noting that the “primary purpose” of prosecutorial immunity is “to protect the judicial process itself... .”’
How later courts described this case
- noting that the “primary purpose” of prosecutorial immunity is “to protect the judicial process itself... .”’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-24-2006
Gleeson v. Prevoznik
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2630
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 05-2630, 05-2731,
05-2879 and 05-4025
MICHAEL F. GLEESON
v.
JOHN C. PREVOZNIK,
Appellant No. 05-2630
MICHAEL F. GLEESON
v.
MICHAEL E. ROBSON; KENNETH E. LENNING, III;
POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT;
TOBYHANNA TOWNSHIP; COOLBAUGH TOWNSHIP;
TODD R. PIERCE; MOUNT POCONO BOROUGH;
TUNKHANNOCK TOWNSHIP; MONROE COUNTY;
MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY;
POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
Michael E. Robson,
Appellant No. 05-2731
MICHAEL F. GLEESON,
Appellant Nos. 05-2879 and 05-4025
v.
JOHN C. PREVOZNIK
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Nos. 02-cv-01747 and 03-cv-00552)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
Argued July 13, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 24, 2006)
Gerard J. Geiger [ARGUED]
Newman, Williams, Mishkin,
Corveleyn, Wolfe & Fareri
712 Monroe Street
P.O. Box 511
Stroudsburg, PA 18360
Counsel for Appellant/Cross Appellee John C. Prevoznik
Nos. 05-2630, 05-2879 and 05-4025
Counsel for Appellees Todd Pierce, Monroe County,
DA Monroe County No. 05-2731
Barry H. Dyller [ARGUED]
88 North Franklin Street
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701
Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant Michael F. Gleeson
Nos. 05-2630, 05-2731, 05-2879 and 05-4025
Harry T. Coleman [ARGUED]
76 North Main Street
Carbondale, PA 18407
Counsel for Appellant
Michael E. Robson No. 05-2731
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
These appeals arise from the same District Court order and common set of
circumstances, and, in the interests of judicial efficiency, we will address the disposition
of both appeals in this opinion.
2
Dr. Michael Gleeson brought this civil rights action to seek redress for an alleged
wrongful seizure of documents from his three places of business and an alleged malicious
prosecution on 465 charges, including the unlawful practice of medicine. Dr. Gleeson
alleges that Detective Michael Robson and Monroe County Assistant District Attorney
John Prevoznik jointly drafted search warrants that led to the search of his businesses and
the illegal seizure of (1) directions to a law firm, (2) legal documents, and (3) a
photocopy of a traffic citation. He further alleges that Detective Robson and Mr.
Prevoznik jointly drafted a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause to secure
an arrest warrant that ultimately caused Dr. Gleeson to turn himself in to authorities. Dr.
Gleeson argues that Robson and Prevoznik lacked probable cause to bring this criminal
complaint against him. Dr. Gleeson brought the following claims: (1) a § 1983 claim for
an illegal search and seizure; (2) § 1983 and state law claims for false arrest; (3) § 1983
and state law claims for a malicious prosecution; (4) a claim of conspiracy to violate §
1983; (5) a state law claim of abuse of process; and (6) a state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.1
Robson and Prevoznik moved for summary judgment on the basis of immunity
from suit. The District Court granted Robson’s and Prevoznik’s motions for summary
judgment in part and denied them in part. As to the illegal seizure claims, the District
1
Not at issue in this appeal, Dr. Gleeson also brought an action against various
municipal defendants for failure to train the county’s police officers to understand the
underlying facts before filing a criminal complaint.
3
Court held that Gleeson had established as a matter of law that the three documents were
not covered by the warrant. The District Court denied summary judgment as to the
seizure of the law firm directions because the record was unclear as to whether the
document was mixed in with a large number of other documents, and it would be
unreasonable to require a police officer to sift through the number of documents while
inside Dr. Gleeson’s business. The District Court held that Detective Robson is not
entitled to qualified immunity as to the traffic citation and legal documents because he
failed to show that they were incriminating or that the incriminating character of the
documents was immediately apparent, as required by the plain view doctrine.
The District Court denied summary judgment regarding the unlawful arrest claim
and Detective Robson’s assertion of qualified immunity as to that claim, because it found
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Detective Robson had probable cause to
apply for and obtain an arrest warrant. The District Court also found that Detective
Robson failed to establish as a matter of law that his reliance on Mr. Prevoznik’s advice
was objectively reasonable.
The District Court also denied summary judgment on the federal and state
malicious prosecution claims because it found a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to: (1) whether Detective Robson had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceeding
by filing the criminal complaint; (2) whether the proceedings terminated in favor of Dr.
Gleeson; and (3) whether Detective Robson had actual malice. The District Court found
4
that Detective Robson failed to establish as a matter of law that it was objectively
reasonable for him to believe that there was probable cause of each crime charged and
that his reliance on Mr. Prevoznik’s advice was objectively reasonable.
The District Court also denied summary judgment on the claim of conspiracy to
violate § 1983 due to the disputed material facts discussed above. The District Court
granted Detective Robson’s motion for summary judgment as to the abuse of process
claim, because Gleeson failed to establish that Robson perverted the criminal process
after filing the criminal complaint. Robson’s motion for summary judgment as to the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was denied because Gleeson tendered
evidence sufficient to submit to the jury the question of whether Robson’s conduct was
outrageous.
Prevoznik’s motion for summary judgment was granted as to Gleeson’s illegal
arrest claim, malicious prosecution claims, abuse of process claim, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim because the District Court concluded that Prevoznik
is entitled to absolute immunity under federal law and “high official” immunity under
Pennsylvania law. The District Court denied Prevoznik’s motion for summary judgment
with respect to the unlawful search claim, finding that Prevoznik is not entitled to
absolute immunity and that he has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish an
entitlement to qualified immunity.
On appeal, Prevoznik argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion
5
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity with respect to his role in obtaining
a search warrant for Gleeson’s medical offices. In Robson’s appeal, he claims the
District Court erred in denying summary judgment on the basis of his defense of
qualified immunity, arguing that he reasonably investigated and charged Gleeson with
crimes on the basis of the advice of Prevoznik.
On cross-appeal, Gleeson argues that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment for Prevoznik based on the defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity with
respect to his out-of-court legal advice to Robson concerning the existence of probable
cause, and his advice to Robson to charge him with crimes without probable cause.
The District Court’s analysis is contained in a 77-page opinion. The court’s
discussion of the issues, and its conclusions, are thoughtful, thorough, and well-reasoned.
We find no error in the District Court’s analysis of the qualified and absolute immunity
issues, and, accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
6