McWilliams v. City of Houston

Case: 21-20369 Document: 00516562148 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/30/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 30, 2022

No. 21-20369 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Charmain McWilliams, individually and as mother and representative

of Estate of Robert Stephen, Jr., deceased; Robert

Stephen, Sr., individually and as father and representative of Estate of

Robert Stephen Jr., deceased; Chantique Johnson, as next

of friend to Serenity Stephens and Jadyne Stephen, minors and

children of Robert Stephen Jr., deceased; A’Neesha Rawls,

as next of friend to Naomi Rawls, a minor and child of Robert

Stephen Jr., deceased; Crystal Johnson, as next of friend to

Lyric Stephen, Bobby Stephen, and Journey Stephen, as

minors and children of Robert Stephen Jr., deceased,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

City of Houston; Ntum Aza Altorshan; Lourdes Torres

Ahmed; Raul Sardinas; Gabrielle Alston; Idelbio Perez-

Gonzalez,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-345

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit

Judges.

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Per Curiam:*

This case stems from the arrest and death of Robert Stephen Jr. while

in jail. Plaintiffs, who are decedent Stephen’s friends and relatives, appeal

the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants

and the City of Houston. Because Plaintiffs fail to show any reversible error

by the district court, we AFFIRM.

I.

Robert Stephen Jr. was arrested by Houston Police Department Of-

ficer Gabrielle Alston for public intoxication after the officer received a call

from a Domino’s Pizza restaurant. 1 Alston brought Stephen directly to the

Houston Central Jail. After they arrived at the jail, Stephen was screened by

Defendant Raul Sardinas, who was the on-duty medical screener during Ste-

phen’s intake. Video evidence shows that he was able to walk when assisted

and to talk 2 to jail personnel. Even though Stephen was able to comply “with

the requests made by [Sardinas] during the screening and evaluation of him,”

the complaint alleged that Sardinas nonetheless “failed to have [Stephen]

treated by any medical personnel” or to provide him with “any medication

to treat [him] and assist in detoxing [him] before transporting him to an iso-

lated cell.”

At this time, Stephen was unable to stand on his own, so the jail offic-

ers “dragged” him to a cell. After being taken to his holding cell, video

*

Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

1

These facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, the operative

pleading on which the district court granted motions to dismiss on all claims.

2

The district court viewed the video evidence upon Plaintiffs’ request. And the

parties do not object to the district court’s consideration of the video on appeal. See also

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (authorizing a district court’s viewing of “the facts

in the light depicted by videotape”).

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evidence shows that Stephen was still able to communicate with staff while

also sleeping and drinking. Defendant Officer Idelbio Perez-Gonzalez visited

Stephen in his cell “to examine [him] and see why [he] was unable to walk.”

But Perez-Gonzalez did not “conduct a full physical examination” or provide

medication to Stephen.

From Plaintiffs’ pleadings, it is unclear how closely the defendants

monitored Stephen’s condition. The complaint states that “Defendant[s]

alleged to have checked on [Stephen] every fifteen (15) minutes for seven (7)

hours, which is approximately twenty-eight (28) times.” Plaintiffs further

allege that Defendants “performed” a “suicide assessment” of Stephen, and

“administered an unknown liquid substance for [Stephen] to drink.” But the

complaint also alleges that the defendants “failed to meet [the City’s moni-

toring] requirements or conduct the required face-to-face inspections,” and

that the Defendants “failed to check on [Stephen] every fifteen (15) and/or

thirty (30) minutes.” Video evidence shows that jail personnel viewed Ste-

phen in his cell more than forty times during the time that he was detained.

And even though these checks mainly consist of the officers walking by the

cell while viewing Stephen in plain sight, others consist of the officers pausing

to talk or interact with him.

On the morning after the arrest, jail officials found Stephen lying face

down and not breathing. Senior Jail Medical Specialist Lourdes Torres Ah-

med performed CPR and used a defibrillator, while another officer called for

emergency medical assistance. But these efforts were unsuccessful, and Ste-

phen was pronounced dead. Later it was determined that the underlying

cause of Stephen’s death was a cocaine overdose.

Plaintiffs have amended their complaint four times since filing their

first complaint in February 2017. The operative complaint alleges twelve

causes of action across three categories of claims. First, Plaintiffs allege

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negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act against each individual defend-

ant and the City of Houston. Second, they assert § 1983 claims against each

individual defendant alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Third, they bring a claim for municipal liability under § 1983

against the City.

The individual defendants and the City moved to dismiss. Plaintiffs

argued that surveillance footage from the jail showed clear violations of Ste-

phen’s constitutional rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss

after viewing the footage, holding that Plaintiffs had not pleaded any viable

causes of action.

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ TTCA claims against the indi-

vidual defendants because those claims were barred under the TTCA’s

choice-of-remedies provision. And the court dismissed the TTCA claims

against the City for a lack of immunity waiver. On the § 1983 claims against

individual defendants, the district court dismissed the claims because the al-

leged facts are insufficient to defeat qualified immunity. Finally, the district

court dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 municipal liability claims because the alle-

gations were insufficient to support any municipal liability theory. All claims

were dismissed with prejudice because the court determined that it would be

futile for Plaintiffs to file yet another amended complaint. Plaintiffs timely

appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257,

260 (5th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” BG Gulf Coast LNG, L.L.C. v. Sabine-Neches Navigation Dist. of Jef-

ferson Cnty., Tex., 49 F.4th 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

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omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). And “a plain-

tiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that

both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense

with equal specificity.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).

III.

The district court properly dismissed the TTCA claims 3 against the

City because there was no waiver of immunity applicable here. To begin, we

must distinguish between the Constitution’s protections for States’ sover-

eign immunities and governmental immunity. These immunities are criti-

cally different and too often conflated. The U.S. Constitution affords States

two types of immunities. The first, Eleventh Amendment immunity, applies

to suits between a State and a citizen of another State. See U.S. Const.

amend. XI. The other, state sovereign immunity, prohibits a broader range

of suits against States. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485,

1496 (2019) (“The sovereign immunity of the States, we have said, neither

derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Con-

sistent with this understanding of state sovereign immunity, this Court has

held that the Constitution bars suits against nonconsenting States in a wide

range of cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Neither of these constitutional sources of sovereign immunity are at

stake in this case. Rather, this case implicates the TTCA, which recognizes

governmental immunity under Texas law that “protects subdivisions of the

3

Plaintiffs also brought negligence claims against the individual defendants under

the TTCA, and the district court dismissed these claims. Because Plaintiffs did not brief

this issue on appeal, they forfeit any challenge to the district court’s dismissal. SEC v.

Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A]ny issue not raised in an appellant’s

opening brief is forfeited.”). We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

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State, including municipalities and school districts.” Mission Consol. Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 n.2 (Tex. 2008). That label can

create some confusion because “immunities” held by arms of the State “gov-

ernment” often turn on principles of the federal constitutional sovereign im-

munity. But as relevant here, “governmental immunity” is no different than

any other state-law defense to a state-law cause of action, which we apply

when exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arismendez v. Nightin-

gale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2007).

Thus, as an initial matter, we presume that a “political subdivision

enjoys governmental immunity from suit to the extent that immunity has not

been abrogated by the Legislature.” Tercero v. Tex. Southmost Coll. Dist., 989

F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). On this issue, the parties

agree that the City is afforded governmental immunity from certain claims.

They disagree, however, as to whether the TTCA provides an immunity

waiver for the present claims. The district court held that there was no im-

munity waiver, and we agree.

To determine whether there is a waiver of governmental immunity for

the claims against the City, we apply Texas law. See Gonzales v. Mathis Indep.

Sch. Dist., 978 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e apply Texas law to assess

whether a waiver has occurred.”); Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 878 F.3d 147,

154 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that the defendants were “protected by govern-

mental immunity against [the] claim under the Texas Tort claims Act.”);

Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 422 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying the

TTCA to determine whether the City of San Antonio’s governmental im-

munity has been waived).

The Texas Legislature enacted the TTCA to provide a limited waiver

of immunity. The TTCA states that “a municipality is liable under this chap-

ter for damages arising from its governmental functions.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &

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Rem. Code § 101.0215. Here, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims concern the pro-

vision of police control and the operation of jails, which are specifically

deemed to be “governmental functions” under the statute. Id.

But “[w]hile section 101.0215(a) brings certain municipal functions

within the purview of the TTCA,” “Texas courts have held that section

101.0215 is not a waiver of immunity.” Henderson v. Iowa Colony, No. 01-15-

00599-CV, 2016 WL 2586715, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 5,

2016, no pet.) (citation omitted); Bellnoa v. City of Austin, 894 S.W.2d 821,

826 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). Consequently, “to determine

whether a municipality may be held liable for governmental functions listed

in section 101.0215, [this court] must first determine whether the alleged

harm meets the conditions of section 101.021.” Bellnoa, 894 S.W.2d at 826;

see Henderson, 2016 WL 2586715, at *3. Section 101.021 provides that a gov-

ernmental unit in the state is liable for: (1) the use of motor-driven vehicles

or equipment, (2) the condition or use of personal property, or (3) the condi-

tion or use of real property. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021.

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the waiver of immunity for property torts

should apply because “the jail, as property of the City, provided the backdrop

for actions of City employees.” But as Plaintiffs themselves point out, the

waiver of governmental immunity regarding the use of property “requires

more than the property’s mere involvement, and property does not cause in-

jury if it does no more than furnish the condition making the injury possible.”

City of Sugarland v. Ballard, 174 S.W.3d 259, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Ballard by arguing that

the jail did more than “furnish the condition” for the injury because it “pro-

vided the backdrop” for the injury to occur. But it is unclear how “providing

a backdrop” is distinct from merely furnishing a condition. Plaintiffs did not

cite any case to support such a distinction, and we find their argument un-

convincing. Thus, as the district court correctly explained, because

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Plaintiffs’ allegations do not concern any of the three circumstances subject

to the waiver of immunity, Plaintiffs’ TTCA claims against the city must be

dismissed.

IV.

Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred when it dismissed

their § 1983 claims against the individual defendants. They argue that the

alleged facts “show that the Individual Defendants violated Mr. Stephen’s

clearly established constitutional right.”

“When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the

plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Ramirez v. Gua-

darrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021). To demonstrate the inapplicability

of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must allege (1) the violation of a federal con-

stitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established at

the time. Id. This court “may tackle these questions in whatever order it

deems most expeditious.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009)). Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient on both prongs.

On the first prong, Plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants vio-

lated Stephen’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment 4 “not to be denied,

by deliberate indifference, attention to his serious medical needs.” Brown v.

Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). But even after taking all well-

pleaded factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favora-

ble to the plaintiffs, the alleged facts do not give rise to any finding of delib-

erate indifference. Brown, 623 F.3d at 255 (5th Cir. 2010). “[A]n official

4

Plaintiffs also allege violations under the Eight Amendment. But these allegations

fail under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Eight Amendment protects only those who have been

criminally convicted, and Stephen was not criminally convicted. Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 664-68 (1997).

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cannot be found liable” for “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm” unless: (1) the official knew of facts leading to an inference of

a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff; (2) the official drew that

inference; and (3) the official disregarded the excessive risk to inmate safety.

Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994)). And we have held that “a serious

medical need is one for which treatment has been recommended or for which

the need is so apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is re-

quired.” Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 949 (5th Cir. 2022).

Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, one may dispute whether the defend-

ants provided adequate medical care. But “[d]eliberate indifference is ‘a

stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded

a known or obvious consequence of his action.’” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d

249, 255 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). Plaintiffs never explain why the defendants

should have recognized that Stephen was more than highly intoxicated and

was in need of immediate medical care, or show that any of the individual

defendants actually recognized such a need and disregarded it. Thus, even

after taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and viewing them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the alleged facts do not warrant a

finding of deliberate indifference.

And even assuming arguendo that a constitutional violation occurred,

Plaintiffs’ allegations are still lacking because the individual defendants’ con-

duct was “not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.”

Macias v. Salazar, No. 21-51127, 2022 WL 3044654, *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 2,

2022). “Showing that a right is clearly established ‘is difficult,’ and this

showing is made only when ‘it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable offi-

cial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Parker

v. Blackwell, 23 F.4th 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cunningham v.

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Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiffs do argue that Stephen

has the right “not to have [his] serious medical needs met with deliberate

indifference.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). But such

a proposition is too general to warrant finding that that “every reasonable

official” in the defendants’ position “would have understood that what he

[was or was not] doing violates that right.” Parker, 23 F.4th at 522.

Plaintiffs also contend that our holding in Bias v. Woods establishes

that Defendants’ failure to treat someone who is unconscious constitutes de-

liberate indifference. Bias v. Woods, 288 F. App’x. 158 (5th Cir. 2008). But

Bias is readily distinguishable from the present case. In Bias, the plaintiff was

unconscious following a suicide attempt. Id. at 159–60. The plaintiff had

“slash[ed] his left wrist and t[ook] an overdose of seven different medica-

tions.” Id. And he was found motionless “approximately twelve to sixteen

hours after [his] suicide attempt.” Id. Such a circumstance is hardly similar

to the present case where the inmate’s originally presented unconsciousness

was caused by intoxication. Plaintiffs contend that Bias stands for the broad

proposition that “being unconscious was open and obvious and an excep-

tional circumstance obviously requiring immediate medical attention.” Un-

like in Bias, the defendants here did not know what had caused Stephen’s

unconsciousness, and there was no “open and obvious” indication that

emergency medical attention was needed. Bias, 288 F. App’x. at 163. And

the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly es-

tablished law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12

(2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Because Plain-

tiffs’ allegations fail under both prongs of qualified immunity, the district

court properly dismissed their § 1983 claims against the individual defend-

ants.

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V.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the City were properly dismissed be-

cause they fail to allege sufficient facts supporting municipal liability under

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Mu-

nicipal liability under § 1983 does not extend merely on a respondeat superior

basis. Id. at 691. Plaintiffs must show that an official policy promulgated by

the municipal policymaker was the moving force behind the violation of a

constitutional right. Piotrowski v City of Houston, 237 F3d 567, 578 (5th Cir

2001). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts

of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby

make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the munici-

pality is actually responsible.” Doe v Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F3d 351,

364–65 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986)).

Plaintiffs brought § 1983 claims against the City under three different

theories: (1) that “the City had certain interrelated de facto policies, prac-

tices, and customs that dictated [illegal] practices and illegal conduct”; (2)

that the City failed to adequately train its employees; and (3) that the City

ratified the illegal conduct by failing to discipline. Each will be addressed in

turn.

A.

Plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts supporting any violation of con-

stitutional rights stemming from the City’s policies. For the City to be liable

under this theory, Plaintiffs must show “(1) a policymaker, (2) an official pol-

icy, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the pol-

icy or custom.” Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 2020).

And there are three ways to show an “official policy”: (1) “written policy

statements, ordinances, or regulations”; (2) a “widespread practice that is

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so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents”

the City’s policy; or (3) under “rare circumstances,” a single act can be con-

sidered a policy if done by an official or entity with “final policymaking au-

thority.” Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2019)

(citations and quotations omitted).

On appeal, Plaintiffs observe that the operative complaint alleges that:

[T]he City’s de facto policies, practices, and customs include

the following: failing to use reasonable force and not deadly

force; failing to properly train, supervise, discipline, transfer,

monitor, counsel and otherwise control police officers; failing to

appropriately and timely identify serious medical attention

needed by Mr. Stephen; failing to timely refer victims like Mr.

Stephen for appropriate medical services, despite clear indica-

tions of serious need; failing and refusing to adequately and

timely communicate critical information regarding Mr. Ste-

phen’s unresponsive condition to health care providers; and

possessing knowledge of deficiencies in the policies, practices,

customs, and procedures concerning detainees like Mr. Stephen

and approving and/or deliberately disregarding those deficien-

cies.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs argue that they satisfied the re-

quirement of showing that the municipality was the “moving force” behind

the alleged injury because they have alleged that the City “authorized, toler-

ated, and institutionalized the practices and ratified the illegal conduct that

led directly to Mr. Stephen’s death.” Horvath, 946 F.3d at 793.

But Plaintiffs never identified any official or entity with “final policy

making authority” other than the City, and they failed to allege that any policy

or custom was the “moving force” of a constitutional violation. Webb, 925

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F.3d at 214; Horvath, 946 F.3d at 793. While the complaint does cite rules and

regulations that apply to the individual defendants, it does not allege that any

specific provision was “the moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Horvath, 946 F.3d at 793. By its most charitable reading, the complaint seems

to be alleging that the policies (as a whole) are ostensibly deficient because

they did not do enough to prevent Stephen’s death. Such a broad allegation,

without more specificity, is insufficient to establish that these policies were

“the moving force” that led to a constitutional violation. Horvath, 946 F.3d

at 793. Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Monell claim merely based on a conclusory

allegation that the policy did not regulate enough. And neither did the Plain-

tiffs sufficiently allege a “widespread practice that is so common and well-

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents” the City’s policy.

Webb, 925 F.3d at 214. Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory insofar as they

are only based on Stephen’s interaction with the individual defendants. The

complaint alleges no specific facts or past practices showing a “widespread

practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom.” Id.

Because Plaintiffs failed to allege any policies or custom that were the “mov-

ing force” of a constitutional violation, they did not allege sufficient facts sup-

porting any § 1983 liability stemming from the City’s policies. Horvath, 946

F.3d at 793.

B.

To succeed on a failure to train claim against the City, Plaintiffs must

show three things: “(1) the training . . . procedures of the municipality’s pol-

icymaker were inadequate, (2) the municipality’s policymaker was deliber-

ately indifferent in adopting the . . . training policy, and (3) the inadequate . .

. training policy directly caused [Stephen’s] injury.” Conner v. Travis Cnty.,

209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200

(5th Cir. 1996)).

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On the first prong, Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s training procedure

was inadequate because “five separate officers failed Mr. Stephen in his time

of serious medical need.” They argue that the failure of five individual de-

fendants shows that “the need for more training is obvious.” But to show

that a training procedure is inadequate, the plaintiffs “must allege with spec-

ificity how a particular training program is defective.” Roberts v. City of

Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005). As the district court correctly

pointed out, Plaintiffs neither identify specific facts about the City’s training

protocols nor describe any deficiencies that pertain to the individual Defend-

ants’ duties. And neither did the complaint allege any fact supporting that

the City was either “deliberately indifferent in adopting [a] . . . training pol-

icy” or that “the inadequate training directly caused the [Plaintiffs’] injury.”

Conner, 209 F.3d at 796. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim

was properly dismissed.

C.

To state a claim for a municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 by way of

ratification, the plaintiffs must show that the “authorized policymakers ap-

prove a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” City of St. Louis v. Prapot-

nik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Even though “the specific identity of the pol-

icymaker” need not be alleged, Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285

(5th Cir. 2016), Plaintiffs still need to identify officials or governmental bod-

ies “who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental

actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitu-

tional or statutory violation at issue.” Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545,

548 (5th Cir. 2008).

Supporting this theory of liability, Plaintiffs allege that “the City was

the authorized policymaker for jail policies,” and “the City failed to take any

remedial or disciplinary action against the Individual Defendants.” Based on

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these allegations alone, Plaintiffs contend that they have “alleged sufficient

facts to establish . . . the City’s ratification of the officers’ conduct.” But

Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show any “specific official policy”

or any “legally authorized policymaker” other than “the City,” much less

identify that a legally authorized policymaker ratified a policy that violate a

constitutional right. Id. Neither do they allege specific facts that support an

inference that any pertinent policymaker knew of unlawful actions and ap-

proved them. Because the complaint failed to state anything more than con-

clusory allegations on this issue, the district court properly dismissed this

claim.

* * *

The TTCA claims against the City were properly dismissed because

no waiver of immunity applies. As to the § 1983 claims, all claims against the

individual defendants were properly dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to

allege sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. And the § 1983 claims

against the City were properly dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to allege

sufficient facts to support any municipal liability theory. Accordingly, we

AFFIRM.

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