Piper v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd.

Opinions of the United

2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-31-2005

Piper v. Portnoff Law Assoc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-4399

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PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 03-4399

BRIDGET A. PIPER, on behalf of herself

and all others similarly situated

v.

PORTNOFF LAW ASSOCIATES, LTD.;

MICHELLE R. PORTNOFF, Esq.;

DAWN M . SCHM IDT, Esq.,

Appellants

On Appeal From the United States

District Court

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-02046)

District Judge: Hon. Marvin Katz

Argued October 5, 2004

BEFORE: SLOVITER, BECKER and

STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: January 31, 2005)

James W. Christie (Argued)

William F. McDevitt

Christie, Pabarue, Mortensen & Young

1880 JFK Blvd. - 10th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellants

David A. Searles (Argued)

Michael D. Donovan

Donovan Searles

1845 Walnut Street - Suite 1100

Philadelphia, PA 18103

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the certified question of whether the

requirements of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), apply to the defendants’

efforts to collect municipal water obligations of the plaintiff,

Bridget Piper. We hold that they do.

2

I.

Until 2002, the City of Bethlehem (“City”) contractually

retained the private law firm of Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd.

(“PLA”) to collect payment for overdue water and sewer

obligations. The City notified PLA of delinquent water and

sewer assessments, and PLA then contacted homeowners in

attempts to collect on those claims.

On February 20, 2002, the City notified PLA of a

delinquent water service obligation of Bridget and Michael

Piper at 828 Kossuth Street, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in the

amount of $252.71. PLA then sent Mr. and Mrs. Piper the

following correspondence:

a. On February 21, 2002, PLA mailed a letter on

City stationery and addressed to Mr. and Mrs.

Piper personally, advising them that they were

delinquent in water fees owed to the City in the

sum of $252.75. The letter stated: “you are urged

to make your payment to [PLA],” and was signed

“Very truly yours, City of Bethlehem.” App. at

R105a; R267a-268a.

b. On April 4, 2002, PLA mailed a second letter

– this time on PLA letterhead – directly to Mr.

and Mrs. Piper. This letter advised them that they

were “delinquent in the payment of [their] water

fees,” and that they owed the City $404.37, which

included the delinquent water bill, interest,

penalties and attorneys’ fees. The letter stated

“[u]nless payment of the above amount is

3

received by [PLA] within ten (10) days of the date

of this letter, a lien will be filed against your

property.”1 It further advised as follows: “You

are hereby advised that City of Bethlehem will

avail itself of all legal remedies until it receives

payment in full. Legal recourse will result in

substantial additional cost to you and may result

in the Sheriff’s sale of your property. . . .

Payment must be made in full.” App. at R108a

(emphasis in original).

c. On May 9, 2002, PLA mailed a third letter to

Mr. and M rs. Piper. Enclosed with the letter was

a copy of a municipal lien “for non-payment of

water fees ... assessed against the [Pipers] and

described properties...” The letter advised Mr.

and Mrs. Piper that the sum of $567.07 was due to

clear the lien (this sum included additional

attorneys’ fees and a filing fee), and warned that

“unless your check in that amount is received by

[PLA] within fifteen (15) days,” PLA would

initiate a Sheriff’s Sale of the Pipers’ home. The

letter concluded by urging Mr. and Mrs. Piper to

“pay the full amount above to this office within

the time period specified.” App. at R109a.

1

Liens to secure delinquent water obligations are provided for

by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Municipal Claims and

Tax Liens Act, 53 P.S. §7101, et seq. (“MCTLA”).

4

d. PLA sent three more letters addressed

personally to Mr. and Mrs. Piper, dated

September 16, 2002, October 3, 2002 and

November 8, 2002. Each letter demanded

payment of a balance due. The October 3, 2002

letter stated “I wanted to afford you a final

opportunity to pay the balance before further legal

action occurs with additional charges assessed.

This balance must be paid within ten days of the

date of this letter...” The November 8 letter stated

that PLA had been directed to file a writ of

execution against the Pipers’ home and that they

would be given “one final opportunity to make

arrangements for payment” during the ensuing

thirty days. See App. at R201a; R204a; R213a.

PLA also made a number of telephone calls to the Piper

residence in an effort to secure payment of the delinquent water

service fees.

PLA has never disputed that the letters it sent to Mr. and

Mrs. Piper failed to include the debt verification language

required by § 1692(g) of the FDCPA.2 App. at R33a. PLA has

2

15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) requires that

Within five days after the initial

communication with a consumer in

connection with the collection of

any debt, a debt collector shall,

unless the following information is

c o n t a in e d i n t h e in i t i a l

5

communication or the consumer

has paid the debt, send the

consume r a wr itte n notice

containing--

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to

whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the

consumer, within thirty days after

receipt of the notice, disputes the

validity of the debt, or any portion

thereof, the debt will be assumed to

be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer

notifies the debt collector in writing

within the thirty-day period that the

debt, or any portion thereof, is

disputed, the debt collector will

obtain verification of the debt or a

copy of a judgment against the

consumer and a copy of such

verification or judgment will be

mailed to the consumer by the debt

collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the

consumer's written request within

the thirty-day period, the debt

collector will provide the consumer

with the name and address of the

6

likewise never disputed that its letters did not state that they

were sent by a debt collector, that the debt collector was

attempting to collect a debt, and that any information obtained

by PLA would be used for that purpose, as required by §

1692(e)(11) of the FDCPA.3 Id.

In May of 2002, PLA secured the issuance of a Writ of

Scira Facias to Mr. and Mrs. Piper by the Court of Common

Pleas for Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The Writ advised

original creditor, if different from

the current creditor.

3

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (e)(11) provides that it is a violation of the

act when a party fails

to disclose in the initial written

communication with the consumer

and, in addition, if the initial

communication with the consumer

is oral, in that initial oral

communication, that the debt

collector is attempting to collect a

debt and that any information

obtained will be used for that

purpose, and the failure to disclose

in subsequent communications that

the communication is from a debt

collector, except that this paragraph

shall not apply to a formal pleading

made in connection with a legal

action.

7

them of “a municipal claim for the sum of $576.03 for water

fees due the City of Bethlehem” and warned that if an Affidavit

of Defense were not filed in 15 days, “judgment may be entered

against you for the whole claim.” App. at R189a; R195a;

R196a. In July and August 2002, Mr. and Mrs. Piper made two

payments to PLA, totaling $553.60. PLA applied the payments

to its own fees and to costs. On October 24, 2002, Mr. and Mrs.

Piper received a notice from the Court that a judgment had been

entered against them in the amount of $465.77. The caption on

the notice included the words “Civil Action – In Rem” without

further explanation. App. at R211a. PLA filed a “Praecipe For

Writ of Execution (Money Judgment)” on February 7, 2003.

The Pipers’ home was scheduled for a Sheriff’s Sale on May 9,

2003.

On March 31, 2003, Bridget Piper filed this suit against

PLA and two of its attorneys, M ichelle R. Portnoff, Esq. and

Dawn M. Schmidt, Esq., in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Complaint alleged

that PLA’s attempts to collect payment of water and sewer bills

owed to the City violated the FDCPA and the Pennsylvania Fair

Credit Extension Uniformity Act, 73 P.S. § 2270.1 et seq.

(“FCEUA”).4 The Complaint alleged that PLA violated these

statutes by failing to include statutory disclosures required for

communications sent to consumers, by falsely representing or

implying that the letters were from an attorney, and by collecting

and attempting to collect fees that were not permitted by the

agreement creating the debt nor permitted by law. The

Complaint sought class certification, declaratory and injunctive

4

The FCEUA defines “unfair methods of competition and

unfair or deceptive practices with regard to the collection of

debts.” 73 P.S. § 2270.4. Engaging in one of those practices

constitutes a violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade

Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq.

(“CPL”).

8

relief, and damages under the relevant statutes.

The District Court issued a preliminary injunction

foreclosing PLA from taking any action to facilitate the

Sheriff’s Sale of Mrs. Piper’s home, see Piper v. Portnoff Law

Assoc’s., Ltd., 262 F. Supp. 2d 520, 527-30 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and

certified a class under both the FDCPA and the FCEUA/CPL.

Piper v. Portnoff Law Assoc’s., Ltd., 215 F.R.D. 495 (E.D. Pa.

2003); Piper v. Portnoff Law Assoc’s., Ltd., 216 F.R.D. 325

(E.D. Pa. 2003).

Mrs. Piper moved for partial summary judgment on the

issue of PLA’s liability as a debt collector under the FDCPA.

The Plaintiffs argued that the delinquent water and sewer bills

qualified as debt under the FDCPA, and, therefore, PLA’s

attempts to collect those debts are governed by the requirements

of the FDCPA. PLA argued that its decision to execute on the

municipal lien rather than proceed in personam against the

individuals removed its collection efforts from the purview of

the FDCPA. The District Court granted Mrs. Piper’s motion by

order dated July 31, 2003,5 but certified for interlocutory appeal

the issue of “whether the FDCPA applies to defendants’

practice.” App. at R41a. We granted petitions for permission

to appeal. 6

II.

5

The District Court determined that no question of material

fact existed because PLA never disputed that it failed to include

the validation language and debt collector information required

by the FDCPA in the letters which it sent to the Plaintiffs.

6

By order entered January 7, 2004, the District Court granted

final approval of the parties settlement as to damages. The

settlement is conditioned on PLA being found to be a debt

collector under the FDCPA.

9

The District Court had jurisdiction over this action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Our review is

plenary. Saunders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir. 2003);

Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell Twp., 319 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir.

2003).

III.

The FDCPA provides a remedy for consumers who have

been subjected to abusive, deceptive or unfair debt collection

practices by debt collectors. Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P.,

225 F.3d 379, 400 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Zimmerman v. HBO

Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir. 1987)). The

“threshold requirement of the FDCPA is that the prohibited

practices are used in an attempt to collect a ‘debt.’” Id.; see 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692e-f. The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any

obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a

transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services

which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for

personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such

obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. §

1692a(5). “The term ‘consumer’ means any natural person

obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. §

1692a(3).

A “debt collector” under the statute is “any person who

uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in

any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of

any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,

directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed

or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Attorneys who

regularly engage in debt collection or debt collection litigation

are covered by the FDCPA, and their litigation activities must

comply with the requirements of that Act. Heintz v. Jenkins,

514 U.S. 291 (1995).

10

The provisions of the FDCPA that Piper relied upon in

her motion for partial summary judgment require the inclusion

of certain information in early communications “with a

consumer in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692g and e.7 Given PLA’s concession that it did not

provide the information required by these sections of the

FDCPA, the issue for decision is whether PLA’s

communications to Piper were communications by a “debt

collector” with a “consumer” in “connection with the collection

of a [debt].”

We first address whether Piper owed a “debt” to the City

within the meaning of the FDCPA. We held in Pollice that a

homeowner’s consumption of municipal water/sewer services

gave rise to an “‘obligation to pay money’ . . . which arose out

of a ‘transaction’ (requesting water and services), the subject of

which was ‘services . . . primarily for personal, family, or

household purposes.’” Pollice, 225 F.3d at 401. We find that

holding to be controlling here.8

7

See n. 2 and 3, supra.

8

PLA insists that Pollice is distinguishable because Piper and

other homeowners in Bethlehem, unlike the Pittsburgh

homeowners in Pollice, did not have to file an application for

water/sewer services and thus did not engage in a “transaction.”

The only cited support for this proposition is the testimony of

Bethlehem’s customer service supervisor, who said that, when

a sale occurs, the title company usually takes care of having the

account transferred to the purchasing party. Compare

Bethlehem, PA. Ordinance art. §§ 911.02(a) and 911.06(a)

(providing for submission of an application by persons desiring

water services and approval thereof by the City). In any event,

we think it clear from Pollice that whenever a homeowner

voluntarily elects to avail himself of municipal water/sewer

services, in whatever manner, and thereby incurs an obligation

11

The next question for resolution is whether PLA’s

communications to Piper were “in connection with the

collection of [that] debt,” or, as we put it in Pollice, whether

they were “used in an attempt to collect a ‘debt’”. Id. at 400.

There can be little debate on this score. Every letter PLA sent

to the Pipers demanded the personal payment of money of the

full amount due from them to satisfy their water/sewer services

obligation to Bethlehem and, indeed, it accepted the payment of

money from the Pipers’ personal checking account. Indeed, as

the text of the letters evidences, the whole purpose of these

communications was to secure the payment of money in

satisfaction of this debt. As defendant Schmidt candidly

testified:

Q. Let me pick up on that. You are not looking

to pay for such services, there is the kind of pro tanto exchange

contemplated by the FDCPA. Pollice, 225 F.3d at 401 (quoting

from Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he

FDCPA applies to all obligations to pay monthly bills which

arise out of consensual consumer transactions.”)). It is true, as

PLA stresses, that a property owner in Pennsylvania may incur

an obligation to pay a water service fee even though he has not

connected his property to the municipal water system, see, e.g.,

Coudriet v. Benzinger, 411 A.2d 846 (Pa. Commw. 1980), but

that is not the situation before us. Nor does this fact render

erroneous the Pollice Court’s characterization of normal

water/sewer fees in Pennsylvania as arising from a “consensual

. . . transaction.” It is apparent from the Pipers’ account with the

City that their service was metered in the normal fashion and

that the amount of their obligation to pay was based on the

amount of water they chose to use. The consensual nature of the

transaction distinguishes the situation before us from tax

assessments which Pollice held to not be debts within the

meaning of the FDCPA.

12

for payments from the real estate but payments

from these individuals, is that correct?

A. That is correct. It is my – the record owners

of the real estate would pay their delinquent tax

and water bills.

Q. If they tendered personal checks, are they

accepted?

A. Yes.

Q. You apply to the claim?

A. That is correct.

Q. Your hope is to get the persons, the

individuals to pay the money?

A. Right. Our hope is that they pay as soon as

possible in fact.

Q. You are not looking to liquidate the real

property, but the payment from the individuals?

A. That is correct.

R.280a-281a.

The communications to the Pollices in Pollice similarly

demanded payment of the full amount of the sewer/water claim

and asked for payment by check. Moreover, those

communications, like those to the Pipers, suggested that if the

recipient did not have sufficient funds available, payment could

be made in full under an installment plan. Pollice, 225 F.3d at

396-97. We perceive no material distinction between the

communications found to be communications “used in an

attempt to collect a ‘debt’” in Pollice and those sent to the

Pipers here.

Given the conclusion that the PLA’s letters were so used

and PLA’s acknowledgment that attempting to collect similar

claims in a similar manner is its sole business, it necessarily

follows that it is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. It also

follows from our conclusion that the Pipers’ water obligation

13

was a “debt” that the Pipers were “consumers” under the

FDCPA. We therefore hold that PLA’s efforts to collect the

Pipers’ delinquent water service fee comes within the scope of

the FDCPA.

We are unpersuaded by PLA’s argument that its practices

cannot be found to be covered by the FDCPA because all it ever

tried to do was enforce a lien in the manner dictated by the

MCTLA. PLA’s letters and calls prior to filing suit, as we have

demonstrated, come within the plain meaning of the text of the

FDCPA. The same can be said about many of the papers that

PLA sent to the Pipers in the course of litigation. This settles

the matter. As PLA acknowledges, the Pipers’ consumption of

water created a personal debt that could be collected in an action

in assumpsit. The fact that the M CTLA provided a lien to

secure the Pipers’ debt does not change its character as a debt or

turn PLA’s communications to the Pipers into something other

than an effort to collect that debt.

We have already noted that, if a communication meets

the Act’s definition of an effort by a “debt collector” to collect

a “debt” from a “consumer,” it is not relevant that it came in the

context of litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995).

The same is true where the communication comes in the context

of in rem litigation. While it is true, as PLA stresses, that the

Pollice opinion does not expressly address the issue, the

communications there came in the context of a situation where

there was a lien securing the homeowners’ sewer/water

obligation and where both the obligation and the lien were

assigned to a debt collector. We nevertheless held that the

Pollices’ obligation was a “debt.”

More directly on point, we held in Crossley v. Lieberman,

868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1998), that the defendant was a “debt

collector” based on the volume of in rem mortgage foreclosure

actions he had filed in the Court of Common Pleas. The letters

found in Crossley to constitute efforts to collect a “debt” are not

materially distinguishable from those sent by PLA.

14

Our sister courts have also held that the fact that

challenged communications come in the context of enforcing a

lien is irrelevant. In Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, 163 F.3d

111 (2d Cir. 1998), the defendant had sent a notice required by

a summary proceeding established by New York law to recover

possession of real property from a tenant who owed back rent.

The defendant “argue[d] that because its three-day notice9 was

sent in connection with a possessory in rem action under [New

York law], it [was] not a ‘communication’ to collect a debt”

within the meaning of the FDCPA. Romea, 163 F.3d at 116.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this

argument on the following grounds:

The facts surrounding an Article 7

summary proceeding prove nothing about whether

the notice that Romea received from Heiberger

was or was not a “communication” sent “in

connection with the collection of any debt,” 15

U.S.C. § 1692e (1994). Whatever else it was, the

§ 711 letter that Heiberger sent to Romea was

undeniably a “communication” as defined by the

FDCPA in that it conveyed “information

9

The notice provided in part:

Please take notice that you are hereby

required to pay to 442 3rd Ave. Realty LLC

landlord of [442 Third Avenue], the sum of

$2,800.00 for rent of the premises[.] . . .

You are required to pay within three days

from the day of service of this notice, or to give

up possession of the premises to the landlord. If

you fail to pay or to give up the premises, the

landlord will commence summary proceedings

against you to recover possession of the premises.

Romea, 163 F.3d at 113.

15

regarding a debt” to another person, id. §

1692(a)(2). And Heiberger makes no attempt to

deny that its aim in sending the letter was at least

in part to induce Romea to pay the back rent she

allegedly owed. As a result, the fact that the letter

also served as a prerequisite to commencement of

the Article 7 process is wholly irrelevant to the

requirements and applicability of the FDCPA.

We therefore hold that the § 711 notice

that Heiberger sent to Romea was a

“communication” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)

and, as such, must comply with the FDCPA’s

requirements.

Romea, 163 F.3d at 116.10

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar

conclusion in In re Martinez, 311 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002)

(adopting District Court opinion reported at 271 B.R. 696 (S.D.

Fla. 2001)), where it found the FDCPA applicable to the service

of a mortgage foreclosure packet including a summons,

complaint, and related items called for by Florida mortgage

foreclosure law.

10

The Romea Court noted that the defendant “at times . . .

portray[ed] the FDCPA and Article 7 as actually conflicting.”

It concluded, as we do here in response to similar suggestions,

that there is no relevant conflict between the FDCPA and state

law. If there were, however, “it would be [state law] and not the

FDCPA, that would have to yield.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n

(1994) (“This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect . . . the

laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices,

except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any

provisions of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the

inconsistency.”). Romea, 163 F.3d at 118 n.10.

16

In addition to this case law, we believe the text of the

FDCPA evidences a Congressional intent to extend the

protection of the Act to consumer defendants in suits brought to

enforce liens. In order to protect such consumers against having

to litigate in an inconvenient forum involving additional

expense, § 1692i of the Act provides that “in the case of an

action to enforce an interest in real property securing the

consumer’s obligation,” a debt collector must “bring such action

only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such

real property is located.” See Shapiro and Meinhold v. Zartman,

823 P.2d 120, 123-25 (Colo. 1992) (attorneys primarily engaged

in enforcement of security interests held to be “debt collectors”

under the FDCPA who are required by § 1692i to bring

foreclosure suits where the real property is located, even though

Colorado law authorized other venues).

Contrary to PLA’s suggestion, we conclude that §§

1692a(6) and 1692f(6) of the Act do not indicate a contrary

Congressional intent. Section 1692a(6) provides the definition

of the term “debt collector.” It starts with the general definition

we have previously discussed and concludes with six categories

of exceptions to the general rule. In between, it provides that

“[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term . .

. includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate

commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of

which is the enforcement of security interests.”

Section 1692f(6) provides:

A debt collector may not use unfair or

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to

collect any debt. Without limiting the general

application of the foregoing, the following

conduct is a violation of this section: . . .

(6) Taking or threatening to take any

nonjudicial action to effect dispossession

or disablement of property if –

17

(A) there is no present right

to possession of the property

claimed as collateral through an

enforceable security interest;

(B) there is no present

intention to take possession of the

property; or

(C) the property is exempt

by law from such dispossession or

disablement.

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

PLA suggests that § 1692a(6), by making all persons in

the business of enforcing security interests debt collectors for

the purposes of one subsection of the Act, reflects a

Congressional intent that such debt collectors be immune from

all of the other provisions of the Act even if they would

otherwise come within the general definition of “debt collector.”

We disagree. The portion of § 1692a(6) upon which PLA relies

is not among the six listed exceptions to the general definition.

It is cast in terms of inclusion, and we believe it was intended to

make clear that some persons who would be without the scope

of the general definition are to be included where § 1692f(6) is

concerned. Even though a person whose business does not

primarily involve the collection of debts would not be a debt

collector for purposes of the Act generally, if his principal

business is the enforcement of security interests, he must comply

with the provisions of the Act dealing with non-judicial

repossession abuses. Section 1692a(6) thus recognizes that

there are people who engage in the business of repossessing

property, whose business does not primarily involve

communicating with debtors in an effort to secure payment of

debts. Just such a person was involved in Jordan v. Kent

Recovery Services, 731 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1990), where an

18

automobile repossession business was held to be subject to §

1692f(6) but not the remaining provisions of the FDCPA.

The determinative factor in answering the question

certified by the District Court is whether the obligation of the

Pipers fits the statutory definition of a “debt” and whether

PLA’s activities fit the statutory definition of a “debt collector.”

As we have explained, giving those definitions their ordinary

meaning, we find them satisfied. We agree with the District

Court that “[i]f a collector were able to avoid liability under the

FDCPA simply by choosing to proceed in rem rather than in

personam, it would undermine the purpose of the FDCPA.”

Piper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 687; see also Romea, 163 F.3d at 118

(expressing the concern that to hold otherwise would create

situations “in which a debt collector sends a notice that complies

with [a state’s] requirements but still contravenes the purposes

of the FDCPA by using abusive or coercive techniques” to

compel payment). 11

IV.

The communications of the PLA to the Pipers were

subject to the requirements of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the

order of the District Court entered July 31, 2003, will be

affirmed.

11

Congress enacted the FDCPA despite the fact that some

states already had procedural requirements for debt collectors

(e.g., Pennsylvania’s MCTLA) in place, because it “decided to

protect consumers who owe money by adopting a different, and

in part more stringent, set of requirements that would constitute

minimum national standards for debt collection practices.”

Romea, 163 F.3d at 118.

19