Opinion

Majid Alzid v. Gizelle Porter

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed: Oct 25, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 31.1%

upholding Sixth Circuit’s rule requiring litigants to properly file objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation before they can contest a district court’s judgment adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation

How later courts described this case

upholding Sixth Circuit’s rule requiring litigants to properly file objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation before they can contest a district court’s judgment adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation
holding that facts not “marshalled in support of or in opposition to the summary-judgment proceeding below” may not be considered by the reviewing court on appeal
barring appeal of several objections to R&R for failure to specifically object below

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0425n.06

Case No. 23-2098

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED

Oct 25, 2024

)

MAJID ALZID, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )

) ON APPEAL FROM THE

v. )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

)

) COURT FOR THE WESTERN

GIZELLE PORTER, et al., DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

) OPINION

Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Christopher Morgan died of a drug overdose while incarcerated at

the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) Michigan Reformatory. Plaintiff-Appellant

Majid Alzid, the personal representative of Morgan’s estate, sued corrections officers Gizelle

Porter, Jeffery Stokes, Scott Corrion, and two John Doe defendants for violating Morgan’s

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committing gross negligence under Michigan

law. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2). A magistrate judge recommended granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on each of Alzid’s claims. Agreeing with a magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation (“R&R”) that Defendants’ actions were not deliberately indifferent

and did not serve as the proximate cause of Morgan’s death, the district court adopted the R&R in

full and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We AFFIRM.

No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

On November 2, 2019, Morgan died of “[a]cute toxicity by the combined effects of ethanol

and heroin” while imprisoned at MDOC’s Michigan Reformatory. At the time of his death,

Morgan was housed in unit J-2. Porter was stationed in unit J-2 from 10:00 p.m. on November 1,

2019 to 6:00 a.m. on November 2, 2019. Corrion and Stokes were stationed on different floors of

unit J for the same shift.

Porter arrived for her shift around 9:45 p.m. on November 1. Early in Porter’s shift, an

inmate informed her that Morgan said he was not feeling well after receiving his evening medicine.

Porter did not remember interacting with Morgan before this shift. And Morgan never told Porter

that he was not feeling well. Porter did not know that Morgan had ever used heroin or any illicit

drugs. Nor did she have any information about whether Morgan had used drugs while incarcerated

at the Michigan Reformatory, or whether he had used or possessed drugs at the time of his death.

Nonetheless, based on the report of Morgan’s fellow inmate, Porter resolved to pay special

attention to Morgan when she went past his cell during her rounds that night to ensure there was

nothing seriously wrong. Porter did not know that Morgan had ingested drugs. And she did not

call medical to check on him.

Consistent with standard Michigan Reformatory practice, Porter conducted a radio check

and a physical round of Unit J-2 every thirty minutes throughout her shift. Video from MDOC

shows that Morgan went to his cell at 9:08 p.m. on November 1 and remained there through the

night. The video also shows that Porter conducted fifteen rounds from the start of her shift until

5:32 a.m. on November 2. Another officer made a round at approximately 1:00 a.m. on November

2 while Porter was on a break.

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

During each of her first fourteen rounds, Porter confirmed by visual observation that

Morgan was breathing. Morgan was also snoring loudly throughout the night, leading Porter to

believe he was fine. On Porter’s fifteenth round, she noticed that Morgan was no longer snoring.

The video shows that Porter stopped at Morgan’s cell at 5:32 a.m. and attempted to wake Morgan,

but Morgan did not respond.

Porter radioed for assistance. Corrion and Stokes, who also had never interacted with

Morgan, responded to her call. Corrion and Stokes arrived within minutes of each other from their

separate floors. Around 5:38 a.m., they pulled Morgan from his cell and started CPR. Other

corrections and healthcare staff arrived in short order to help revive Morgan. Sadly, their efforts

were unsuccessful, and Morgan was pronounced dead at 5:58 a.m.

Alzid sued Porter, Corrion, Stokes, and two John Doe defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Michigan law for their conduct during the period leading up to Morgan’s death.

Specifically, Alzid claims that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Morgan’s

serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that their conduct was grossly

negligent under Michigan law and not protected by governmental immunity under Mich. Comp.

Laws § 691.1407(2)(c).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on each of Alzid’s claims. Defendants claimed

they were entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims and state governmental employee

immunity for the gross negligence claims. Alzid countered by moving to deny or alternatively

defer ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(d) because Defendants

allegedly withheld video evidence in discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

Magistrate Judge Kent issued an R&R, recommending that the court: (1) grant Defendants’

motion for summary judgment; (2) dismiss the case against the two John Doe defendants; and

(3) deny Alzid’s Rule 56(d) motion. Alzid objected to the R&R on three grounds. Alzid claimed

it would be erroneous to grant the motion for summary judgment because Alzid set forth facts that

established Porter acted both with deliberate indifference and with gross negligence. Alzid also

claimed the magistrate judge erred by focusing on Alzid’s conduct in discovery, rather than

Defendants’ conduct, when considering Alzid’s motion under Rule 56(d). The district court

overruled Alzid’s objections and adopted the R&R in full.

Alzid appeals on two grounds. He first argues that the district court erred in finding that

Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. He also claims that the district court erred in

holding that Defendants’ gross negligence was not the proximate cause of Morgan’s death.

Defendants respond that Alzid’s only viable claims on appeal are those against Porter because

Alzid did not properly object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the claims

against Corrion, Stokes, and the two John Doe defendants. Thus, he waived those arguments on

appeal. For her part, Porter argues that the district court properly granted summary judgment on

the claims against her because Alzid points to no evidence in the record that would support the

subjective prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry or a finding of gross negligence under

Michigan law.

II.

We first address the proper scope of this appeal. See Smith v. Detroit Fed. Tchrs., Loc.

231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Defendants maintain that the only issues before this

court are whether the district court erred in terminating Alzid’s Eighth Amendment and Michigan-

law gross negligence claims against Porter. We agree.

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

It is well settled that litigants must raise objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R or else

waive them on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (upholding Sixth Circuit’s rule

requiring litigants to properly file objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation before they

can contest a district court’s judgment adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation). “[O]nly

those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for

appellate review.” Smith, 829 F.2d at 1373; see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596–

97 (6th Cir. 2006) (barring appeal of several objections to R&R for failure to specifically object

below). This requirement limits appellate review to issues that were adequately considered by the

district court. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147–48; Smith, 829 F.2d at 1373–74.

The R&R recommended granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity on each of Alzid’s § 1983 claims. The magistrate judge concluded that Alzid

could not establish the deliberate indifference inquiry’s subjective prong against Porter and that

Alzid failed to make any allegations or offer any specific evidence pertaining to Corrion’s or

Stokes’s actions during the relevant time period. The magistrate judge also recommended that the

two John Doe defendants be dismissed from the action because Alzid failed to identify them after

discovery.

Alzid objected only to the recommendations regarding his claims against Porter. Indeed,

his objections referenced only Porter by name. And none mentioned any of the specific grounds

on which the R&R recommended dismissal of Alzid’s claims against the other defendants—i.e.,

lack of personal involvement as to Stokes and Corrion and failure to identify the John Doe

defendants. “[M]aking some objections but failing to raise others will not preserve all the

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

objections a party may have.” Smith, 829 F.2d at 1373; see also Thomas, 474 U.S. at 148. In

objecting to the R&R’s deliberate indifference determination solely as to Porter, Alzid failed to

preserve any other objections he may have had and waived those arguments on appeal.

The magistrate judge recommended granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on Alzid’s gross negligence claims because Alzid presented no evidence that any of the

defendants’ actions were the proximate cause of Morgan’s death as required by Michigan law.

Alzid objected, arguing that he “set forth facts which established Porter acted with gross

negligence.” (R. 72, PageID 485). This objection, too, only identified and discussed Alzid’s

claims against Porter. While Alzid loosely referred to “Defendants” at one point in this objection,

he cabined his challenge by solely advancing how the evidence demonstrated that Porter was

grossly negligent and the proximate cause of Morgan’s death. Consequently, Alzid waived his

gross negligence claims against the other defendants also. See Smith, 829 F.2d at 1373–74

(concluding that failure to object to magistrate judge’s recommendation waived argument on

appeal regardless of whether the argument was voluntarily considered by the district court).

Because Alzid preserved only his claims against Porter, we will limit our review to Alzid’s

arguments that the district court erred in granting Porter’s motion for summary judgment on his

(1) § 1983 deliberate indifference claim, and (2) Michigan-law gross negligence claim.

III.

We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, construing the facts, and

drawing all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Fisher

v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper when no

genuine dispute of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The central issue is whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission of Alzid’s claims to a jury or whether the evidence “is so one-

sided” that Porter must prevail as a matter of law. See id. at 251–52. Where the movant establishes

the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden of demonstrating the existence of such an

issue shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e)). A non-movant can establish the existence of such specific facts through affidavits or by

the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id.

IV.

Government officials are protected by qualified immunity for actions taken within the

scope of their authority which do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). “A plaintiff who brings a § 1983 action against such an official bears the burden of

overcoming the qualified immunity defense.” DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 608

(6th Cir. 2015). “At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant

violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established.” Id. We may consider

these requirements in the order of our choosing. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Here, Alzid has failed to meet the first requirement, so we forgo consideration of the second.

A prison official may not be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for failing to provide

adequate assistance for an inmate’s serious medical need unless the inmate can show that the prison

official acted with “deliberate indifference.” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018)

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). To prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner

must point to evidence that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Such deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 736–37.

A deliberate indifference claim has two parts: (1) “an objective component—a ‘sufficiently

serious medical need;’” and (2) “a subjective component—a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’”

Griffith v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo

County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). To succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim, Alzid

must present sufficient evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact on both prongs of the

inquiry. See id. at 567–68.

An objectively serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897 (cleaned up). We have routinely

held that “a condition resulting in death is ‘sufficiently serious’ to meet the objective component.”

Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2021) (listing cases). Here, Morgan died

from “[a]cute toxicity by the combined effects of ethanol and heroin.” (R. 53-5, PageID 258).

And Defendants do not contest whether the objective prong was met here. We therefore accept

that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Morgan was suffering from a “serious medical

need” at the time of his death.

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

To satisfy the second prong, Alzid must show that Porter acted or failed to act with a mental

state “equivalent to criminal recklessness.” Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2013).

Criminal recklessness “must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s

interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “It is obduracy and wantonness,

not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and

Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id.

Under Farmer, Alzid was required to demonstrate that Porter was “both . . . aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and .

. . also dr[e]w the inference.” 511 U.S. at 837. This inquiry can be “satisfied by something less

than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will

result,” id. at 835, but “[k]nowledge of the asserted serious medical needs or of circumstances

clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference,”

Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896).

Alzid’s claim fails on the subjective prong of the inquiry. He has offered no evidence that

Porter knew of facts from which to infer a substantial risk of harm to Morgan and declined to act

on them. Alzid primarily cites allegations contained in his complaint. He draws our attention to

the deposition testimony of a fellow inmate discussing the overdose death of a third inmate. But

this evidence is not properly before us as it was neither presented to nor considered in the district

court. See Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equip., Inc., 62 F.4th 969, 976 (6th Cir. 2023) (holding that

facts not “marshalled in support of or in opposition to the summary-judgment proceeding below”

may not be considered by the reviewing court on appeal). When the moving party has met her

burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, the non-movant cannot rest on

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No. 23-2098, Alzid v. Porter, et. al.

pleadings to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact does exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248–49; Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009).

The undisputed facts in the record establish that Porter had no information about Morgan’s

prior drug usage while incarcerated or otherwise and that she did not know where he got the drugs

that caused his death. In fact, Porter did not remember ever having interacted with Morgan before

November 1, 2019. Porter also did not know that Morgan had ingested drugs. Her only knowledge

about Morgan’s health came from another inmate who told her that Morgan “wasn’t feeling well

after he took his meds.” (R. 53-2, PageID 247–48). Morgan said nothing to Porter about how he

felt. Even were we to conclude that Porter was negligent for not calling for medical assistance

upon learning that Morgan felt unwell—a question for which we express no opinion—mere

negligence is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835;