explaining that “Rule[s] 32.2(a)(3) and (5) would preclude [a juror-misconduct] claim if it could have been raised at trial or on appeal ... [and to overcome the procedural bars contained in Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R.Crim. P., the petitioner must] show that his claim could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Rule[s] 32.2(a)(3) and (5) would preclude [a juror-misconduct] claim if it could have been raised at trial or on appeal ... [and to overcome the procedural bars contained in Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R.Crim. P., the petitioner must] show that his claim could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal”
- holding that a claim of juror misconduct raised .in a postconviction petition shall not be treated as a claim of newly discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e), Ala. R.Crim, P,
- recognizing that claims in a postconviction petition may be held to be procedurally barred following an evi-dentiary hearing
- holding] that the preclusionary ground[s] of Rule 32.2 apply to allegations of juror misconduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur in the order granting the application for rehearing. However, I disagree with the conclusion that "Sheriff Whittle was a key witness who had improper close and continual contact with the jury." 851 So.2d at 612 . Thus, I dissent from Part I. I concur in Part II., and I concur in the result to remand the case with instructions. *Page 618