“embracing the concept of arguable probable cause” in determining whether an officer is entitled to state-agent immunity on a plaintiffs false arrest claim
How later courts described this case
- “embracing the concept of arguable probable cause” in determining whether an officer is entitled to state-agent immunity on a plaintiffs false arrest claim
- denying immunity to the city where the plaintiffs state-law claims of excessive use of force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery were based on the officer’s alleged neglect, carelessness, and unskillfulness
- stating if the agent is not entitled to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then the plain language of the statute withholds immunity from the City
- “As a police officer, [the defendant] qualifies as a peace officer for purposes of [discretionary function immunity].”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that affirms the trial court's summary judgment, the denial of the motion to recuse, and its order granting the City's motion to dismiss. However, I must dissent from the reversal of any portion of the trial court's summary judgment and its ruling on the City's motion to dismiss. First, I disagree with the majority's analysis of probable cause and its application of Micalizzi v. Ciamarra, 206 F. Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). It also seems that the majority has judged the officer's actions too strictly and without due regard for the immunity offered by § 6-5-338 , Ala. Code 1975, or for the threat that Borders's actions posed to other people on the dance floor when he was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
The trial judge had the best opportunity to view the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.