Case law

United States v. Hill

645 F.3d 900 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 5, 2011

The district court found that Hill qualified for the adjustment. … The court acknowledged that Hill didn’t establish liquor law policy or liquor commissioner policy, nor did he supervise other employees, but found that he qualified for the enhancement because he exercised substantial influence

Durable Manufacturing Company v. LABR

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 18, 2009

Here, however, there is indeed statutory language clearly directing that DOL’s sufficient workers determination be linked in time to the filing of a visa application. … When DOL amended § 656.30(b) essentially to establish a 180-day time limit for previously approved labor certifi- cations, the plaintiffs’ right to the certifications’ indefinite validity ended.

Old Ben Coal Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, and Lowell Mitchell

62 F.3d 1003 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 16, 1995

Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424, 433 (4th Cir.1986), which concluded that “a single x-ray ... will clearly suffice to trigger the presumption.” … Rather, the regulation requires the claimant to establish at least one of the qualifying elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 147-48 , 108 S.Ct. at 433-34 .

United States v. Alanis, Antonio

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 7, 2001

Count V, which pertained to the November 4 seizure, clearly involved more than 5 kilograms. … Alanis’s substantial rights were clearly not affected by the district court’s error. F.

Martha Mills v. United States

713 F.2d 1249 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 18, 1983

First, it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that if the qualifying portion of a statute is rendered inoperative, such a holding should not serve to extend the scope of the authority which the statute … Goldfarb is thus not inapplicable, as the dissent asserts, since its mandate clearly outlawed minimum fee schedules which were not “purely advisory.”

United States v. Walter Merlin Chase, United States of America v. Wilbur Floyd Hilliard

281 F.2d 225 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 10, 1960

Prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such circumstances, the Constitution gives a witness the privilege of remaining silent. … Of course, defendants had immunity as to the offenses of which they had been previously convicted.

United States v. Terrance Thornton

463 F.3d 693 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 12, 2006

The government maintained that all of Thornton’s qualifying convictions were properly considered. … Thornton also argues that the officers did not have a proper reason to look into the windows of the SUV, but this argument is clearly without merit.

United States v. Kasuboski

834 F.2d 1345 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 25, 1987

The scheduling order issued by the district court established a November 15,1986 deadline for filing dispositive motions. … so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.

United States of America Ex Rel. Joe L. Ashford v. Director, Illinois Department of Corrections

871 F.2d 680 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 3, 1989

The Supreme Court has, however, qualified the right to effective cross-examination: “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination … The jury was aware that the witness had been granted immunity. Id. We affirmed the conviction. 579 F.2d at 1022 .

Locomotive Engineers Mut. Life & Accident Ins. Ass'n v. Laurent

172 F.2d 889 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 21, 1949

As a result, we find no evidence to justify us in concluding that the District Court’s findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous in this respect. … Thus, Irma was a qualified beneficiary, even were there lack of jurisdiction in the Arkansas court, for, under this finding, she was a qualified beneficiary under the by-laws of plaintiff as one dependent upon the insured

Argelio Gonzales v. Brett Mize

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 11, 2009

More- over, while it is true that the circuit court did not cite Cuyler, a state court’s decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law merely because the court does not cite federal law. See Bell v. … Therefore, this court rejects Gonzales’ arguments that the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. III.

Hall, Merrill E. v. Norfolk Southern

469 F.3d 590 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 9, 2006

Hall then moved to amend his complaint to add Conrail as a defen- dant, but by that time the statute of limitations had run and any claim against Conrail was time-barred unless it qualified for “relation back” under Rule … But having a contractual right to seek indemnification is not the same as being immune from a suit altogether.

Alexander A. Azar v. United States Postal Service

777 F.2d 1265 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 27, 1985

After finding these facts, the district court applied a test originally established by the Ninth Circuit in TRW, Inc. v. … The Postal Service first contends that reasonable reliance can never be established if the party has the means of ascertaining the true facts.

Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corporation

105 F.2d 450 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 7, 1939

The record clearly justifies the conclusion that Sinko did not meet the test prescribed by the law of unfair competition. … We realize that requiring a secondary meaning as a 'condition precedent to relief in these cases often makes the “diligent thief immune, while the one who might hesitate and delay must give up his *454 plunder.”.

SHAN ZHU QIU v. Holder

611 F.3d 403 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 12, 2010

To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must qualify as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). … The fact that the police sought Qiu for questioning was insufficient, the IJ found, to establish the level of persecution necessary to qualify as a refugee. Qiu does not challenge this point.

United States v. Charles Alden, A/K/A Charles Alden Boyd

476 F.2d 378 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 30, 1973

It is our holding that the district court clearly abused its discretion in not permitting the doctors to testify. … The basic fault in the present case is that Alden was not permitted through the doorway of establishing the foundation.

Fidele Sanon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

52 F.3d 648 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 11, 1995

To consolidate his power, Sankara established local groups called Committees in Defense of the Revolution (“CDRs”) throughout the country. … of persecution that qualified him for withholding of deportation.

Sean Smith v. Utah Valley University

619 F. App'x 559 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 13, 2015

And it concluded that qualified immunity shields the school officials sued in their individual capacities. … The Eleventh Amendment immunizes an unconsenting state from suits for damages unless Congress has validly exercised its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Waukesha Hygeia Mineral Springs Co. v. Hygeia Sparkling Distilled Water Co.

63 F. 438 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 1, 1894

If the contract governs, the proof tending to show priority of use is immaterial, and the complainant is entitled to protection against employment of the word “Hygeia,” as a trade-name for waters, without the qualifying words … The trade-mark, when established, is valid and entitled to protection, whether registered or not.

Nabil Raja Dandan, Ketty Dandan, Souzi Dandan, A.K.A. Souzy Dandan, Sandra Dandan, and Raja Nabil Dandan v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General

339 F.3d 567 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 11, 2003

To qualify for this discretionary waiver, an alien needed to establish that he had been present in the United States for seven years prior to the filing of his application and that his deportation would result in extreme … hardship to himself or to a qualifying relative.