Case law

12th Street Gym, Inc., Robert Guzzardi, at No. 95-1864 v. General Star Indemnity Company, at No. 96-1845

93 F.3d 1158 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 28, 1996

Hence, both the “mere existence” and the “conduct or exposure” interpretations have some basis in the text of the policy. *1166 More importantly, the language of the STDE does not clearly reveal the required nexus between … However, we note that nothing in Linn prevents us from examining the purely legal issue of the scope of coverage under the insurance policy so that we may establish the applicability of the STDE. .

United States of America Ex Rel. Ernest J. Bolognese E-9803 v. Joseph R. Brierley, Superintendent

412 F.2d 193 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 28, 1969

is for this very reason that this court has carefully guarded against the indiscriminate application of waiver to defeat legitimate judicial redress. 6 Such high standards, however, should not be so sterily applied as to immunize … The record clearly shows that in open court and in the presence of counsel, the appellant was told that he had the right to have the “motion for a new trial processed fully and decided by the court.”

Phyllis J. Stahl and Morris Stahl, Her Husband, and Mollie Lynn Stahl, a Minor, by Phyllis J. Stahl, Her Guardian Ad Litem v. Ohio River Company v. G. M. Crain River Towing, Inc. Morris Stahl

424 F.2d 52 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 1, 1970

To do so would enable a third-party defendant to effectuate what an original defendant clearly may not. … This language, unlike the language permitting third-party defendants to plead "claims" against a plaintiff, clearly recognizes contingent liability.

White v. Beal

555 F.2d 1146 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 5, 1977

The plaintiff class is composed of individuals generally qualifying for benefits under Pennsylvania’s medical assistance program established under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 , et seq. … A person who cannot see clearly beyond a short distance from his face because of a refractive error may not be given eyeglasses under the Pennsylvania plan, but a person with only slightly impaired vision, caused by pathology

Sebki v. Attorney General of the United States

378 F. App'x 184 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 23, 2010

“The threshold for establishing eligibility for withholding of removal is higher than that for establishing entitlement to asylum and requires the alien to demonstrate a ‘clear probability’ that, upon removal to the country … However, "[r]ecasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction^]” Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 190 .

John William Dunn v. Raymond J. Colleran

247 F.3d 450 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 20, 2001

We further find that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court caselaw, and that the District Court erred in concluding otherwise. … Thus, the district attorney clearly qualified the contested remark by indicating his [sic] recommendation was still intact. 42 A273-A274 (internal citation omitted).

United States v. Chris Hickman

991 F.2d 1110 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 16, 1993

The sentencing judge here clearly understood this reliance that the clients had placed upon defendant's exercising good faith. … They gave him the total responsibility to construct their home; he assured them he was qualified and responsible.

31 Fair empl.prac.cas. 832, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,516 William Massarsky and Gertrude Massarsky, His Wife, in No. 82-5176 v. General Motors Corporation, a Corporation of the State of Delaware, in No. 82-5177

706 F.2d 111 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 11, 1983

even though he was undisputably qualified for that position. … This evidence established that the Company policy with respect to GMI student immunity from layoff was in place sometime prior to Massarsky's furlough and that it was not pretextual or a coverup for intentional discrimination

Randall L. Guthrie, Thomas D. Chambers, Boyd R. Guthrie, Albien J. Kos, Melvin C. Bumbarger, Delvin Cole, Ray R. Alvetro and Warren C. Hamilton, on Behalf of Themselves and All Other Employees of Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., Similarly Situated v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Randall L. Guthrie, Thomas D. Chambers, Boyd R. Guthrie, Albien J. Kos, Melvin C. Bumbarger, Delvin Cole, Ray R. Alvetro and Warren C. Hamilton, on Behalf of Themselves and All Other Employees of Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., Similarly Situated v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation

722 F.2d 1141 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 1, 1984

In any event Bumbarger with 57% and Cole with 51.9% qualify. R.L. Guthrie's percentage was 47.22%, Boyd R. Guthrie's 31.65%, Kos's 33%. … He does not qualify as exempt." 556 F.Supp. at 167 . 37 We find there are material disputes of fact as to Alvetro's duties from May 1981 to June 1982.

Robert S. v. Stetson School

256 F.3d 159 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 3, 2001

Id. 18 In light of Rend ell-Baker, it is apparent that many of the factors upon which Robert relies here are insufficient to establish state action. … S 6351(a)(2)(iii), but also to "[a]ny individual resident within or without [the] Commonwealth" who is found to be qualified or to a qualified "private organization." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

Roger Real v. Attorney General United States of America

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 30, 2025

“credibly established” and “adequately corroborated.” … Justice Jackson, concurring in Wilkinson, rightly observed that Congress retains the authority to more clearly limit judicial review, but it has not done so. 601 U.S. at 227.

Bancroft Convertible Fund, Inc. v. Zico Investment Holdings Inc.

825 F.2d 731 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 1987

That pattern, Zico contends, qualified Zico Investment Holdings Inc. for the exemption in section 3(c)(1)(A). … Clearly, however, the district court drew permissible inferences from the facts presented.

Thomas Gage v. Frank Provenzano

571 F. App'x 111 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 3, 2014

We also affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Provenzano was entitled to qualified immunity because he acted pursuant to a state-court judgment. See id. at 51. … Gage has not argued on appeal that the District Court erred in that regard, however, and any such error would be harmless because his claims against Provenzano are clearly barred for the reasons explained by the District

Ramada Development Company v. Martin W. Rauch, Defendants-Third Party J. Stewart Stein, Third Party

644 F.2d 1097 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 14, 1981

This sentence was intended to prevent one from being able to “immunize from admissibility documents otherwise discoverable merely by offering them in a compromise negotiation.” … He alleges that the district court’s finding is supported by no evidence and accordingly must be reversed as clearly erroneous.

David Munchinski v. Gerald Solomon

618 F. App'x 150 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 2015

“Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional … At the 12(b)(6) stage, the Prosecutors must establish that “the allegations of [Munchinski’s Amended Complaint] . . . indicate the existence of absolute immunity as an affirmative defense; the defense must clearly appear

Attilio Agnellino v. State of New Jersey and Howard Yeager, Principal Keeper, New Jersey State Prison

493 F.2d 714 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 13, 1974

“His waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will . . . . ” 15 In Grunewald v. … receipt of the television set from the defendant and the proximity of the [gas station] to the [business establishment].

Robinson v. Secretary Homeland

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 2, 2009

9 establish eligibility at “time of filing.” … Regarding the majority’s structural interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), I do not agree that the second sentence clearly modifies the first sentence.

John Lesko v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm

34 F.4th 211 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 17, 2022

He fails to establish prejudice. See Palmer, 592 F.3d at 394 (courts may resolve a Strickland claim by concluding that prejudice has not been established). … Levit, and counsel was not ineffective for relying on a qualified expert who missed a diagnosis. See id. at 382.

United States v. Paul Walasek

527 F.2d 676 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 30, 1975

Nevertheless, the remedy against potential abuses is not to establish a rule, easily circumvented, by which some formal act of the grand jury will be required to establish “pendency.” … Clearly a non-coercive but corrupt attempt to influence, e. g., by bribery, is within the proscribed conduct. E. g., United States v.

Ronald Gibson, and Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, and Cross-Appellee

567 F.2d 1237 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 15, 1977

For the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity for the “negligent and wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). … does not establish that all operational questions were delegated to the Center.