Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,466 results
4.55s
Russell v. North Broward Hospital
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 2, 2003
The regulation does so, in relevant part, by specifying that in order to qualify as a serious health condition involving continuing treatment under the FMLA, the health condition must result in a period of incapacity of … Circuit that the regulatory “objective test for ‘serious health condition,’ which avoids the need for employers – and ultimately c ourts – to make su bjective d ecisions a bout statu tory ‘serio us health conditions,’ clearly
Cited 0 timesPublishedJohn Wayne Conner v. GDCP Warden
784 F.3d 752 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Apr 15, 2015
Conner’s ineffective- assistance-of-counsel and prosecutorial-misconduct claims—we cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established … “The clearly erroneous standard is very deferential.” Madison, 761 F.3d at 1255.
Cited 33 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 18, 2016
. § 2113(a) and (d)—that qualifies as a crime of violence via § 924(c)’s residual clause. … Because defendants have a clearly established expectation that they will receive reasonable sentences and the Guidelines serve as the foundation of the reasonableness analysis, the Guidelines provide notice as to the scope
Cited 0 timesPublishedJohnny Lee Litman v. Secretary, Of the Navy
703 F. App'x 766 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 18, 2017
In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of race under Title VII, a plaintiff must show he (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse … Additionally, the district court did not clearly err by concluding Litman failed to demonstrate he warranted equitable tolling.
Cited 19 timesUnpublishedMarvin Edwin Johnson v. Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
938 F.2d 1166 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 4, 1991
In rejecting the extreme duress mitigating circumstance, the sentencing court said: “The evidence submitted by the defendant’s psychologist during the penalty phase of the trial clearly established that the defendant was … The sentencing judge also found that the “evidence clearly established that Marvin Edwin Johnson fully appreciated the criminality of his conduct and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.”
Cited 72 timesPublishedBernard Schoninger Shopping Centers, Ltd. v. J.P.S. Elastomerics, Corp.
102 F.3d 1173 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jan 6, 1997
The installation of over 100,000 square feet of membrane and fiberboard at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars is a "valuable addition" to the Kmart building, and it therefore qualifies as an "improvement." … Even if we could glean some semantic distinction from the two provisions, both statutes provide However, Schoninger's brief implies, but does not assert, that the evidence established another, distinct
Cited 15 timesPublished815 F.2d 641 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 29, 1987
of circumstantial evidence which may necessitate the resolution of conflicting inferences, a task peculiarly within the province of the jury. 10 The standards governing the determination of an age discrimination case are clearly … This inference may be demonstrated by proof that the plaintiff 1) belongs to the statutorily protected age group, 2) was qualified for the job, 3) was discharged and 4) was replaced by a person outside the protected group
Cited 3 timesPublishedSamuel Valerio-Estrada v. U.S. Attorney General
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Feb 24, 2026
Based on these facts, he as- serted that the IJ had clearly erred in concluding his parents would not suffer extreme hardship if he was removed. … that the IJ had not clearly erred in assessing the hardship his five children and two par- ents would face upon his removal.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedUnited States v. William Howard Cross, Sr.
708 F.2d 631 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jun 30, 1983
The exclusion from grand jury service of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. … But the matter before us is clearly collateral to any judicial decision that forms part of a traditional judicial proceeding.
Vacated on other grounds by United States v. Cross, 468 U.S. 1212 (1984)Cited 15 timesPublished691 F.2d 1364 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Nov 22, 1982
that unjustifiably exclude qualified females from jobs and job opportunities solely because of their sex. … Thus Hardin’s prima facie case of discriminatory treatment is established.
Cited 79 timesPublishedVictoria McPhie v. Mike Yeager
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jun 25, 2020
; (3) it treated him less favorably than others similarly situated outside his protected class; and (4) he was qualified for the job. … Finally, because we need not reach the issue, we decline to address the district court’s alternative conclusion that the Coweta defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
Cited 0 timesUnpublished370 F.3d 1305 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 28, 2004
establish that a defendant has accepted personal responsibility." … The district court clearly erred, however, in concluding that the offense of conviction was committed to facilitate the sexual assault.
Cited 103 timesPublishedJacob Farmer v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
589 F. App'x 913 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 23, 2014
They also alleged a violation of their right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. … Woods could qualify for in-state tuition because he had a Georgia driver’s license, and concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that Mr.
Cited 1 timesUnpublishedMarlene Jaggernauth v. U.S. Attorney General
432 F.3d 1346 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Dec 19, 2005
If Jaggernauth was convicted under subpart (a), her taking of property would have involved an intent to “deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership,” and would therefore qualify as a “theft” as defined by … Because it has not been clearly established that Jaggernauth’s 2001 conviction for grand theft is an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), we conclude that the BIA erred in upholding Jaggernauth’s removal
Cited 125 timesPublishedChristopher Vangile v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
695 F. App'x 510 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 13, 2017
The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. … Also, an ALJ “must clearly articulate the reasons” for disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. Id. (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).
Cited 30 timesUnpublishedBranca v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Company
773 F.2d 1158 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 15, 1985
[Emphasis supplied.] 23 If we assume that the Argentine decree qualifies as prima facie evidence under section 731.103(2), we must determine if the Brancas' action for insurance benefits is one of the "proceedings under this … As such, the trial judge's finding that the Brancas did not carry their burden of proof is not clearly erroneous. Also, the Brancas raise no circumstances justifying a new trial under Rule 60(b).
Modified by Branca v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Company, 789 F.2d 1511 (1986)Cited 10 timesPublished827 F.3d 1334 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Jul 7, 2016
it creates uncertainty about how to evaluate the risks posed by a crime and how much risk it takes to 3 Case: 16-13338 Date Filed: 07/07/2016 Page: 4 of 17 qualify … But as far as we can tell no other circuit has held that the residual clause of the mandatory career offender guideline is categorically immune from a Johnson challenge.
Cited 13 timesPublishedSouthern Coal Corporation v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc.
28 F.4th 1334 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Mar 28, 2022
This qualifies as “prevail[ing] on the central claims ad- vanced.” See Sykes, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 77–78. A litigant’s success does not have to be total to be considered the prevailing party. … We further conclude that district court did not clearly err in interpreting this provision at trial and finding it unenforceable.
Cited 5 timesPublishedElliott Gelber v. AKAL Security, Inc.
14 F.4th 1279 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Sep 30, 2021
And as we have explained, our caselaw had not clearly settled either the allocation of burdens or the standard for judging the compensability of meal breaks. … But he failed to demonstrate that these limitations qualified as “real limitations”—that is, that these limitations inured to Akal’s benefit.
Cited 12 timesPublishedOwner-Operator Indep. Drivers v. Landstar System
622 F.3d 1307 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Oct 4, 2010
Plaintiffs were instructed that simply proving the Defendants charged more for a product or service than they paid a third-party vendor is insufficient, standing alone, to establish … Mo. 2002) (“Although disgorgement is an equitable remedy, it does not qualify as injunctive relief.”), aff’d 339 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 973 (2004).
Cited 31 timesPublished
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