reversing a judgment on remand because the trial court had considered additional evidence rather than entering a corrected judgment based on the evidence originally presented to it
How later courts described this case
- reversing a judgment on remand because the trial court had considered additional evidence rather than entering a corrected judgment based on the evidence originally presented to it
- "[I]t is clear that the trial court, on remand, was to determine, from the evidence already before it, the degree of any disability Johnson suffered as a result of the February 1993 on-the-job accident. . . . Instead, the trial court took new evidence on the issue already decided by this court, and that evidence was intermingled with evidence pertaining to another injury. The trial court was not free to conduct a new trial. . . ." (citing Auerbach v.Parker, 558 So.2d 900 (Ala. 1989); Murphree v.Murphree, 600 So.2d 301 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992); and Exparte Dodson, 459 So.2d 884 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur with the main opinion. I write specially to note that we are not bound by our denial of mandamus relief in Ex parte City of Gadsden (No. 2980734, April 13, 1999), 777 So.2d 337
(Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (table). Denial of a mandamus petition "cannot have res judicata effect on subsequent proceedings in light of the extraordinary nature of the writ of mandamus," and such a denial "does not operate as a binding decision on the merits." R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison , 641 So.2d 225 , 229 (Ala. 1994).