“embracing the concept of arguable probable cause” in determining whether an officer is entitled to state-agent immunity on a plaintiffs false arrest claim
How later courts described this case
- “embracing the concept of arguable probable cause” in determining whether an officer is entitled to state-agent immunity on a plaintiffs false arrest claim
- denying immunity to the city where the plaintiffs state-law claims of excessive use of force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery were based on the officer’s alleged neglect, carelessness, and unskillfulness
- stating if the agent is not entitled to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then the plain language of the statute withholds immunity from the City
- “As a police officer, [the defendant] qualifies as a peace officer for purposes of [discretionary function immunity].”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur in affirming the trial court's denial of Borders's motion to recuse, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Earle as to Borders's malicious-prosecution claim, and the summary judgment in favor of Earle and the order granting the City's motion to dismiss as to Borders's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . I dissent from the reversal of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Earle and its order granting the City's motion to dismiss with respect to Borders's claims alleging excessive use of force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. I believe that, based upon the evidence before it, the trial court's rulings as to all issues are due to be affirmed.