Case law

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  • United States v. City of Warren

    138 F.3d 1083 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 16, 1998

    In the present case, we believe that the district court clearly erred in finding that the United States failed to establish racial discrimination based on disparate impact in violation of Title VII for municipal positions … clearly erroneous.

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • Lynn Green v. Thomas D. Hocking

    9 F.3d 18 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 29, 1993

    The court ruled that Hocking, by confining his activities to those of a legal nature, is immune from liability under the FDCPA. Green then brought this timely appeal. … II The question presented is whether Hocking, by filing a complaint, qualifies as a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. 2 The FDCPA imposes civil liability only on “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692 .

    Abrogated by Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Creusere v. Weaver

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 26, 2009

    In resolving questions of qualified immunity, we proceed in two steps. … If this question is answered in the affirmative, we next ask “whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case.” Scott, 127 S.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Majid Alzid v. Gizelle Porter

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 25, 2024

    Defendants claimed they were entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims and state governmental employee immunity for the gross negligence claims. … Government officials are protected by qualified immunity for actions taken within the scope of their authority which do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • James Adkins v. Morgan Cty., Tenn.

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 8, 2020

    In assessing qualified immunity, we are asking only whether Schubert violated a clearly established constitutional right by being deliberately indifferent to Adkins’s serious medical condition. … Clearly Established Right Finally, we ask whether the constitutional violation at issue in this case was of a clearly established right.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Mabry

    518 F.3d 442 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 3, 2008

    Accordingly, the informal resolution of the Nelson Mill payment dispute cannot qualify as a “settlement” under § 186(c)(2). III. … His expert had solicited bids from a variety of contractors to establish this range.

    Cited 88 timesPublished
  • Michael A. Costantino, on Behalf of the Class of v. Trw, Inc. Jake Schoepler, Secretary, Board of Administrators Trw Salaried Pension Plan

    13 F.3d 969 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 29, 1994

    Plaintiffs claim that the retroactive application of interest rates established in section 1139 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was unconstitutional, denying them the proper amount of their vested early retirement benefit. … In context, the purpose of the passage was to contrast the lack of protection afforded non-qualifying participants with the protection afforded qualifying participants.

    Cited 130 timesPublished
  • Marc Belding Anderson v. General Lewis B. Hershey, National Director, Selective Service System

    410 F.2d 492 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 11, 1969

    In the case of an exemption, the Congress has made the decision that qualifying persons shall be beyond the pool of manpower available for military purposes. … However, Congress has not seen fit to grant an exemption to persons qualifying for a III-A classification.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Sanders v. Parrish

    141 F. App'x 412 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 1, 2005

    As we conclude the Law Enforcement Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to the Law Enforcement Officers, and we remand the case to the district court … We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Law Enforcement Officers.

    Cited 3 timesUnpublished
  • George Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America

    416 F.2d 655 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 26, 1969

    The italicized portions of the disputed agreement clearly indicate that it is expressly limited in its effect to its signatories. … Hutcheson, swpra (that a union must act in furtherance of its own self-interest in order to retain immunity from the antitrust laws), and reaffirmed in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, supra.

    Reversed on other grounds by Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971)Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Shipp v. Williams

    62 F. 4 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 8, 1894

    We are clearly of opinion (hat the circuit court had no jurisdiction, and that appellants’ demurrer should have been sustained. … Brown filed his bill in the state court, seeking foreclosure, alleging that Walker, the trustee, had never qualified as trustee, and did not intend to qualify, or execute the same.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Jimmy Lee Harvest v. John Randolph, and State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation

    104 F.3d 361 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 18, 1996

    PER CURIAM. 1 The defendant John Randolph appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . … The court held that TDOT was immune from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment, but that Randolph had been sued in his individual capacity and was not entitled to qualified immunity. 4 In accordance with these rulings

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Tammy Korthals v. Cty. of Huron

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 13, 2020

    The determinative question becomes whether that right was “clearly established,” so as to overcome qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. … There are two aspects to qualified immunity’s “clearly established” element that the district court overlooked or misunderstood.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • David Durham v. Jerry Niffenegger

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 7, 2024

    But qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages under § 1983 if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would … Durham next asserts that the district court erred in granting Detectives Niffenegger and Purdy qualified immunity on his malicious prosecution claim.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Jalowiec v. Bradshaw

    657 F.3d 293 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 7, 2011

    The Ohio Supreme Court’s resolution of this claim, finding no Strickland prejudice, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. D. … The district court denied habeas relief, finding that the Ohio courts’ disposition of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

    Cited 176 timesPublished
  • Shamrock Coal Company, Inc. v. Sill Lee

    751 F.2d 187 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 4, 1985

    The ALJ found that Lee was a coal miner who had 17 years of qualifying coal mine employment within the meaning of the Act. … It was clearly not the intent of Congress to impose such a difficult if not impossible burden upon a party opposing entitlement benefits.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • United States v. Ronda Nixon

    694 F.3d 623 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 11, 2012

    As for Rufus’s opinion testimony, the district court clearly followed the procedure suggested in Johnson for qualifying Rufus as an expert. The prosecutor No. 09-5979 United States v. … Here, the uncontradicted proof established that Pruitt had authorized Nixon to obtain the American Express credit card for his firm’s use.

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Smith v. Berghuis

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 24, 2008

    Instead, a federal habeas court may reverse only where the state court’s application of clearly established law is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1521. … The Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary, he argues, constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as announced in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Duren v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bender v. Hecht's Dept Stores

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 1, 2006

    Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (C.A.9 2003) (holding that qualifications evidence standing alone may establish pretext where the plaintiff’s qualifications are “‘clearly superior … qualifications must “leap from the record and cry out to all who would listen that [the plaintiff] was vastly – or even clearly – more qualified for the subject job.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Malone v. Windsor Casino Ltd.

    14 F. App'x 634 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 23, 2001

    Ultimately, the district court found that plaintiff could not establish limited personal jurisdiction and dismissed the action. … It is axiomatic that the basis for “hailing” a foreign defendant into court must be clearly articulated when establishing personal jurisdiction. “He must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction.”

    Cited 3 timesPublished

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