Case law

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  • Richard R. Rothman v. Emory University and Richard W. Riley, Secretary of the Department of Education

    123 F.3d 446 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 23, 1997

    Prior to the enactment of § 1367, our case law clearly provided that federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but not over permissive counterclaims. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. … Finally, the court clearly imposed a just penalty of $2,767.22, which includes amounts for the attorney’s fees Emory incurred in reviewing the non-responsive documents and for part of the photocopying expense.

    Cited 64 timesPublished
  • Jimmy Hinkle v. Rick White

    793 F.3d 764 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 16, 2015

    The district court concluded that Hinkle had not established a protected liberty interest and granted the defendants summary judgment. … Rather, to establish his due process claim, Hinkle needed to show a liberty interest with which the defendants interfered.

    Cited 51 timesPublished
  • Head, Lawrence E. v. Chicago School Refor

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 25, 2000

    See Swick, 11 F.3d at 86-88 (pecuniary losses qualify as actionable deprivations of property). … The district court did not consider whether the Board had established any of the contractual grounds for terminating its contract with Head.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • A. E. Staley Manufacturing Company v. Staley Milling Company

    253 F.2d 269 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 13, 1958

    This is simply not an instance of where some critical finding, or findings, of fact are clearly erroneous. United States v. … We can conceive of no right upon our part to set them aside, for we cannot say, as a matter of law, that they are clearly erroneous.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • United States v. Plaze E. Anderson, Also Known as Plaze Thomas

    303 F.3d 847 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 19, 2002

    She wanted immunity for herself or Kin-low-Glosson before she would provide details. … That clearly is not an instance of the government attempting to bolster its witness. The remaining transcript citations fare no better.

    Cited 41 timesPublished
  • United States v. Andrew West, Vertis King, and Garland Jeffers

    670 F.2d 675 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 22, 1982

    Defendants, however, were unable to show that the Government had promised Dunigan immunity from prosecution in exchange for testifying against defendants. … Moreover, it was clearly admissible against Mrs. Jeffers as an admission of a party. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).

    Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Vernard L. Green, Jr., 258 F.3d 683 (2001)Cited 128 timesPublished
  • United States v. Durriel E. Gillaum

    355 F.3d 982 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 20, 2004

    Hardamon, 188 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1999)) (“Under the clearly erroneous standard, ‘if two permissible views exist, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’ ”); id. at 872 (defendant made no showing … As a result, Gillaum argues, the Illinois convictions cannot be considered qualifying felonies for sentence enhancement.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Janet K. Hodge v. Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors, Cannery, Dairy Employees & Helpers' Local Union 695

    707 F.2d 961 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 25, 1983

    In the course of her routine work, plaintiff also had most of the clerical contact with the office’s confidential and sensitive information (although the record does not establish that other clerical workers were specifically … Defendants challenge as clearly erroneous the district court’s finding that plaintiff was fired for her political differences with the incumbent administration.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Ermand Hysi and Mirela Hysi v. Alberto R. Gonzales, 1

    411 F.3d 847 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 15, 2005

    At the status hearing where the report was received into evidence, the IJ clearly told Hysi’s substitute counsel that a written opinion would be issued unless she heard anything further from the parties. … Nor can he establish eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture. Ahmed v.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • William Johnson v. Joseph Botica

    537 F.2d 930 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 2, 1976

    Clearly, such iron workers are not eligible for a pension merely because they performed work in the industry, no matter how extensive their work may have been prior to the existence of the *936 Plan. … The challenged Pension Plan was qualified for a federal tax exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a), and appellant argues that the result of applying § 401(a) to Article III, § 2(a)(3) of the Plan is to invoke the sanctions of

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Lewis v. School District 70

    523 F.3d 730 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 17, 2008

    The FMLA establishes two categories of protections for employees. … Lewis clearly had been acting as a husband and not as an attorney, Mr. Jones’ statement still would be privileged under Illinois precedent.

    Cited 160 timesPublished
  • Alexandre Solomakha v. Safety International, LLC

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 5, 2020

    Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983), another case the Alex Parties cite, interprets the relevant section of the Contribution Act, but only as it applies to “insolvent or immune defendant[s].” Id. at 206. … That case does not define the meaning of the rele- vant exception, nor does it resolve whether the obligation of a settling party qualifies.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Alexandre Solomakha v. Safety International, LLC

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 5, 2020

    Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983), another case the Alex Parties cite, interprets the relevant section of the Contribution Act, but only as it applies to “insolvent or immune defendant[s].” Id. at 206. … That case does not define the meaning of the rele- vant exception, nor does it resolve whether the obligation of a settling party qualifies.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Alexandre Solomakha v. Safety International, LLC

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 5, 2020

    Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983), another case the Alex Parties cite, interprets the relevant section of the Contribution Act, but only as it applies to “insolvent or immune defendant[s].” Id. at 206. … That case does not define the meaning of the rele- vant exception, nor does it resolve whether the obligation of a settling party qualifies.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bratton v. Shiffrin

    585 F.2d 223 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 18, 1978

    Against the backdrop of this rather complex regulatory scheme established “to protect travelers”, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (n)(2), unfolds the story of the plaintiffs in this case. … Where, as here, the federal right is so clearly defined, and where resolution of the dispute will depend on interpretation of the regulations in question, we will not deny a remedy.

    Vacated by Shiffrin v. Bratton, 443 U.S. 903 (1979)Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Postma, Vickie L. v. Paul Revere Life

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 7, 2000

    Postma was still an employee (although on medical leave at the time), CPG established or maintained the benefit plan. The court’s finding that CPG maintained its benefit plan for its employees is not clearly erroneous. … Postma clearly made less than 80% of her prior income because she did not work at all.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Charlotte A. Pitcher v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company

    93 F.3d 407 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 22, 1996

    The record is devoid of any evidence establishing that the lumps detected in Pitcher's breasts by Dr. … On the other hand, the record does clearly establish that Pitcher had suffered from a fibrocystic breast condition for some twenty years.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.

    805 F.2d 705 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 3, 1986

    The first poison pill that CTS adopted clearly flunked the test. … King, 792 F.2d 602, 604-06 (7th Cir.1986)), so we must uphold it unless it is clearly erroneous.

    Reversed on other grounds by CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)Cited 14 timesPublished
  • United States v. Mutuc, Ernesto G.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 21, 2003

    It is clear that, if required, the two witnesses would have been qualified as experts in their fields under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. … establishing trial strategy.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • SHERWIN MANOR NURSING CENTER, INC. v. McAULIFFE

    37 F.3d 1216 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 6, 1994

    See Reichenberger, 660 F.2d at 285 ("legal fees expended by the plaintiffs in the administrative proceedings cannot qualify as a constitutional injury absent a showing of deprivation of constitutional magnitude"). … Paty, 435 U.S. 618 , 98 S.Ct. 1322 , 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978), and Sherwin's complaint clearly alleged anti-Semitic animus and conduct involving, inter alia, criticism of Sherwin's meal offerings because of its adherence to

    Cited 6 timesPublished

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