Samuel Valerio-Estrada v. U.S. Attorney General

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13287

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SAMUEL VALERIO-ESTRADA,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A089-967-157

____________________

Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Samuel Valerio-Estrada petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that affirmed an order

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). After careful review, we

deny the petition for review.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Valerio-Estrada, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United

States without inspection in March 1999. In 2012, the Department

of Homeland Security served him with a notice to appear that

charged him as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as a noncitizen present in the United States with-

out being admitted or paroled. He later conceded, through coun-

sel, that he was removable as charged. A removable noncitizen

may obtain “discretionary relief” under several different provisions

of the INA. Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 149 F.4th 1202, 1204

(11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212

(2023)). “One [such] option is to convince an immigration judge to

‘cancel’ his removal,” through an application for “cancellation of

removal.” Id.; see INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Valerio-Es-

trada timely filed such an application in 2015. The evidence sub-

mitted in support of that application showed the following.

Valerio-Estrada lived in DeFuniak Springs, Florida with his

five U.S. citizen children, who, at the time of the IJ hearing, were

between 2 and 12 years old. He was 40 years old at the time of the

hearing on the merits of his application. He had entered the United

States in 1999 and had worked several jobs since then, including

carpentry and landscaping work. He testified that he was the sole

economic provider for his children, his parents, and his wife—who

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also did not have legal status in the country—was not employed

and took care of the children. His children only spoke English and

had never visited Mexico. If he were removed, his children and his

wife would move with him to Mexico. Valerio-Estrada explained

that his children were healthy, but his parents were suffering from

health concerns.

Valerio-Estrada also took care of his elderly parents who

lived with him in DeFuniak Springs. His father was a 78-year-old

U.S. citizen, and his mother was a 64-year-old legal permanent res-

ident of the United States. Valerio-Estrada’s father suffered from

diabetes and high blood pressure, had undergone cataract surgery,

and was taking a variety of medications. His father could not walk

well due to a knee surgery and his poor eyesight, so he depended

on Valerio-Estrada for assistance. His mother, on the other hand,

had undergone surgery for a benign tumor and suffered from vari-

ous medical conditions, including essential hypertension, obesity,

hyperlipidemia, and a strain of her neck muscles. Because of these

medical issues, Valerio-Estrada’s parents required “constant atten-

tion.” Valerio-Estrada helped his parents by taking them to medi-

cal appointments and paying for their medical care.

Valerio-Estrada testified he was the sole provider for his chil-

dren and his parents. He had six siblings in the United States, but

they were not in frequent contact. He believed none of them

would take care of his parents if he were removed to Mexico. That

said, he conceded that one of his sisters helped him with his parents

every three or four months and that all six of his siblings in the

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United States lived in the region of Florida where he and his parents

lived. He also explained he did not have family in Mexico who

could assist him if he were removed. He had two sisters and a

brother in Mexico, but his two sisters were not employed and his

brother only did seasonal work on a ranch.

Valerio-Estrada submitted various information about the

conditions in Mexico. This evidence discussed poverty, crime, and

limited access to healthcare and educational opportunities in Mex-

ico, and it described how those issues affected children specifically.1

Valerio-Estrada also testified that he was from a particularly impov-

erished region in Mexico where there were limited educational op-

portunities. If he was removed, he explained, he would work “in

the fields,” and be paid 100 pesos a day; or approximately $10 dol-

lars. He testified that $10 a day was insufficient to provide for his

family, and there was not enough work for him to make $10 a day

for each weekday.

In 2012, Valerio-Estrada pled nolo contendere to state charges

for creating, using, or possessing with intent to use, counterfeit or

fictitious personal identification information. He received a sen-

tence of three years’ probation for his offense, with the possibility

of early termination after two years. He explained that this arrest

1 Some of this evidence is dated. For instance, Valerio-Estrada submitted a

report on “Children’s Health in Mexico” that was last updated in December

2000. In any event, we consider it because the agency appears to have done

so.

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and conviction was for working with a social security number he

had purchased which was not his own.

Valerio-Estrada’s mother and father each testified in support

of his application. His mother explained that she had high blood

pressure, high cholesterol, and a “cardiac issue,” and Valerio-Es-

trada brought her to her appointments for these conditions and

paid for her care. She thought she might immigrate with her son

to Mexico so she could be with her granddaughters because she

“could not live without them.” Even so, she noted that there were

not any facilities where she could receive medical care in Mexico.

Valerio-Estrada’s father explained he had diabetes, high blood pres-

sure, and high cholesterol, and he took medications for each of his

conditions. He used a cane to walk because of his knee surgery,

but the surgery and diabetes caused him pain and made it difficult

for him to walk. Valerio-Estrada took him to his medical appoint-

ments and paid for his housing. Valerio-Estrada’s father did not

testify as to whether he would move to Mexico if Valerio-Estrada

was returned.

After the testimony and evidence were presented, the gov-

ernment argued that Valerio-Estrada lacked sufficient good moral

character, as required for cancellation relief. INA§ 240A(b)(1)(B),

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). It also argued that the hardship Valerio-

Estrada’s family members would suffer from Valerio-Estrada’s re-

moval were similar to “those that would be suffered by anybody

else in his position,” and was thus not “exceptional” or “unusual,”

as necessary to merit cancellation relief. Valerio-Estrada contested

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

the government’s characterization of his moral character and ar-

gued he was dedicated to his family and had been attempting to

provide for them when he improperly obtained a social security

number. He also argued that the totality of the circumstances es-

tablished that his family members would suffer the requisite hard-

ship, and he pointed to BIA precedent, specifically Matter of Recinas,

23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), as presenting “factual similarities”

with his case and justifying relief.

In an oral opinion, the IJ denied Valerio-Estrada’s applica-

tion. After summarizing the law relevant to the statutory criteria

and the relevant facts, the IJ concluded that Valerio-Estrada pro-

vided inconclusive proof about his good moral character because it

was unclear whether or not he had completed his term of proba-

tion for his fraudulent personal identification conviction.2 Next, it

found that Valerio-Estrada failed to show that his removal would

cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying

relatives under BIA precedent. The IJ explained that relevant fac-

tors included the ages, health, and circumstances of the qualifying

relatives; whether the qualifying relative was a child with very se-

rious health issues or compelling special needs in school; whether

the qualifying relatives were elderly parents who were solely de-

pendent on the applicant for support; and whether the applicant

2 The IJ also reasoned that, even if Valerio-Estrada had proven that he pos-

sessed good moral character, his conviction would go against him with respect

to considering whether to grant his application if the IJ found that he estab-

lished statutory eligibility. The agency did not ultimately resolve the applica-

tion on this step, so it is not discussed further.

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had family and community ties in the United States and abroad.

The IJ also noted that all factors are viewed in the aggregate.

As to Valerio-Estrada’s children, the IJ noted that they were

all healthy, and there was no evidence that they had any compel-

ling special needs in school. It acknowledged the evidence about

conditions in Mexico but concluded that this evidence did not show

that Valerio-Estrada’s children would suffer exceptional and ex-

treme hardship if he was removed. It also stated that the children

would not be separated from their father because Valerio-Estrada

had testified that his children would go with him to Mexico if he

was removed. It also found insufficient evidence to show Valerio-

Estrada would be unable to find employment and provide for his

family in Mexico, concluding that the evidence showed hardship

that ordinarily resulted from removal of parents with children who

are U.S. citizens.

As to Valerio-Estrada’s parents, the IJ stated that there was

no evidence that his mother was continuing treatment based on

her surgery, and otherwise, there were no “test reports of diagnosis

and prognosis of any very serious aliments of the parents for which

they are receiving treatment and continue to receive treatment.”

It also explained that, although Valerio-Estrada had testified that he

provided financial support to his parents, his father received Medi-

caid and Social Security payments, and there was no evidence as to

how much of his parents’ medical expenses Valerio-Estrada paid.

It found Valerio-Estrada had failed to show that he was the sole

caretaker for his parents because there was no evidence that his

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

siblings who lived in the United States would not and could not

step in and take care of their parents if he was removed. Based on

those facts, the IJ concluded Valerio-Estrada had not shown his re-

moval would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

to his parents, adding that his mother had testified that she would

return to Mexico with him and her grandchildren if he was re-

moved. For those reasons, the IJ found Valerio-Estrada failed to

establish his statutory eligibility for cancellation relief.

Valerio-Estrada administratively appealed the IJ’s decision.

His brief on appeal presented several arguments, but, at bottom,

he argued that he had established each of the statutory require-

ments for cancellation relief. As to the requirement that he prove

a qualifying family member will suffer exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship, Valerio-Estrada argued that his case was similar

to Matter of Recinas, and the BIA should reach the same result as it

did in that case. He argued that the youth of his children and the

old age and medical conditions of his parents weighed in favor of a

finding of hardship. He highlighted evidence about his mother’s

medical conditions and her testimony showing that she would re-

turn to Mexico with him if he were removed. He also reiterated

that his father required constant care. Based on these facts, he as-

serted that the IJ had clearly erred in concluding his parents would

not suffer extreme hardship if he was removed. He also argued

that the IJ failed to consider hardship cumulatively, as BIA prece-

dent required.

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As related to his children, Valerio-Estrada argued that the IJ

applied the wrong standard by erroneously requiring him to prove

that he had a child with a serious health issue or compelling special

needs in school. He argued that his facts—including that his chil-

dren were born and raised in the United States, spoke only English,

and would have a much lower standard of living and lack of eco-

nomic opportunity in Mexico if they were removed—were suffi-

cient to establish extreme hardship. Finally, he argued that the un-

availability of alternative methods for immigrating to the United

States and the length of his relatives’ residence in the United States

further supported his claim that his family members would suffer

hardship.

Valerio-Estrada also submitted new evidence in support of

his administrative appeal, which showed that he had successfully

completed his term of probation and that he now had a social se-

curity number and employment authorization documents. 3 He ar-

gued this evidence showed he had good moral character, satisfying

another element of the cancellation statute. DHS, in response to

Valerio-Estrada’s administrative appeal, moved for summary affir-

mance. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2). It argued that the IJ was clearly

correct that, even though Valerio-Estrada’s family members would

suffer some hardship if he was removed, they would not suffer ex-

ceptional and extremely unusual hardship as required by statute.

3 The BIA would later construe these new documents as a motion to remand.

Valerio-Estrada does not challenge this re-characterization in his petition for

review, so we operate on the same assumption.

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In September 2023, a single judge of the BIA dismissed Va-

lerio-Estrada’s administrative appeal. The BIA adopted and af-

firmed the IJ’s finding that Valerio-Estrada had not shown that his

removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hard-

ship to a qualifying relative, and it reasoned that the IJ had not

clearly erred in assessing the hardship his five children and two par-

ents would face upon his removal.

The BIA rejected Valerio-Estrada’s argument that the IJ had

improperly required him to prove that he had a qualifying child

with a serious health issue by explaining, instead, that the IJ had

simply considered his children’s health and educations as relevant

factors in its overall assessment of the hardship requirement. It also

held that the IJ had properly considered the record evidence in the

aggregate and with a forward-looking view, as BIA precedent re-

quired. The BIA explained, moreover, that it found Valerio-Es-

trada’s argument that his situation was analogous to Matter of

Recinas unpersuasive. It reasoned that the applicant in Matter of

Recinas was the sole provider for her six children and her entire

family resided in the United States. On the contrary, Valerio-Es-

trada “ha[d] a partner who assists him with the raising of his chil-

dren, and he has siblings in both the United States and Mexico.”

Because the BIA concluded that Valerio-Estrada had not estab-

lished his eligibility for cancellation under the statutory criteria, it

declined to address his remaining arguments. For the same reason,

it rejected Valerio-Estrada’s construed motion to remand, explain-

ing that he “ha[d] not shown how his evidence, which” addressed

his “good moral character, would likely change the outcome of the

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case in light of” its ruling on hardship. Valerio-Estrada timely peti-

tioned for review.

II. SCOPE & STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review legal issues de novo. Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

451 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006). We also review our jurisdic-

tion de novo and sua sponte. Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312,

1321 (11th Cir. 2021), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos-Zac-

aria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419–23 & n.2 (2023). 4 When we have

jurisdiction to do so, “[w]e review the BIA’s decision as the final

judgment, unless the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision.” Gon-

zalez v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated

in part on other grounds by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.

369, 412–13 (2024). In deciding whether to uphold the BIA’s deci-

sion, we are limited to the grounds upon which the BIA relied. Id.;

Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1369 (11th Cir. 2011). To the

extent that the BIA agrees with and adopts the IJ’s reasoning, how-

ever, we may review the IJ’s decision as well. Kazemzadeh v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009).

“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review pure findings of fact” re-

garding cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b). Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1211. Yet, whether a given

4 In 2023, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner’s obligation to exhaust ad-

ministrative remedies, found in INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), is a

claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional limitation, and is subject to waiver

and forfeiture, Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 419–23 & n.2, overruling our prior

cases that held the contrary.

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

set of facts satisfies the statutory hardship component of the can-

cellation of removal statute, INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D), “presents a ‘mixed question’ of law and fact,” that

we have jurisdiction to review. Id. at 1208 (quoting Wilkinson, 601

U.S. at 222). Because this mixed question of law and fact is “‘pri-

marily factual,’” our review is for substantial evidence. Id. at 1211

(quoting Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222, 225). 5 When we review for

substantial evidence, we will affirm the agency’s decision “if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on

the record considered as a whole.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d

1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Al Najjar v. Ash-

croft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2001)). In doing so, “we

view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s

decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that deci-

sion.” Id. at 1029. “This standard is high: we will not reverse a

finding of fact unless the record compels reversal.” Laguna Rivera

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 130 F.4th 915, 919 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Adefemi,

386 F.3d at 1026–27).

We review the BIA’s denial of motions to remand, reopen,

or to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Chacku v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

555 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008); Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 332

5 The government’s brief, filed before Lopez-Martinez, contended that the

proper standard of review is abuse of discretion. Conversely, Valerio-Estrada

originally argued that our review was de novo. Because the issue was resolved

in Lopez-Martinez, we need not revisit it.

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F.3d 1321, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2003). 6 When we review for abuse of

discretion, we ask whether the BIA exercised its discretion arbitrar-

ily or capriciously. Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1243

(11th Cir. 2013). The BIA can abuse its discretion by making an

error of law, or by failing to follow “its own precedents without

providing a reasoned explanation for doing so.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

An application for cancellation of removal “proceeds in two

steps.” Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1204 (quoting Wilkinson, 601

U.S. at 212). First, the immigration judge must assess whether the

applicant is eligible under the statutory criteria. Id.; see INA

§ 240A(b)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). Second, if

the applicant satisfies those criteria, an immigration judge “decides

whether to exercise his discretion favorably and grant the nonciti-

zen relief.” Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1204 (quoting Wilkinson,

601 U.S. at 212–13); see INA § 240A(b)(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)

(noting that the “Attorney General may cancel removal” to a

noncitizen who satisfies the statutory criteria (emphasis added)). In

6 When “a motion to remand seeks to introduce evidence that has not previ-

ously been presented, it is generally treated as a motion to reopen . . . .”

Chacku, 555 F.3d at 1286; see Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1301. We note that some of

these cases rely on since superseded regulations. E.g., Al-Najjar, 254 F.3d at

1301 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (1999)). No party suggests that this undermines

these holdings and, in any event, BIA caselaw preserves the same distinction

between motions to remand and to reopen, so we apply the same here. See

Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992), abrogated in part on other

grounds by In Re L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 419–20 (BIA 1996) (en banc).

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this case, the agency did not reach the second step, it rejected Va-

lerio-Estrada’s application on the statutory criteria. In fact, the BIA

addressed only one of the statutory criteria; it concluded that Va-

lerio-Estrada failed to “‘establish[] that removal would result in ex-

ceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent,

or child,’ who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.” Wil-

kinson, 601 U.S. at 213 (quoting INA § 240A(b)(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)). Accordingly, our discussion centers on this ele-

ment. 7

Valerio-Estrada argues, primarily, that the agency erred by

failing to follow its own precedent when it rejected his application.

As he did before the agency, he focuses much of his briefing on

Matter of Recinas. While he does not separate them out in his brief-

ing, his argument raises two questions with different standards of

review, as laid out above. The first question is whether the BIA

applied a legal standard different from the standard established in

BIA precedent. This is a legal question which we review de novo.

Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1213 (addressing a similar argument).

The second question is whether the record establishes the requisite

7 In its initial brief, the government argued that we lacked jurisdiction over

Valerio-Estrada’s petition for review. Valerio-Estrada has maintained that we

have jurisdiction. Our precedent has since resolved this issue. After Wilkinson,

we have jurisdiction to review “immigration authorities’ conclusion that an

applicant for cancellation of removal hasn’t satisfied [INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C.]

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s exceptional-and-extremely-unusual-hardship standard.”

Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1205. We lack jurisdiction to review purely factual

arguments in this context, but we do not read Valerio-Estrada’s briefing to

raise any purely factual argument.

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“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” This presents a

mixed question of law and fact, which we review for substantial

evidence. Id. at 1211. We address these two issues separately. See

id.; see also Samayoa v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 128, 136–41 (1st Cir. 2025)

(taking a similar approach). After resolving those two issues, we

turn to Valerio-Estrada’s challenge to the denial of his motion to

remand, reopen, or reconsider.

A. The BIA did not err in Denying Valerio-Estrada’s Applica-

tion for Cancellation of Removal.

i. The BIA Applied the Correct Legal Standard.

The BIA has addressed the “extremely and unusual hard-

ship” standard in several cases. See, e.g., Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N.

Dec. 808, 811 (BIA 2020); Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec.

319, 323 (BIA 2002); Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 468–73;

Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001)

(en banc). Collectively, this body of precedent establishes three le-

gal standards relevant to this case. 8

First, the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship stand-

ard is “high,” in part because “Congress intended to tighten the

hardship standard” the BIA had been applying to previous itera-

tions of the cancellation statute. Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I.

& N. Dec. at 59; see also Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1212

8 The parties do not dispute the existence or applicability of these legal stand-

ards nor argue that the statutory scheme requires different legal tests. See

Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1211 n.10.

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(“[c]onditions satisfying [the hardship standard] are ‘substantially

beyond that which ordinary would be expected to result from the

[non-citizen’s] removal’” in the ordinary case (citation omitted)).

At the same time, BIA precedent also recognizes that a non-citizen

“need not show that such hardship would be ‘unconscionable.’”

Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 468. Second, BIA precedent

instructs that whether an application shows extremely and unusual

hardship is “based on” the agency’s “cumulative consideration of

all hardship factors . . . .” Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811;

Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64 (same). Third,

when “a claim is based on the health of a qualifying relative,” the

BIA requires an applicant to show “[1] that the relative has a serious

medical condition and, [2] if he or she is accompanying the appli-

cant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the

claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.”

Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1211 (alteration adopted) (citation

omitted). Of course, not every claim will rely on the health of a

qualifying relative, but the agency, in all cases, considers the age,

health, and circumstances of qualifying family members as part of

its cumulative review of hardship. Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec.

at 468.

In light of the foregoing, Valerio-Estrada’s argument, that

the agency erred “by improperly applying the totality of facts”

standard, is incorrect. Both the IJ and the BIA recited and applied

the cumulative analysis required by agency caselaw and reasonably

applied the legal standards we have just explained. See Kazemzadeh,

577 F.3d at 1350 (explaining that where, as here, the BIA adopts the

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IJ’s opinion, we review both decisions). For instance, the IJ ex-

pressly stated that “all hardship factors should be considered in the

aggregate” and then analyzed the facts relevant to Valerio-Estrada’s

citizen “children and also to his parents who are a citizen and a per-

manent resident, respectively.” The BIA, reviewing this decision,

correctly found that the IJ “considered the hardship testimony and

evidence presented . . . cumulatively” and in a “forward-looking

analysis” as BIA precedent required. In light of these statements,

we conclude that Valerio-Estrada’s legal standard argument fails.

Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811; Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga,

23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64.

ii. Substantial Evidence Supports the Agency’s Hard-

ship Determination.

Valerio-Estrada’s next argument is that the undisputed facts

in the record establish hardship sufficient to satisfy the statutory

hardship criteria. Reviewing the decision on this issue only for sub-

stantial evidence, we reject his argument in this respect as well.

In Matter of Recinas, the BIA found that an applicant success-

fully met the hardship standard for cancellation of removal.

23 I. & N. Dec. at 473. The applicant in that case was a single

mother of six children, without any close relatives in Mexico. Id.

at 469. The evidence showed the applicant’s children had spent

their whole lives in the United States and did not speak Spanish

well, the children were wholly dependent on the applicant, the ap-

plicant depended on her mother for child care, she would struggle

to find work in Mexico that also would allow her to provide a

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

supportive home for her children, and she did not have realistic

prospects of lawful immigration to the United States. Id. at 470–

72. The BIA concluded, based on these facts, the mother’s situation

was distinct from the facts of two of its prior cases—Matter of Mon-

real-Aguinaga and Matter of Andazola—adding that “[t]he cumula-

tive factors present in this case are indeed unusual and will not typ-

ically be found in most other cases, where respondents have

smaller families and relatives who reside in both the United States

and their country of origin.” Id. at 472–73. The BIA reiterated,

however, that “any hardship case ultimately succeeds or fails on its

own merits and on the particular facts presented . . . .” Id. at 469.

In Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, on the other hand, the BIA af-

firmed an IJ’s denial of cancellation of removal for an applicant with

two U.S citizen children and parents who were lawful permanent

residents. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 64–65 (noting that the applicant was

in good health, there was no evidence that he could not work and

support his children in Mexico, he would not be separated from his

wife, the applicant’s father would go with the applicant to Mexico,

the children knew both English and Spanish, and the parents did

not have any health problems). Similarly, in Matter of Andazola, the

BIA found an applicant had not shown the necessary hardship

where she had two healthy U.S. citizen children and no relatives in

Mexico, one of her children had a close relationship with their

grandmother, and she was not married but lived with the father of

her children who contributed to the household. 23 I. & N. Dec. at

320–24 (explaining, in addition, that the applicant worried her chil-

dren would receive worse education in Mexico and she would not

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23-13287 Opinion of the Court 19

be able to obtain employment in Mexico comparable to her job in

the United States). The BIA concluded that the fact pattern pre-

sented” was, unfortunately, “a common one, and the hard-

ships . . . as outlined are simply not substantially different from

those that would normally be expected upon removal to a less de-

veloped country.” Id. at 324.

In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the

agency’s ultimate determination. As the BIA has explained, cancel-

lation decisions are incredibly fact-bound and they “succeed[] or

fail[] on [their] own merits and on the particular facts presented.”

Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 469. The particular facts in this

record do not compel a finding that Valerio-Estrada’s qualifying

relatives will suffer hardship “substantially beyond that which or-

dinarily would be expected to result from [a non-citizen’s] deporta-

tion.” Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1212; see also Laguna Rivera,

130 F.4th at 919.

Valerio-Estrada contends that, like the applicant in Matter of

Recinas, he has many children for whom he is the sole financial pro-

vider, and his children do not speak Spanish well and are unfamiliar

with Mexican culture. Even still, the BIA correctly determined that

he is not a single parent like the applicant in Matter of Recinas.

Moreover, there is no evidence that Valerio-Estrada would have

trouble both finding work and taking care of his children in Mex-

ico—as the applicant in Matter of Recinas did—given that his wife

and mother testified they would travel with him to Mexico. 23 I.

& N. Dec. at 469–73. Indeed, Valerio-Estrada testified he would be

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-13287

able to find some work in Mexico. Although he testified that work

would be limited and would not pay well, and the country reports

indicated that Mexico has extreme levels of poverty and limited ed-

ucational opportunities, that evidence related to the general ad-

verse conditions in Mexico and, while relevant, is insufficient on its

own to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship. See Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64.

In addition, some of the facts in Valerio-Estrada’s case also

are analogous to those in Matter of Andazola and Matter of Monreal-

Aguinaga, where the BIA denied relief. Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N.

Dec. at 469–73; Matter of Andazola, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 320, 324; Mat-

ter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 64–65. For example, in

Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, the BIA noted that the applicant would

not be separated from his wife and the applicant’s father would

move to Mexico with the applicant. See 23 I. & N. Dec. at 64–65.

These facts are quite similar to the facts here. Adefemi, 386 F.3d at

1026–27; cf. Ferreira, 714 F.3d at 1243. Moreover, as Valerio-Estrada

acknowledged, he has family in Mexico, unlike the applicant in

Matter of Recinas, and his mother would relocate to Mexico if he

was removed. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 469. As relates to his parents, the

agency reasonably found that Valerio-Estrada’s father received

Medicaid and Social Security benefits that would help him pay for

healthcare, and Valerio-Estrada has siblings who live in the United

States who can help their parents if Valerio-Estrada is removed.

“It is of course possible that alternative inferences might

have been drawn from the record that would have been more

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23-13287 Opinion of the Court 21

favorable” to Valerio-Estrada and it is true that his removal “may

very well cause [his relatives] some—even much—hardship.”

Lopez-Martinez, 149 F.4th at 1212. Even so, the standard for relief

is high and our review is deferential. Id. For the reasons provided,

the agency did not reversibly err in denying Valerio-Estrada’s ap-

plication for cancellation of removal.

B. The Agency Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Va-

lerio-Estrada’s Motion to Remand.

Finally, Valerio-Estrada challenges the BIA’s denial of his

motion for remand, arguing that the evidence he submitted bol-

stered his argument that he was entitled to a favorable exercise of

discretion. Even so, the BIA’s opinion is clear that the BIA did not

reject Valerio-Estrada’s appeal on the discretionary step, but in-

stead on the first step: the statutory criteria. Therefore, it had no

reason to remand for further consideration on the second step.

Generally, “agencies are not required to make findings on issues

the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.” INS

v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976). For this reason, the BIA

did not abuse its discretion and we deny the petition for review on

this issue as well. Chacku, 555 F.3d at 1286; Assa’ad, 332 F.3d at

1340–41; Ferreira, 714 F.3d at 1243.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons we have explained, we deny Valerio-Es-

trada’s petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.