Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • John Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register

    580 F.2d 1166 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 30, 1978

    Although the regulations do not define the term “index,” the Committee clearly intended that the word have its ordinarily understood meaning. … Act. 21 This new statute amended 5 U.S.C. § 702 to provide for a general waiver of sovereign immunity whenever non-monetary relief is sought.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Medora v. Colautti

    602 F.2d 1149 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 1979

    Of course, any rule that withholds aid from qualified applicants preserves state funds. … The Supreme Court concluded: “The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to this legislative purpose.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Gleeson v. Prevoznik

    190 F. App'x 165 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 2006

    to establish an entitlement to qualified immunity. … We find no error in the District Court’s analysis of the qualified and absolute immunity issues, and, accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 6

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

    342 F.3d 242 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 2003

    As part of the RPSA, Congress created Amtrak and provided private railroads the opportunity to transfer their passenger-service obligations to Amtrak, which Congress had established for that purpose. … The Commonwealth Court clearly overlooked the fact that SEPTA was a party to both the PUC proceedings and the Consent Decree proceedings.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Estate of Palumbo v. United States

    675 F.3d 234 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 2, 2012

    A district court’s ruling can only be reversed under abuse of discretion review if its decision was arbitrary, irrational, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or based on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion … (ii) which meets the requirements of the 1st sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) of Title 28, United States Code (as in effect on October 22, 1986) except to the extent differing procedures are established

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • In Re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation

    868 F.3d 231 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 21, 2017

    The Supreme Court clearly placed the onus of explaining or justifying a large reverse payment on antitrust defendants. … Beyond immunizing certain petitioning in the judicial system, Noerr-Pennington immunity also protects petitioning of “all types of government entities.” Cheminor Drugs, 168 F.3d at 122.

    Cited 97 timesPublished
  • Randell v. Newark Housing Authority

    384 F.2d 151 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 3, 1967

    appellants since New Jersey court procedures would play a crucial role in our decision of any “due process” constitutional issues. 10 A party cannot refuse to make any use of a system of “administrative” and “judicial” relief clearly … The trial judge thus reasoned that the Newark Housing Authority and defendant Danzig, its director, were within the immunity of the City of Newark. See, also, footnote 50 in Monroe v.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Janet M. Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA

    440 F.3d 604 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 20, 2006

    The question we are confronted with, then, is not whether she can perform the essential functions of her job without reasonable accommodation, for *612 clearly she cannot; but, rather, whether she can perform the essential … individual under the ADA and therefore could not establish his prima facie case.

    Cited 210 timesPublished
  • Patricia Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing LLC

    793 F.3d 355 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 13, 2015

    It went on to state that the “burden is on the Defendant to determine and establish that it sought location information.” App. 405. … Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (holding that qualified immunity is an 19 affirmative defense to a § 1983 action in part because the facts that might support the defense are in the

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Sidney Lundy Claire Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., T/a Trop World, Defendant/third Party v. Dr. Domenic Frank Carlino, Individually Dr. Domenic Frank Carlino, a Professional Association, Third-Party

    34 F.3d 1173 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 12, 1994

    Clearly it must have communicated to him that the Lundys intended to sue someone else. Dr. … Greenberg, an intubation kit consists of equipment that is used to insert an endotracheal tube into an individual, thereby establishing a more efficient airway than that which can be established with an ambu-bag 5 Nurse Slusher

    Cited 109 timesPublished
  • Dale Morgan v. Centre County

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 12, 2026

    But even if Brown violated Morgan’s rights, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity if the unlawfulness of his conduct was not clearly established at the time. District of Columbia v. … The District Court found no such clearly established right, so it ruled that Brown was entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Garcia v. Atty Gen USA

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 5, 2006

    For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Garcia’s state drug conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the illicit trafficking route.8 In order to qualify as an aggravated felony under the illicit … Moreover, the criminal complaint clearly establishes that Garcia did in fact sell drugs to an undercover officer.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre

    321 F.3d 411 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 6, 2003

    If the conduct and manner of operation of [Desi’s] does not qualify as a nuisance bar, then that concept is meaningless in Pennsylvania. Id. at 76-77. … Thus, without violating Rooker-Feldman, the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Section 1981 and 1982 claims may proceed on the theory that, although there were numerous establishments in Wilkes- Barre that clearly constituted

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Jenner v. McDaniel

    123 F. App'x 900 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 17, 2005

    Jenner alleges that the Program is “secular humanistic in nature and establishes a ‘religion.’ ” Aplt.Br. 13-14. … The magistrate judge correctly noted that, because the Colorado statutes grant discretion to prison officials to determine whether a prisoner shall qualify for earned time credits based on behavior, those statutes do not

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Mather & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    171 F.2d 864 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 3, 1949

    Charles, Victor, and Gilbert were each given 250 shares; Josephine, 50, of which 3 were initially issued to three other individuals for the purpose of qualifying them as directors; and the remaining 200 shares became treasury … The legislative history of this provision indicates that its purpose was to establish “new rules for those exchanges or ‘trades’ in which, although a technical ‘gain’ may be realized under the present law, the taxpayer actually

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • United States v. Anthony Joseph Acon

    513 F.2d 513 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 6, 1975

    The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Chavez , however. … Clearly, the name of the authorizing officer is less important than statements of fact which must be submitted under § 2518(l)(b).

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Jacqueline Watson, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Septa"), Appellee/cross-Appellant

    207 F.3d 207 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 20, 2000

    See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 601 (1971)(defining “demonstrate” as “to manifest clearly, certainly, or unmistakably”). … Under Smith , it is clearly proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown.

    Cited 123 timesPublished
  • Randy A. Foreman v. Exxon Corporation, Third-Party Cross-Appellant v. Diamond M Company, Offshore Casing Crews, Inc., Third-Party Cross-Appellee

    770 F.2d 490 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 12, 1985

    It is well established, however, that because of Offshore’s status as employer of Foreman and because Foreman is subject to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 , employees … Louisiana law is clear that a contract of indemnity for one’s own negligence can not be allowed unless the parties specifically, clearly and expressly agree to such. Rivers v.

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • Files v. Exxonmobil Pension Plan

    428 F.3d 478 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 2, 2005

    A domestic relations order is a QDRO “only if such order clearly specifies . . . … Thus, the statute contemplates and the plan establishes the “process” by which a DRO is “qualified.”

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    743 F.2d 148 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 29, 1984

    The non-inurement test is clearly articulated in Founding Church of Scientology v. … A large religious institution with a broad base of support, such as one of the more established churches, could be the springboard for large-scale publishing houses dedicated to advancing its doctrines and be assured of qualifying

    Cited 22 timesPublished

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