Code, § 51115, and concluding, “When the Legislature
wishes expressly to preempt all regulation of an activity, it knows how to
do so.”].)
Finally, we are guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional
and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and
doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction
which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language
used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its
constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally
reasonable.” ’ (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 548.)
In short, if a statute is ambiguous, we adopt the less constitutionally
problematic interpretation. (See Siskiyou, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at
p. 445 [explaining the constitutional avoidance canon “ ‘is a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,
resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress [or, mutatis
mutandis, the Legislature] did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts’ ”].)
23
With this maxim in mind, we will not construe Senate Bill 1334’s
oblique reference to a portion of the home rule doctrine as an enunciation
of the Legislature’s intent that section 512.1 was intended to apply to
charter cities and therefore the City.
2. The Legislative History and Other Statutory Context Do Not
Show A Legislature’s Intent to Cover the City
Other aids to statutory construction support our conclusion that the
Legislature did not clearly intend for Senate Bill 1334 to reach charter
cities or the City.
From its inception, the scope of Senate Bill 1334 was couched as
applying to a subset of public employers. The April 2022 bill analysis
presented the key issue to the Senate Committee on Labor, Public
Employment and Retirement as whether healthcare employees “working
for specified public sector employers including the University of California”
should be granted the same meal and rest breaks as private sector
workers. (Sen. Com. on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement,
Analysis of Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended Mar. 29, 2022, p. 1, italics
added.) The Legislature did not mention charter cities or charter cities and
counties during the legislative process. As discussed ante, it focused on the
University of California and implied an intent to overturn Gomez, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th 386 and Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage District,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 729, neither of which pertained to the City or
charter cities. The Legislature failed to mention Curcini, supra, 164
Cal.App.4th 629 or Dimon, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 1276, which concerned
the applicability of section 512 to charter counties.
The one amendment to the bill’s definition of “Employer” merely
added “counties.” And the express reason for this change had nothing to do
24
with charter counties.8 (Accord Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d
129, 133–134 [“After passing the Assembly in an amended form, Assembly
Bill 1935 was further amended in the Senate to exclude from its reach ‘a
charter city and county’—i.e., San Francisco—and ‘charter cities of over
2,000,000 population’—i.e., Los Angeles. The measure was debated on the
floor and narrowly defeated on its third reading. . . . We may reasonably
infer that by so voting the Legislature rejected the very extension of the
statute which appellant now asks us to adopt under the guise of judicial
construction.”] (Ector) superseded by constitutional amendment on other
grounds as stated in Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994)
21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1644.).)
The statutory context further dismantles plaintiffs’ position. Both
section 512.1 and section 555 sit within Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the
Labor Code. (§§ 500–558.1.) Section 555 provides: “Sections 550, 551, 552
and 554 of this chapter are applicable to cities which are cities and
counties and to the officers and employees thereof.” (§ 555.) Since San
8 The reason given for amending the definition of “Employer” to
include “counties” was that doing so would “conform[] to the definition of
employee.” (Assem. Com. on Labor and Employment, Analysis of Sen. Bill
1334, supra, as amended Apr. 6, 2022, p. 3.) However, in no version of the
bill did the term “counties” appear in the definition of “employee.” At the
time of the Assembly’s amendment, the bill “[d]efine[d] employee to mean
an employee who provides direct patient care or supports direct patient
care in a general acute hospital, clinic, or public health setting.” (Id. at
p. 1.) Considering a prior comment in the Senate Appropriations
Committee’s report on Senate Bill 1334 that “[t]he only state-operated
general acute care hospitals appear be the UC hospitals” (Sen. Com. on
Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1334, supra, as amended Apr. 6, 2022,
p. 2), we therefore understand that adding the term “counties” to the
definition of “Employer” was intended to clarify the terms “clinic” and
“public health setting,” as used in the definition of employee.
25
Francisco is the only city in California which is both a city and county,
section 555 makes clear that sections 550, 551, 552, and 554 are applicable
to the City. Senate Bill 1334 did not amend section 555 to include section
512.1, nor does section 512.1 reference “cities which are cities and
counties.” This implies the Legislature did not intend section 512.1 to
apply to the City. (See Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 238, 247, fn. 10 [“Under ‘the interpretive canon expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, . . . the explicit mention of some things in a text
may imply other matters not similarly addressed are excluded.’ ”].) While
this implication certainly is not dispositive, and we do not announce a
“requirement, formal or otherwise, to amend section 555” every time the
Legislature intends to cover San Francisco, we reject plaintiffs’ argument
that section 555 is “not relevant.”
Section 555 also offsets the import of the Labor Code’s general
provisions’ definition of “county.” The Labor Code’s general provisions
instruct that “[u]nless the context otherwise requires, the general
provisions . . . shall govern the construction of this code.” (§ 5.) Within
those general provisions, “ ‘county’ ” is defined to include “ ‘city and
county.’ ” (§ 14.) But the context of section 555 “otherwise requires” a
narrower reading of section 14. (§ 5.) Section 555 was enacted in 1941,
last amended in 1955, and expressly addresses “[a]pplicability to cities and
counties” within the chapter that includes section 512.1; whereas section
14 was enacted in 1937, has not been amended since, and construes
“county” for the entire code. Therefore, section 555 controls, it being the
“ ‘later, more specific statute.’ ” (Boermeester v. Carry (2023) 15 Cal.5th 72,
92, fn. 6.)
26
Moreover, in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 our Supreme Court
confronted a similar situation and determined that, in light of the
constitutional home rule provisions, “ ‘context otherwise require[d]’ ” a
narrow application of an intra-code definition. There, a former employee of
a charter city argued that his firing by that city violated Government Code
section 50083’s prohibition on requiring residence as a condition of
employment. (Ector, at p. 132.) “Appellant relie[d] on section 50001 of the
same code, which declares generally that ‘ “Local agency” as used in this
division [i.e., including § 50083] means county, city, or city and county,
unless the context otherwise requires.’ ” (Ibid.) The appellant “urged that
respondent is a ‘city’ within the definition of section 50001 and hence is
bound by the prohibition of section 50083.” (Ibid.) Because section 50083
conflicted with charter cities’ explicit constitutional authority to prescribe
the qualifications of their employees (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5), our high
court disagreed, stating: “[W]hen the legislation is read together with
certain governing provisions of the Constitution ‘the context otherwise
requires’ a more limited meaning for the term ‘local agency’ in section
50083: i.e., when the agency in question is a city, the section is intended to
apply only if it is a general law city rather than a charter city.” (Ector, at
p. 132.)9 Because applying section 14 to section 512.1 would implicate
charter cities’ explicit constitutional authority over their employees’
9 Article XI, section 10(b), which permits “[a] city or county, including
any chartered city or chartered county” to require employees “to reside
within a reasonable and specific distance of their place of employment,”
was added to the Constitution in response to Ector. (Graham v. Kirkwood
Meadows Pub. Util. Dist., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1644.) This does not
impact the import of Ector for our purposes.
27
compensation, the canon of constitutional avoidance and the logic of Ector
apply here.
D. Plaintiff’s Other Argument Fails
Plaintiffs urge us to distinguish Redondo Beach, arguing that, rather
than search for clear intent as that court did, we must broadly interpret
section 512.1 to apply to the City because our Supreme Court requires
“ ‘statutes governing conditions of employment . . . to be construed broadly
in favor of protecting employees.’ ” They contend that requiring a clear
intent that the Legislature intended for meal and rest breaks to apply to
charter cities “conflict[s] with precedent specific to employment.” This
argument is inapposite because our holding does not turn on a “clear
indication of intent” standard.
* * *
We do not find section 512.1’s text unambiguous as to whether the
statute applies to the City, and other considerations do not support the
finding of such legislative intent. Considering the City’s sovereignty over
its employees’ compensation and bearing in mind that judicial restraint
requires that we not decide constitutional questions where statutory
grounds are available and dispositive, we will not infer an intent to
contravene the City’s home rule authority without more explicit guidance
from the Legislature.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to recover its costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
CLAY, J.*
* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
28
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
29
Trial Court: Superior Court of California, City and County of San
Francisco
Trial Judge: Hon. Ethan P. Schulman
Counsel: Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Caitlin E. Gray, Alexander
S. Nazarov, Miranda Mammen; Kaufmann & Gropman,
Aaron Kaufmann and Elizabeth Gropman for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
David Chiu, City Attorney, Cecilia T. Mangoba, Chief
Labor Attorney, and Adam M. Shapiro Deputy City
Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
Levy et al. v. City and County of San Francisco – A172068