holding that the use of a large percentage of strikes to remove blacks from a jury presents a prima facie case of discrimination
How later courts described this case
- holding that the use of a large percentage of strikes to remove blacks from a jury presents a prima facie case of discrimination
- noting "that a defendant can establish a prima facie case solely on the fact that a prosecutor used a large number of his peremptory challenges to strike black veniremembers"
- "disapproving [its prior holding] that '[w]hen the evidence shows only that blacks were struck and that a greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inference of discrimination has not been created.' "
- discussing the "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing the trial court's findings of fact on a Batson challenge
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ex Parte Harris, 2006 Ala. LEXIS 102 (2006)
Rather, for purposes of Harris's argument that Thomas applies, we conclude that her conviction was final when this Court decidedThomas. Therefore, Harris's case is distinguishable from those cases she cites indicating that Thomas
The opinion
As the author of what was a perfectly good opinion (in Harrell v. State , 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 984 , 111 S.Ct. 1641 , 113 L.Ed.2d 736 (1990)), I was first inclined to dissent. However, after studying J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. , ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89
(1994), which forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender ("sex" according to the caustic dissent of Justice Scalia) as well as on the basis of race, I believe that the requirement of a prima facie showing of discrimination *Page 9
has been abolished. In spite of the weak attempt by the majority in J.E.B. to assure that J.E.B. does not eliminate all peremptory challenges, I read J.E.B. as requiring a nongender, nonrace reason for striking any juror that is struck, and as requiring no prima facie showing of gender (sex) or racial discrimination before a disclosure of reason is required. Therefore, there is no more peremptory challenge.
I believe that the peremptory challenge has served the litigants in this state (black, white, male, female, rich, poor, plaintiff, civil defendant, state, criminal defendant) well. I add this concurrence in the result to my too-frequent dissents in bemoaning the demise of an effective means of assuring that the litigants in the courts of Alabama are satisfied with the jurors to whom they entrust their lives, liberties, sacred honor, and property. Ex parte Jackson , 640 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1993); Huntley v. State , 627 So.2d 1013
(Ala. 1992); Ex parte Thomas , 601 So.2d 56 (Ala. 1992); Guthrie v. State , 598 So.2d 1020 (Ala. 1992); Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc. , 578 So.2d 1254 (Ala. 1991); and Van Scoy v. State , 555 So.2d 195 (Ala. 1989).