Case law

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  • Russell v. North Broward Hospital

    Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 2, 2003

    The regulation does so, in relevant part, by specifying that in order to qualify as a serious health condition involving continuing treatment under the FMLA, the health condition must result in a period of incapacity of … Circuit that the regulatory “objective test for ‘serious health condition,’ which avoids the need for employers – and ultimately c ourts – to make su bjective d ecisions a bout statu tory ‘serio us health conditions,’ clearly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • John Wayne Conner v. GDCP Warden

    784 F.3d 752 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Apr 15, 2015

    Conner’s ineffective- assistance-of-counsel and prosecutorial-misconduct claims—we cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established … “The clearly erroneous standard is very deferential.” Madison, 761 F.3d at 1255.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • In Re: William Hunt

    Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 18, 2016

    . § 2113(a) and (d)—that qualifies as a crime of violence via § 924(c)’s residual clause. … Because defendants have a clearly established expectation that they will receive reasonable sentences and the Guidelines serve as the foundation of the reasonableness analysis, the Guidelines provide notice as to the scope

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Johnny Lee Litman v. Secretary, Of the Navy

    703 F. App'x 766 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 18, 2017

    In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of race under Title VII, a plaintiff must show he (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse … Additionally, the district court did not clearly err by concluding Litman failed to demonstrate he warranted equitable tolling.

    Cited 19 timesUnpublished
  • Marvin Edwin Johnson v. Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

    938 F.2d 1166 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 4, 1991

    In rejecting the extreme duress mitigating circumstance, the sentencing court said: “The evidence submitted by the defendant’s psychologist during the penalty phase of the trial clearly established that the defendant was … The sentencing judge also found that the “evidence clearly established that Marvin Edwin Johnson fully appreciated the criminality of his conduct and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.”

    Cited 72 timesPublished
  • Bernard Schoninger Shopping Centers, Ltd. v. J.P.S. Elastomerics, Corp.

    102 F.3d 1173 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jan 6, 1997

    The installation of over 100,000 square feet of membrane and fiberboard at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars is a "valuable addition" to the Kmart building, and it therefore qualifies as an "improvement." … Even if we could glean some semantic distinction from the two provisions, both statutes provide However, Schoninger's brief implies, but does not assert, that the evidence established another, distinct

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Gilbert C. Delgado, Herbert W. Cox, Gilbert G. Ensley, Robert E. Hilderbrand, James Drexler, Jr., John L. Leverette, Fred L. Hicks v. Lockheed-Georgia Company, a Division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant- Gilbert C. Delgado, Cross-Appellants v. Lockheed-Georgia Company, a Division of Lockheed Corp., Cross-Appellee

    815 F.2d 641 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 29, 1987

    of circumstantial evidence which may necessitate the resolution of conflicting inferences, a task peculiarly within the province of the jury. 10 The standards governing the determination of an age discrimination case are clearly … This inference may be demonstrated by proof that the plaintiff 1) belongs to the statutorily protected age group, 2) was qualified for the job, 3) was discharged and 4) was replaced by a person outside the protected group

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Samuel Valerio-Estrada v. U.S. Attorney General

    Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Feb 24, 2026

    Based on these facts, he as- serted that the IJ had clearly erred in concluding his parents would not suffer extreme hardship if he was removed. … that the IJ had not clearly erred in assessing the hardship his five children and two par- ents would face upon his removal.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. William Howard Cross, Sr.

    708 F.2d 631 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jun 30, 1983

    The exclusion from grand jury service of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. … But the matter before us is clearly collateral to any judicial decision that forms part of a traditional judicial proceeding.

    Vacated on other grounds by United States v. Cross, 468 U.S. 1212 (1984)Cited 15 timesPublished
  • 30 Fair empl.prac.cas. 624, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,176 Mary Delia Russaw Hardin v. Leroy N. Stynchcomb, 1 Etc.

    691 F.2d 1364 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Nov 22, 1982

    that unjustifiably exclude qualified females from jobs and job opportunities solely because of their sex. … Thus Hardin’s prima facie case of discriminatory treatment is established.

    Cited 79 timesPublished
  • Victoria McPhie v. Mike Yeager

    Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jun 25, 2020

    ; (3) it treated him less favorably than others similarly situated outside his protected class; and (4) he was qualified for the job. … Finally, because we need not reach the issue, we decline to address the district court’s alternative conclusion that the Coweta defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Damon Amedeo

    370 F.3d 1305 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 28, 2004

    establish that a defendant has accepted personal responsibility." … The district court clearly erred, however, in concluding that the offense of conviction was committed to facilitate the sexual assault.

    Cited 103 timesPublished
  • Jacob Farmer v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia

    589 F. App'x 913 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 23, 2014

    They also alleged a violation of their right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. … Woods could qualify for in-state tuition because he had a Georgia driver’s license, and concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that Mr.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • Marlene Jaggernauth v. U.S. Attorney General

    432 F.3d 1346 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Dec 19, 2005

    If Jaggernauth was convicted under subpart (a), her taking of property would have involved an intent to “deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership,” and would therefore qualify as a “theft” as defined by … Because it has not been clearly established that Jaggernauth’s 2001 conviction for grand theft is an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), we conclude that the BIA erred in upholding Jaggernauth’s removal

    Cited 125 timesPublished
  • Christopher Vangile v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

    695 F. App'x 510 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 13, 2017

    The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. … Also, an ALJ “must clearly articulate the reasons” for disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. Id. (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).

    Cited 30 timesUnpublished
  • Branca v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Company

    773 F.2d 1158 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 15, 1985

    [Emphasis supplied.] 23 If we assume that the Argentine decree qualifies as prima facie evidence under section 731.103(2), we must determine if the Brancas' action for insurance benefits is one of the "proceedings under this … As such, the trial judge's finding that the Brancas did not carry their burden of proof is not clearly erroneous. Also, the Brancas raise no circumstances justifying a new trial under Rule 60(b).

    Modified by Branca v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Company, 789 F.2d 1511 (1986)Cited 10 timesPublished
  • In re: Leonard Sapp

    827 F.3d 1334 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 7, 2016

    it creates uncertainty about how to evaluate the risks posed by a crime and how much risk it takes to 3 Case: 16-13338 Date Filed: 07/07/2016 Page: 4 of 17 qualify … But as far as we can tell no other circuit has held that the residual clause of the mandatory career offender guideline is categorically immune from a Johnson challenge.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Southern Coal Corporation v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc.

    28 F.4th 1334 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Mar 28, 2022

    This qualifies as “prevail[ing] on the central claims ad- vanced.” See Sykes, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 77–78. A litigant’s success does not have to be total to be considered the prevailing party. … We further conclude that district court did not clearly err in interpreting this provision at trial and finding it unenforceable.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Elliott Gelber v. AKAL Security, Inc.

    14 F.4th 1279 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 30, 2021

    And as we have explained, our caselaw had not clearly settled either the allocation of burdens or the standard for judging the compensability of meal breaks. … But he failed to demonstrate that these limitations qualified as “real limitations”—that is, that these limitations inured to Akal’s benefit.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers v. Landstar System

    622 F.3d 1307 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 4, 2010

    Plaintiffs were instructed that simply proving the Defendants charged more for a product or service than they paid a third-party vendor is insufficient, standing alone, to establish … Mo. 2002) (“Although disgorgement is an equitable remedy, it does not qualify as injunctive relief.”), aff’d 339 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 973 (2004).

    Cited 31 timesPublished

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