Head, Lawrence E. v. Chicago School Refor

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3408

Lawrence Head,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Chicago School Reform Board

of Trustees,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 3943--David H. Coar, Judge.

Argued March 30, 2000--Decided August 25, 2000

Before Bauer, Diane P. Wood, and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

Williams, Circuit Judge. Before the start of the

1994-95 school year Lawrence Head accepted a

four-year contract to serve as the principal of

Chicago’s Nathaniel Pope Elementary School. After

the 1996-97 school year, however, the Chicago

School Reform Board of Trustees removed Head from

his position and assigned him to administrative

duties in the Department of Schools and Regions.

Believing that the School Reform Board of

Trustees had violated his due process rights and

had breached its contract with him, Head filed

suit against the School Reform Board of Trustees.

The district court rejected Head’s claims and

Head now appeals. For the reasons stated below,

we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

In March of 1994, the Chicago Board of

Education,/1 acting through the Local School

Council, hired Head as the principal for

Nathaniel Pope Elementary School ("Pope

Elementary") and gave him a four-year contract

ending June 30, 1998. By its own terms, the

contract could be terminated only on certain

limited grounds./2 Similarly, under the Illinois

School Code, Head could be discharged during the

term of his contract only for cause following an

extensive and detailed notice and hearing

process. 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/34-85.

Beginning in 1995, the Board, aided by newly

enacted state laws granting it greater powers,

1995 Ill. Laws 89-15, sec. 5, began to step up

its efforts to remedy deficient performance in

Chicago’s public schools. Pursuant to these

efforts, in October 1996, Pope Elementary was

identified as a poorly performing school and was

placed on probation. A school on probation is

subject to greater Board oversight and must take

certain steps to improve performance. 105 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/34-8.3. In particular, Head, as

Pope Elementary’s principal, had primary

responsibility for implementing a Corrective

Action Plan to raise student test scores.

During the 1996-97 school year, the Board came

to the conclusion that Head was not fulfilling

his responsibility in this regard. Therefore, in

early June of 1997, Hazel Stewart, the Education

Officer for the region encompassing Pope

Elementary, advised Head that the Board would

seek to remove him as Pope Elementary’s principal

at the end of that school year. A letter signed

by Chicago Public Schools CEO Paul Vallas and

dated July 2, notified Head that pursuant to 105

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/34-8.3(d), which governs

schools under probation, a principal removal

hearing would be scheduled for Pope Elementary.

Head received a second letter signed by Vallas,

dated July 3, scheduling the removal hearing for

July 14 and detailing the criteria the Board used

in deciding to seek his removal./3 A separate

letter also notified the school community of the

principal removal hearing.

Margaret Fitzpatrick presided over the July 14

hearing. During the hearing, eight witnesses

presented evidence supporting Head’s removal

while seven witnesses testified on Head’s behalf.

After the hearing, Head, through his attorney,

submitted a brief arguing against his removal.

About a week after the hearing, Fitzpatrick

issued a written decision recommending that Head

be removed as principal of Pope Elementary. That

same week, a Chicago Public Schools official,

Phillip Hansen, criticized Head’s performance on

a cable access program. Then, on July 28, the

Board adopted Fitzpatrick’s recommendation and

removed Head as principal of Pope Elementary.

Following the Board’s decision, Head was

assigned to work in the Department of Schools and

Regions, and from there, he obtained an

assignment as a hearing officer. Head’s

employment with the Board ended in August of

1998, 60 days after the expiration of his

contract. Throughout this period, Head continued

to receive the same pay and benefits he had

received as the principal of Pope Elementary,

though Head claims that he lost a salary increase

he would have received had he remained principal.

Eventually, Head filed suit against the Board

based on the Board’s actions in removing him as

principal of Pope Elementary. He raised

essentially four claims: (1) that, without due

process, the Board had deprived him of a liberty

interest in pursuing his occupation; (2) that,

without due process, the Board had deprived him

of a property interest in employment beyond the

term of his contract; (3) that, without due

process, the Board had deprived him of a property

interest in employment through the end of his

contract; and (4) that the Board had breached its

contract with him. On a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), the district court rejected the first

two of these claims, but allowed the last two

claims to go forward./4 Later, however, on a

motion for summary judgment, the district court

rejected Head’s remaining claims and entered

judgment in the Board’s favor. Head appeals the

district court’s decisions on all four of his

claims.

II

Before we come to the merits of Head’s appeal,

we must address a jurisdictional issue raised by

the Board. The Board argues that we lack

appellate jurisdiction to consider Head’s

challenge to the district court’s decision to

dismiss, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), two of

his claims. The Board claims that the district

court dismissed the two claims without

prejudice,/5 and therefore, the dismissal does

not qualify as an appealable "final decision"

under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291.

While it is true that the district court’s

ruling on the Board’s motion to dismiss is not a

final decision (not only because it was without

prejudice, but also because it did not dispose of

all of Head’s claims, see LeBlang Motors, Ltd. v.

Subaru of Am., Inc., 148 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir.

1998) (discussing finality of dismissals without

prejudice); United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods.,

Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1990)

(discussing finality of decisions disposing of

fewer than all claims against all parties)), non-

final decisions become appealable after a final

decision is entered. Badger Pharm., Inc. v.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir.

1993) (an appeal from a final decision brings up

for review all previous orders entered in the

case); Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892

F.2d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). And, the

district court’s ruling on the Board’s summary

judgment motion is a final decision, as it

resolved all outstanding claims and made clear

that Head’s suit was at an end. See Otis v. City

of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1163-66 (7th Cir. 1994)

(en banc). Moreover, the district court entered

a formal Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 judgment, which

removes any doubt as to whether any portion of

Head’s suit remained active. See Kolman v.

Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to

consider all of Head’s claims on appeal.

III

A. Claims Resolved in Motion to Dismiss Decision

We consider first the two claims the district

court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)--that,

without due process, the Board deprived Head of

a liberty interest in pursuing the occupation of

his choice and that, without due process, the

Board deprived Head of a property interest in

employment beyond the term of his contract. We

review such dismissals de novo, taking a

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in his or her

favor. Strasburger v. Board of Educ., Hardin

County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d

351, 359 (7th Cir. 1998). A claim should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "no relief

could be granted ’under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations.’"

Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir.

1998) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).

1. Liberty Interest Claim

In setting out the basis for his due process

liberty interest claim in his complaint,/6 Head

alleged that the Board (or at least certain

persons associated with the Board) deprived him

of a liberty interest in pursuing the occupation

of his choice by disseminating false allegations

regarding his performance as Pope Elementary’s

principal./7 In ruling that Head’s allegations

failed to state a claim, the district court

concluded that Head had not adequately alleged

that the Board deprived him of a liberty interest

in pursuing his occupation. We agree, although

for a reason slightly different than that given

by the district court.

A claim that a government employer has

infringed an employee’s liberty to pursue the

occupation of his or her choice requires that (1)

the employee be stigmatized by the employer’s

actions; (2) the stigmatizing information be

publicly disclosed; and (3) the employee suffer

a tangible loss of other employment opportunities

as a result of the public disclosure.

Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 356; Harris v. City of

Auburn, 27 F.3d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir. 1994).

However, simply labeling an employee as being

incompetent or otherwise unable to meet an

employer’s expectations does not infringe the

employee’s liberty. Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65

F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1995). The

employee’s good name, reputation, honor, or

integrity must be called into question in such a

way as to make it virtually impossible for the

employee to find new employment in his chosen

field. Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408

(7th Cir. 1997); Lashbrook, 65 F.3d at 1348-49;

Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir.

1987).

The district court based its dismissal of

Head’s due process liberty interest claim on a

determination that Head had not pleaded

sufficient facts to establish the legal elements

of his claim. To survive a motion to dismiss,

however, Head was not required to plead with such

particularity. See Veazey v. Communications &

Cable of Chicago, Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 853-54 (7th

Cir. 1999); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516,

518-19 (7th Cir. 1998). The allegations in Head’s

complaint, although conclusory and somewhat

incomplete, are adequate to put a reader on

notice as to the gravamen of Head’s due process

liberty interest claim. As such, the allegations

are sufficiently particular to survive a motion

to dismiss. See Scott v. City of Chicago, 195

F.3d 950, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1999); Bennett, 153

F.3d at 518-19.

The problem for Head is not insufficient

particularity, but rather too much particularity.

He alleged in his complaint that the Board’s

published allegations "constitute charges of

ineptitude and professional inadequacies." If

this is true, as we must assume it to be, Head

has pleaded himself out of court by including

allegations that establish his inability to state

a claim for relief. See Bennett, 153 F.3d at 519;

Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 558-59 (7th Cir.

1994). Simple charges of professional

incompetence do not impose the sort of stigma

that actually infringes an employee’s liberty to

pursue an occupation. Lashbrook, 65 F.3d at 1348-

49; Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 693-94 (7th

Cir. 1985). Only if the circumstances of an

employee’s discharge so sully the employee’s

reputation or character that the employee will

essentially be blacklisted in his or her chosen

profession will it be possible to pursue a due

process liberty interest claim. Lashbrook, 65

F.3d at 1348-49 (listing charges of immorality,

dishonesty, alcoholism, disloyalty, Communism, or

subversive acts as the sort of charges that

infringe an employee’s liberty); Ratliff v. City

of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 625-26 (7th Cir.

1986) (concluding that charges of untruthfulness,

neglect of duty, and insubordination against a

police officer impose sufficient stigma); see

also Olivieri, 122 F.3d at 408; Colaizzi, 812

F.2d at 307. As Head’s allegations of stigma fall

short of this threshold, he has failed to state

a due process liberty interest claim.

2. Property Interest Claim

Head claims that a requirement, found both in

his contract and in a 1996 Board publication,

that he be given notice five months before the

end of the contract term regarding whether his

contract would be renewed, grants him a property

interest in employment beyond the term of his

contract, which the Board could not deprive him

of without due process. After reviewing Head’s

entire contract (which Head attached to his

complaint), the district court concluded that

Head had no property interest in future

employment with the Board and therefore could not

state a due process claim. We agree.

Property interests are enforceable entitlements

to a benefit or right. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Lashbrook, 65 F.3d at

1345; Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 86

(7th Cir. 1993). They can arise directly from

state or federal law (as with a statute granting

a benefit) or indirectly through the operation of

state or federal law on certain conduct (as with

a contract). Lashbrook, 65 F.3d at 1345; Swick,

11 F.3d at 86. A mere opportunity to acquire

property, however, does not itself qualify as a

property interest protected by the Constitution.

Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 452 (7th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Cornelius v. LaCroix,

838 F.2d 207, 210-12 (7th Cir. 1988).

Head’s contract with the Board makes it plain

that Head has no enforceable entitlement to

employment beyond the term of the contract. It

provides, "This Agreement, including and not

withstanding the procedures set forth herein,

shall expire at the end of its stated term and

shall not grant or create any contractual rights

or other expectancy of continued employment

beyond the term of this Agreement." This

provision conclusively dispels any confusion

regarding the possibility of a property interest

in future employment created by the requirement

that Head be given five months notice of whether

his contract would be renewed. And, there is

nothing in the Illinois School Code that

overrides (or is even inconsistent with) this

aspect of the contract. Cf. Lyznicki v. Board of

Educ., Sch. Dist. 167, Cook County, Ill., 707

F.2d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1983) (considering a

similar claim by a principal based on the

Illinois School Code). Accordingly, the district

court properly dismissed Head’s claim that the

Board unconstitutionally deprived him of a

protected property interest in employment beyond

the term of his contract.

B. Claims Resolved in Summary Judgment Decision

We turn next to the two claims on which the

district court granted summary judgment--that,

without due process, the Board deprived Head of

a property interest in remaining the principal of

Pope Elementary through the end of his

contractual term of employment, and that the

Board breached its contract with him. This court

reviews a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, construing the evidence and the

inferences drawn from it in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Curran v.

Kwon, 153 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1998). Summary

judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine

issue of material fact such that judgment is

proper as a matter of law. Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)).

1. Due Process Claim

In support of his remaining due process claim,

Head contends that by removing him from his

position as principal of Pope Elementary before

the end of his contract, the Board deprived him

of a property interest in continuing in that

position for the term of his contract. There can

be no doubt that, as a public employee who by

contract and statute could be removed only on

limited grounds, Head had a property interest in

completing his contract in accordance with the

terms of his contract, one of which specifically

made him principal of Pope Elementary. Jones v.

City of Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435, 1440-41 (7th

Cir. 1995); Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d

1435, 1437-38 (7th Cir.), aff’d by an equally

divided Court, 464 U.S. 813 (1983). The question

the Board raises, which the district court never

adequately addressed, is whether the deprivation

Head suffered is more than de minimis, as it must

be to be actionable. Swick v. City of Chicago,

supra, 11 F.3d at 87-88; see also Dill v. City of

Edmond, Okla., 155 F.3d 1193, 1206-07 (10th Cir.

1998) (collecting cases).

The Board suggests that because Head received

the same salary and benefits after his removal

that he did when he was principal, he, at most,

suffered a de minimis deprivation of property.

The Board’s suggestion is flawed, however. To

begin with, the relevant question is whether Head

received all the salary and benefits he would

have received if he had remained Pope

Elementary’s principal. Head opposed the Board’s

summary judgment motion on the ground that he did

not receive all he would have been due. If he is

right, he suffered an injury that is plainly more

than de minimis. See Swick, 11 F.3d at 86-88

(pecuniary losses qualify as actionable

deprivations of property). Moreover, even if Head

did receive all he would have been due had he

remained Pope Elementary’s principal, he might

still have had a constitutionally protected

property interest in remaining in that position.

We have recognized that a loss of position that

impedes future job opportunities or has other

indirect effects on future income can inflict an

actionable deprivation of property. Swick, 11

F.3d at 86. We need not definitively answer

whether Head has adequately established that he

possessed a protected property interest in

remaining Pope Elementary’s principal through the

end of his contract, however, since we agree with

the district court that Head’s challenges to the

adequacy of the procedures afforded him prior to

his removal are without merit.

A public employer who removes an employee from

a job in which the employee has a

constitutionally protected interest must provide

certain limited pre-termination procedures,/8

including, at a minimum: (1) oral or written

notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the

employer’s evidence; and (3) an opportunity for

the employee to tell his or her side of the

story. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Staples v. City of

Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1998).

Also, the chosen decisionmaker must be impartial.

Bakalis v. Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318, 323-26 (7th

Cir. 1994). Head contends that the procedures he

was afforded did not satisfy these minimum

requirements in two respects./9

Head first complains that he did not receive

adequate notice of the charges that led to his

removal. We cannot accept this argument, however.

Notice is constitutionally adequate if it is

reasonably calculated to apprise interested

parties of the proceeding and afford them an

opportunity to present their objections. Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14

(1978); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Hartland

Sportsman’s Club, Inc. v. Town of Delafield, 35

F.3d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994). In a pair of

letters sent over one week prior to the removal

hearing, the Board informed Head that a principal

removal hearing had been scheduled for Pope

Elementary and detailed four particular grounds

on which his removal was being sought, see supra

note 3. Clearly, Head was apprised of the removal

proceedings, and, while the charges against him

may not have been as specific as Head would have

liked, they were certainly sufficient to allow

him to defend himself. In any event, Head admits

that he was fully apprised of the charges at the

hearing and that afterwards he was able to submit

a brief in response to the evidence presented at

the hearing. For both of these reasons, we find

it impossible to conclude that Head did not

receive adequate notice of the charges that led

to his removal.

Head also complains that Margaret Fitzpatrick,

the hearing officer who presided over his removal

hearing, was not an impartial decisionmaker.

Specifically, Head contends that Fitzpatrick

cannot be considered an impartial decisionmaker

because she was employed by the Board, he had no

input on her selection, she had previously

represented him and the Board, and she had on a

prior occasion presented evidence regarding an

earlier controversy at Pope Elementary. Those

serving as adjudicators are presumed to act in

good faith, honestly, and with integrity. Withrow

v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). To overcome

this presumption, a plaintiff must come forward

with substantial evidence of actual or potential

bias, such as evidence of a pecuniary interest in

the proceeding, personal animosity toward the

plaintiff, or actual prejudgment of the

plaintiff’s case. Id.; Bakalis, 35 F.3d at 323-

26. Evidence of prior familiarity with the

plaintiff or his or her situation, or even of

involvement in the particular matter under

consideration, is not adequate by itself to

overcome the presumption. Withrow, 421 U.S. at

47; Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.

Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 493

(1976); Staples, 142 F.3d at 387; Panozzo v.

Rhoads, 905 F.2d 135, 140 (7th Cir. 1990). Viewed

in the light most favorable to Head, the evidence

he relies on amounts to nothing more than

evidence of Fitzpatrick’s prior familiarity with

him and Pope Elementary. As such, it does not

overcome the presumption of good faith that is

afforded adjudicators. Accordingly, Head’s claim

that Fitzpatrick was biased must fail.

As there appears to be no reason to doubt that

the Board afforded Head constitutionally adequate

procedures before removing him as principal of

Pope Elementary,/10 the Board was entitled to

summary judgment on Head’s due process property

interest claim relating to his removal before the

end of his contractual term of employment.

2. Breach of Contract Claim

Head claims that by removing him from his

position as principal of Pope Elementary before

the end of his four-year contractual term of

employment, the Board breached its contract with

him. The district court concluded that no breach

occurred because the Illinois School Code governs

Head’s contract and, in removing Head, the Board

complied with the provisions of the Illinois

School Code regarding the removal of a principal

from a school on probation (specifically 105 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/34-8.3(d)). Head argues that the

district court misinterpreted the contract. We

agree.

As the contract between Head and the Board

specifically makes Head principal of Pope

Elementary, there can be no doubt that the Board

terminated the contract by removing Head from

that position. The question is whether it had

grounds for terminating the contract. As noted

above, see supra note 2, the contract provides

five grounds for termination. Removal of the

principal pursuant to 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/34-

8.3(d) is not one of them, nor has the Board ever

suggested that any of the grounds for termination

has been satisfied. The only ground with any

connection to the reasons for Head’s removal is,

"discharge of the Principal for cause pursuant to

Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 122, sec. 34-85."/11 But,

the Board concedes that it did not follow the

procedures or afford Head the rights provided by

sec. 34-85.

The district court did not consider whether the

Board had established any of the contractual

grounds for terminating its contract with Head.

Instead, the court concluded that the contract is

governed by, and therefore apparently

incorporates, the Illinois School Code, and that

if Head was properly removed under any provision

of the Illinois School Code, there could not be

a breach of the contract. This interpretation

reads too much into the contract. The contract

does provide that Head must fulfill the

obligations placed on him by the Illinois School

Code, but the contract says nothing about

incorporating, wholesale, the various provisions

of the Illinois School Code relating to the

removal of a principal. There is, for instance,

no term allowing for termination of the contract

upon "discharge of the principal pursuant to the

Illinois School Code." To the contrary, the

contract specifically identifies a single

provision, sec. 34-85, that must be used in

discharging a principal for cause. As we read the

Board’s contract with Head, the contract may be

terminated only if one of the five contractual

grounds for termination is satisfied.

Whether by mistake or design, Head’s contract

grants him greater rights than the Illinois

School Code appears to grant him. The Board was

obligated to honor those contractual rights by

satisfying one of the five contractual grounds

for termination of the contract. It did not do

so. Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court erred in ruling that the Board did not

breach its contract with Head.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that

there is no merit to Head’s due process claims,

but that his breach of contract claim should have

survived summary judgment. Accordingly, we Affirm

in part and Reverse in part the judgment of the

district court, and we Remand the case for further

proceedings.

/1 The Board of Education was subsequently

supplanted by the School Reform Board of

Trustees, which itself was recently replaced by

a new Board of Education. For simplicity’s sake,

we will refer to all of these entities simply as

"the Board."

/2 The contract provides:

This Agreement may be terminated for any one of

the following reasons or by any one of the

following methods:

(a) written agreement of the Local School

Council, Board of Education and the Principal;

(b) discharge of the Principal for cause

pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 122, sec. 34-85;

(c) closure of the attendance center;

(d) death, resignation or retirement of the

Principal;

(e) misrepresentation referred to in section IX

of this Agreement [which requires certain

truthful representations to be made].

/3 Specifically, the criteria detailed were:

A. Failure of the Principal to effectively and/or

sufficiently implement the Corrective Action

Plan, which has resulted in deficiencies in any

of the following:

* School leadership;

* Parent/community partnerships;

* Student centered learning climate;

* Professional development and collaboration;

* Quality instruction plan; and

* School management.

B. Failure of the school to show sufficient

increase in student scores on the TAP achievement

test.

C. Failure of the Principal to effectively and/or

sufficiently follow the recommendation(s) of the

Probation Manager.

D. Failure to improve student attendance and/or

drop-out rate in the school.

/4 Although the district court purported to simply

deny the Board’s motion to dismiss in its

entirety, it is clear from the district court’s

order regarding the motion to dismiss, as well as

its subsequent summary judgment order, that it

considered these claims dismissed.

/5 Actually, the district court’s order is silent on

whether the claims were being dismissed with or

without prejudice. But, since Head does not make

an issue of this and it does not matter to our

ultimate conclusion, we will assume that the

claims were dismissed without prejudice.

/6 We focus here only on what Head alleges in his

complaint. In pleadings subsequent to his

complaint, Head elaborated on the allegations he

made in his complaint. Specifically, he

identified Phillip Hansen’s criticism of him on

a cable access program and the letter informing

the Pope Elementary community of the principal

removal hearing as particular incidents of

stigmatizing publicity. Although we do not

consider these allegations, Head suffers no

prejudice because they are simply sets of facts

that could be proved consistent with the

complaint’s allegations, which we must take into

account in any event. See Nance, 147 F.3d at 590.

/7 Head’s complaint might be read more narrowly to

allege simply an injury to his reputation, an

allegation that most certainly could not survive

a motion to dismiss in light of Paul v. Davis,

424 U.S. 693 (1976), which holds that simple

defamation by a government actor does not give

rise to a due process liberty (or property)

interest violation. Under the applicable standard

of review, however, we are required to give

Head’s complaint a generous reading. Therefore,

we read Head’s complaint to allege more than

simple defamation.

/8 Limited pre-termination procedures are

permissible only if full post-termination

procedures are available. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-47 (1985). As

the parties here do not challenge the proposition

that the legal framework governing limited pre-

termination procedures applies, we assume full

post-termination procedures are available.

/9 Head also suggests, in passing, that the Board’s

failure to provide him with more elaborate,

trial-type rights (like the ability to cross-

examine witnesses) deprived him of due process.

This is not so. See Staples, 142 F.3d at 387

(pre-termination hearing does not require the

incidents of a full, trial-type hearing).

/10 The parties, and the district court, have spent

much effort explaining why Head was or was not

entitled to the procedures mandated by one or

another statutory regime. This sort of inquiry is

completely irrelevant, however, to the question

of whether Head received constitutionally

adequate process. For these purposes, it does not

matter if the state provided the procedures it

was required to provide under its own laws. Kyle

v. Morton High Sch., supra, 144 F.3d at 451-52.

/11 In 1993, Illinois recodified its laws, and when

it did so, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 122, sec. 34-85

became 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/34-85.