Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersca5

10,000+ results

1.44s

  • Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid

    256 F.3d 260 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Feb 22, 2001

    established in Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986). … Neither party chapter,” however, plainly contemplatingSSand by can point to definitive authority establishing implication, leaving intactSSthe state’s immunity DART’s status under Texas law.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Washington v. Thomas

    Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Jul 24, 2023

    “In deciding an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, we can review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not their genuineness.” Wagner v. … City of Richmond, 287 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir.2002) (“An officer challenges materiality when he contends that, ‘taking all the plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, no violation of a clearly established right was

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District

    659 F.3d 358 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Aug 5, 2011

    Qualified Immunity As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established … Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.63 We hold today that the alleged facts do indeed make out a violation of Jane’s substantive

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Diversacon Industries, Inc. v. National Bank of Commerce of Mississippi

    629 F.2d 1030 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Nov 3, 1980

    Appropriately, therefore, we proceed to review the Court’s dismissal under the “clearly erroneous” standard of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). … Here, the agreement upon which Diversacon is suing the Bank is clearly the single business transaction to which all of Diversacon’s activities related-the construction of the Louisiana highway.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Thomas Darrell Camp v. United States

    413 F.2d 419 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Jun 26, 1969

    establishing his right to the ministerial exemption and the board has no affirmative duty to ascertain whether or not the registrant qualifies for the exemption. * * * The Act provides that regular or duly ordained ministers … In this case there was clearly a “basis in fact” for the denial of the ministerial exemption.

    Cited 67 timesPublished
  • prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 12,346 Fred Davis, Cross-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, Intervenor-Appellee, Cross-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Continental Gin Company, Allied Products Corporation, as Successor Company to Continental Gin Co., Cross-Appellees

    892 F.2d 378 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Jan 31, 1990

    The district court's order awarding Davis $125,000 is not clearly erroneous. VI. … Weber, 542 So.2d at 554, provides support for apportioning part of the immune employer's fault to a plaintiff who is partially at fault.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Anne L. ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas C. REED, Secretary of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee

    567 F.2d 1283 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Feb 15, 1978

    We are unable to say that this is clearly erroneous. Meyer’s eventual disqualification supports but by no means compels a finding that his selection over Adams was based on sex discrimination. … Plaintiff argues on appeal that the numbers presented establish or support a prima facie case of discrimination.

    Cited 57 timesPublished
  • Whirlpool v. Shenzhen Sanlida

    80 F.4th 536 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Aug 25, 2023

    And, as already noted, Shenzhen’s position directly contradicts both the plain text of Rule 65 and our precedent as established in Corrigan. … Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing the two-step analysis to resolve a claim for trade dress infringement, noting that “[t]he first question is whether the product’s trade dress qualifies

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • United States v. Jarrett Vander Smith, Jr., and Daniel Jay Schacht

    414 F.2d 630 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · May 14, 1969

    By way of defending the case in the District Court, Smith and Schacht contended that they qualified to wear parts of the uniform pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A. § 772 (f) (1952) 3 , which permits an actor to wear a military uniform … Congress obviously intended by means of the broad statutory language to invest the court with great discretion to establish conditions which would lead to the defendant’s ultimate acceptance by society. Barnhill v.

    Reversed on other grounds by Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp.

    28 F.3d 1379 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Aug 3, 1994

    Hollymatic cites two cases in which we entertained interlocutory appeals of, respectively, denial of a motion for summary judgment and of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), both requested on the basis of qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity provides a rare exception to the general rule that we will not address on appeal a denial of summary judgment.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Wayne Alfred JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CO., Defendant-Appellee

    652 F.2d 574 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Aug 6, 1981

    a job for which he was qualified. … At this point in the trial evidence had already established that Johnson’s skin flare-ups were caused by temperature and perspiration.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Joseph D. Beasley, M.D., United States of America v. Oscar E. Kramer, Jr.

    550 F.2d 261 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · May 10, 1977

    The record does not support Beasley’s argument, the findings of the trial court are certainly not clearly erroneous, and the issue is without merit. … The “cause” language of the former version of § 287 has clearly been replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 2 (b) . . .

    Cited 57 timesPublished
  • Roark v. Individuals of the Federal of Prisons

    558 F. App'x 471 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Mar 18, 2014

    In addition, we do not have appellate jurisdiction over the denial of an application for a TRO because it does not qualify as an “injunction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1). See Faulder v. … Because we find that Roark has not shown that the facts and the law “clearly favor” granting relief or that he has established the required four elements for granting an injunction, we conclude that the district court did

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • McClure v. Biesenbach

    355 F. App'x 800 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Dec 9, 2009

    The court held that Biesenbach and Davilla were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs failed to show (1) that their allegations, if true, established a violation of a clearly established right; and (2) that Defendants … “Government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

    Cited 8 timesUnpublished
  • McWilliams v. City of Houston

    Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Nov 30, 2022

    Stephen’s clearly established constitutional right.” “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Ramirez v. … To demonstrate the inapplicability of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must allege (1) the violation of a federal con- stitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Singleton v. St Charles Parish Sheriff's Department

    306 F. App'x 195 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Jan 16, 2009

    We agree that Miguez and Roth’s actions on September 12, 2005, were protected by qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would

    Cited 3 timesUnpublished
  • Pat S. Holloway v. Judge Dee Brown Walker

    811 F.2d 263 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Apr 15, 1987

    While the appeal was not frivolous when commenced, the contentions of counsel for plaintiffs regarding diplomatic immunity were clearly lacking in legal or factual substance and the assertions regarding armed resistance should … However, our reconsideration convinces us that the proof does not establish that Johnson’s actions as counsel must have been based on less than a belief formed after reasonable inquiry that the assertions made were well grounded

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Leslie Lassberg v. Bank of America, N.A.

    660 F. App'x 262 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Aug 23, 2016

    In regard to Barrett Daffin, the district court found that Lassberg failed to bring a viable claim against Barrett Daffin because it was protected by qualified immunity. … It based this conclusion on the rule established in Reinagel v.

    Cited 16 timesUnpublished
  • Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards

    67 F.3d 103 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Oct 23, 1995

    Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2939 n. 10, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); (2) Congress has clearly expressed its intent to abrogate or limit that immunity through its legislative authority, Quern v. … The district court found that Congress clearly intended to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the Nonintercourse Act and had the power to do so under the Indian Commerce Clause,4 citing Oneida

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Lee v. Macon County Board of Education

    456 F.2d 1371 · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Mar 6, 1972

    “In order to establish that a former [principal] was not ‘qualified,’ and therefore not within the protective penumbra of Singleton , a school board would have to establish the [principal’s] lack of ‘qualification’ by means … And in order to fulfill that burden the board would have to establish quite clearly why one who was qualified prior to a desegregation order suddenly became unqualified after the order.” Lee, supra, at 1110.

    Cited 14 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.