"the applicable time limit for ruling on a posttrial motion in a juvenile proceeding in district court is fourteen days” after the motion for rehearing has been filed
How later courts described this case
- "the applicable time limit for ruling on a posttrial motion in a juvenile proceeding in district court is fourteen days” after the motion for rehearing has been filed
- In the matter of Gregory Blake HICKS and Allison Denise Hicks
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I respectfully but with some reservation dissent. Quite frankly, there is authority and sound reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I believe there is a better approach that can be taken, and this approach reaches a more equitable result.
I agree with the conclusion stated in the majority opinion that there is no valid reason for two different time periods for denying posttrial motions in juvenile proceedings depending on whether the proceeding is before a district or circuit judge. Promulgation of Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure rules 20 and 28 has fundamentally restructured the juvenile court system. Now all types of juvenile cases listed in rule 28 (C)(2) are appealed directly to this court.
To me there are two reasons for concluding that the ninety-day rule of 59.1 is applicable in the instant case.
The first reason is based on my analysis of rule 1. Careful scrutiny of the Comment to rule 1 reveals a concern for maintaining procedural distinctions between "district court proceedings" at the "district court level" and proceedings at the circuit court level. For those cases governed by rule 28 (C)(2), a district judge does not now sit at the "district court level" (with appeal to the circuit court for trial de novo); rather, the district court judge sits at the circuit court level with appeal directly to this court on the record. Rules 20 and 28 (C)(2). Thus, the ninety-day rule should apply.
The second reason is a policy reason. One of the fundamental cornerstones of modern procedure is the principle of *Page 650
uniformity. To require different procedural timing rules for a now unified court system runs counter to this desirable procedural objective and should be rejected. There is no longer any valid reason for having a different timing principle applicable to juvenile proceedings included in the scope of rule 28 (C)(2). When the reason for the rule no longer exists, the rule should "fall." In fact, the supreme court recognized this goal of uniformity of practice by setting a uniform rule of fourteen days from which to appeal such proceedings. Rule 28 (C)(3).
I would deny the motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely taken.