The opinion
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion simply because, in my view, Ex parte Clayton , 552 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1989), directly controls the outcome of this case. Neither Clayton nor the Fair Dismissal Act draws any distinction in the operation of that Act as between teachers and nonteachers. Section 36-26-101 describes only one probationary period for employees subject to the Fair Dismissal Act. Ex parte Clayton holds that that period — three years — need not be continuous or consecutive. 552 So.2d at 154 -55 .
As the majority notes, the Fair Dismissal Act is applicable to the employee in this case, McLeod, because that is the law of this case. The issue of whether McLeod, as a teacher at a junior college, would be governed by the Fair Dismissal Act, and therefore by the Supreme Court's holding in Clayton , if the applicability of the Fair Dismissal Act to McLeod was not the law of this case, is an issue not presented to this court at this time.