Case law

United States v. Marquise Bell

947 F.3d 49 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 7, 2020

Relying on Anglin and Rosario, Bell argues that “more than a mere threat is required to establish physical restraint.” Appellant’s Br. 10. … We established a distinction between brandishing and otherwise using a weapon in United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.

Irelan v. Barnhart

82 F. App'x 66 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 4, 2003

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is eligible for benefits under the Act. … In this case, however, the ALJ’s written decision clearly indicates that substantial evidence in the record — namely, the opinions of Drs.

West Indian Co. v. Government of the Virgin Islands

844 F.2d 1007 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 1988

Clearly the Virgin Islands Government achieved significant benefits for itself. … WICO is obviously not immune from gener *1023 ally applicable police power measures not inconsistent with the Second Addendum.

DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Pension

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 2005

ERISA § 204 establishes permissible accrual practices for pension plans. It makes no provision for break-in-service rules. … ERISA clearly answers this question in the affirmative.

Milton Argueta v. Attorney General United States of America

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 23, 2024

The BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Immigration Judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that the evidence failed to demonstrate that the “difficulties [Argueta’s] qualifying relatives might … Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that diminished educational opportunities are not enough to establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”).

Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. C. R. Grove, Joined as by Court Order. Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. C. R. Grove, Joined as by Court Order

367 F.2d 625 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 4, 1966

The complaint clearly states that plaintiff's credit was injured as a result of the publication. … Clearly, the characteristics and dishonest conduct imputed in the advertisement need no extrinsic proof of explanation.

Proceeding before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia v. Johnson

790 F.3d 457 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 12, 2015

established Federal law.” … implement a new constitutional rule announced by the United States Supreme Court. 13 Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that the state court, ethics board, or other appropriate entity can make and enforce clearly-established

Knapik v. Atty Gen USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 2004

Nonetheless, both Nugent and Munroe approach.9 found it proper to examine the amount of loss established. … the Government has supplied employer bank, petitioner avoided (and we can think of) no principled reason admitting that she intended to defraud, not to apply the formal categorical thus not qualifying

United States v. Martin Geevers

226 F.3d 186 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 18, 2000

Geevers maintains that he qualifies for this reduction because he had not drawn the full amount of money that he falsely deposited at the time of his arrest. … Indeed, the District Court did not clearly state whether it thought that the *197 offense pleaded to resolved the issue. See App. 57 (“18 U.S.C.

Mary Vizzini, Administratrix of the Estate of Salvatore Vizzini, Deceased v. Ford Motor Company C/o C. T. Corp. System

569 F.2d 754 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 16, 1977

Here plaintiff’s experts were adequately qualified to testify as experts. They testified to a defect in the adjuster cable of the left front brake. … That case resolved a split among the circuits by establishing the propriety of partial new trials; but it also qualified the power to do so: Where the practice permits a partial new trial, it may not properly be resorted

Point Landing, Inc. And Point Landing Fuel Corp. v. Omni Capital International, Ltd., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs- Appellants-Appellees v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., Defendant-Third Party and James Gourlay, Third Party William S. Smith, Jr., and Ruby M. Smith v. Omni Capital International, Ltd., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. And James Gourlay, Third Party Frank J. George and Brenda A. George v. Omni Capital International, Ltd., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. And James Gourlay, Third Party Dennis M. Rosenberg and Joan Rosenberg v. Omni Capital International, Ltd., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. And James Gourlay, Third Party

795 F.2d 415 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 8, 1986

When there is a hiatus in the Federal Rules the district court may establish its own ad hoc rule, provided that it is fair and reasonable and not inconsistent with any of the express rules. … Service was effected under Rule 4(d)(3), but the court clearly expanded the scope of its minimal contact inquiry to the national forum.

Piper v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd.

396 F.3d 227 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 31, 2005

The Plaintiffs argued that the delinquent water and sewer bills qualified as debt under the FDCPA, and, therefore, PLA’s attempts to collect those debts are governed by the requirements of the FDCPA. … Heiberger & Associates, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998), the defendant had sent a notice required by a summary proceeding established by New York law to recover possession of real property from a tenant who owed back rent.

In Re Tmi. Metropolitan Edison Company ("Met Ed") Pennsylvania Electric Company Jersey Central Power & Light Company General Public Utilities Corp. Babcock & Wilcox Co. McDermott Inc. Dresser Industries, Inc. Ue & C--Catalytic, Inc. (Raytheon) Burns & Roe Enterprises, Nos. 94-7600/7601, and Metro Edison Company ("Met Ed") Pennsylvania Electric Company Jersey Central Power & Light Company General Public Utilities Corp. Babcock & Wilcox Co. McDermott Inc. Dresser Industries, Inc. Ue & C--Catalytic, Inc. (Raytheon) Burns & Roe Enterprises, No. 94-7602

67 F.3d 1119 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 17, 1995

Because the TMI accident occurred in 1979, well before the effective date of the 1988 Amendments, the qualified prohibition does not apply here. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210 note (1988) (Effective Date of 1988 Amendment). … The district court correctly reasoned: 27 In passing the [Amendments] Act, Congress clearly had an opportunity to overturn the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Silkwood.

Glory Obianuju Ezeagwuna v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States

325 F.3d 396 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 14, 2003

The memo was therefore clearly not available prior to the close of evidence. … extraordinary, and would clearly substantiate the respondent’s claim.

United States v. Charles Harris, in Nos. 73-2041, 2046 and Harold Young. Appeal of Harold E. Young, in Nos. 73-2040, 73-2045. United States of America v. Alvin E. Young, in No. 73-2043. Appeal of Harvey Johnson, in No. 73-2042

498 F.2d 1164 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 12, 1974

I think you can get to the point clearly and promptly and unequivocally.' The court also stated that in light of what it termed Mr. … Although this latter phrase clearly referred to the Government's inability to promise Ms.

Stephen Porter v. Merakey USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 30, 2024

The Court ruled that Porter failed to establish a prima facie case for both disability and age discrimination claims. … App’x at 405 (finding “that the differences between [plaintiff] and [the hired candidate] were not so disparate that a reasonable factfinder could rationally conclude that [plaintiff] was clearly the better candidate for

Gulf Oil Corporation, in No. 82-3035 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Philadelphia Gas Works, Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Public Service Electric and Gas Company, New Jersey Natural Gas Company, Washington Urban League, the Brooklyn Union Gas Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors. Gulf Oil Corporation, in No. 82-3132 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Philadelphia Gas Works, Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Washington Urban League, and Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors. Washington Urban League, in No. 82-3137 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Philadelphia Gas Works, Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and Gulf Oil Corporation, Intervenors. The Public Service Commission of the State of New York, in No. 82-3166 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Gulf Oil Corporation, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors, the Brooklyn Union Gas Company, Intervenor. Philadelphia Gas Works, in No. 82-3167 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Gulf Oil Corporation, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors, the Brooklyn Union Gas Company, Intervenor. Gulf Oil Corporation, in No. 82-3242 v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors, Washington Urban League, Intervenor

706 F.2d 444 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 15, 1983

(II App. pp. 12-26). 15 The ALJ held that Gulf had not made out a prima facie case to establish force majeure volumes. … Storms qualify as a force majeure event because they are unexpected, and out of the party's control. (II App. p. 21).

First National Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortgage Co.

576 F.2d 479 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 1978

We already have commented sufficiently upon the circumstances to indicate the basis of our judgment that the trial court’s findings in this respect also are entitled to be sustained as being not clearly erroneous. … It is true that foundations laid for the offer of P. 27A for any purpose were rather weak. 19 Yet the court accepted them as qualifying the exhibit for the purpose of showing trends.

Baby Neal v. Casey

43 F.3d 48 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 15, 1994

Adequacy of representation assures that the named plaintiffs' claims are not antagonistic to the class and that the attorneys for the class representatives are experienced and qualified to prosecute the claims on behalf of … However, this case is clearly distinguishable.

Sterten v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (In Re Sterten)

546 F.3d 278 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 4, 2008

The Court examined each fee and concluded that only two of them — a $25 “mark up” in the appraisal fee and $32 charged for notary services— qualified as “finance charges” under the Truth in Lending Act. 2 The Court then sua … This argument fails for the same reason the previous argument did—Sterten cannot establish that she suffered any prejudice as a result of Option One’s failure to raise the issue. Cf.